

THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT AND STATUS OF SUDANESE REGION ABEYI

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ABSTRACT:

THE CIVIL WAR CAUSED BY REBEL MOVEMENTS IN DARFUR AGAINST KHARTOUM AND ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN JUBA AND KHARTOUM IS COMPLEX DUE TO THE FAULTS OF THE ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS FACTIONS, THE MYRIAD REBEL FACTIONS, BECOMING THE LONGEST AND COMPLICATED CONFLICT IN THE HISTORY OF AFRICA.

THE DISCONTENT LEADS TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CONFLICT IN DARFUR PROVINCE; IT DOESN'T HAVE AS BASED THE ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS CRITERIA, BUT THE POPULATION RESENTMENT TOWARDS THE UNEVEN DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. THE SECESSION OF SOUTH SUDAN HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE KHARTOUM (THE TRANSPORT PIPELINES ARE LOCATED IN THE NORTH) RELATIONS WITH DARFUR (SOUTH SIDE ALWAYS) RELATED TO THE DISCOVERY AND EXPLOITATION OF PETROLEUM DEPOSITS. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, INCLUDING CHINA AND RUSSIA, COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE VETO POWER, AS WELL AS ALGERIA AND PAKISTAN, EXPRESSING DISSATISFACTION WITH THE THREAT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST SUDAN, ESPECIALLY SINCE SANCTIONS RELATE TO OIL EXPORTS.

KEY WORDS: SUDAN, DARFUR, SOUTH SUDAN, PIPELINES, OIL EXPORT

CHINA - THE PIVOT ROLE BETWEEN THE TWO SUDANESE'S STATES

The civil war caused by rebel movements in Darfur¹ against Khartoum and armed conflict between Juba and Khartoum is complex due to the faults of the ethnic and religious factions, the myriad rebel factions, becoming the longest and complicated conflict in the history of Africa.

The discontent leads to the outbreak of the conflict in Darfur province; it doesn't have as based the ethnic or religious criteria, but the population resentment towards the uneven distribution of wealth. Until the outbreak of the crisis in Darfur, the Sudanese Central Government sought to build an "Ideal" Islamic State without opponents and without any other religious groups, the Muslim population from Western Province are the main source for the armed forces sent against the people of the South.²

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¹ See <http://www.nationmaster.com> (accessed November 10, 2016).

² See Paul Duță ș.a., *Africa – o țintă economică?* (Tehno Media, Sibiu, 2009), 258-277.

China supports the multilateral trade with African States in cooperative systems with custom models of development and governance like FOCAC,³ in a vision different from that of Western models, those of the Bretton Woods institutions.⁴

In 1990, China's strategic commitment starts in the region relying on the advantage of the lack of previous colonial power in Africa by developing the existing close cooperation between Sudan and China, leading Sudan to become a major exporter of oil on the Chinese market, after Chevron had discovered serious deposits of oil in Sudan (1978).⁵

In 1994, China's major investments beginning in the field of petroleum in Sudan so that in 2002 the Sudan covered 40% of African oil imports.⁶

On August 2003, peace talks begin in Nigeria with the participation of the UN and the AU.⁷ The parties to the conflict shall endeavor to settle the crisis through political means, but the fighting continues. JEM only accepts UN mediation and have no confidence in the AU peacekeepers.⁸

On 24 September 2003, the Security Agreement is signed between the Government and the southern guerrillas by providing for the strengthening the Popular Movement, as well as the establishment of a territorial autonomy.⁹

The Sudan Army and Islamist militias Janjaweed faces black tribes grouped in Sudan Liberation Army - SLA, and the Justice and Equality Movement - JEM.¹⁰

In April 2004 in N'Djamena, Chad is involved in negotiations; these materialized in "agreement for the humanitarian cessation of fire" between the Sudanese Government, on the one hand, the JEM and the SLA on the other side. Continuation of the Sudanese crisis could have implications not only for the internal stability of that State, but also for the regional state such as Chad, the neighbor of the Sudan, can be "contagious." Sudanese President seize power through a coup in December 1990, the Sudanese Government gave him military support. Meanwhile, he owes its domestic political support to a tribe, Bidayat, which has the same ethnic origins with the Zaghawa tribe, in the Darfur province, tribe that played an important role in starting the rebellion but also the target of the actions undertaken by the Khartoum.

In 2004, under the auspices of the AU is sent an international mission of observer in the Darfur province. The AU Mission has not been able to prevent widespread atrocities against civilians in the occupied areas of the region, the size of the territory and the level of danger are the main factors of the failure of such peacekeeping operations.¹¹

³ The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation - FOCAC.

⁴ Chinese leaders even came up with the following motto "Do as we (Chinese) do, but not as they (the West) say." See Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?" *Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 4, (October 2010), 126.

⁵ See Sawadogo Wilfried Relwende, "South Sudan secession: What implications for Darfur and Beijing's strategic policy options?" *Issues and Studies*, 49(2), (2013, National Chengchi University, Taipei), 147-177.

⁶ Large Daniel, "From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations with Sudan," in *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*, ed. Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (London: Hurst, 2008), 280.

⁷ See Paul Duță ș.a., *op.cit.*, 263.

⁸ Teodor Frunzeti, *Lumea 2005*, Enciclopedie Politică și Militară, (Editura Centrului Tehnic Editorial al Armatei, București, 2005), 648.

⁹ See Sefa-Nyarko, C., "Civil war in South Sudan: Is it a reflection of historical secessionist and natural resource wars in "Greater Sudan"?" *African Security*, 9(3), 2016, 188-210.

¹⁰ See Paul Duță ș.a., *op. cit.*, 271.

¹¹ *African Union Mission in Sudan - AMIS. United Nations Security Council Rezolution nr. 1564*, 4 April 2004.

The 2500 soldiers and observers participating in the AMIS prove insufficient to ensure peace in Darfur (area whose surface is similar to the surface of France), allowing the Janjaweed militias to pursue reprisals against civilians, burning their homes and forcing more than 2 million residents to flee.

On 3 July 2004, the Government of Sudan and the United Nations signed a Joint Statement, affirming, on the one hand, the Sudanese officials pledge to resolve the conflict between North and South and the crisis in Darfur, and on the other hand, the commitment of the UN to provide assistance.¹²

Several members of the Security Council, including China and Russia, countries which have veto power, as well as Algeria and Pakistan, expressing dissatisfaction with the threat of sanctions against Sudan, especially since sanctions relate to oil exports.¹³

The fighting continues, so that the AU creates a Commission to monitor cessation of fire. Its observer's report that, while the villages populated by ethnic groups other than the Arabic were completely destroyed (depopulated, looted and burned), Arab settlements are functional, and their inhabitants unharmed.¹⁴

In January 2005, the International Conference in Nairobi confirms that the war ended in the South and stresses the need for the immediate establishment of peace in Darfur. Meanwhile, the Janjaweed Arab militia continues the attacks on African tribes of the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa leading to the creation of a wave of approximately 1200000 refugees and 50000 victims. In this situation the intervention of the international community is imperative.¹⁵

¹² *United Nations Security Council Resolution nr. 1547*, 11 June 2004.

¹³ See Lagu, J., *Sudan: Odyssey through a State, from Ruin to Hope*, (Khartoum University Press, Khartoum, 2006), 21.

¹⁴ See *Human Rights Watch Interview* – 2005.

¹⁵ See *Human Rights Watch Interview* – 2005.



Figure no 1 - The Darfur, South Kordofanul and Blue Nile areas¹⁶

On 24 March 2005, the Security Council launches a UNMIS mandate to support North-South Agreement compliance and the disarmament processes, organization of elections and the return of refugees. As a general term of the mandate, the mission should enable the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to promote the principles of the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, as well as the protection of the fundamental rights of the Sudanese population as a whole, particularly in the fight against impunity criminal, to cooperate with AMIS.¹⁷

On 9 June 2005, NATO announced that it would support the AU (AMIS I and AMIS II) in the management of the crisis in Darfur, which was the first NATO mission on the African continent, beyond the borders of its members, resulting in misunderstandings and controversies related to the status of the mission “out of area” between British and American pole at Franco-German within the organization.¹⁸

In December 2005, Chad declared itself in “State of belligerence” with Sudan,¹⁹ which it accuses of attempted to “destabilize” and support rebels who oppose Deby President. At the end of 2005, the situation becomes very complex, due to the proliferation of armed groups and the rebels, the bandits and the Chad rebels’ entry and the deserters from the army, which gather in Darfur preparing to attack Chad.

¹⁶ https://www.google.ro/search?q=south+sudan+maps&biw=1280&bih=871&tbm=isch&imgil=3Me0s_ITG_uL3M%253A%253BoToHi9, (accessed November 10, 2016).

¹⁷ See, *United Nations Security Council Resolution nr. 1590*, 25 Mars 2005.

¹⁸ See Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Puterea militară în secolul XXI*, (Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, București, 2005), 10.

¹⁹ See Stephen Brown and Jörn Grävingholt, *From Power Struggles to Sustainable Peace: Understanding Political Settlements* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2011), 11.

In January 2006, SLM launched a number of attacks in Shearia, in Golo, and on a Government convoy. These attacks have been directed mainly against the Janjaweed militias, but there were also a lot of collateral victims, mostly civilians.

A new dimension of the conflict is given by the emergence of a group that calls itself the “Islamic resistance movement from Darfur” with attacks on the Danish and Norwegian interests in the area, as a reaction to the international crisis provoked by caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed.

In February 2006, a peace agreement is signed in Tripoli on the crisis in Darfur. The Presidents of Sudan Omar al-Bashir and Chadian Idriss Deby signed at Tripoli, a peace agreement supported by Libyan leader Muammar al-Ghaddafi.²⁰

The Commission meeting of AU and UN manifests its total approval toward the Resolution of the Security Council of 3 February 2006 regarding the transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The first reaction of the Sudanese Government, conveyed through the voice of Minister of Foreign Affairs Lam Akol, was rejecting the transfer of AMIS authority to the UN.²¹ Within the National Assembly of Sudan, the Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs subdue for debate a motion on the transfer of UA authority to UN reiterating the idea of a complete failure in it implements this transfer.

The two rebel movements - JEM and SLM - supports from the beginning the crisis, the need for the involvement of the United Nations or even to NATO, with a strong mandate as a legal support able to put an end to the atrocities committed in the area. In this sense the two movements were engaged in powerful media campaigns directed against the inability of AMIS to protect the civil population and to be replaced by the UN or NATO forces. To support the point of view expressed previously, the two movements organized and lead protest manifestations.

The prospects for resolving the crisis in Sudan depend on the mission to secure the Darfur region, the transformation of AMIS into a mission of the UN²² within the framework of the partnership between AU and the UN being established a transitional period until 30 September 2006.²³

China is faced with the dilemmas of choosing between supporting the Government in Khartoum or involvement in fighting the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, the secession of South Sudan (2011) respectively between the principle of non-interference or constructive engagement.²⁴

The secession is in prospect of its supporters on how to settling the civil war and the disappearance, the main cause for future armed conflicts by separating the warring parties through international borders while for the supporters of unity of Sudan, the secession even though it will make transfers of populations is not going to achieve ethnic homogeneity.²⁵ Sudan has five times

²⁰ See *Liberation Movement (SLM), Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)*, Sept 30, 2005 from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/darfur.htm>, (accessed November 10, 2016).

²¹ Jok Madut Jok, *Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan: Living in Fear under a Newly-Won Freedom*, Special Report No. 1 (Juba: The Sudd Institute, January 12, 2013), p. 7.

²² Jok Madut Jok, *Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan...*, 7

²³ Jok Madut Jok, *Mapping the Sources of Conflict and Insecurity in South Sudan...*, 7

²⁴ See Large Daniel, “From Non-Interference to Constructive Engagement? China's Evolving Relations with Sudan,” in *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and A Continent Embrace*, ed. Chris Alden, Daniel Large, and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (London: Hurst, 2008), 295-318.

²⁵ See Paul Duță ș.a., *Africa – o țintă economică?* (Tehno Media, Sibiu, 2009), 258-277.

more troops than South Sudan, to which is added the Janjaweed²⁶ with a reputation particularly after the bloody raids carried out in Darfur.

The Secession of South Sudan has a direct effect on the Khartoum (the transport pipelines are located in the North) relations with Darfur (south side always) related to the discovery and exploitation of petroleum deposits (80% is located in the South).²⁷

The political objective of the rebel movement in Darfur similar to those of the SPLM/A sought initial to change the in Khartoum and a greater autonomy; after the death of the SPLM/Ar, Dr. John Grange (30 July 2005), the political object of SPLM/A is become independent of Khartoum following a referendum, while Darfur remains within Sudan but maintaining the request of a regime change and maintaining links with South Sudan. The risk is the Darfur rebel movements move from their demands related to the unresolved political autonomy to demand political independence *de jure*.

During 2005-2011, China's relations with Sudan and South Sudan are conducted on the basis of the principle "a Sudan two systems."

In April 2012, the President of South Sudan pay a visit to China, stressing the common vital interests related to Chinese investment in the petroleum sector from South Sudan providing about 98% of the State budget.

Beijing proposes the project of building a pipeline to transport the oil towards the world market through Kenya, ensuring the preparation of specialists in the field of petroleum.²⁸

Sharing the taxation benefits from the exploitation of oil deposits (5% Sudan, 85% South Sudan, 10% Abeyi) will encourage the authorities in Juba , attracting the attention and interests of foreign investors reconfiguring strategies and geopolitics in the region but also on a possible wider autonomy for Darfur.

China may enjoy the pivot role between the two Sudanese's states, according to an author, on the modeled on "divided Nations"²⁹ dependent on one another - the oil fields are located in the South and the refineries in the North refineries - the participation of China in ensuring political stability.

THE CONUNDRUM OF ABYEI REGION STATUS

The Abyei region is rich in resources is situated at the border of Sudan and South Sudan is cause for intrastate dispute after the independence between two major groups - Ngok Dinka (agro-pastoral population claiming affiliation to South Sudan with main location in Bahr el Ghazal) and Misseriya (nomad population in the Northern region but which migrates annually into the region

²⁶ An armed militia sponsored by President Al-Bashir.

²⁷ See Ali Askouri, "China's Investment in the Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying Communities," in *African Perspectives on China in Africa*, ed. F. Manji and S. Marks (Cape Town: Fahamu, 2007), p. 77. See also Sudan Tribune, "China to Expand Investment in South Sudan after Independence," *Sudan Tribune*, June 1, 2011, <http://www.sudantribune.com/China-to-expand-investment-in,39080> (accessed October 27, 2016).

²⁸ Xinhua, "China Trains Petroleum Workers in South Sudan," *China Daily*, July 11, 2011, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/11/content_12879709.htm (accessed October 23, 2016).

²⁹ North and South Yemen before unification in 1990, North and South Vietnam in 1975, East and West Germany in the 1990s, and more contemporary cases such as North and South Korea since 1953, and Taiwan and Mainland China since 1949. See Yu-shan Wu, "From Romantic Triangle to Marriage? Washington-Beijing-Taipei Relations in Historical Comparison," *Issues & Studies* 41, no. 1 (March 2005), 113-159.

and it is considered to belong to Sudan with main location in Kordofan)³⁰ - propagating uncertainty and instability for South Sudan.³¹ The colonial Administration further complicates relations between the two communities through the expansion of Ngok Dinka administration ensured in Kordofan.³²

During the conflict between North and South, both in the first civil war (1955-1972) and the second civil war (1983-2005) the two populations are positioned in different camps - Ngok Dinka allies with southern Anyana rebels, subsequently with SPLA³³ and the Misseriya with the Khartoum Government - the region became the main battlefield antagonizing extreme violence and egregious brutalities.³⁴

The existence of unclarities regarding the international border and the unresolved refugee population drama questions the implementation of the CPA. According to the Peace Agreement, the South will become autonomous for a period of six years, after which a referendum will be held to decide if the Sudan splits or Sudan will remain a unified State.

The benefits of exporting oil are divided equally between the Government and South Sudan. The political system of the Government in Khartoum is to be restructured based on democratic principles and respect for human rights. There will be two armies, if it chooses secession.³⁵

Two years after the signing of the Machakos Protocol which signed The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area negotiate the inclusion of the Abeyi region in a referendum for independence, key elements being who is "resident" of the region, and which the territorial borders are.

Through negotiation, the region has a special administrative regime on an interim period pending the conduct of referendum - the local government dependent on the National Government and international monitors, residents may be citizens of both the Western Kordofan and of Bahr el Ghazal, the oil royalties are divided into six parts (the Governments of the two countries, the two districts, Hgok Dinka and Misseriya).³⁶

³⁰ See Bekoe Dorina, Kelly Campbell, and Nicholas Howenstein, *Resolving the Boundary Dispute in Sudan's Abyei Region*, (US Inst of Peace Oct 2005), online at <http://www.usip.org/publications/resolvingboundary-dispute-sudans-abyei-region> (accessed 5 December 2016).

³¹ See Johnson, Douglas H., "Why Abyei Matters: The Breaking Point of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement?" *African Affairs*, 107 (426), 2008, 1-19.

³² See *South Sudan President to Assert Abyei Belongs to Dinka Ngok* (Sudan Tribune Jul 24, 2011), online at <http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-President-asserts,39616> (accessed 7 December 2016).

³³ Sudan People's Liberation Army - SPLA.

³⁴ See Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock **2-3 (Intl Crisis Group Oct 12, 2007), online at <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/hom-of-africa/sudan/B0470/o20Sudan0/o20Breaking%20the%20Abyei%20Deadlock>. Ashx, (accessed 5 December 2016).

³⁵ *2004 Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Army on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict*. See McNeily Jack, "A condominium approach to Abyei," *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Volume: 13, Issue: 1, Summer 2012, 265-290.

³⁶ See, for example, Rebecca Hamilton, "How a Residency Dispute in One Key Town Could head Sudan Back to War," *Christian Sci Monitor*, Nov 2, 2010, online at <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/1102/How-a-residency-dispute-in-one-key-town-could-lead-Sudan-back-to-war> (accessed 5 December 2016).

If for a serious disagreement - setting boundaries - is constituted “the Abyei Boundaries Commission,”³⁷ to establish the residence status of the Misseriya nomad population nature has raised concerns especially in the absence of CPA regulations.³⁸




Figure no 2 - The pipelines of Sudan³⁹

The refusal to accept the “Abyei Boundaries Commission” report triggered hostilities between the Misseriya and the SPLM/A in Abeyi which leads to the deaths of tens of thousands of refugees.⁴⁰ Both parties agreed to refer the case to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague.

The solution for the Abeyi must satisfy the interests of both parties, in compliance with the requirement of the CPA to hold the referendum even if there is strong opposition to it by working to establish boundaries to clarify status of Misseriya in this region.⁴¹

The Misseriya vote can change the demographics of the region and manipulate the vote, and can block or cancel the promotion of economic interests of particularly importance to both

³⁷ Composed of five members representing North Sudan, five members representing the SPLM/A, and five international experts... “[t]he Commission will endeavor to reach a decision by consensus. If, however, an agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the experts will have the final say.” See *The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area*, §1.1.3.

³⁸ *The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area*, Chapter IV notes only: “The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across the territory of Abyei.”

³⁹ https://www.google.ro/search?q=south+sudan+maps&biw=1280&bih=871&tbm=isch&imgil=3Me0s_ITG_uL3M%253A%253BoToHi9, (accessed November 10, 2016).

⁴⁰ Amber Henshaw, *Sudan Tinderbox Catches Fire* (BBC May 24, 2008), <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/africa/7418582.stm>, (accessed 7 December 2016).

⁴¹ President Omer Al-Bashir has cemented North Sudan's hardline position, stating that the referendum will only take place “if all the people of Abyei participate, not just the Ngok Dinka.” See *No Referendum in Abyei, Sudanese Official Says* (Sudan Tribune Dec 9, 2010), <http://www.sudantribune.com/No-referendum-in-Abyei-Sudanese37221>, (accessed 5 December 2016).

countries, especially since none of them has the full rights over the region and both the Ngok Dinka and the resistance in the region does not accept such a solution.⁴²

The control of the region's by a single population - Ngok Dinka or Misseriya State – supported by the states that was aligned - South Sudan or Sudan - will be done at the expense of other population as well as other smaller ethnic groups in this area.

⁴² See Thirik Mijak, *Is SPLM Buying Abyei and Selling Heglig to North Sudan Regime?* (Gurtong Nov 22, 2011), online at <http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/cd/ArticleView/rnid/519/ardcleId/6072/Is-SPLM-Buying-Abyeiand-Selling-Heglig-to-North-Sudan-Regime.aspx>, (accessed 5 December 2016).

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