

ROMANIA-MAJOR PLAYER OF INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT:

THE CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE (CEE) AND SOUTHEAST EUROPE (SEE) HAVE BECOME THE MAIN SUPPLIERS OF LABOR FOR WESTERN EUROPE, BUT WITHOUT RADICAL POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE BIRTH RATE, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT MIGRATION FLOW FROM CEE AND SEE WILL REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE OVERALL MIGRATION IN THE EU.

THE DECREASING BALANCE OF MIGRATION FROM CEE AND SEE COULD JUSTIFY THE PARADIGM OF "FORTRESS EUROPE" (A EU CLOSE-BORDER WITHOUT INTERNAL RESTRICTIONS). IN ADDITION, EU AS "GLOBAL ACTOR" REQUESTS A SCHENGEN AREA WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS FOR THE MOVEMENT INSIDE THE "FORTRESS EUROPE".

IN THE CASE OF ROMANIA, YOUTH MASS MIGRATION WILL CREATE A DIRE PERSPECTIVE FOR SOCIETY AND ECONOMY. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT ROMANIA WILL LOSE 4-5 MILLION PEOPLE BY 2025. THERE IS A FLOW OF MIGRANTS FROM MOLDOVA TO ROMANIA. THE ROMANIAN FLOW OF MIGRANTS IS FOCUSED ON "GINTA LATINA" – SPAIN AND ITALY – AS MAJOR TARGET COUNTRIES.

KEYWORDS: MIGRATION, CIRCULAR MIOGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION

In the European Union, the migrant population (above 44 millions) supports the paradigm of "transnational community" in "the age of mobility".

There is a new perspective on population movement, including migration management as well as "circular migration" (from destination countries back to their home areas) apart from temporary, cyclical, regular or contract migration. In particular, circular migration can be seen as facilitating the dissemination of new ideas and practices, even if it is not the root cause of the transformation.

The circular migration requires bilateral and multilateral agreements. Nowadays, a large number of migrants stays only for a short period before either moving back or moving on. Circular circulation between origins and destinations has become a habit that can transform communities of origin in different ways, such as spreading the idea of small family norms or reinforcing a sense of belonging to larger polities such as the state.

INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION

EU regulations regarding the legal status of people of another nationality are subject to cross-criticism, probably due to the conceptual uncertainty, situation which could be resolved by a constitutional regulation of European migration for an improved status of the

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Schengen area which should exclude political maneuvering as hindrances of the free movement of EU citizens.

Within the framework of the European members of the OECD states, during 1995-2003, migrants got two-thirds of the new jobs.² From the perspective of the EU future, it is estimated that in 2050, the population age segments can be: 0-14 years-18%, 15-64 years - 16% , 65+ - 77%.³

Intraregional migration in South-Eastern Europe is dependent on language - the ability to use both the Cyrillic and the Latin alphabets, knowing the official language, common culture and history. A special remark is necessary for the migration during the Balkan wars; during the period 1991-2004 around 1.3 million people in the former Yugoslavia requested asylum in the developed states and 2.5 million people fled their homes, taking refuge due to violences.⁴ In an evaluation of the United Nations regarding the South-Eastern Europe in 2010, there were around 65.267.000 inhabitants with a zero population growth rate; without any positive changes of the natural increase of population, it is unlikely that the migrationist flow in this space should be significant within the frame of the migration inside the EU space.⁵ In the South-Eastern Europe, interregional migration is represented by the migration of Albanians to Greece (433,500 Albanians according to the 2001 census).⁶

Between the migrationist phenomenon and cultural policies of host states we can notice a number of models and philosophical perspectives, not necessarily without some cooperation at various levels. Multiculturalism (understood as the respect for the cultural identity of the communities of immigrants) staged by Sweden and the Netherlands, assimilationism (the complete assimilation of newcomers) agreed by France and the exclusivism (rigid legislation with mandatory standards for immigrants) promoted by Germany, Switzerland.⁷ One can speak of integration strategies through integration policies for immigrants as in the case of Germany, the Netherlands⁸, Austria⁹, Denmark and Switzerland. On the other hand, in some Western countries, the concept of heavy immigration

² See Swing Lacy William, "Building Migration Partnerships", *International Organization for Migration*, April 28, 2009, <http://www.ion.int/jahia/Jahia/media/> (Accessed 12 January 2015)

³ See, Global Risk Network of the World Economic Forum, *Europe@Risk: A Global Risk Network Briefing*, Geneva, PricewaterhouseCooper, 2008, p.10. See also, Coleman David, *Europe's Demographic Future: Dimensions, and Challenges*, New York, Population Council, 2005. http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i48/27.pdf.

⁴ See Grecic Vladimir and Jankovic, "Managing Population Movement: The Challenge for Diplomacy in Southeast Europe," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, [journal of diplomacy.org](http://www.diplomacy.org) (Accessed 20 January 2015).

⁵ See United Nations, *World Population Prospect*, <http://esa.un.org/unpp/p2k0data.asp>. (Accessed 15 January 2015).

⁶ See, Antonopoulos, "Are the Others Coming? Evidence on Alien Conspiracy from Three Illegal Market in Greece", *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 2009, 475-493.

⁷ See Jess M., *Europeanization of Immigrant Integration - A Legal Perspective*, in European University Institute, Latvia (2008): 3; See also, Carrera S., *A Typology of different integration programmes in the EU*, Center for European Policy Studies (2006): 6.

⁸ In 1992, the Netherlands adopts "The Integration of Newcomers Act" - *Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers* WIN - The Integration of Newcomers Act, for legalizing the compulsory programs for integration, financed by the government, municipalities and UE funds.

⁹ The compulsory courses for integration in Germany and Austria are paid by beneficiaries; in Austria the people with low financial possibilities are given back part of the money. See, Goodman Sara Wallace, "Integration Requirements for Integration's Sake? Identifying, Categorizing and Comparing Civic Integration Policies", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* (2010): 755.

("over immigration"), which affects the national identity of the state - especially in Germany¹⁰, is strongly promoted also against the freedom of movement within the EU.

Cultural factors play an important role in shaping the migrationist phenomenon, their analysis being fundamental in understanding the trend of the phenomenon. The deliberate confusion between Romanians and Bulgarians on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Romani (gypsies), has historical roots; ignoring this reality does not lead anywhere.¹¹ The peculiarity lies in the fact that in the 1990s, many specialists who came in Romania advocated for the integration of the Romani population in the society, blaming us for the lack of flexibility of the Romanian society; in fact, it is about a series of standards which at that time were quite difficult to achieve.¹² In the case of the Romani people who have migrated - population which is by definition nomadic - some EU member states have opted not for sustained policy of integration in a civilized society, but for sending them to the states of origin, a particularly controversial solution.¹³ On the other hand, de plano blaming the Romani population is not a solution for any situation. Consequently, the concept of multiculturalism is seriously affected in the majority of EU by the superficial approach regarding the phenomenon of Romani people and not by the escalation of extremism which is a consequence, not a cause.¹⁴

¹⁰ The most prestigious conservative daily newspaper, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), and its editor, Frank Schirrmacher, propagates on one hand a fear of extinction of the Germans, and on the other hand this paranoia of over immigration and how population loss affects a nation's political might. See, Albert F. Reiterer, "Migration and the Demographic System in East Central Europe," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015).

¹¹ The growing concern of the French media with Romani immigrants is marked by ethnic bias and stigma. The fact is also supported by the reality that, especially in terms of anticrime/anti-immigration, the media discourse does not seek to provide causal explanations, but rather tends to advance homogenizing and standardizing presentations. See, Ana Rodica Staiculescu and Mircea Gherasim, "Struggles in the representations of Romani immigrants in the North of France: from migration management to public discourse", *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* nr. 6/2014, Addleton Academic Publishers, 751-761.

¹² The Romani or Gypsies had come to the Balkans from northern India, were enslaved. In 1864, the full Gypsy emancipation in Romania was official. See, David M. Crowe and John Kolsti, Eds, *The Gypsies of Eastern Europe* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1991), 61-65. Almost 130,000 Romanians legally fled abroad in 1990, though Radio Bucharest claimed "that more than 800,000 people had emigrated in the first eight months of 1990." German authorities reported that over half of the 35,345 Romanians who entered Germany that year were Gypsies, while in 1992, about 33,600 Romanian gypsies reached that country. The new arrivals were soon subjected to an upsurge of neo-Nazi and right-wing violence that resulted in a growing number of Romani deaths. See, David M. Crowe, *A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 107-112.

¹³ Is there a chance that ethnic or national tensions will be stoked by migration? I do not believe this is the case. Migrants-if they are not refugees- are seldom fanatical nationalists. The majority of migrants are ready to adapt and assimilate completely into the mainstream of the target society. People in host societies are often very reluctant to accept newcomers, especially when these people belong to a socio-economic class that is lower than theirs. See, Albert F. Reiterer, "Migration and the Demographic System in East Central Europe," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015).

¹⁴ The issue of the Romani people has been discussed by the media from all parts of the continent, sliding from a tone of disapproval to proclaiming the need to take political measures. The migration of Romani Romanians in the north of France is a result of an influx of immigrants that grew in the last five years. The dramatic changes happened, especially after 2007, and were followed by a stabilization of migration flows after Romania joined the European Union. As expected, the latest statistics on Romanian immigrants into the French community continue to indicate their important presence in the region. See, Ana Rodica Staiculescu and Mircea Gherasim, "Struggles in the representations of Romani immigrants in the North of France: from migration management to public discourse", *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* nr. 6/2014, Addleton Academic Publishers, 751-761.

The border control regime in Europe which is also regularly subject to recurrent attacks and blamed as the source of nationalist movements exacerbation within the EU member states is to be urgently clarified in the conditions of a serious crisis in Eastern Europe.

The analysis of migration trends shows a number of interesting realities in the case of migration to North America; thus, 20% of the Scandinavian people (1860-1930), 40% of British people (1861-1913) and 40-50% of Italians returned to their place of origin in the twentieth century. In the case of Argentinian people's migration to Brazil, 66% returned back (1899-1912). Comparatively, the rate of return in the case of migration to the US varies according to the ethnic group: 50% in the case of Italians, 15-20% in the case of Jews coming from Russia.¹⁵

The study of migration in the Eastern Asian space offers a number of interesting phenomena which are necessary for the understanding of similar processes in the European space. If, in the last century in the East Asian area (1993 - 3 million people) the migration was not considered a major phenomenon, in 2003 the official number was 10 million people, motivated by: marriage/partnership, adoption of children, education, elderly care.¹⁶

If in the early 90s there was a substantial amount of scenarios regarding the devastating effects of migration from Eastern Europe, the further realities demonstrated that those were just catastrophic variants which had nothing in common with current realities.¹⁷ Indeed, there were migrationist movements from East to West but within reasonable limits and with undeniable economic effects for the benefit of the West.¹⁸

The area of Central and Eastern EU states is characterized by migrationist flows in both directions, but the emigration flow is defining.

The phenomenon of immigration in the case of Romania is the effect of the geopolitical scene established by peace treaties on the conclusion of the World War II; thus, millions of Romanian people have become citizens of Soviet Republics of Moldova and Ukraine. A great number of citizens of the Republic of Moldova, by virtue of their Romanian origin, migrated to Romania, later on requesting Romanian citizenship; after 2007, a part of Moldovan emigrants who had Romanian citizenship migrated within the EU, seeking work because of job shortages in the Romanian economy.¹⁹ We can speak of Chinese emigrants

¹⁵ See, Ronald Skeldon, "Managing Migration for Development: Is Circular Migration the Answer?" *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015).

¹⁶ In 2005 South Korea, 14% of marriages were performed between a Korean and a foreign wife, 40% of them being from rural areas. This reality has been characterized by the media in Korea "their own kind of globalization". In Taiwan, one-third of marriages are concluded with non-Taiwanese spouses; the main source of wives being Vietnam and mainland China. In the case of Japan, 5% of marriages are concluded with wives from abroad. See, Michael Douglass, "Globalizing the household in East Asia," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015).

¹⁷ Kofi A. Annan, former General Secretary of The United Nations, who firmly believed that: "migrants will exist as long as nations exist".

¹⁸ Art. 2 from the Protocol no. 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights mentions:

1. "Anyone who is legally on the territory of a state has the freedom to movement and freely choose the residence.
2. Every individual is free to leave any country, including its own country.
3. There rights cannot consist the object of constrains than those which, according to the law, are necessary measures in a democratic society, for the national security, public safety, preventing illegal acts, the protection of health and morals, or to protect their rights and freedoms" (European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003).

¹⁹ See Dura, George. "A tale of two visa regimes: repercussions of Romania's accession to the EU on the freedom of movement of Moldovan citizens." *UNISCI Discussion Papers* no. 10 (2006): 257-274.

working in the Romanian trade and textile industry, but their number does not exceed the number of 150,000 people.

The phenomenon of emigration has been extended to all the states of Central and Eastern UE; the difference resides in the ratio of migrants and the favorite destinations of each state migrants. In the case of the Czech Republic, the major migration is towards Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria; Slovaks go to the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom and Germany; Poles go especially to Germany but also to the United Kingdom and, to a lesser extent, to Austria. In the case of Poland, the return of migrants from the U.S. can be a case of circular extra-European migration. The ethnic migration from Bulgaria to Turkey at the rate of 220,000 until 1989 is exceeded by the number of 750,000 during 1989-2004 in EU; Bulgarian migrants prefer Germany and Italy.²⁰ Hungarians are moving towards Germany, and to a minor extent to Austria and the Netherlands. Lithuanians prefer Spain, Latvians are heading for Germany and for the United Kingdom and Estonians are choosing Finland and Germany.²¹

The concept of intra-European migration would be supported by the huge number of Romanian migrants to a limited number of states - Spain and Italy - especially because Romania is not traditionally a source state of migrants. One cannot speak of migrant phenomena in Romania before 1990; there were only a few minor temporary migrant flows.

However, the effects of some policies of "intensive care", respectively the transition from centralized economy to market economy resulted in the loss of nearly half of the jobs in Romania. The consequences of these policies have led an active population of about 5 million people to remain jobless, out of which most have opted for a massive migration mainly to Spain and Italy.

In 2010, migration outside the EU is dominated by the Turks (2.4 million people) and Moroccans (1.7 million people); according to the author, in the case of such a so-called "intra-European migration" from an EU Member State to another EU Member State, the Romanians dominate (1.7 million people) followed by the Italians (1.3 million people), the Poles (1.2 million people) and the Albanians (1 million people).²²

Italy (50% of migrant population) and Spain (25% of migrant population) represent the main target countries of migration, due to linguistic affinity. According to some authors, migration becomes a mass phenomenon and its rate reaches 10-28% of the Romanian population.²³ Most authors consider that in the case of Romanian migrants is specific the phenomenon of "circular migration".²⁴

Please note that the roots of the migrant phenomenon are particularly complex – from an economic, social and political view. As regarding the economic segment, the market

²⁰ See Rangelova Rossitsa and Vladimirova Katya, "Migration for Central and Eastern Europe: the Case of Bulgaria", *South-East Europe for Labor and Social Affairs*, 2004, 7-30.

²¹ See Albert F. Reiterer, "Migration and the Demographic System in East Central Europe," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015).

²² See Antonio Ricci, "România: imigrație și muncă în Italia înainte și după aderarea la UE," în *Românii din Italia între respingere și acceptare* (editată de Confederația Caritas România și Caritas Italiana, - Romania: immigration and work permit in Italy before and after accession to the EU, in "the Romanians in Italy between rejection and acceptance (edited by Caritas and Caritas Romania Confederation Editura Idos, Roma, 2010), 15.

²³ See Monica Susanu, "Dynamics of Remittances towards Romania after EU Adhesion", *Annals of "Dunărea de Jos" University of Galați*, Fascicle I. Economics and Applied Informatics Years XVII, 2 (2011): 14, http://www.ann.ugal.ro/eco/Doc20ii_2/MonicaSusanu.pdf. (Accessed 25 January 2015).

²⁴ Contemporary Romanian migrations are classified into six types (of which circular migration within Schengen is the most important). See Baldwin-Edwards, Martin, "Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis: Migration Policies for a Romania within the European Union", *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* nr.1/2007, Frank Cass, London UK, 5-35.

economy but also the ageing of the population in some of the countries of the EU, can be punctual explanations because the phenomenon of migration is carried out across the whole humanity.²⁵

One can talk, bearing in mind certain data, about a migrant phenomenon from Italy to Romania between 1861 and 1940. Before the First World War, there was a migration flow from Italy to Romania. During the interwar period, the number of migrants increased mainly due to taking into account the number of the Italians who were working seasonally in the newly Romanian annexed lands -Transylvania, the Banat.²⁶

In the case of Great Britain, which is seen by the British public as the "immigration issue", is not a solution to immigration. The situation of the migrants from the EU Member States - Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria - are intensely debated subjects in the media - although they are EU citizens and benefit from all the advantages of freedom of movement.

The understanding of freedom of movement for those born outside the United Kingdom by promoting the concept of "flexibility" is in fact a restrictive policy meant to discourage the phenomenon of migration in the United Kingdom, although such procedures do not apply to British citizens in the EU states.²⁷

In 2013, a repetition of such scenarios was exploited politically by the extremist movement UNIK from the United Kingdom with gross offenses against Romania and Bulgaria which proved to be unsustainable by further development; furthermore, the economic studies on the effects of migration from Romania and Bulgaria to the United Kingdom emphasized the benefits of the host state. Moreover, the Romani issue should have an approach at the level of the whole continent or at least within the EU Framework.²⁸

On another plan, free movement in Europe enabled the changes on the status of the citizens of a state regarding the assessments of other states' citizens, which were induced or exacerbated in most cases on unsubstantiated grounds.²⁹

THE MIGRATION OF THE ROMANIANS

The phenomenon of migration in the Romanian society took unusual features with profound negative implications on society such as the decline of the population primarily active, family abandonment, and the focus on building a career at the expense of starting a family. On the one hand the very high flow of migration towards Spain and Italy brings a

²⁵ See Piperno, Flavia. "From Care Drain to Care Gain: Migration in Romania and Ukraine and the Rise of Transnational Welfare." *Development* 50, no. 4 (12, 2007): 63-68.

²⁶ Whole groups of Italians, coming mainly from the North and South, although to a lesser extent, came to Romania for employment. The second period corresponds to the period between the two world wars when the Italian community enhances its number. Note that Northern Italy was included in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. See Dragulin, Sabin, "Migrant phenomenon in Romania. Case study: the Italians (1868-2010)", *Sfera Politicii* nr.4/2011, Bucharest, 9-21.

²⁷ See, Bridget Anderson, "British Jobs for British Workers?: Understanding Demand for Migrant Workers in a Recession," *The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations*, Winter/Spring 2010, journal of diplomacy.org (Accessed 20 January 2015)

²⁸ The protection of minority rights is central to this process of democratization. Engaging the constructivist approach, this project seeks to understand the domestic impact of international minority rights norms and the actors who promote them by testing the utility of a current "spiral model" of human rights norm socialization concerning two cases: the Roma minority in the Czech Republic and the Hungarian minority in Romania. See, Swimelar, Safia Noel, *The making of minority rights and the return to Europe: International norms and transnational actors in the Czech Republic and Romania*, The University of Nebraska – Lincoln, 2003.

²⁹ The case of Romania is symptomatic for the European Union as it is today, adding a "new" mobile Europe to the "old" continent. See, Pânzaru, Ciprian; Reisz, Robert D., "Validity of the Push and Pull Hypothesis for the Explanation of Romanian Migration Flows", *Journal of Social Research & Policy* nr.4/2013, University of Oradea Publishing House, 93-108.

number of very acute phenomena upon the Romanian society.³⁰ On the other hand, analyzing the economic and financial developments in Spain and Italy it appears that the migrant flows from Romania are not caused by the general economic situation in the target state, a reality that contradicts the theories of the migration phenomenon.

In 1990, arises the first flow of migration from Romania to Germany ethnically motivated; the migrants are ethnic Germans who emigrate to Germany and who are strongly supported by German authorities.³¹

A second wave to Italy could be justified by cultural affinity and economic interests.

A third wave to Spain takes place after that to Italy. Both Italy and Spain adopt measures to regularize the status of illegal migrant-workers but also of their families. In order to give theoretical justification of these workflows, one can operate with certain indicators, including unemployment which is regarded as being the most relevant.

Drastic reduction of the population. In the period 1999-2011, the Romanian population decreased by 3 million people mainly due to the phenomenon of migration and the trends forecast that this phenomenon will continue so that by the 2050 is expected a decrease in the population to 15 million people.³² Another negative effect of the migration is the ageing of the remaining population because the choice of migration is very strong at the very young age of the population concerned to complete their university studies abroad.

The pronounced ageing of the Romanian population is becoming a very serious phenomenon; in general, the analysis of the migration phenomenon focuses on economic and financial issues, being too easily overlooked the aspects concerning the human relations which damaged within the environment of departing migrants. The Sociology of Migration, developed by the Chicago school, reported social consequences which among the very wide framework of globalization imposes new horizons on giving more importance to the relationship within the family, and of the accelerate forced ageing of the population that the migrants leave.³³

³⁰ The departure of such a large number of Romanian citizens on Spanish territory, leads to a series of serious problems for Romania. Analyzing, the long - term social and economic effects of the massive emigration of Romanian citizens are negative: the decrease of the number of taxpayers to the state budget; work force deficit, demographic decline through the deterioration of the age structure of the population; the absorption of the possible emigrants returned in the country in the illegal or informal sector; the increase of divortiality and nuptiality; the emphasis of community and regional disappearance on Romania's territory, the poor villages and counties becoming more poor in comparison to the ones that benefited from the money sent home by migrants; the decrease of the volume of remittances following the more frequent reduction of the connections with the country, after the whole family has been moved abroad; areas seriously affected by the massive migration of work force, like health, education and research. Goga, Cristina Ilie, "Evolution of Romanian migration to Spain since 1989 up to the Present", *Revista de Științe Politice* nr.35/2012, Craiova, 262-267.

³¹ In 2014, 98,000 Romanians, 96,000 Poles, 38,000 Bulgarians. See *Statistisches Bundesamt: Immer mehr Zuwanderer kommen aus Osteuropa*, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/statistik-immer-mehr-zuwanderer-kommen-aus-osteuropa-a-1019245.htm>. (Accessed 20 February 2015).

³² The statistical data compiled indicated that in the year 2010, there were as many as 2,769,400 Romanian migrants living and working in countries other than Romania within the European Union. Pânzaru, Ciprian; Reisz, Robert D., "Validity of the Push and Pull Hypothesis for the Explanation of Romanian Migration Flows", *Journal of Social Research & Policy* nr.4/2013, University of Oradea Publishing House, 93-108.

³³ Five types of effects were identified: financial; on spousal relations; on children; on old family members and on composition of the population. The most important are the financial impacts, but there are also invisible side-effects, such as deterioration in the relations between spouses and the decrease of the parents' roles for children. The importance of the old family members is re-evaluated; they are key social links between migrants and the family members that have remained at home. See Nemenyi, Agnes, "International Migration for Work-Consequences for the Families Who Remain at Home (The Case of Romania)", *Journal of Population Ageing* nr.2/2012, Springer Science & Business Media, Dordrecht, 119-134.

The data on the number of Romanian migrants varies from one source to another; however, the unanimous opinion is that Romania is on the first place in Europe in terms of the number of migrants, followed by Poland, Italy and Portugal (so out of the first four places, on the first three there are the Latin States). The use of analytical methods and the interpretation of migrant flows like the push and pull model³⁴ are not relevant for the migration phenomenon in Romania as a whole, but when it is applied to certain bilateral relations - Italy and Spain - is relevant.³⁵ Both statistical data and field literature point out that migration in Romania has become a chronic social phenomenon.³⁶

The youth trained or due for training. The migration phenomenon from an economic perspective is thoroughly dependent upon the economy of the migrant's state; in the last 25 years, Romania has regressed in terms of economy, losing millions of jobs. Once a country of immigration has become in the last quarter of a century a country of emigration, forcing millions of residents to seek their employment in Europe (it is estimated between 2-5 million people of migrants). A demographic analysis of the changes in the last 25 years which have occurred in the Romanian society would be extremely interesting but it is not the subject of this article. The migration in finding a job in the EU is accompanied by both opportunities and challenges and dramas in the country of departure and will not be excluded in the state to which people emigrate. In terms of demography, the analyses are typically conducted over a longer period of time and cannot be studied separately from the economic and social dimension.³⁷

The loss of human capital by Romania represents a serious blow for the age pyramid of the population; the comparison between the level of vocational training and university education of migrants and of those remaining home is favorable for those leaving home. For migrants, it raises a number of issues that have to be paid - learning the language, finding a job. Migrants are more interested in finding a job and less in political aspects of society in trying to integrate; one should keep in mind that young people are most prone to migrate, most active, and who can bring an extra life to democracy or restriction of democratic access

³⁴ Pull factors are the reasons which determine a person or a group to choose a certain destination, and the push factors are the reasons which determine or encourage a person or a group to make the decision to migrate in the first place. See Martin, P. (2003), "Managing international labor migration in the 21st century", *South Eastern Europe Journal of Economics*, 9-18.

³⁵ See Pânzaru, Ciprian; Reisz, Robert D., "Validity of the Push and Pull Hypothesis for the Explanation of Romanian Migration Flows", *Journal of Social Research & Policy* nr.4/2013, University of Oradea Publishing House, 93-108.

³⁶ A few statistics which highlight the characteristics of the phenomenon for Romania.1990 (96929), 1991(44160), 1992 (31152), 2006 (14197), 2007 (8830), 2008 (8739), 2011 (18307). See Popescu, Bogdan M. "Partidele politice din România și diaspora. Discursuri și strategii electorale pentru câștigarea alegerilor din 2012 [Political Parties in Romania and Diaspora. Speeches and Electoral Strategies for winning elections in 2012]." *Sfera Politicii [Scope Of Policy].20*, no. 3 (May, 2012): 25-35, 206.

³⁷ The main patterns of the demographic evolution after 1989 can be summarized to the following characteristics: rapid and massive decline in birth rates in early 1990s and maintaining it at a low and relatively constant in subsequent years (almost 40% lower than 1989); impairment of health of population and life expectancy at birth recoil during 1991-1996; reduce of mortality by age and consistent rise in life expectancy at birth since 1996 but no positive effect on overall mortality (deaths per 1000 inhabitants), due to the increased number and proportion of the elderly, where it produces most of the deaths (80% of deaths held annual population aged 60 and over); installation of natural population decline (since 1992) due to the above-mentioned developments of birth and mortality; restructuring of internal migration flows between urban and rural economic crisis of the 1990s that hit especially urban population, increasing unemployment and housing costs; a veritable explosion of external migration, the major component being temporary migration. See Porumbescu, Alexandra, "East European Migration Patterns -Romanian emigration", *Revista de Științe Politice* nr.35/2012, Craiova, 268-274.

which is a serious loss (in some Western States access to political rights is done after certain periods of time).³⁸

The age of most migrants is between 26 and 40, with a capacity of employment and vocational training obtained prior to migration and unlikely interested in starting a family. The migration of highly qualified people ("brain-drain") is on average between 11-14% but in Romania's case is huge, respectively 22, 7%.³⁹

Feminization. A unique feature of Romanian migration is "feminization", due to the increase in the number of women in the total number of migrants. In the field literature, the ratio between men and women varies according to the place of departure: men predominate in migration to the developed states and women to developing states, the overall ratio between women and men within the total flow of migrants being equal.⁴⁰

The flow of migrants from Romania, as part of the women's detachment has found some interesting developments: thus, if in the beginning the major profile was that of the "house wife" now has been moving to that of a woman interested in careers, jobs that require complex vocational training.

The reality effects on the Romanian society are quite negative, especially on children left in the care of parents or relatives, family disintegration, leaving elderly relatives without help.⁴¹

Romanian women migrate in greater numbers than men, being motivated by the desire to provide a better life for their families.

The case of 2014 elections. The phenomenon of migration puts pressure on electoral legislation, characterized by a disintegration of excessive legislative and causing complaints of election fraud.⁴² Organizing the vote for Romanian citizens abroad has proved to be a real failure in the case of 2014 elections. It was found a serious malfunction due to the conflict between bureaucracy and legal and constitutional judiciousness, blocking the voting for them by refusing the establishment of polling stations.

Bureaucracy and deficient internal organization led to the failure of the election, even the recording of some regrettable events in Italy (Turin), the interference of the gendarmerie troops for the dispersing the Romanian people with tear gas. The estimation of the voters' number is imperfect; it is done at the request of the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs approves the final number of polling stations.⁴³

The religious activity of the migrants. The phenomenon of migration of Romanians after 1990, at the beginning motivated politically or ethnically and next for finding a job in

³⁸ See Mussino, Eleonora and Salvatore Strozza. "Does Citizenship Still Matter? Second Birth Risks of Migrants from Albania, Morocco, and Romania in Italy." *European Journal of Population* 28, no. 3 (2012): 269-302.

³⁹ See OCDE, *Database on Immigrants in OECD countries (DIOS)*, January 2008, http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,3343,en_2649_39023663_40644339_1_1_1_1,00.html (Accessed 20 January 2015).

⁴⁰ Antonopoulos, "Are the Others Coming? Evidence on Alien Conspiracy from Three Illegal Market in Greece", *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 2009, 475-493.

⁴¹ "Families in which women migrate are perceived as having a greater risk of disintegration, the secret for a stable family being the presence of the women in the domestic space, with the essential role of ensuring the cohesion of the family and for this reason the dysfunctions appeared in the family are seen as the failure of the women to perform this role" (Femeile și migrația internațională, 2013).

⁴² See, Popescu, Bogdan M. "Partidele politice din România și diaspora. Discursuri și strategii electorale pentru câștigarea alegerilor din 2012 [Political parties in Romania and the Diaspora. Speeches and Electoral Strategies for Winning Elections in 2012]." *Sfera Politicii [Scope Of Policy]*, 20, no. 3 (May, 2012): 25-35, 206.

⁴³ The overall procedure is one that maintains the vague estimations related to past elections and has no exact mechanism of quantification of the number of voters. See, Septimius Pârnu, "Codul electoral nu mai poate aștepta" [Electoral code can no longer wait], *Electoral Expert Review*, Quarterly review of electoral studies, analysis and research, nr. 4 (8)/2014, 19-33.

the European space, has generated spectacular organization of Romanian communities, being alone or together with members of their families in the life of worship.⁴⁴

The administrative structure of the Romanian Orthodox Church - Patriarchate, metropolitanates, archdioceses, dioceses, vicarages, archpriestships, monasteries, affiliates, schetes and methochions - being dependent on the number of believers for whom it is organised. The huge size of the migration phenomenon raised in front of the main religious worship the religious service in Romania.⁴⁵

Thus, the phenomenon of migration has caused the organization, within the framework of the Romanian Orthodox Church, of the two Metropolitanates: The Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Germany, Central and North Europe, and Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Western and Southern Europe. The organization and their development have been recaptured on the basis of the contributions of Romanian citizens who are abroad without significant support from the Romanian Government. The most impressive religious activity of the migrants is the community of Romanians from Spain which started the construction of an Orthodox Cathedral in Madrid.

The two metropolitanates and subordinated structures were organized in an impressive pace as follows:⁴⁶ Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Germany, North and Central European - made up of Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg,⁴⁷ Romanian Orthodox Bishopric of North Europe⁴⁸ -,⁴⁹ Romanian Orthodox Metropolitanate of Western and Southern Europe - composed of Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of Western Europe⁵⁰ Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of Italy⁵¹, Orthodox Romanian Bishopric of Spain and Portugal.⁵²

CONCLUSIONS

Romania's transition from a centralized economy to a market economy in the conditions of EU membership has cost several million jobs, creating a huge storage of active population for circular migration.

Compliance with all requirements of the EU policy and ignoring national economic interests, with a strong deindustrialization, the abolition of the national character of the banking system and the accumulation of capital, did not allow the creation of new jobs in the place of the defunct accenting domestic crisis of work force.

The working population in the West EU show worrying trends regarding the phenomenon of "aging", the solution is a massive infusion of migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the demographic policy of Romania in the last 25 years has been deficient, the natural increase becoming negative and accentuating the phenomenon

⁴⁴ See Quffa, Wedad Andrada. "The Effects of International Migration on Post-Revolutionary Romanian Society." *Revista de Științe politice* [Review of Political Sciences], no. 42 (2014): 238-250.

⁴⁵ Surugiu, Oana. "Between Assimilation and Accommodation: Migration and Translation Policies in Post-Communist Romania." *Sfera Politicii* [Scope of Policy] 19, no. 12 (12, 2011): 56-63.

⁴⁶ <http://episcopiaspanieiportugaliei.es/index.php/catedrala-din-madrid>

⁴⁷ (77 congregations and affiliates)

⁴⁸ (14 congregations and 6 affiliates in Sweden, 8 congregations in Denmark, 5 congregations și 4 affiliates in Norway)

⁴⁹ Consisted of: Romanian Orthodox Archdiocese of Germany, Austria and Luxembourg, Romanian Orthodox Bishopric of North Europe.

⁵⁰ Includes: 6 archpriestships, 133 congregations and affiliates, 9 monasteries, 2 schetes, 1 chapel and 34 missions

⁵¹ Includes: 18 archpriestships, 189 congregations and 100 affiliates, 4 monasteries, 2 schetes, 4 episcopal chapels and a mission (Malta).

⁵² Includes: 8 archpriestships (Madrid, Barcelona, Castellon, Sevilla, Vitoria, Asturias, Castilla - La Mancha Membership and Portugal Archpriestship), 106 congregations and 21 affiliates.

of "forced aging" of the population through the departure of a significant part of the working population.

Although Romania has natural resources and extraordinary geopolitical meanings, the lack of local capital does not allow for the re-launch of the labor market.

Migrant population who entered the labor market in the EU is generally more qualified for the work they performed.

A circular migration settlement, with positive and negative effects, at EU level is more than necessary. A possible measure would be reviewed, editing some rules in the States originated from certain facilities or material stimuli (wages, taxes, rates). In the case of temporary work programs, the relations settlement would be in the interests of migrants and of the states - native and desired destination. An equally important issue is the depopulation of some countries in the EU.

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