

## HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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### ABSTRACT:

*MANY CONFERENCES ARE ORGANISED REGARDING THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THESE CONFERENCES AIMS ARE FOR THE NPT MEMBER STATES TO ENGAGE TO BAN AND ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.*

*THE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST CONSIDER THE HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS; THE THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE CONSIDERED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.*

*IN THE DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION, THE NUCLEAR TEST SCENERY BAN PLAYS THE CRUCIAL; ACCORDING TO THE EU REGARDING THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR TESTING MUST BE RATIFIED BY EU STATES. IN THIS RESPECT, THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, THE EU IS MAKING BOTH POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL EFFORT SUPPORTING THE PROVISIONAL TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT, THE VERIFICATION REGIME, NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DETECTION SYSTEM, TRAINING IN CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS IN THE FIELD.*

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**KEY WORDS:** THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

### HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

In March 2013, the Norwegian Government is organizing the first Conference concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, with the participation of representatives from 127 countries.

A conference dedicated to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, from Espen Barth Eide, organized by Norway, underlines the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, presented by several experts (preparation of emergency interventions, the effects on people and the environment, the development in the medium and long term).<sup>2</sup>

Several conclusions emphasize: emergency intervention is unlikely to be adequate and sufficient, the establishment of such capabilities being questioned; the destructive consequences of the nuclear tests that remain, even if political circumstances change; the detonation of nuclear weapons effects, which do not stop at national borders, the effects can be regional and even global.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> *Findings of the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March 2013*, Working paper submitted by Norway, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.

<sup>3</sup> *Chair's summary of the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March 2013*, The Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo.

In February 2014, a second Conference was organized by Mexico with the participation of 147 state delegates and 120 NGOs.

In December 2014, the Austrian Government organized a third Conference on the topic of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, involving delegates from 158 countries. These conferences aimed to ensure that the NPT member states commit to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The major interest of the international community is a concrete and urgent progress in favor for nuclear disarmament, being underlined by the Vienna Conference concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear<sup>4</sup> weapons through the eight key conclusions.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, the effects do not stop at national borders; they may potentially be irreversible and more complex than the common understanding; the effects of the nuclear tests have induced a long-term radioactive contamination; as long as nuclear weapons exist there is the possibility of nuclear explosions and the danger of access of non-State actors; nuclear deterrence is viewed as a potential nuclear war stint that involves risk; the intervention measures and emergency humanitarian assistance are not and may not be appropriate especially for populated areas, prevention is the only viable measure against humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons; there is no universal legal regulation concerning nuclear weapons; ethical and moral dimension become very important.<sup>6</sup>

The conference on the "humanitarian perspective" was attended by representatives from Great Britain and the USA, even though, usually, the P-5 is highly suspicious of humanitarian movements, because of the potential for the development of actions in favor of disarmament that can very easily escape control.<sup>7</sup>

The effects of promoting humanitarian aspirations in the field of nuclear weapons induce a state of nervousness in the relations between the P-5 and their allies,<sup>8</sup> who cannot observe the contradictions between humanitarianism and the nuclear deterrence strategies.

Catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons must take into account the humanitarian considerations in the process of disarmament, bearing in mind that the threat of use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as a crime against humanity.<sup>9</sup>

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC)<sup>10</sup> was formed in response to the permanent threat towards humanity, that is presented by the possession of nuclear weapons by the P-5 and the

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<sup>4</sup> [www.hinw14vienna.at](http://www.hinw14vienna.at); (accessed February 19, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> *The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (8-9 December 2014) and the Austrian Pledge: Input for the 2015 NPT Review Conference*, Working paper submitted by Austria, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 29.

<sup>6</sup> *"The Urgent Need for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World"*, The Special Declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Third Summit of HERBERT, held in Belén, Costa Rica, on January 28 and 29, 2015. [www.bmeia.gv.at/update-pledge-support](http://www.bmeia.gv.at/update-pledge-support); (accessed February 19, 2016).

<sup>7</sup> *Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons* held in Oslo, in Nayarit, Mexico, and in Vienna.

<sup>8</sup> Paul DUȚĂ, "Human security and the phrase „Partnership for Security” for NATO’s strategic concept”, *Strategic Impact*, Issue: 4/2009, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2005, pp. 55-64.

<sup>9</sup> The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the withthe picture of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, that "there is in neither customary international law of conventional ABR cloud specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict , and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." [www.hinw14vienna.at](http://www.hinw14vienna.at); (accessed February 19, 2016).

<sup>10</sup> The New Agenda Coalition, formed in the NAC-1999 to Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, proposes a series documents NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP 18 (on "effective measures"); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. WP III/19 (on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC.

three other States that are in possession of nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT. It is against the law to hold indefinitely these weapons for security reasons, even though the disarmament process is not simple, unrealistic or impossible to implement.<sup>11</sup>

NAC calls for RevCon to highlight the possible humanitarian catastrophe, as well as the compliance with humanitarian law regulations, noting the increasing fear to this path within the international community. Furthermore, the legal instruments which are needed to ensure that "effective measures"<sup>12</sup> required by art. VI NPT (the Main task of the Committee I) should be pragmatically implemented, as well as in the organizing of forums for disarmament but also in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly.

India, Israel, and Pakistan are imposed to become signatory states to the NPT as NNWS and to commit to respecting the IAEA safety standards for their nuclear plants without raising objections; NAC calls for Korea to return to the NPT and to comply with the IAEA safety standards.<sup>13</sup>

RevCon 2015 diplomatic preparations include a re-evaluation of the ethical dimension of the NPT, to make nuclear weapons incompatible with humanitarian law, based on a provision of the 2010 NPT final document.<sup>14</sup>

Thus, the ICRC has adopted a number of resolutions emphasizing the lack of any adequate humanitarian response capacity to the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>15</sup>

The humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons constitutes the subject of another document of RevCon 2015, being considered a central imperative of NPT by three-quarters of NPT member states.<sup>16</sup>

It presents a series of recommendations, *inter alia*, the risk of a nuclear explosion being higher than in the past due to the proliferation, the need to comply with international law becoming acuter, including international humanitarian law and the implementation of the obligations under the NPT through effective measures.

## THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

2016 marks the 20th anniversary from the opening for signature of the treaty banning nuclear<sup>17</sup> tests, the entry into force depending on the signature of the eight states form Annex

III/WP 25, 2015 NPT/CONF./PC./WP-27 and NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. I/WP. 29 (on nuclear disarmament); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC./WP-26 (transparency); and NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. I/WP. 30 (on verification).

<sup>11</sup> *Taking forward nuclear disarmament*, Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 8.

<sup>12</sup> NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP 18 (on "effective measures").

<sup>13</sup> *Taking forward nuclear disarmament*, Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 8.

<sup>14</sup> "The Conference expresses deep concern at the STI catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law." [www.hinw14vienna.at](http://www.hinw14vienna.at); (accessed February 19, 2016).

<sup>15</sup> The International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC. the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement in 2011 and 2013 adopted resolutions noting the lack of any adequate humanitarian response capacity to the use of nuclear weapons and the need for concrete action leading to the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and their elimination". [www.hinw14vienna.at](http://www.hinw14vienna.at); (accessed February 19, 2016).

<sup>16</sup> *Working Paper on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons*, submitted by Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Holy See, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 30. View the *2010 NPT Review Conference* resolved in Action 1 of the 2010 Action Plan that "All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons."

2 of the Treaty; however, demonstrating its viability verification system (detection of three Korean nuclear tests).<sup>18</sup>

In 28<sup>th</sup> September 2013, the Resolution 68/32 of the General Assembly of the United<sup>19</sup> Nations calls the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, storage, transfer, use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

By 2018, the United Nations will hold a high-level conference on nuclear disarmament as a concrete way to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

Although within the RevCon 2010<sup>20</sup> there are discussions about the condition of the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary committee for nuclear disarmament, linked to the existence of a work plan negotiated and agreed upon, the opposition of some NWS is blocking the emergence of this structure.<sup>21</sup>

Achieving an agreement to remove nuclear weapons enjoys widespread support, even if the Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)<sup>22</sup> acted for the format of the Conference on disarmament, a direction in which progress is almost nonexistent.

On a non-governmental level, the initiative of negotiating an agreement on the prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons is led by The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.<sup>23</sup>

Negotiating an agreement concerning the possession of nuclear weapons may call into question a future agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons; such an initiative is based on the lack of results in compliance with the obligations laid down in article VI of NPT.

In NAM view, the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the threat of using nuclear weapons, expressing the concern that the request made a long time ago as NNWS signatories to the NPT to receive negative security assurances from P-5 through legal unconditional commitments, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, has not been done.

The unilateral commitments each NWS agreed upon, which granted security assurances, are limited, conditional and inadequate and are not rising to the requirements of the universal character, the legal relevance, effectiveness, non-discrimination, and irrevocability.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, it calls for the removal of the threat of using nuclear weapons from military and security doctrines of NWS and from NATO Strategic Concept, which involves a

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<sup>17</sup> The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. View *The ninth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, September 2015; the Group of Eminent Persons by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

<sup>18</sup> *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, Working paper submitted by Australia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan and Nigeria, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 23.

<sup>19</sup> Follow-up to the high level meeting of 2013, of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament.

<sup>20</sup> The action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.

<sup>21</sup> *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

<sup>22</sup> The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty. Non-Aligned Movement, the Non-Aligned States-NAM. Further we will be using this acronym, because the position in relation to the NPT of the Group of non-aligned States parties to the NPT is similar to that of NAM.

<sup>23</sup> The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons-ICAN.

<sup>24</sup> *Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons*, Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 2

deterrence policy. The NAM document expresses its dissatisfaction with the lack of NWS political will in relation to the concerns expressed in NPT.<sup>25</sup>

It notes the need for NPT to regain credibility to eliminate the gap between disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the establishment of "effective measures" of disarmament in accordance with article VI, NPT, developed under serious discussions relating to legal framework expanded and prohibitive.<sup>26</sup>

Thus NAC propose a number of options:<sup>27</sup> a) a convention on nuclear weapons irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament within a limited period of time; b) an agreement banning nuclear tests accompanied by practical implementation agreements; c) a framework agreement on mutual support instruments establishing key prohibitions of nuclear disarmament; d) a hybrid arrangement which would include the above variations or other working hypotheses.

Achieving the above objectives circumscribed in art VI NPT can be done through a dual approach: combining technical and political advantages and disadvantages in negotiating a long-term agreement.

NAM stresses concern over to the seriousness of the threat to humanity, the existence of nuclear weapons and potential threats of using them, advocating for simultaneous efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament through: a) a general reduction of the overall nuclear weapons arsenals; b) reduction should not be dependent on the type, location; c) reducing the significance and roles of nuclear weapons in the concepts, doctrines and security policies (supports and promotes the threat of use of nuclear weapons aimed at the concept of security of military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies);<sup>28</sup> d) promoting policies to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to reduce the danger of a nuclear war for the simulation of non-proliferation and disarmament; e) the future operational status of nuclear weapons systems; f) reduce the risk of use of nuclear weapons; g) increase transparency and mutual trust.<sup>29</sup>

NAM is worried by the lack of progress in the implementation of disarmament obligations of NSW<sup>30</sup> inaction, which puts under a question mark the subject matter and the purpose of the NPT non-proliferation credibility, but also underlines the importance of multilateralism and multilateralism's solutions accepted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

According to NAM, it is appropriate to negotiate and establish timelines for the elimination of nuclear weapons and track the progress so that is respected.

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<sup>25</sup> *Nuclear-weapon-free zones Working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 4.

<sup>26</sup> *Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, the Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.

<sup>27</sup> NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP. 18, para. 29.

<sup>28</sup> The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also remains deeply concerned at the "Strategic Concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

<sup>29</sup> *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13. According to the obligations under article 4. VI, para. 3 and 4 letter c, decision from the NPT "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (1995), "The plan of the 13 practical steps" (2000), "The action plan on nuclear disarmament" (2010), "The action 5 of the Final Document of the Review Conference of 2010.

<sup>30</sup> Referred to as "The action 3 of the 2010 Final Document."

To be noted that NPT signatories of NNWS agree to assume legal obligations not to produce the materials needed for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Unilateral or bilateral declarations to reduce nuclear weapons cannot cover the lack of progress in the elimination of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the modernization of nuclear weapons, their infrastructure and transport systems must cease in NAM's vision.<sup>31</sup>

The entry into force of the agreement signed by Russia and the USA has not eliminate general concerns related to continued modernization of nuclear weapons, which cover the gap left in the reductions of the nuclear arsenal which was agreed (by improving qualitative, the development of new types of superior quality, broadening the spectrum of more options for the targets concerned).

In terms of reducing deployments and those with operative status, they cannot replace irreversible reduction, as being necessary to respect the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification of these reduction, due to a lack of correlation between the unlimited character of the NPT and the unlimited character in time of possession of nuclear weapons regime deriving from both vertically and horizontally.<sup>32</sup>

NAM advises against negative effects of development of anti-missile defense systems<sup>33</sup> and the space militarizing atmospheric, calling for the commencement of negotiations on the space militarizing atmospheric.<sup>34</sup> Consequently, NNWS are entitled to effective security guarantee, universal, non-discriminatory and unconditional, irrevocable threat of use or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance;<sup>35</sup> it has been proposed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be considered "crimes against humanity" and the possession of nuclear weapons to not be covered by international humanitarian law. Corollary, military doctrines should not talk about the "threat of use" or "use of nuclear weapons".<sup>36</sup>

NAM proposes the commencement negotiation in the form of a Convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons accompanied by an action plan with clear deadlines, divided into three five-year phases – each with the duration of five years.<sup>37</sup>

The first phase of the action plan (2015-2020) is devoted to the negotiation and signing of the Convention with the prohibitory obligations, procedures of destruction through an integrated system of monitoring. Also in this phase the measures agreed by RevCon in 1995, 2000 and 2010 will be implemented. The SRSG will periodically inform the preparatory sessions of RevCon 2020 about the progress.

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<sup>31</sup> In order to comply Nr with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

<sup>32</sup> The action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

<sup>33</sup> The anti-ballistic missile defence systems.

<sup>34</sup> At the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31.

<sup>35</sup> View The advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the *With the picture of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* that "there is in neither customary international law of conventional ABR cloud specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law".

<sup>36</sup> See also, "Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons", which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF. 2010/WP. 47.

<sup>37</sup> *Draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons*, Working paper submitted by the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.

The second stage (2020-2025) follows the ratification and entry into force of the Convention and the action plan with deadlines that are set: the multilateral verification integrated system, the declaration and inventory of the contents of the nuclear missile arsenals, decommissioning, storage, and regulation of transfers of nuclear material in "peaceful purposes". The exercise of these measures and the vector is designated taking the IAEA as an example.

The third stage (2025-2030) includes a range of irreversible removal measures and verification of nuclear weapons, conversion to "peaceful purposes" and generalization of application of IAEA safety standards for all nuclear installations.

It is necessary to develop technologies and procedures of verification and control of nuclear weapons through an international effort to establish an international verification regime overall.<sup>38</sup>

The principle of transparency is a condition for the existence of the principle of verification of disarmament to ensure that disarmament measures are met in accordance with the principle of irreversibility.<sup>39</sup> Transparency can be achieved, in the case of NNWS, through periodic reporting according to a certain pattern,<sup>40</sup> and for the NWS through reports submitted to the Committee of Governors of the IAEA.<sup>41</sup>

In 2014, the NWS presents a "common framework" to avoid "relating to a standard reporting form" agreed in the action plan RevCon 2010, Japan, by giving a series of proposals in regards to this "oversight": in preparation for the RevCon 2020 a standard form for reporting the completion of the disarmament obligations shall be set; the presentation of numeric information for the measurements of nuclear warheads, means of transport, weapons decommissioned, fissionable material for military purposes, measures for diminishing the importance of the military and security concepts, doctrines, policies.

The reporting mechanism built by 2020 will be subject to improvement by 2020 RevCon.

In 2007, the international cooperation initiative of the British (NWS)-Norwegian (of NNWS) to check the overall nuclear weapons (UKNI)<sup>42</sup> has provided the first way of checking for equipment of NNWS and procedures for inspection and analysis of the results of the inspections.<sup>43</sup>

The project has revealed, in a holistic vision of verification, the complex issues that can be exceeded by constructive partnership, avoiding transferring information favorable to the proliferation. Furthermore it suggested that NNWS use their own nuclear experts knowledgeable in the restrictions and specific constraints on nuclear installations, subjected to verification inspections.<sup>44</sup>

UKNI project can be considered the starting point for future nuclear verification procedures in compliance with the protection of information barriers and the overall

<sup>38</sup> View the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

<sup>39</sup> NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP.

<sup>40</sup> NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. WP/12.

<sup>41</sup> *Transparency, Reporting and Strengthening the Review Process*, Working paper submitted by Japan, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 32.

<sup>42</sup> The UK-Norway Initiative-UKNI.

<sup>43</sup> *The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative: Further Research into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement*, the Working Paper submitted by the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 2015 NPT/CONF. 31/WP.

<sup>44</sup> See Mărcău Flavius Cristian, "Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area," *Analele Universității „Constantin Brâncuși” din Târgu - Jiu*, nr. 4/2015, Seria Litere și Științe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuși”, pp. 77-85.

improvement of nuclear missiles and widening access agenda contextualized in nuclear installations being laid open to verifications.

With regard to the pillar of nuclear disarmament, Egypt notes that over a 25-year period since the signing of the NPT, it has not seen the Elimination of nuclear weapons and for over 45 years from its entry into force, as a fault of the prolongation of the NPT indefinite, the progress is minor.<sup>45</sup>

RevCon improved the provisions for the NPT<sup>46</sup> and on the follow-up conferences regarding the catastrophic humanitarian utilization of nuclear<sup>47</sup> weapons by creating conditions, in Egypt, for the negotiation of a Convention on nuclear weapons simultaneously with further work of the Conference on disarmament.

The fact that there are no time limits for the enforcement of the obligations of disarmament is a serious reason for restarting the negotiations on an agreement for the prohibition and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material, under the control of effective multilateral international powers, in a specific period of time, within the framework of the Conference on disarmament.

In April 2009, in Prague, President Obama declares support for nuclear disarmament through concrete steps, even though the objective will not be achieved rapidly.<sup>48</sup>

In 2013, President Obama, announced in Berlin, that he is ready to reduce by one-third of the strategic nuclear warheads, determined by the New START, and to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, measures which must be negotiated with Russia.

In 2014, 85% of the 31,255 (1967) nuclear warheads and 90% of non-strategic missiles have been reduced.

The role of nuclear weapons in American politics is to deter a nuclear attack against USA and its allies and partners. The U.S. will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against NNWS signatory of the NPT which comply with their obligations regarding non-proliferation; their use will be decided only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, allies and partners. The programs are for upgrading nuclear safety, to reduce the risk of nuclear<sup>49</sup> catastrophes and not to increase striking powers.<sup>50</sup>

The rigorous verification system of the New START provision<sup>51</sup> and the publication of data on the US nuclear arsenal are the expression of the implementation of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification under the conditions of increasing complexity of verification.<sup>52</sup>

US hasn't conducted any nuclear tests for more than 23 years, supporting the ratification of the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests;<sup>53</sup> complying with voluntary moratorium, participating in monitoring nuclear explosions.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> *Nuclear Disarmament*, Working paper submitted by Egypt, New York, 27 April-22 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 39.

<sup>46</sup> The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; The 13 Practical Steps 2000 Review Conference; Action 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Plan of Action Review Conference.

<sup>47</sup> Oslo, Norway, conferences in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna, Austria, in December 2014.

<sup>48</sup> *Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Disarmament*, Working paper submitted by the United States of America, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 44.

<sup>49</sup> The practice of open-ocean "unlikely case of unauthorized or accidental launch of missiles, directs them towards the ocean.

<sup>50</sup> The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

<sup>51</sup> The United States and Russia have exchanged more than 8.300 notifications on the numbers, locations, movements, and eliminations of U.S. and Russian strategic forces covered by the Treaty.

<sup>52</sup> The Nuclear Threat Initiative as the International Partnership launched for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

<sup>53</sup> Only will carry out safety and maintenance of nuclear arsenals through the *Stockpile Stewardship Program*.



For several years, the United States has not enriched uranium product (1964) or plutonium (1988) necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons; during 1993-2014, the US has bought from Russia enriched uranium which it processed into less enriched uranium using it in nuclear power plants; significant amounts of plutonium were withdrawn from military deposits.<sup>55</sup>

Sustained efforts to stop the production of necessary material for nuclear weapons require that the next step should be a multilateral verification of closure of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.<sup>56</sup>

USA renews its negative security guarantees for NPT member of NNWS, which comply with non-proliferation obligations, stating their openness to a legal document in this respect for a nuclear weapons free zone.<sup>57</sup>

Positive security guarantees are offered to the victims of states who use or threat of nuclear weapons in an aggression directed against them.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> The International Monitoring System, International Centre, the Data and the on-site Inspection (OSI), the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO).

<sup>55</sup> *The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation* (PMDA).

<sup>56</sup> *The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty* (FMCT). See also the consensus conclusion of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT (established pursuant to UNGA A/RES/53/67) and the Shannon Report (CD/1299).

<sup>57</sup> *The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review*.

<sup>58</sup> "The United States intends to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the [NPT] that is the victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons it has used." *The Security Council resolution S/1995/984*.

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