

## THE MUSLIM RADICALISM WITHIN THE AFRICAN SPACE

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### ABSTRACT

ONE OF THE KEY-PHENOMENONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA, THE MUSLIM RADICALISM HAS AS THE MAIN VALENCE THE HIGH DEGREE OF THREAT FOR BOTH THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND THE MUSLIM ONES. THE MIXTURE BETWEEN THE RADICAL IDEOLOGY, THE MIGRATION, THE INTERNET GIVES BIRTH AND HELPS DEVELOP THE "TERRORIST REGIONAL CELLS" THAT THREAT THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

DESPITE THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF SOME SPACES DURING THE BIPOLAR PERIOD, THE END OF THE COLD WAR ALLOWED THE ASIAN VECTORS TO ENTER THE AFRICAN SPACE AND THE ISLAM TO REORGANIZE AND THINK OF THE CONQUERING AND /OR KEEPING CONTROL OVER SOME TERRITORIES, THE MOST ELOQUENT CASE BEING SOMALIA, TO START ORGANIZING AND DEVELOPING CENTERS OF INDOCTRINATION, OF MILITARY TRAINING IN A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL MANNER, FINANCIALLY SUPPORTED BY MUSLIM ENTITIES.

THE BOKO HARAM IS A THREAT TO THE POPULATION AND THE NIGERIAN STATE AND ITS NEIGHBORS; THE ISLAMIC NORTH CONSIDERS THE CHRISTIAN SOUTH AS ADVANTAGED AND DEMAND FOR A RADICAL CHANGE, ON THE BACKGROUND OF CONTESTING THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION, AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE NIGERIAN STATE, DEMANDING A "PURELY ISLAMIC" REGIME. THE BOKO HARAM DEMANDS HAVE SOME "HARD CORE": THE NORTH IS POOR AND CORRUPT, THE ADMINISTRATION IS BARELY NOTICEABLE.

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**KEYWORDS:** THE MUSLIM RADICALISM, AFRICAN SPACE, "TERRORIST REGIONAL CELLS", THE BOKO HARAM.

### ISLAM, KORAN AND ITS PROPHETS<sup>2</sup>

Etymologically, The Islam is an Arab word meaning obedience (complete abandon to the Divine Will, and to His Law, accordingly), included in the triad: Islam, imam<sup>3</sup>, ihsan<sup>4</sup>. The Islam is the obedience of the Universe to Allah's will. In this acceptance, all celestial bodies (the Sun, the Moon, etc), the mineral, vegetal and animal worlds are Muslim.

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<sup>2</sup> See Constantin Onișor, Paul Duță, Adrian Dobre, *Areale globale: Uniunea Europeană - Africa subsahariană*, Techno Media , (Sibiu Publishing House , 2009), 114-121.

<sup>3</sup> Iman: faith

<sup>4</sup> Ihsan: the holy virtue, the spiritual beauty; the dynamic and transformed element of The Way, complementary to the assimilation of the doctrinaire thruths. It is the very focus of the soul to break through the waves separating the being from God. „To adore God as if you'd seen Him, and even if do not see Him, He sees you“. *The Koran*, 380

All that exists obeys Allah, the supreme Divinity, universal, or, in other words, The Universe in Muslim<sup>5</sup> and The Islam is a universal religion.<sup>6</sup> The human existence develops on two plans: the first one, determined by the Divine Will, uninfluenced by humans, without will freedom, a plan of Nature's laws. The second plan, of humans' actions, of rationality, in which humans are allowed to think, choose and act.<sup>7</sup>

The Koran and The Bible are the most spread and read books ever written; The Koran is the axis /source to which theology, jurisprudence, education, moral, science report themselves, being considered by the Muslim theologians as aspects of the One and Only Truth. According to The Koran, in Muhammad's message, Allah is God, the only One. All His deeds are free acts, arbitrary in fact, or they depend on His will only.<sup>8</sup>

The Koran is the most important Muslim book, and appeared in 610, with the first visions that Muhammad had.<sup>9</sup> It contains 114 chapters (surra) including 6236 verses<sup>10</sup>, of different lengths, ended in rimes or assonance, making the text easier to be read or recited. The speaker is always God, Allah, never Muhammad who is a messenger, a prophet.

The sources for the Dogmatic inspiration of the Koran are mostly Hebrew.<sup>11</sup> The Islamic religion doesn't suggest ideals that are unreachable for the believer; it a predominantly practical doctrine, reflecting the practicality of its establisher, a religion addressed to simple people: It does not mention mystical sacraments, needs no ascetic and abandonments, nor does it installs a clerical hierarchy.<sup>12</sup>

The second important Islamic dogma refers to the Revelation, interpreted as a help received from Allah via His messengers, the Prophets.<sup>13</sup> The Koran is a guide for life for a normal human being; Its ethics is based on moderation and common-sense.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Even someone reecting Allah, or of a different faith is still considered a Muslim, as long as they exist physically. Because from the very beginning, from embryo beyond the physical death, every human cell, every organ follows, implacably, the path forecasted by Allah. Even ones tongue, rejecting Allah willingly or otherwise or praising other Gods, is naturally Muslim. The heart filled with love and respect, not towards Allah, but to other Gods, is, by feelings, still Muslim. All these are subjected to the Divine Will, their functions and activities being in accordance with the feelings of this Divine Will. See *The Koran*, 254.

<sup>6</sup> The Koran states the fundamental unity of humans; all people have an identical nature, created by God. The Tradition clearly states : „All men are equal, like the teeth of a weaver's comb; there are no differences between the white and the black, an Arab and a non-Arab, except for the degree in which they fear God.“ See Fritjaf Schuan, *Let's understand Islam. An introduction to the Muslim Spirituality*, (Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest, 1994), 32.

<sup>7</sup> They are free to choose their way of life and can adopt the desired ideology. They are also free to follow their own life principles or other people's principles. Men have free will and can choose their line of conduct. See The Koran, 264.

<sup>8</sup> He is Freedom, Knowledge and Almighty; He is the Creator of heaven and earth and of everything that exists, He brings into existence whatever He desires. The nights follow the days, the rain falls from the sky, the boat floats on the sea due to this continuous creation. In other words, Allah not only directs the cosmic rytms, but also the deeds of the people. See The Koran, 75.

<sup>9</sup> The first official version was drawn in the year 650 by Muhammad's ex-secretary, Zaid ibn Thabit. See The Koran, p. 18 and the next.

<sup>10</sup> „In the name of God, the merciful“. al Quran means: lecturing, reciting. *Ibidem*, 10.

<sup>11</sup> The Old Testament and the Talmud, and far much less, the Christian ones. (The Gospels, in the first place).

<sup>12</sup> Its fundamental dogma states the monotheism: Allah is God; He is unique, he is not part of a Holy Trinity, nor does He have a Son. Allah has 99 attributed names; He is almighty and merciful, the aster and creator of the world; but, unlike the Hebrew dogma that states the world's creation in six days, The Koran states for a continuous creation of the world by Allah. *Ibidem*, 10.

<sup>13</sup> These give or remind The Law to the people and warn and preach them when they fail to respect It. They are many: „I've sent a messenger to every people“, says God. The Prophets also have the gift to do wonders; but Muhammad claimed only one for him: to have revealed to people The Koran. Finally, the Prophets advice people to do good. *Ibidem*, p. 81 and the next.

<sup>14</sup> It is advisable to despise richness, to practice generosity, to be humble; but do not overreact in any way. It does not advocate austere life, only moderation: „Eat and drink, but not too much.“ *Ibidem*, p. 50 and the next.

Instead of the ascetism, The Koran recommends activities that are useful to humans, such as helping the poor, the widows and the orphans.<sup>15</sup>

His message, the Prophet reintegrates people in a new community, of a religious nature, called *umma*. He created the Arab nation, allowing, at the same time, the Muslim expansion beyond racial and ethnical frontiers. The energy spent with the inter-tribal fights was channeled towards external wars, against pagans, in the name of Allah and for the final victory of monotheism.<sup>16</sup>

The Muslim Prophets announce the true religion, pure, unaltered by superstitions.<sup>17</sup>

*Sharia* appeared in about 900, as an Islamic code of laws, lying at the bottom of all daily activities of people and communities. It was established by a scholar from Mecca, El-Shahii<sup>18</sup> who stated that „the Law must have four roots“to which are added, later on, mostly for political reasons, some more roots. The ads and the interpretations stimulate and promote the religious fundamentalism and the radical ideology as an extreme form of political and social activism. The fundamentalism is a coming back to the traditional Islamic values in order to stop its decline, because the Islamic society has detached itself from the true Muslim values; this allowed the Western culture to intrude; the solution is to revitalize and return to Islam by introducing *Shariei* and by rejecting the Western culture, together with the repolitisation of the Islam.<sup>19</sup>

The Koran, received by Divine revelation, condemning some anti-social deeds, establishes the lines of the moral conduct.<sup>20</sup>

Muhammad's words and deeds form *The Sunna*.<sup>21</sup> *The Sunna* was written according to the interpretation given by El-Shahii to one of Muhammad's statements: „My people won't tolerate what proves to be wrong“.<sup>22</sup>

*Sharia* completes The Koran and *The Sunna*, mentioning some anti-social deeds considered illegal. If at the beginning of Islam, *Sharia* played a positive role by guiding the society, its newly re-enforcement by means of excesses and cruelty against societies already affected by conflicts, poverty and huge social lack of balance is the expression of a radicalism threatening the human condition, the peace and international security.<sup>23</sup>

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15 „The Islam accepts the world and human life the way they are, as an opera that cannot be criticized, as a manifestation of Allah's will, not at all denaturalized and corrupt due to some unforgivable original fault. Therefore, the Christian ascetism and giving up to all earthly possessions cannot be admitted“. Fritjaf Schuan, *Let's understand Islam. An introduction to the Muslim Spirituality*, (Humanitas Publishing House, Bucharest 1994), 42.

16 Yet, Mohammad was successful in his campaigns against the nomad tribes and especially against the Mecans due to negotiations rather than fighting, setting thus an example for His followers, The Khaliffs.

17 These are of two types: the Prophet, whose mission is to watch over the true faith and the messenger who converts the unfaithful and reveals the Divine Truth to them. The Koran names 25 prophets (the main are Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Jesus and the last and most important, Muhammad); but, according to Tradition, they are more than one hundred thousand. See Fritjaf Schuan, *Ibidem*, 57.

18 Father of Islamic jurisprudence.

19 See Robert Van De Weier, *Islam and The West*, (Alfa Publishing House, Bucharest 2001), 65.

20 Among the anti-social deeds: the crime, burglary, speculation, exploiting the poor, forgery and adultery. There are recommendations for conduct, thus, without stating clearly against slavery, it recommends to slave owners to free their slaves; it does not condemns polygamy, but recommends a maximum of four wives; and allowing for the divorce, it still recommends life bonds.

21 Although according to The Koran Muhammad was a sinful man, God chose Him as a Prophet for His wisdom and His understanding power; thus, His words and example are the model for the rest of the people.

22 When consensual, a particular case should have the strength of a law.

23 There was a problem in this respect, namely most of today's politicians and Muslim activists have no idea of the last two roots of the above mentioned four. That's why, for example, the Talibans from Afghanistan elaborated a law code pretending it was based on The Koran and Muhammad's words, disregarding the popular

The distortion of some religious precepts and the manipulation for the benefit of politics has transformed a key Islamic concept *-jihad-* into one with disastrous consequences,<sup>24</sup> though its only aim of this fight was supposed to be the freedom of believe for the Muslim adepts<sup>25</sup>.

In 1928, the Egyptian El Banna establishes "The Muslim Brotherhood" attracting „people of all walks of life, forming groups of families, a certain number of groups forming a battalion“<sup>26</sup>, the Muslims' fight against the West transforming in mass politics. Extreme radical forms take form during the<sup>27</sup> Iranian Revolution in 1979<sup>28</sup> as well as at the taking of Kabul in 1996 by the Taliban.<sup>29</sup>

The first fundamentalist ideological centre appeared at Azhar, In Egypt, with the work of Omar Abder Rahman on *Jihadului*, a call to arms against the infidels. It was said that The Islam was installed by means of arms, so in the future this is the only alternative for the Muslims.<sup>30</sup>

One of the key-phenomenons on the international agenda, the Muslim radicalism has as the main valence the high degree of threat for both the developed countries and the Muslim ones. The mixture between the radical ideology, the migration, the internet gives birth and helps develop the "terrorist regional cells" that threat the international security.

will and the righteousness of the decisions. This was a case that showed that when there are no people's consensus and justice; the objectives of The Sharia are far from being reached, being cruelly crushed.

<sup>24</sup> Sheik Fadlallah, the chief ideologist of Hezbollah, stated: „When The Islam starts a war, it fights like any other world power, defending itself to preserve its existence and freedom, being forced to adopt preventive actions when it finds itself in danger“. A book of studies, *Terorismul: istoric, forme, combatere*, (Omega Publishing House, Bucharest 2001), 168.

<sup>25</sup> This Divine permission has certain limitations „first of all, God allows the Muslims to fight only against those fighting against their religion; it is not allowed to fight a war for power and pray. Secondly, the fight shall be honest, without deceiving, and after their victory, the Muslims would not take advantage of their enemies. In all their fights, Muhammad and His followers respected these principles as well as all the laws in *Sharia* plus two more: the children, women and the old were to be spared regardless the conditions; the same for animals, crops and buildings. See Robert Van De Weier, *The Islam and The West* , (Alfa Publishing House , Bucharest 2001), 66.

<sup>26</sup> The leaders of this organization sustained that all Muslim governments from The Middle East were corrupted by the Western ideas, therefore they must be changed; new governments are required to devote themselves to the strict enforcement of The Islamic Law of *Sharia*. The most important action of The Brotherhood was the assassination of The Egyptian President Sadat in 198, for he opened the country to the foreign investors. The Brotherhood infiltrated among The Army and the social services in most Muslim countries, helping the enforcement of *Sharia* and supporting the anti-western feelings. See Robert Van De Weyer, *Islam and the West*, (Alfa Publishing House, Bucharest, 2001), 33.

<sup>27</sup> Van De Weyer, *Islam and the West*....,33.

<sup>28</sup> To remove The Shah, who was pro-West, establishing laws that were not in accord with *Sharia* and a Western model in education. It was led by The Ayatollah Khomeini, who was more and more dangerous, even in exile. Due to modern communications, he was able to find supporters and detailed a plan to remove the Shah; when he triumphantly returned from exile, even the richest business-people followed him. He had hoped that by removing The Shah he also removed the bonds with The West, condemning The USA and naming it „the great Satan“. Van De Weyer, *Islam and the West*...., 34.

<sup>29</sup> A military group formed after the Russian invasion in Afghanistan. Following the Cold War, both Americans and British trained the Taliban guerilla, providing also money and weapons. After gaining the political power, The Taliban showed themselves even more eager to enforce *The Sharia*, or at least their own interpretation of it, considered by Muslim specialists, especially those from Iran, to be very cruel. Van De Weyer, *Islam and the West*...., 35.

<sup>30</sup> One of the Omar Rahman's apologists, Abdes Salan Farag wrote a book that became „The Bible of Sadat's assassins“ suggesting in it that terrorism presented as a holy war would be fundamented in The Koran, being one of its seven fundaments. Another opinion states that the Islamic fundamentalism roots in the anachronistic development of the Muslim countries compared to the Western, Christian ones. See Gheorghe Arădăvoaică, Gabriel Naghi, Dan Niță, *Sfârșitul terorismului?* (Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 2002), 194.

Almost 80% of the violence within the African space during the last 15 years was of religious nature. The religious factor is not hidden, on the contrary, it is held up as an engine and a symbol of the violent and self-started political and/or social/ ethnical movements, disregarding their political orientation.<sup>31</sup>

The spreading of the Jihad ideology against The USA and its allies,<sup>32</sup> being in fact a militant interpretation of Islam, promotes "the global Jihad", which is considered by some analysts to be supported by a probable temporal and spatial planning within a decentralization process regarding the traditional territories (Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya a Mindanao) and geo-political points such as Afghanistan (the heart of Asia), Iraq (The Middle East) and Somalia (Africa). The last events in Sahel and the emerging of The Islamic State support this perspective.<sup>33</sup>

As an extreme political instrument, the terrorism motivates via religion by tendentiously interpreting some Koran texts, the ubiquity of the threat and its turning into an engine of the violent ideology.

The direct threat against The USA and its allies (Canada, Europe and Australia) will influence the neighbor states (India, Russia and China).

The terrorism's demography and geography would change, influenced by the the entire Muslim world, the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, followed by a huge development of the Asian and African terrorism, especially in the Sub-Saharan space dominated by the Somali terrorism, but also in the Maghrebian space.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the strategic value of some spaces during the bipolar period, the end of the Cold War allowed the Asian vectors to enter the African space and the Islam to reorganize and think of the conquering and /or keeping control over some territories, the most eloquent case being Somalia, to start organizing and developing centers of indoctrination, of military training in a quasi-governmental manner, financially supported by Muslim entities.

*Maghreb* is an Arab term with different acceptations: „Occident“, „West“ or „the land where the Sun sets down“<sup>35</sup>. From the historical point of view, it was used for the territories beyond the Nile Valley, along the North Coast of Africa, up to the Atlantic. Within the modern state frame, this definition includes five countries: The Alger, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania (no exit to The Mediterranean Sea) and Tunis. The francophone researchers have often used the term „*Maghreb*“ in a less larger sense, including only three countries: The Alger, Morocco and Tunis. These differences in definition show the arbitrary character of such concepts as region and regionalism.<sup>36</sup>

The Maghreb is very distinct geopolitically. During the pre-Arab period, the shores of North Africa were caught in the fights for power between Rome and Cartagena as well as between The Byzantine Empire and Persia. Following the Islam's expansion, the area fell under the Arab and Ottoman influence. The Mediterranean influences continued due to colonialism and the decolonization started after the IWW by insurrectional movements.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>31</sup> See, Hamas in Gaza, Fatah in the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Tareek-e-Taliban in Pakistan, Afghan Taliban in the South-East of Afghanistan, The Tamil Tigers in the North-East of Sri Lanka, Kurdish Workers Party in the North-East of Turkey, Uighur in Xingjiang (Wets of China).

<sup>32</sup> See the Global Jihad Movement.

<sup>33</sup> See Gunaratna, Rohan, *Understanding the challenge of ideological extremism*, UNISCI Discussion Papers nr.18/ Oct 2008. Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 113-126.

<sup>34</sup> Especially in Libya, Tunis, Alger and Morocco.

<sup>35</sup> See Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newnham, *Dictionary of International Relations*, (Universal Dalsi Publishing House , Bucharest, 2001), 323.

<sup>36</sup> Zlatko Šabic and Ana Bojinovic, *State and Non-state Actors in Regional Institutional Webs: the Case of the Mediterranean*, document presented to the 4th Convention of CEEISA, Estonia, 25th-27th of June 2006, 2-11.

<sup>37</sup> Burgat, François, *l'islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du Sud*, Paris, 1988, Karthala.

In the spring of 1958, the three francophone states launched a call to form the United Maghreb Unit and since then there have always been some shy tentative to create a cooperation frame.

In November 1989, the five states formed The Union of the Maghreb States.<sup>38</sup> This represented a consequence of both the Mediterranean dimension and of the Arab one in the Maghrebian politics. All five states are employed in institutional building and consolidation. The characteristics of the sub-Maghreb region include Algerian internal problems, the partial exclusion of Libya from the regional relations, Europe's proximity and the European colonial past, the interaction with the black Africa, from the neighborhood. These countries share common history in attempting to reach North-African unity ended by creating the United Arab Maghreb.

The dissensions between Morocco and the Western Sahara and those between Tunis and Algeria obstruct these attempts. The faith of the North African regional integration movements depended, also, on the Union's relations with Europe.<sup>39</sup> Depending economically on Europe and on the European policy in supporting the regional integration in North Africa impacted enormously upon regional policy and upon the economy of the Western Arab world.

From a historical and religious perspective, „The Great Discord“ (655-661), issued by conflicts for political power and the succession after Hussein, the fourth khalifs, generated three branches differing among one another by the way and the authority in the interpretation of the Koran 1) sunny (about 85%); 2) Shiites (about 15%), over 4/5 of these are localized in Iran, forming the majority of the population (91%), the rest are majority in Azerbaijan (66-70%), Iraq (60-65%), Bahrain (70%) and minority in other states; 3) kharijiti (0,2%); 4) different other branches considered sectary (such as the Baha'i, the Sikh).

The traditional *Sunni* cult has four branches: malekism in Maghreb, the South of Egypt and the West of the Sub-Saharan Africa; hanefi in Turkey and other ex-Turkish countries, except for the Maghrebian ones; şafiism, mainly in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and less in Egypt, Caucuz, Central Asia, South Yemen and Palestine; hanbalism, the most radical form, spread in Saudi Arabia (with the dynasty and the wahhabit order) and Qatar.

The Kharijits, are about 2-3 mil. people and are rigorous, dynamic, honest and solidary; they live mostly in Oman and in some parts of Mzab in Alger and on the island of Djerba, belonging to Tunis.

The *Shi'ah* are grouped as follows: 1) Duodecimans (about 90% spread in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, The Gulf, Lebanon, Syria, India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the former SSRR); 2) Ismails, subdivided in Druzes (Lebanon, Syria, Israel and Jordania), Nizarits (among which the Hashashins are the actual Ismails living in Syria, Lebanon, Oman, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan); 3) Nusairits (Alauits, in Turkey, especially among the Kurds, in Syria and Lebanon); 4) Zaijalists (North Yemen); 5) different other factions: Kaysanitsi, Mukhtary, Septimans, Agha-Khan, Quarmats, etc.<sup>40</sup>

### **ISLAM'S EXPANSION DIRECTIONS AND THE RADICALISM CENTERS**

Though it's not about regional politics, the study of the Muslim world on the African continent notices at least three waves of bonds going beyond the colonial borders and even some geo-political concepts. A flux of the African Muslim population is from Mozambique

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<sup>38</sup> The Union of the Arab Maghreb – UMA.

<sup>39</sup> George Joffe', *The Western Arab World: Background Assessment*, in Gerd Nonneman (ed.), *The Middle East and Europe: the Search for Stability and Integration* (London: Federal Trust, 1993), 197–201.

<sup>40</sup> Massouillé 2003: 41.

(insignificant), Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. A second Islamic chain ties Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco; the third chain of Muslim states is formed of Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Ciad, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Guinea-Conakry, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone. There are some influences in states that are not entirely Muslim: Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, Togo and Liberia.

Sahel is a vast space with few people divided into weak, poor states, with poor police and military forces. The political and economical landscape of Sahel offers excellent conditions for proselytisms and for the development of the radical Islam. There is a very active Muslim radical group with its logistic and doctrinaire center in the South of Alger, stating that the poverty is due to inobservance of the Islamic law.

There is a coherent opinion noticing some characteristics of the relation Islam-terrorism: the existence of some cells that promote the radical Islam in Nigeria and Niger; some radical terrorism suspects taking refuge from Algeria to Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Ciad as a safety measure but also to promote the radical Islam.

The difficult access in the Saharian space— especially in Mali, Ciad, Niger and Mauritania – is a natural advantage exploited by the radical Islam as a training sanctuary, and for regrouping and doctrinaire centre. Kidnapping children from school develops into a religious fanatical method used in many African places, following the Chechnya model in Caucaz.

#### **THE RADICAL ISLAM IN THE WEST AFRICA**

In West Africa, though some violent phenomenon caused by the radical Islam occurred, there are no reasons for serious concerning.

The Salaffi movement from the South of Algeria (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat - GSPC) controls the barely populated South of Algeria opposing the government in the capital of the country, Alger. GSPC promotes its ideology in Sahel but also in the West of Africa using the same trade routes used for trading gold, slaves, salt in use from the colonial times.




Fig. nr.1 – The spreading of the Islam within the African space<sup>41</sup>

In West Africa, Nigeria (with about 180 mil. people) hosts training centers for radical Islamists – the Islam appears here in the XI<sup>th</sup> century, strongly develops in Kano (the XIV<sup>th</sup> century), in Katsina (the XVI<sup>th</sup> century), in Zaria and Zamfara (the XVII<sup>th</sup> century), becoming a true political force in the XIX<sup>th</sup> century in the north of Nigeria.<sup>42</sup> Nigeria's history, tributary to the artificial building from the British colonial era which reunited people of different religions - Muslims, Christians and Animists, mentions an Islamic govern following Sharia in the North of the country and even when colonial rules were imposed, this was done by manipulating the Muslim social and political institutions.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>41</sup> See Laremont, Ricardo; Gregorian, Hrach, "Political Islam in West Africa and the Sahel", *Military Review*, Vol. 86 Jan/Feb 2006, Department of the Army Headquarters, Fort Leavenworth, 28.

<sup>42</sup> In 1804, a Jihad movement, lead by Uthman dan Fodio, a religious leader, switches from social to political by creating a Muslim state based on the Islamic law, an successful entity up to present. See Matthew Hassan Kukah and Toyin FaIoIa, *Religious Militancy and Self-Assertion: Islam and Politics in Nigeria*, Aldershot: Avebury, U.K., 1996, 3.

<sup>43</sup> See FaIoIa, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and secular Ideologies*, (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 24-25.

In 1949, The Congress of the Northern People's Congress is established (CNPC) working to reestablish the "Sokoto Khalifat" and the enforcement of the Islamic law, at least in the North of Nigeria, if not on the entire territory, with the help of Saudi Arabia and also Libya, Morocco, Tunis, The United Arab Emirates, Jordania, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon and Senegal.<sup>44</sup>

For almost 40 years, Nigeria is led by soldiers, mainly from the Islamic North, with strong Muslim bonds. The leading military group, though imposing a strict regime, controlling the tensions between the state's legislation and the Islamic law, failed to eradicate the violence against Christian communities from the Islamic North, from Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Bauchi and Zaria respectively.<sup>45</sup> Violence is registered within the Muslim world, from the groups promoting the Islamic law as interpreted by the Iranian Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini against the Shiits from Kano, Kaduna, Zaria, Katsina, Maiduguri and Bauchi.<sup>46</sup>

In 1999, civilian governs take the political power but the religious violence between Muslims and Christians reappear together with the risk of Nigeria splitting up on the North-South axis; according to an opinion, the strong assertion of the Islamic movement in the North of Nigeria was financially supported by bak-schemes ensuring money flows from Sudan, Iran, Libya, Syria, Palestine and especially Saudi Arabia.<sup>47</sup>

Nigeria is the second power of the sub-saharian Africa. It is the 6<sup>th</sup> oil exporter in the world; OPEC member, integrated in the West-African Economical Community – ECOWAS; it is the dominant economy in the region. It is a federal state and has 20% of the African IGP and 40% of the external commerce of the entire black Africa. Its military expenses are of 1.2 % of IGP. Its natural, energetic,<sup>48</sup> hydrological and mineral resources<sup>49</sup> are important.

The road network, its background trade systems are well developed and the school allow for an educated elite. The oil exploitation<sup>50</sup> brings \$16 blds a year, to an external debt of \$32 blds. Military and political expensive are high, given the fact that three quarters of the population leave in great poverty. Nigeria is like a gigantic with clay feet, formed of many ethnical and religious minorities, with strong social inequities and unstable oil resources.

The economy has management problems, being based on tribal structures, using political criteria in its development, facing insufficient equipments, administrative programs and poor communications. The society is severely fractured. The ethnical mixture is organized on three main ensembles: the Muslim Haoussa and Peul in North, Yoruba in South-East and the Christian Ibo at East.

Boko Haram as a form of radical Islamism,<sup>51</sup> a militant movement established in North Nigeria embraces the same ideology as the riot in; the police forces cannot control the zone.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>44</sup> See FaIoIa Toyin, *The History of Nigeria*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 28.

<sup>45</sup> The 1960 is the year of Nigeria's independence. See FaIoIa Toyin, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and secular Ideologies*, (New York: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 24-25.

<sup>46</sup> See William F.S. Miles, "Religious Pluralisms in Northern Nigeria," in Nehemia Levtzion and Randall L.Pouwels (ed.) *The History of Islam in Africa*, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 209-226.

<sup>47</sup> See Laremont, Ricardo; Gregorian, Hrach, "Political Islam in West Africa and the Sahel", *Military Review*, Vol. 86 Jan/Feb 2006, Department of the Army Headquarters, Fort Leavenworth, p. 31. See MEIB Staff, "Hezbollah and the West African Diamond Trade," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin*, vol. 6, no.6-7 (June/July 2004), on-line at <[www.meib.org/articles/0407\\_12.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/0407_12.htm)>, on 1st of April 2015.

<sup>48</sup> Oil, gases.

<sup>49</sup> Iron, dolomite.

<sup>50</sup> 2.5 million barrels per day.

<sup>51</sup> Boko Haram, *Boko* – instructional book (lingua franca Hausa); *Haram* – sinful things (Arab). It is a syntagm and a slogan, "Western-style education and its products are sacrileges"; in 2009, the movement is presented by Mohammed Yusuf in an interview at BBC, stating among others "Western-style education is mixed with issues

The movement is a threat to the population and the Nigerian state and its neighbors; the Islamic North considers the Christian South as advantaged and demand for a radical change, on the background of contesting the Western civilization, and the legitimacy of the Nigerian state, demanding a "purely Islamic" regime. The Boko Haram demands have some "hard core": the North is poor and corrupt, the administration is barely noticeable.

In 1999, in 12 states from the North of Nigeria Sharia is reintroduced, though Mohammed Yusuf, in favor of a "pure Sharia", transparent and equitable, considers not enough. In 2003, the politician Ali Modu Sheriff becomes governor in Borno department and names Alhaji Buji Foyi, an important Boko Haram member as the responsible with the religious affairs.

In 2007, Boko Haram relations with the Muslim administration get worse because of the building of a Mosque named Ibn Taymiyyah (the father of Salafi) and of a Saleffi school in Maiduguri by Mohammed Yusuf.

In 2009, there are clashes between the members of the movement and the security forces in several locations - Bauchi, Kano, Yobe and Borno, ended with over 700 Boko Haram dead, including Mohammed Yusuf, his deputy Abubakar bin Muhammad Shekau and Alhaji Buji Foyi.

In 2010, representatives of some Muslim radical movements - Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud<sup>53</sup>, a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel<sup>54</sup> supported the military training. In September 2010, over 100 partisans of the cause are freed from the prison of the Bauchi department, by fight; bomb attacks took place against Christians on Christmas; 80 people died.

In 2011, there were terrorist attacks to block the elections in Maiduguri and Bauchi, against Goodluck Jonathan, the Christian President, following the dead Muslim President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, from the North of Nigeria. Goodluck Jonathan's access to power was based on the 8 years rule - a succession between a Muslim President and a Christian one every 8 years. Boko Haram continued the rebel actions this time against Muslim personalities who criticised the movement - the leader Shehu al Kanuri (North-East of Nigeria, South-East of Niger, West-Ciad, North-Cameroun), the cleric Ibrahim Ahmad Abdullahi Bolori from Maiduguri, the cleric Ibrahim Birkuti from Borno Department.<sup>55</sup> On 15<sup>th</sup> of June 2011, in Abuja, there was the first suicidal attack against the Nigerian Police Forces Headquarters, followed by attacks against governmental officials and a suicidal attack against UN officials in Abuja, when 25 people died.<sup>56</sup>

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that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam." See Peter Pham, "The Ongoing Struggle against Boko Haram," *U.S. House of Representatives Documents*.

<sup>52</sup> In 1970, Muhammadu Marwa from Cameroun starts a mass movement against the Islamic hierarchy and also anti-govern; he is killed in 1980, but the movement re-starts in 1982, 1984 and 1985. See Freedom C. Onuoha, "The Islamist Challenge: Nigeria's Boko Haram Crisis Explained," *African Security Review* 19, no. 1, 2010, 54-67.

<sup>53</sup> Al Jazeera. See Joe Boyle, "Nigeria's 'Taliban' Enigma," BBC, July 31, 2009.

<sup>54</sup> The emir of the Islamic Maghreb (the emir of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb - AQIM). Joe Boyle, "Nigeria's 'Taliban' Enigma," BBC, July 31, 2009. Plus the Islamic leader Ansar Dine and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).

<sup>55</sup> "Very soon, we will wage jihad... our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country ungovernable." "Nigerian Islamists Vow 'Fiercer' Attacks," *AFP*, June 15, 2011.

<sup>56</sup> "Nigeria UN Bomb: Video of 'Boko Haram Bomber' Released," BBC, September 18, 2011. A series of radical operations follow: suicidal attacks against police departments in Damaturu, Yobe department (4<sup>th</sup> of November, 2011); a massacre in the Christian neighborhood, ended with 150 dead people; bombs exploding near the catholic church in Madalla, near Abuja, ended with 32 dead people and followed by more explosions (25<sup>th</sup> of December, 2011); the attack in Kano, 185 people died.

In 2012, Boko Haram had a series of bases, being a force able to start a war. While in Mali there was the multinational operation led by France - "Serval"- the Nigerian Army was deployed against Boko Haram and the fights overstepped the Nigerian borders.

In 2013, the Nigerian Army gave up controlling the border zones towards Niger, Ciad, Cameroun; their control being held by the militants taking measures such as replacing the Nigerian flag, overtaxing, establishing local governs.<sup>57</sup> Kidnapping was a common practice,<sup>58</sup> completed by other forms of violence, in a zone where the population lives with less than \$1 a day.

It is estimated that Boko Haram became a guerilla force with geopolitical implications that caused more than 300.000 refugees and affected the daily life for millions of people. Supporting this movement became a global threat.<sup>59</sup>

Nigeria has an active diplomacy; it is the voice of Africa; it integrates in its sphere of influence the peripheral areas, opposing to France's participation to ECOWAS, wishing to be considered a hegemonic power in the area of that organization. Yet, its internal instability prevents it from manifesting its hegemonic tendencies.<sup>60</sup>

Nigeria received Islam in the X<sup>th</sup> century was strongly connected to Libya (North) due to commerce cu and the language, and bonded with Nigeria because of the ethnicity and religion (South).<sup>61</sup> During the last years, there were violent actions supported by the activists from the South of Algeria, against the Nigerian Govern, especially at the Niger-Ciad border, a movement financially supported by Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Libya and Iran. Money supports are given to schools and mosqs, together with teachers and clerics, as active vectors of the Islamic law, in order to improve the economic and political life.

In Ciad, the ethnical diversity contains 200 groups (Sara, Arab, maba, toubou), the biggest being the Sara group (South) in power 1961-1979, after that, the power was held by the North. Muslims are about 80% of the population, mainly in North and in the towns in

<sup>57</sup> Local governs in Marte, Magumeri, Mobbar, Gubio, Guzamala, Abadam, Kukawa, Kaga, Nganzai and Monguno See Pham, J. Peter, "Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Orbis* 55, no. 2, Spring 2011, 35-42.

<sup>58</sup> Boko Haram sequestered 300 girls, from a school in Chibok and a French family of 7 people – for a \$3 mil. and the freedom for 17 Boko Haram members, kept in a prison in Cameroun, plus the kidnapping of three priests - one French and two Ialians. Pham J. Peter, "The Dangerous 'Pragmatism' of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb," *Journal of the Middle East and Africa* 2, no. 1, January-June 2011. Outside the Nigerian territory, in Cameroun were reported the kidnapping of a Canadian priest and ten Chinese workers. For the Nigerian families, kidnappers ask for sums between \$10.000-20.000, sometimes up to \$250.000. See Tattersall Nick and William Maclean, "Nigerian Sect Leader Praises al Qaeda, Warns U.S.," *Reuters*, July 13, 2010. "We are holding them hostage because the leaders of Cameroon and Nigeria detained our women and children under inhumane conditions". See Hamza Idris, "Why We Abducted French Nationals--Shekau," *Daily Trust*, March 19, 2013. The demands were entitled, see also Chuks Okocha, Yemi Akinsuyi, Michael Olugbode, and Aminu Mohammed, "Boko Haram Amnesty ... Women, Children Detainees to be Released First, Says FG," *This Day*, May 23, 2013.

<sup>59</sup> See "Nigeria's Boko Haram 'got \$3m ransom' to free hostages," *BBC*, April 26, 2013; Ndahi Marama, "Kidnapped Monguno Regains Freedom after Payment of Ransom," *Vanguard*, May 7, 2013; Jacob Zenn, "Boko Haram's Evolving Tactics and Alliances in Nigeria," *CTC Sentinel* 6, no. 6, June 2013, p. 11; Robert Marquand, "Nigeria Has Arrested 10 Generals for Aiding Boko Haram," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 4, 2014.

<sup>60</sup> See Constantin Onișor, Paul Duță, Adrian Dobre, *Areale globale: Uniunea Europeană - Africa subsahariană*, (Techno Media, Sibiu, 2009), 58.

<sup>61</sup> A multiethnic state with a population of 10 millions people (56% Hausa, 22% Djerma-Songhay, 8.5% Tuareg, 8% Fulani and 4% Kanuri) predominantly Islamic (90% of the population) spread in two great parts: the Suffi and the fundamentalist Wahhabi, of Soudi inspiration; the fundamentalist are organized against the Suffi in two groups: The Islamic Culture and Groups Association (Souleiman Youssouf) and The Association of The Islamic Niger (El Haii Aboubacar Issa). See Anneli Botha and Hussein Solomon, *Terrorism in Africa*, Centre for International Political Studies, University of Pretoria, 2002, 10, <[www.up.ac.za/academic/cips/Publications/TERRORISM%20In%20AFRICA.pdg](http://www.up.ac.za/academic/cips/Publications/TERRORISM%20In%20AFRICA.pdg)>, (accesed in 1 April 2015).

South.<sup>62</sup> Along with the ethnical diversity, another factor in favor of the radical Islam is the strong influences of Libya, Egypt and Sudan over Ciad.<sup>63</sup>

Having strong cultural, political and trading bonds since the VIII<sup>th</sup> century, Libya and Egypt open and maintain many commercial routes to the Sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the Muslims had historical religious contacts with Libya and Darfur (Sudan),<sup>64</sup> especially after the taking of the power from the French colonists by the non-Muslim group Sara Algeria, Egypt, Sudan and Libya prepare and support Muslim rebel forces from North.<sup>65</sup> In 2004, the radical violence is stopped by the Ciad Army, ending with the death of 43 fighters from Algeria, Niger, Nigeria and Mali.<sup>66</sup>

In Mali there are 11 millions people in two groups<sup>67</sup>; it got the Islam in the XI<sup>th</sup> century and evolve to the moderate cult Sufi Qadiriyya tempering the Wahhabi tendencies of the Saudi Arabia and Libya, even if in Bamako there were Tuareg rebel movements against the govern.<sup>68</sup>

Mauritania with a population around 3 millions people, got the Islam in the XI<sup>th</sup> century, when the Berbers brought it there - Sanhaja and also a traditional form brought by the Moroccans – Almoravids – which reformed the Berber form, spreading in the Ghana Empire, (presently Mali) and in the Takrur Empire (presently Senegal).<sup>69</sup> There were no radical forms, but the border with Algeria was difficult to control. The humanitarian activities supported by Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Qatar are mainly for the building of mosques and

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<sup>62</sup> Population: 54% Muslims (mainly Suffi – Tijaniyya - the fundamentalists are in minority (Mahamadou Mahamat/from 2002 Haroun Idriss Abou-Mandela but also other imams imani transiting Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), 30% Christians, 16% animists. See "Backgrounds: Chad Religious Freedom," Countries of the World: Chad (25 June 2012): <[www.ncbuy.com/reference/country/backgrounds.html?code=cd&sec=religiousfree](http://www.ncbuy.com/reference/country/backgrounds.html?code=cd&sec=religiousfree)>, (accessed in 2 April 2015).

<sup>63</sup> The Arabs control the state's commerce, the maba are in the centre – in Abeche and Am-Dam -, toubou are in the North of Ciad - Borkou, Ennedi and Tibesti - with traditional connections with Libya. See J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Africa's Thirty Year War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963-1993*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1999), 6-7.

<sup>63</sup> Bonds to the. XIX<sup>th</sup> century Jihadist initiatives from Libya and Sudan and Suffi supporters – Sanusiyya (Libya) and Mahdiyya (Sudan). After the end of the colonial power from Ciad, the Islamism divides in: a conservatory movement and a pan-islamic orientation. See Mario J. Azevedo and Emmanuel U. Nnadozie, *Chad: A Nation in Search of its Future*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 6-7.

<sup>64</sup> Bonds to the XIX<sup>th</sup> century Jihadist initiatives from Libya and Sudan and Suffi supporters – Sanusiyya (Libya) and Mahdiyya (Sudan). After the end of the colonial power from Ciad, the Islamism divides in: a conservatory movement and a pan-islamic orientation. See Mario J. Azevedo and Emmanuel U. Nnadozie, *Chad: A Nation in Search of its Future*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 95.

<sup>65</sup> In 1960, Sadiq al-Mahdi's (Sudan) and in 1969 Muammar Qaddafi's (Libya) support the rebel Muslim movement for the creation of a "Sahara's Islamic State" made from Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ciad, Niger and Mali. More, Libya declares in 1981, its unification to Ciad and in 1982, Niger's unification to Libya. See Burr J. Millard and Collins Robert O., *Africa's Thirty Year War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963-1993*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1999), 6-7.

<sup>66</sup> See Laoro Gondje, "Chad says killed 43 Islamic militants in clashes," *Sudan Tribune*, 11 March 2004, <[www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=4547900](http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=topNews&storyID=4547900)>, (accessed on 3<sup>rd</sup> of April, 2015).

<sup>67</sup> North (Tuaregs and the Moori) and South (Mande), 80% Bambara speakers apart from the language of the ethic group they belong to. See Nicolas Colombant, "Mali's Muslims steer back to spiritual roots," *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 February 2002, <[www.csmonitor.com/2002/0226/p08s020-woaf.html](http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0226/p08s020-woaf.html)>, (accessed on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April, 2015).

<sup>68</sup> In The North of Mali, the movement led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar threatened the Northern border, spongy enough for easy radical movements. See Carlos Echeverria Jesus, "Radical Islam in the Maghreb," *Orbis*, Spring 2004, 10.

<sup>69</sup> Ethnical structure: 30% Moors (mix Arab-Berber), 30% black (ethical groups Peul/Fulani, Soninke, Wolof), 40% racial mix (Moor/black). Official languages - Hassaniya (Arabic dialect), Wolof. Other languages – French, Pulaar and Sonike. See Muriel, Gomez-Perez, "l'islamisme Dakar: d'un contrôle social total une culture du pouvoir," *Afrika Spectrum* 1, pp.79-98, 1994.

Islamic schools, monitored by the authorities that sometimes forbid some political and religious manifestations considered "threats".

Senegal and the present states – Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea-Conakry – before the colonial age were part of a single state, Senegambia, following the Takrur Empire. In the Takrur Empire in the XIII<sup>th</sup> century, Islam appeared and expanded during the next four centuries in the entire territory.<sup>70</sup> In the XIX<sup>th</sup> century, Umar (bin-Said) Tall led a reformist Muslim movement and fights the French, introducing Islam in Bambara, the present Mali. In the XX<sup>th</sup> century, the Islam becomes Senegal's religion, mainly because of Ibrahim Niass, whose influence extends towards Western, and Northern Africa, and also in the Middle East. The Jihad promoted by Ibrahim Niass was addressed to the heart and not to the sword - peaceful resistance instead of violent opposition towards the colonial regime. He was followed by Muridiyya, the leader Falilou M'Backe.<sup>71</sup>

Cote d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Togo are West African states in which the Muslim communities experienced some radical Islam. In this region, between the XI-XIX<sup>th</sup> centuries the Islam spread so that Samory Toure ("The Black Napoleon") created the Islamic State Wasulu (on the actual territory of actual Cote d'Ivoire and the North of Burkina Faso) with a moderate Islam. In the XX<sup>th</sup> century there appears the Wahhabi, promoted by Al-Hajj Tiekedo. Between the trend promoted by Ibrahim Niass (in Senegal and around) and the Wahhabi from Cote d'Ivoire there are big differences especially in expressing radicalism. In 2002, in Cote d'Ivoire, Alassane Outtara, the leader of a Muslim group from the North and from Burkina Faso organized a coup d'etat.

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<sup>70</sup> In the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century, The Islam expands due to the Jakhanke Senegalese missionaries – in Guinea-Conakry. See Ghalioun, Burhan, *In Islam et islamismes au sud du Sahara Islam et islamismes au sud du Sahara*, 1998, edited by Ousmane Kane and J.-L. Triaud. Paris: IREMAM-Karthala-MSH, 7-12.

<sup>71</sup> See Ghalioun, Burhan, *op.cit.*, 23-27.

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