

THE HORN OF AFRICA AND ISMALIC RADICALISM

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ABSTRACT:

CUSTOMARY IDENTITY VS. ISLAM, RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM VS. ISLAMIC RADICALISM, DEMOCRACY VS. MILITANCY, WAR VS. INSURGENCY, AND DEMOCRACY VS. AUTHORITARIANISM – THE EAST AFRICAN SPACE IS CURRENTLY THE SCENE OF STRONG INTERACTIONS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, BOLD FOREIGN POLICIES, AND TENACIOUS ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

THE GROWTH OF THE RADICAL ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA IN THE LAST DECADES WAS MANIFESTED THROUGH THE SPREAD OF THE SALAFI AND WAHHABI CLERICS, WHICH HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON THE TRADITIONAL PRACTICES, AS WELL AS BY THE EMERGENCE OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM GROUPS INFLUENCED BY THESE IDEOLOGIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADICAL ISLAM IS DUE TO THE CONFLUENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF FACTORS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL, SPECIFIC TO THE EAST AFRICA REGION.

MOTIVATED BY A RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ISLAMIC LAW, THE JIHADIST IDEOLOGY WILL REPRESENT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND PERSISTENCE OF THE THREAT FOR THE CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM AS WELL AS THE WESTERN SOCIETIES AND GLOBALIZATION WILL ACCELERATE THE SPREAD OF THIS IDEOLOGY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.

THE MOST EFFECTIVE BARRIERS AGAINST THE INGRESS OF TERRORISTS AND RADICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE REGION ARE NOT ONLY APPLICATIONS OF MILITARY FORCE, BUT ALSO CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSLIMS FROM EAST AFRICA. AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION IN THE LONG TERM WOULD REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE THIS REGION, A WELCOMING AREA FOR EXTREMIST GROUPS AND TERRORIST ATTACKS.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM, ISLAMIC RADICALISM, EAST AFRICA, SALAFI AND WAHHABI CLERICS, ISLAMIC LAW,

THE HORN OF AFRICA

An area of impressive and traumatizing contrasts, a beauty eloquent in opposition with the daily atrocities of the human survival, a wealth incontestable in opposition with exacerbated greed, a place which has endured over the age a peculiar combination of underutilization of resources and external support impossible to verbalized³, often referred to as the place of immeasurable beauty, a veritable ocean, a separate planet, a huge and varied⁴ cosmos overshadowed by brutal colonialism and by an absolutely chaotic division of the

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³ Barbara Kingsolver, *The Poisonwood Bible*, (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2005), 7.

⁴ Ryszard Kapuściński, *The Cobra's Heart*, (Penguin, UK, 2007), 5.

destines of some nations.⁵ Furrowed by deep scars and remnants of contact with so many Africa civilizations seeks a path, a decent destiny that would lead to a long-awaited and desired balance.

Despite an UN arms embargo, according to the UN monitoring group concerning Somalia, the flows of weapons to Somalia have increased aggressive due to a growing number of member as well as the networks of trading of arms who were involved in this process. According to the report, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Lebanese Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia and Syria have supplied weapons and logistical support for ICU, while Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen have offered military assistance to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).⁶

The arms trading networks in Yemen have sent the large consignments of weapons to all the parties' involved in the conflict in Somalia. The large quantities of weapons have passed through Bakaaraha, a network of arms markets interconnected financially in Somalia with Mogadishu highest market. After the victory of the CPE on the coalition ARPCT, networks in Yemen have begun carrying weapons exclusively to the ICU. However, according to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, military leaders have continued to buy an increasing number of weapons and to work through the relatives to ensure clandestine purchases of high caliber weapons.⁷

The arm trafficking on a large scale is not limited, of course only to Somalia. Suppliers of weapons also satisfy the needs of the various armed rebel groups in Sudan. Moreover, there is a market for weapons, undercover, in the area of eastern Nairobi, where many Somalis have settled. The illegal weapons are also brought and trafficked through airfields in the north-west of Kenya.

Customary identity vs. Islam, religious extremism vs. Islamic radicalism, democracy vs. militancy, war vs. insurgency, and democracy vs. authoritarianism – the East African space is currently the scene of strong interactions, violent conflict, bold foreign policies, and tenacious economic interests. It is a reality of chance in which any change takes place expeditiously, from the change of political regime to the change of the military strategy or the nation's economic.⁸ Viewed from this perspective, East Africa seems to need the stability, even if one is offered under the auspices of radical Islam and Sharia. This scenario may become a reality in a short time as well as the radical changes whether political, economic, social or foreign policy. Based on these considerations it arises in this space deeply troubled a situation which in literature, after the Second World War became known under the generic name of "Catch 22"⁹ or "22 Clenci".

East Africa, like any region, state, nation or organization tends towards stability, security and aspires to sustainable development which, within the framework of the socio-political guidelines is achieved through means of good governance, political liberalism and the national contribution. The problem is that the region of East Africa, to achieve these goals has at its disposal as solutions the radicalism itself, which wants to fight in the perspective of

⁵ Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *A Grain of Wheat*, (Heinemann Educational Books, 1994), 11-13.

⁶ UN Security Council, 2/2007/436, "Letter dated 19 December 2007 from the Acting Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council."

⁷ UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, „Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676.”

⁸ Mărcău Flavius Cristian, "Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area," *Analele Universității „Constantin Brâncuși”* din Târgu - Jiu, nr. 4/2015, Seria Litere și Științe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuși”, 77-85.

⁹ Joseph Heller (1961).

security and stability. The truth is that the East Africa needs this radicalism, regardless of its origin - Islamist, pro - Western nationalist or customary law.

The prevalence of an informal economy refers to the extent to which the informal economy overshadows the formal economy and which has escaped from the state control. Informal report to the total labor force is greater for women than for men and is predominantly in small business, such as retail trade and in the agricultural sector. This also involves a significant amount of cross-border trading.

In some cases, the informal sector institutionalized by the corrupted customs authorities, border guards and police, the terrorist networks offer the opportunity to launders money gives them the necessary funds for the transport or facilitates them to carry out financial transactions they need to operate. In Somalia, financial transactions are conducted through the "hawala", an informal system widely used throughout Africa, but also in the Middle East and South Asia. In the past, hawala transactions have not left any trace of the paper. The anonymity of these transactions has enabled the terrorists and their supporters' transfers of funds, without problems or prohibition of any kind. Since 11 September 2001, the national central banks of the countries of origin and international organizations have taken measures to increase the surveillance of the hawala transactions.

The presence of the authorities at the border areas it is vital to the entire territory of East Africa, reflecting a general incapacity of governments to maintain the foreign groups on the outside of their territories. For example, Kenya border with Somalia is very easy translucent -and at the same time, large part consists of the arid and sparsely populated by ethnic Somalis. Although there are many custom checkpoints Kenya, the rest of the border is rarely patrolled, and there are very many smuggling routes.¹⁰

The surveillance of the coastline and maritime is minimal. The waters in this area of Africa have become some of the most susceptible areas of the maritime piracy in the world. According to the annual report of the Office of the International Maritime, there have been 31 incidents of piracy and armed robbery reported against the ships from the coast of Somalia and 13 in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in 2007 alone.¹¹

With 20 countries¹² in composition and a population of approximately 400 million¹³ inhabitants - The greatest of the regions of Africa, of which approximately 66 % Christians, 21% Muslims and 10 % ethno¹⁴ religious and the prospect to balance this gap by the middle of the XXI century¹⁵, East Africa is already shaping as being an important vector and the cradle of social struggle - political - economic - military between the precepts of democracy supported by the society as a whole and the radicalism of the Islamist, facing the denigration of any form of social or political development in the area.

The radicalism can be categorized in general as a set of "concepts and political attitudes which pursuets categorical and radical measure in solving the social life problems"¹⁶, which emphasizes the fact that the radicalism is the one who changes invariably and perfected the political landscape, economic and social of the areas they come into contact.

The growth of the radical Islam in East Africa in the last decades was manifested through the spread of the Salafi and Wahhabi clerics, which have put pressure on the

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, „Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya.”

¹¹ International Maritime Bureau, „Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2007.”

¹² *** *Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings*, United Nations Statistics Division scheme of geographic regions, 2013.

¹³ *** *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision*, United Nations, Population Division, 2015.

¹⁴ *** *Largest Religious Groups – Eastern Africa*, Association of Religious Data Archives, 2012.

¹⁵ *** *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*, Pew Research Center, 2015.

¹⁶ Florin Marcu, *Marele dicționar de neologisme*, (Saeculum, București, 2000), 7.

traditional practices, as well as by the emergence of extremism and terrorism groups influenced by these ideologies. The development of the radical Islam is due to the confluence of a large number of factors of socio-political, specific to the East Africa region. In external categories is part of the following: the effects of the Islamic renaissance at the global level of the past few decades, the influence of the international organizations as well as the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the export of Saudi Arabia funds and ideologies, the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the international spread of radical Islamist networks. The internal dynamics, which contribute to the rise of radical Islamism, has included the increase in the movements of the internal Islamist.

As regards to East Africa, it can be really being considered the cradle of the guidelines of the radical Islamist worldwide. During the Cold War black continent was under the domination of the colonial times, and if in the case of the latter the war was indeed one cold, it has generated many conflicts ignited in the geographical territory of the "South", where the countries have become desirous to assert national liberation from the tutelage domineering European empires.

In assessing terrorism in East Africa, a distinction must be made between Kenya and Tanzania, which provides a different type of environment for terrorist networks by virtue of their degree rather high bureaucratization, to Somalia, which has been in a statelessness status since the collapse of Siad Barre in 1991. The big urban areas in Kenya and Tanzania, together with their infrastructure somewhat functional and the companies arranged in a reasonable manner, offered these groups the opportunity to maintain the anonymity and to find the resources they need to build such networks.

In exchange, in statelessness Somalia, taking into account that the society is organized in the vast majority into clans, the authorities, to the extent that they are present, have a good capacity for monitoring these groupings. This makes Somalia difficult to penetrate to outsiders unless they have the protection of the local groups. Although those outsiders might be successful in bringing a local group, segmentation of social groups and the nature of the social relations would limit their ability to extend its influence on them. This makes the Tanzania and Kenya favorable areas for the development of the terrorist networks, even in the case in which Somalia becomes a refuge for some of them.

From Congo to the Horn of Africa and South Africa, the Cold War has created or facilitated the conflicts and destructive wars¹⁷ of national emancipation national. It is the moment when, under the influence of US foreign strategy the African terrorist phenomenon has appeared in the form of the group RENAMO¹⁸ in Mozambique financed by the Rhodesia racist and by South Africa who wanted the segregation, with the political support of the US¹⁹. The climax of this strategy has been reached in the Middle East, when the support given to the mujahedeen in their fights against the USSR forces has led to ideology of war and anchored in the religion through the creation of a global network of Islamism fighters, which now have returned to haunt the US into an Goardina equation which brings together the groupings of the Islamic radical of East Africa, Al Shabaab - acting under the tutelage of Al Qaeda, Hizbul Islami - Islamic Party which has brought together under the same management the four big insurgent Somalian groups ARS-A of Hassan Awey , Jabhatul Islamiya, Brigade Ras Kamboni and the Muaskar Anole grouping, police forces of the Harti tribe and ISIS located in the close proximity of East Africa in the village of Yemen and in areas north of

¹⁷ David Percox, *Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonization*, (New York, Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 18.

¹⁸ RENAMO (1975) and FRELIMO.

¹⁹ Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror*, (Harmony, 2005), 45.

the Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Libya²⁰, share their interests and to fight for domination.

Under the influence of a social environment unfavorable is developing these radical avatar precepts of ecclesiastical. Islam itself can be considered radical, because it has changed the perception of spirituality, of the tribes of nomads who had a polytheistic or even a non-religious perspective on existence. The nomadic origin of these social groups has made that their existence to invariably interact with numerous communities in search of a place to build a venue in which to develop into a national state governed by the rule of law. The interactions between these groups of nomadic Islamists have not always been the most favorable of their objectives; most people tend to marginalize or not to accept them. Moreover, the spectrum of the threats to the national security of the peoples made the ideological radicalism and terrorism the most vividly perceived threats to the social balance²¹. Motivated by a radical interpretation of the Islamic law, the jihadist ideology will represent the most significant and persistence of the threat for both the conservative Muslim as well as the Western societies and globalization will accelerate the spread of this ideology to the detriment of the national governments, the US and its allies as well as in those places deprived and degraded in terms of social values where the Islamist rhetoric will be received as the savior.

With regards to East Africa, it is envisaged that this to be part of the process of globalization of the Islamic radicalism, alongside the Urdu communities in Pakistan or India, Pashto in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bengali from Bangladesh and India, Bahasa in Indonesia and Malaysia and Malay in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The combination of these radical local actors with global players raised the level of the threat to a new record, the latter by giving them the logistic support and the support of the ideological they would need to continue the fight at the local level, in exchange to provide the necessary support in the global operations run by their sponsors²². Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Congo or Somalia are most often mentioned to in the media streams on the terrorist attacks, and we will see undoubtedly an extension of these territorial limits, the rest of Africa cannot remain immune of this scourge that will generate in time other cells, groups and the Islamist sects, more violent and more persevering in proselytizing acid.

In order to be able to reduce the threat coming from this scourge, the governments have approached a tactic of armed reprisals in order to destroy these deviant behaviors but have lost sight of the disadvantaged communities that formed the basis of which the Islamists choose their recruits. Any future strategy must focus not only on combating terrorism extremist groups but also on the extremism in the communities²³.

The religion will always be a central element of any nation, deeply rooted in the conscience and closely linked to very existence of that nation. Religious leaders have always had a huge influence on international politics a relevant example being the recognition of the Palestinian state by Pope Benedict XVI century in February 2013 and the signature of the

²⁰ *** *ISIS's Regional Campaign: March 2016*, Institute for the Study of War, 2016, <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%27s%20Regional%20Campaign%20MAR2016.pdf>, (accessed in 26.05.2016).

²¹ Rohan Gunaratna, *Understanding The Challenge Of Ideological Extremism*, (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2008), 9.

²² Rohan Gunaratna, *Understanding The Challenge Of Ideological Extremism*, 227.

²³ Rohan Gunaratna, *Re-Assessing the Terrorist Threat: The Past, the Present, and the Future*, Inside on Terrorism, SITE Intelligence Group, <http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/44-reassess>, (accessed in 30.03.2016).

Agreement the religious and spiritual in 2015 under the leadership of the Pope Francis²⁴. It becomes obvious that religion has become so an instrument as a means of making international politics, to influence the governments or political leaders to direct or redirect foreign policy depending on the actions of the Church. Although precepts governing the church, any orientation would be, have existed and - in extreme conditions there will be a tendency of extremism, religion seeking the means to maintain its position as governess in front of the political orientations whether it is democratic or dictatorial. Islamism should be included in the category of extreme religious precepts, because it starts from the existing precepts and develop or interpret them in an extreme manner, marginal, exacerbating the importance of the conflict, the jihad in preserving and asserting that religious orientation. However the radicalism generates fundamental changes on the geographical scene of East Africa, starting with the change of population perspective, resizing the aspirations and hope for a stable and peacefully environment, favorable to the development, the involvement of international actors in the area by kinetic action or investments in the economy of the continent, the way in which the governments or state leaders are forced to address security issues, displacing an impressive number of immigrants to the adjacent areas or even to the neighboring continents, at the reconsideration of the options for young people for the future, generating situation of crisis by preventing access to humanitarian agencies in the area and to occupation of vast strips of the territory of the member of law, the fact is that the Islamic option is a radical one for Africa, and its choice will result in the lack of a peaceful conformation of the population, a total dismantling of the social space - economic - politically on the continent, before a settlement of its Islamist faults.

The region of the Horn of Africa is regarded as being made of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, but other analysts have also included Kenya, while some have ruled out Sudan.²⁵

It has become a common thing that the region of the Horn of Africa is almost confused with the notion of particularly dangerous, kind of a terrorist hotspot. Some analysts claim that this is due to the state of weakness of the states in the area, which makes them highly susceptible to terrorism, and are used as a waiting area or the hosting terrorist bases. Others bring forward the thesis that claims that Islamic extremists are tolerated and encouraged the violent acts carried out in the name of the "jihad".

The legitimacy of NATO intervention in the region does not only have a single point of departure but should be regarded as a response of the international community to a series of serious problems of political and social life but also the repeated infringements of human rights.²⁶

The coasts of Africa, and in particular the shores of the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and those of the western part of the Indian Ocean, were susceptible to illegal fishing, traffic of goods and persons and piracy²⁷.

²⁴ *** *Vatican signs treaty recognizing State of Palestine*, AFP, 2015, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/vatican-signs-treaty-recognizing-state-of-palestine/>, (accessed in 04.04.2016).

²⁵ Lyons, Terrence B.: "The Horn of Africa Regional Politics: A Hobbesian World," in Howard Wriggins (ed.): *Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 153-209. See also Selassie, Bereket Habte: *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa*, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 9.

²⁶ Mărcău Flavius Cristian, Ina Raluca Tomescu, "Coordinates of NATO – EU cooperation", in proceedings "Strategic changes in Security and International Relations", 2014, 258-265.

²⁷ ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, Annual Report 2013, January 2014, 27.

In the year 2005, is adopted the strategy of maritime safety, a strategy for identifying maritime safety, defense and facilitate the trade. This strategy also includes proving aid to African states to be able to secure the borders²⁸.

The representatives of the US Government, members of EUCOM (United States European Command), US Naval Forces Europe and ACSS (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies) together with the representatives of the African countries initiated a series of ministerial debates that have as a theme the maritime safety. These debates are aimed at increasing the capacity to monitor illegal activities and implementation of maritime laws²⁹.

In the waters of the eastern part of Africa forces in the framework of the CJTF- HOA Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa) operates in conjunction with the coalition forces CTF-150³⁰ (Coalition Task Force 150) for the provision of maritime safety on the routes in the vicinity of the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

In 2004, the G8 launched a program to train 75000 soldiers, mostly Africans, called GPOI – Global Peace Operations Initiatives.

The political conflicts and instability present in some African states have caused human suffering on a large scale and has undermined the economic, social and political development³¹.

The terrorist attacks on the US Embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi in 1998, on the various objectives of the Mombassa, Kenya and the attacks in Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania have stressed the presence of the threat of terrorism in the region.

"Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competitive demands, and internal revolts, and tribal rivalries, ethnic or religious groups. (...) All these various causes have the same goals: the failure of the states, humanitarian disasters and safe areas for the propagation of terrorism"³².

South Africa is the subject that brings forefront the issues of international maritime safety. The reason for these concerns at the international level may be because of the intentions manifested by China and India, in particular about the use of Africa natural resources which are located along the coastline.

Given the commercial interests of several states, the companies operating in the areas of the coastal areas must be protected. Another important requirement is international maritime security for commercial shipping. Other points of interest could be linked to the so-called "war on terrorism", of the mode of development and the granting of humanitarian aid, to limit the illegal migration and efforts to combat illegal waste shipments and poaching.

For more than three decades' peace and stability have not been found in the region in the Horn of Africa, a region which has been devastated by armed conflict.

Ethiopia was the victim of a civil war and involved in a conflict with Somalia and Eritrea (State, which has gained independence in 1993). Sudan has been involved in a bloody civil war, and Somalia has been devastated by the conflicts between gangs that demanded governance.

²⁸ The White House, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, September 20, 2013, p. 6.

²⁹ Congressional Research Service, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa*, March 2013, 11.

³⁰ CTF 150 – UK, France, Germany, Pakistan and US.

³¹ Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress*, (Washington D.C., 2015), 5.

³² The White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States*, September 2012, 13.

During the Cold War, the great powers pursued their own interests in the region, so that they become interdependent and the factions from different countries will to declare independence³³.

Somalia, having a strategic location in the Horn of Africa, is run without the support of a central government since 1991. The social system and way of life of the people of Somalia are extremely serious and steadily deteriorated, especially since the beginning of the year 2007. Over 1.5 million Somalians depend on the humanitarian aid, 80% is distributed by sea from Kenya. The ports and the shores of Somalia are usually unguarded, and this together with the deployment of various illegal activities has increased the uncertainty. For years, foreign warships patrolled the area and have occupied the inland waterway arteries, and the lack of maritime safety has a negative impact on the economic development, regional security, and stability throughout the region.

Somalia is involved in conflicts for two decades. The regime imposed by President Siad Barre was in an extremely repressive way generating from the year 1987 bloody internal conflicts. The central authorities have disintegrated rapidly, and in 1990; Somalia is a permanent battleground controlled by the chiefs of the tribes which dispute their power³⁴.

In January 1991, Barre he fled the country after his army was defeated by the Mogadishu militia led by General Muhammed Farah Aideed³⁵. Somalia is today a country in a state of chaos and torn apart by a civil war.

The international interventions (UNOSOM I and UNITAF) have failed³⁶. In accordance with the Security Council resolution, number 814, UNOSOM II took over the objective of establishing a new government, a new police and justice and the rebuild the economy. UNOSOM II was a multinational force composed of 20,000 soldiers from the peacekeeping forces ("Peacekeepers"), 8,000 people in the logistics department and 3,000 of civilians of 23 nations. Their mandate was intended to impose certain conditions of peace in the area and militias disarm.³⁷

General Aideed has been perceived as being the main obstacle to achieve the objective of UNOSOM. The efforts the arrest or kill him have failed, but after the incident "Black Hawk Down", or "Day of the Rangers" according to the Somali references, (March 1994) the United States have withdrawn their forces from Somalia³⁸. Shortly after some other international coalition and withdrew their troops.

A part of the territories of the Horn of Africa still benefit from foreign support (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti).

After 20 years of violence and anarchy, Somalia is still without a central government authority. Somalia has no national armed forces or the police forces, but there are still Militia groups and groups committed to provide protection³⁹.

The removal of barriers to the economic growth path - there is a general agreement in the political community on the need to promote economic opportunities, in particular, for young people in order to reduce the number of potential recruits' jihadist. However, given the extent of the barriers to economic growth in East Africa, it would be more realistic maybe a process of establishing a minimum order, security, and predictability in the behavior of the

³³ Hans Seidel Foundation Kenya, *The maritime security quandary in the horn of Africa region: Causes, consequences and responses*, January 2015, 8.

³⁴ M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, (Johannesburg, 2015), 6.

³⁵ G. Arnold, *Africa. A Modern History*, (London, 2006), 16-23.

³⁶ A. Oyebadé and A. Olao, *Africa after the Cold War. The Changing Perspectives on Security*, (London, 2015), 12.

³⁷ M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, 47.

³⁸ M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, 48.

³⁹ <http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/SecInfo.html> (accessed in 20 May 2016).

governments, the attenuation of corruption, for the reduction of trade barriers, the debt relief were appropriated and to promote entrepreneurship, with an emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises.

The most effective barriers against the ingress of terrorists and radical ideologies in the region are not only applications of military force, but also cultural and social aspects of the Muslims from East Africa. An effective solution in the long term would require the removal of conditions which make this region, a welcoming area for extremist groups and terrorist attacks. A strategic approach could include the following elements:

Strengthening state's institutions and the civil society - this could be accomplished by programs to improve the public administration and the government services, professionalism, as well as the support of the activities of the non-governmental organizations.

Supporting the regional governments to cooperate in obtaining a better control of borders, both land, and sea - this could be accomplished by the providing resources, training and surveillance systems suitable for the environment and the capabilities of the countries of the region. The improvement of the border control is particularly important in the case of the friendly countries bordering southern Somalia, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, to prevent the movement of terrorists across their borders.

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