

MIGRATION OF TERRORISTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Nicolae MELINESCU¹

ABSTRACT: *ENORMOUS PROGRESS HAS BEEN RECORDED IN FIGHTING BOTH TERRORISM AND MARITIME PIRACY IN THE YEARS FOLLOWING THE ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER 2001. THE PRESSURE PUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON EXTREMIST GROUPS AND SEAFARING BANDITS HAD SOME SIDE EFFECTS, NONETHELESS. PIRATES IN SOMALI WATERS LEFT THE SAFETY OF THE TERRITORIAL WATERS AND VENTURED FURTHER OUT INTO THE OCEAN IN SEARCH OF NEW TARGETS. SOME OF THEM SAILED DOWN SOUTH AS FAR AS THE MOZAMBIQUE SHORES TO OUTSMART THE INTERNATIONAL WATER PATROLS. NIGER DELTA VIGILANTES MAY HAVE USED PART OF THE ILLICIT MONEY GAINED FROM OIL BUNKERING TO SUPPORT THE JIHADISTS FROM BOKO HARAM. TERRORISTS, IN THEIR TURN STARTED TO SEARCH NEW VULNERABLE TARGETS OUTSIDE THEIR TERRESTRIAL OPERATION GROUNDS. THE HIGHJACKING OF THE CRUISER ACHILLE LAURO IN 1985 AND THE ATTACK ON THE AMERICAN GUIDED-MISSILE DESTROYER USS COLE OUTSIDE THE PORT OF ADEN IN 2000 PROVED THAT THE SEA WAS NOT OUT OF REACH FOR CRIMINAL ACTS. WHAT THE PLANET'S OCEANS NEED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IS NOT ONLY A TIGHTER REGULATED MARITIME REGIME TO PREVENT ARMED ATTACKS BUT ALSO, A SEAT IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AS A BRITISH ADMIRAL HAS SUGGESTED.*

KEY WORDS: SEA PIRACY, MIGRANTS, SEA ROBBERIES, MARITIME SAFETY, FAILED STATES

The international community put a strenuous pressure on terrorist groups after the attacks of the 11th of September 2001. Closer monitoring of arms deals, of illegal financial operations and a tightly knit-network of intelligence agencies from the US and from allied, partner countries closed in a circle of fire around extremist, violent factions. Strategic terrestrial targets like nuclear plants, airports, government buildings, international organizations headquarters witnessed improved security arrangements designed to protect them and to discourage possible attacks.

Unfortunately, such measures covered mainly Europe, North America and industrialized countries from the Far East like Japan, South Korea and China, to a certain extent. Failing or failed states like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were the new terrorist hubs for training insurgents and for planning armed attacks against civilians and democratic institutions.

At enormous costs, some areas of the world concerned with their own security have been gradually better prepared to counter terrorist attempts, while new regional conflicts like the one in Syria turned large populated areas from sensitive countries into new havens for extremist operations. The migration flow that local or regional conflicts produced brought

¹ Associate Lecturer, "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca

hundreds of thousands of civilians to the rich European countries. Sequential measures to stem the tide of so-called refugees proved feeble, hectic palliatives for a process which caught Europe completely unprepared. Once the Turkish gateway seemed to reduce the flow to a dripping, following the three billion euros earmarked by the European Union to slam the door for Syrians, Afghans or Pakistanis, migration of civilians shifted its course from the enlarged Middle East, first to eastern and northern Africa. Soon, the pressure from countries like Egypt and Sudan, forced migrants to take the route through the Sahel area and Libya. The change of venue was the outcome of a secret plan worked out by the European Union and its conductor Germany. On March the 23d 2016, the foreign ministers of the 28 member countries (with Britain still clinging on the organization) earmarked 35 million euros for eight African countries to fight illegal human trafficking for duration of three years. Two contradicting facts questioned the rightfulness of the project. First, part of the money would inevitably go to despots and tyrant rulers liker the Sudanese Omar Hassan al-Bashar, indicted by the International Criminal Court for genocide and crimes against humanity. Secondly, the so-called TOP 37, as the EU document was labeled, used the term “dictators” for local leaders, proving beyond any doubt that those behind the project were perfectly aware that part of the money, if not its entirety, would end up in private pockets to support local political police and repressive state systems. The German paper Der Spiegel, which scooped the story, linked the secret regimen of the document to such irregularities and quoted an insider from the office of the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who stated that the secrecy of the plan was to confer reliability and credibility to the EU’s commitment in its fight against illegal migration². Most recently, even the sieving along this escape route from poverty and conflict through Libya across the Mediterranean came under monitoring. Migrants from all over Sub-Saharan Africa were undeterred and followed a western escape along the coast of Sierra Leone, Senegal, up north towards Gibraltar. (See map below)



²<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/eu-to-work-with-despot-in-sudan-to-keep-refugees-out-a-1092328.html>, accessed 23 January 2017.

As ground-security measures were being set up, terrorist groups sought new battlefields where to perpetrate their criminal acts. Consequently, the most promising of them all seemed the high seas.

After 1990, maritime piracy proved that international waters were a vast unregulated territory, difficult to monitor firstly because the law of the sea adopted by the United Nations (UNCLOS) in 1982 provided no direct operational role in fighting crimes committed in the international waters, and secondly large parts of the Earth's oceans were out of the regular, crowded sea passages. The Gulf of Aden, a paradise for the Somali pirates, has always been a heavy traffic route, yet more than four hundred commercial vessels were attacked and highjacked in 2010 alone because that particular sea lane is three times larger than the whole European continent and almost impossible to become rock-bottom safe for seafarers.

Soon, one country after another started to be concerned with their connections to the world via the seven seas and produced whatever safety naval force they could provide. The European Union, NATO, individual countries like China, Russia, Israel, Japan, even Iran and North Korea deployed their military vessels in the west of the Indian Ocean to put an end to Somali piracy. But, as Andreas Graf concluded, remedies in the Gulf of Aden relied on the international presence, bordering Somalia as a failed state losing with no border police, and no navy to patrol the territorial waters. "A more promising strategy to curb maritime violence in the Gulf of Aden needs to make allowance for the following three lessons: First, the efforts have to be regionalized. Second, stepping up regional capacities of policing requires decisive international support in terms of finances, equipment and training. Finally, in the long run, political stability and economic development play a crucial role towards curbing violence in the area"³. At the end of two long decades when almost two thousand sailors were killed, countless went through the ordeal of being held hostages for ransom, after billions of dollars lost or paid to captors (between three and sixteen billion dollars a year⁴), the relentless pressure put on pirates by the international community started to pay back.

The other African area tortured by vigilante commandoes has been the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea where armed robbery incidents registered a 30 per cent increase in 2014 alone, according to Control Risks. "Criminal groups continue to expand their operational areas south of Nigeria for the first time. Kidnapping-for-ransom off the Niger Delta region saw a significance increase, both in activity with incident numbers up by 355 per cent compared to 2013, and in operational range, with successful attacks being recorded further from the Nigerian coast"⁵.

When countermeasures against Somali pirates yielded some results, 2014 being the first year without new attacks on commercial vessels sailing from the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, the centre of maritime crime moved to the West African waters, which soon became a new global hotspot for theft and plunder.

Fighting this new trend seemed more difficult than in the case of Somalia for several reasons. First, the latter's government cannot control even half of its land, let alone the territorial waters. Henceforth, the international community was asked to come to the rescue and even to operate within the 12 miles limit, based on the Un Security Council resolution

³ Andreas Graf, *Countering Piracy and maritime terrorism in South East Asia and off the Horn of Africa*, Pirat_Working papers on maritime Security, Nr. 5, April 2011, p.5
www.maritimesecurity.eu/fileadmin/content/news_events/workinpapers/PiratT_Arneitspaper_No4_2001_Graf.pdf, accessed 13 May 2015

⁴ "In 2003 ship owners reported 445 attacks in which 92 seafarers were killed and 359 were assaulted and costs in 2004 amounted to \$16 billion per year" Gal Luft and Anne Korin, "Terrorism Goes to Sea"
<http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2004-11-01/terrorism-goes-to-sea>, accessed 14 November 2004

⁵ *Piracy, Terrorism and Diverse Maritime Threats*, www.maritime-executive.com/article/2014-Piracy-Terrorism-Diverse-Maritime-Threats-2014-03-14, accessed 28 November 2016.

1880. With Nigeria, the setting is completely different. Much of oil bunkering, armed terror and rebellious militia gangs operate against the backdrop of the territorial waters and even inside the national territory in the Nigerian Delta, which makes international intervention an aggression against a sovereign state. Yet Nigeria seems closer to terrorism than Somalia because local vigilantes, like the Niger Delta Defence Force and others like it took refuge under political claims such as defending the local population brutally impoverished by the federal government in conjunction with major international oil corporations.

The Ocean Piracy Report, quoted by *The Independent*, signaled out “unacceptable” levels of piracy both inside the Niger Delta and outside of it. The cause identified by its authors hinge on a lack of, or poor cooperation between the authority and the oil companies⁶. A very likely outcome could be a revival of insurgent attacks with a different aim: to provide money for the furious and brutal commandoes of Boko Haram. Basically, this is one major transgression that ocean robbery and hostage taking may witness in the near future. In early April 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Prince Zeid Raad al Hussein told the Organization’s Human Rights Commission in Geneva that “Boko Haram have been murdering dozens of young women and girls they had taken as «wives» and using children as «expendable cannon fodder»”⁷.

A spike in attacks accompanied such a savage behaviour on land and at sea, although a direct connection has not been proven by independent sources so far. Yet, Control Risks “registered a 30 per cent increase in piracy incidents and armed robberies at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. Criminal groups continue to expand their operational area south of Nigeria”⁸.

We can conclude henceforth, that the campaign of the Nigerian federal army against Boko Haram’s ground operations forced its fighters to take their weaponry and their terror tactics outside state boundaries into Cameroon and Chad, and to point out that illegal bunkering in the Niger Delta pushed crime gangs outwards into the territorial waters and even further into the Gulf of Benin. Such a translation may bring a slight advantage in combating criminal groups. Once they operate outside the 12 miles limit of the Nigerian territorial waters, the area may be policed by an international task force, as it happened in the Gulf of Aden. Such an operation could, at least, deter attacks to move outside state boundaries, with the corresponding loss of illicit gains designed to fund terrorist operations inside Nigeria. Tom Peterson, head of the Control Risk’s maritime Risks Analysis Department stated that “The centre of maritime piracy has been shifting west for a number of years, and the decline in activity off east Africa in 2003 has seen the Gulf of Guinea emerge as the gold hotspot for maritime crime”⁹.

What has become a major challenge at local and at regional level, is disorder at sea, the basic framework both for piracy and terrorist activities. “Insurgents and terrorists grab the opportunity to pursue their activities largely unmolested by law enforcement”¹⁰. Such a statement brings in the question not only of “how?”, but also of “where?” Again, two areas pop up as possible stages of such dramatic developments, areas marked by a fragmented state like Nigeria, torn between the Christian, oil-rich south, and the Islamist, poorer north. Such a divide could be just a superficial conflict. What lies deeper than that is the lack of will and power of the federal authority to fight the crime machine, which has been circulating huge

⁶www.independent.co.uk/environment/oceans-need-their-own-seat-on-the-united-nations-says-royal-navy-expert-10302155.html, accessed 26 June 2015.

⁷<http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3021104/UN-rights-chief-chief-Boko-Haram-fighters-murdered-captive-women.htm#xxz23W8KkiNGV>, accessed 24 June 2015.

⁸ *Piracy, Terrorism and Diverse Maritime Threats...*

⁹ *Piracy, Terrorism and Diverse Maritime Threats...*

¹⁰ Martin Murphy, *Contemporary Piracy and maritime Terrorism. The Threat to International Security*, Adelphy Paper 358, Routledge, New York, 2010, p. 10.

amounts of black money among warlords, politicians and religious leaders¹¹. To challenge them would mean an all-out offensive against private armies like Boko Haram or the Niger Delta Defence Force. The Nigerian President, General Muhamadu Buhari pledged to stamp out insurgents, but words and promises alone could hardly deter militants from orchestrating attacks and manslaughter. “Further key factors such as port and anchorage crime, domestic instability and civil unrest, political violence, territorial disputes and migration can pose a similar level of reputational, operational and security risk for shipping and offshore oil and gas industry”¹².

In Somalia, maritime piracy provided better and better trained and battle hardened insurgents for terrorist groups like Al Shabaab. Although terrorists have not gone to sea yet, they can have new fighters from among former sea pirates. The latter have grown in the cult of armed violence after the fall of the Siad Barré regime in 1991. Light weaponry is easier to get than water or khat leaves in the area. There is no legal authority to impose law and order for a country dominated by tribes, clans and local warlords. That is why maritime piracy could breed terrorism so easily. A second trend is for terrorists to migrate from land onto the sea. Possible targets across the waves are mainly civilian and they include commercial ships, oil rigs, harbour facilities and also narrow naval passages like the Hormuz, Malacca, Gibraltar or Bosphorus straits. “Like terrorist lethality, the key factor that drives an organization to be more likely to conduct maritime attacks is the number of connections with other terrorist organizations. Knowledge and connections seem to be driving such attacks and thus underline the importance of capabilities over ideology related to such attacks”¹³. Even if terrorist groups mistrust pirates ideologically, they still may find the latter useful because they have built an underground industry circulating billions of dollars that may very well support Al Qaeda or Boko Haram. The marriage of the two branches of organized crime may lead to disastrous blows first to the world economy and second to regional stability and trade. One bleak scenario may put together terrorist ambitions to destroy the current world order, and the skills and daring of pirates knowledgeable enough to sink a huge tanker or cargo ship in order to block a major international waterway. Such a plan is not as far-fetched as it may seem. In 2014, Al Qaeda commanders ordered jihadists to blow up large ships passing through the Gibraltar to disrupt the oil bloodline linking the Middle East to Western Europe and North America¹⁴.

What segregates terrorism at sea from maritime piracy is actually not only the scope but also the vastness of the playfield. Moreover, “Piracy is predicated on financial gains, while terrorism is motivated by political goals beyond the immediate act of attacking a maritime target the former will eschew attention and aim to sustain their trade while the latter will court publicity and inflict as much damage as possible”¹⁵.

Terrorism migration has been directed recently two ways. One was the overspill effect of extremist groups operating in their own countries, which involved neighbours, as was the case of Nigerian parasite army spreading their raids of killing into Chad and Cameroon. Porous borders, a lax or inefficient frontier patrolling system allowed paramilitary gangs to swing from one state into the other. West African countries experienced their own internal

¹¹ See John Campbell, *Nigeria. Dancing on the Brink*, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Lanham MD, 2011

¹² *Piracy, Terrorism and Diverse Maritime Threats*, op.cit.

¹³ piracy-studies.org/terror-at-sea-exploring-maritime-targeting-by-terrorist-organizations, accessed 18 September 2014.

¹⁴ Jennifer Smith, “Terrorists plan to blow up oil tankers and hijack cargo ships passing through Gibraltar to wreak havoc on global economy”, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article=2808633/Terrorists-plan-blow-oil-tankers-hijack-cargo-ships-passing-Gibraltar-wreak-havoc-global-economy.html, accessed 2 May 2015.

¹⁵ Adam Young and Mark Valencia, “Piracy and Terrorism Threats Overlap”, *The Washington Times*, July 7, 2003.

insurgencies and did not muster enough military might to contain and reject alien brigands. Al Shabaab tortured small communities in Somalia and killed 147 people in the Kenyan Garissa University in early April 2015. According to the Kenyan media quoted by international publications, “The suicide vest-clad gunmen, whom the Somali terror group Al Shabaab claimed as their own, told students they «were here to make your Easter holidays better» and warned of further attacks”¹⁶.

A definite convergence between sea piracy and maritime terrorism has not been cemented so far, according to even the most pessimistic surveys, but the danger looms in the dark. The interests of the two kinds of criminals still collide head-on. While pirates’ perpetual aim is to keep the international shipping machine grinding in order to have their pick of targets, terrorists envisage precisely a disruption of the maritime traffic to cause economic disaster, distrust in national governments and armies and a loss of face of the democratic societies. True enough, both pirates and terrorists are very deft in carrying out armed attacks mainly against civilians. Pirates use their guns to hijack commercial vessels. Once they are on board, they keep the hostages alive to make sure the ransom money will come. Terrorists unleash a more sophisticated arsenal to kill as many people as possible, to destroy historic landmarks, to generate public fear and panic with a total disregard for human lives.

One basic difference prevails, and, paradoxically, may lead to closer contacts between pirates and terrorists. The former are experts in sailing. They are also better and more experienced attackers travelling in speedboats across the waves. The latter are trained fighters able to plan well in advance their operations; they are indoctrinated to act in unity on the ground to kill without mercy and to impose their extremist order. Most terrorists come from instruction camps supervised by former military advisers left unemployed after the conflicts in Bosnia, Angola, Kosovo, Sierra Leone or the Democratic Congo. Terrorists’ fighting abilities are still deadlier than those of the pirates, a conclusion validated by ISIS’ whirlwind campaign and the aggressiveness of Al Shabaab in eastern Africa. Initially its leaders condemned sea-piracy and focused on winning the hearts and minds of the rural population claiming that the 2010 rich crop had been the fortunate outcome of their control in the grain-production areas of central and south Somalia. Dwindling funds pushed Al Shabaab leaders to approach pirate gangs after 2011. Peter Chalk explained the terrorists’ presumed shift of focus “to water-based activities through five factors:

- vulnerabilities that have encouraged a higher rate of pirate attacks also apply to terrorism;
- A growth in maritime sports and equipment provided terrorists with readily accessible training and resources to operate at sea;
- Maritime attacks offer terrorists an alternate means of causing mass economic destabilization;
- Sea-based terrorism constitutes a further means of influencing mass coercive punishment on enemy audiences;
- The expensive global container-shipping complex offers terrorists a viable logistic conduit for facilitating the covert movement of weapons and personnel”¹⁷.

A fellowship of sea criminals and Islamist die-hards worked around the African coasts for quite some time. No less than 98 hundred attacks committed by some or the others happened in the last forty years. An irreversible marriage of the two violence-prone groups

¹⁶ Aislinn Laing, Mike Pflanz, “Kenya university attack: They were lined and executed”, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindian_ocean/kenya/11514500/Kenya-university-attack-They-were-lined-up-and-executed.html, accessed 5 May 2015.

¹⁷ Peter Chalk, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2008, p. XIII.

lies down the road so far. However, a firmer attitude and a more comprehensive international strategy to contain and finally to annihilate them through freezing their assets, through monitoring and restricting their freedom of movement and through obliterating their recruiting campaigns may jumpstart a handshake with the devil in order to make them both cross a threatening precipice cracking under the militants' and the pirates' feet.

What have prevented a real union between pirates and terrorists until recently were equally their incomplete similarities and their disdainful differences. They both share legal and jurisdictional weaknesses and a potential for ransom. Nevertheless, geography plays different roles in each case. While piracy peaked in underprivileged areas confused by a feeble law-enforcement presence, terrorism cultivated local and even international support in regions with tight tribal and communal control. Where piracy enjoyed the cultural acceptability of local warlords, terrorists leaders associated themselves to stronger networks as was the case of Al Shabaab, which placed its authority under the Al Qaeda umbrella. Soon enough, after such an allegiance, the Somali Islamists expanded their attacks in neighbouring Kenya to the south and into the ever-lasting enemy's territory of Ethiopia, to the north-west. Such an expansion of its attacks west was not merely a revenge for Somalia's defeat in the Ogaden war, but rather a sort of punishment for the libertine society tolerated by Addis Ababa and for its relaxed attitude towards the local Christians, the oldest such community in Africa.

Territorial conflicts and ground battles are very visible and local or international media feed radiantly on them, especially if they are very brutal. Wars at sea have always been surrounded by mystery and uncertainty for the general public. A merge between piracy and terrorism, if it ever happens, is going to be obscured by actual circumstances. What has become more and more obvious is the necessity to defend the high seas from becoming a favourite operation theatre for terrorists. The British admiral Sir James Burnell-Nugent suggested that oceans must have their own seat in the United Nations. Their representative may attend Security Council meetings whenever matters connected to seafaring are discussed. The former Fleet Commander-in-Chief of the Royal navy suggested that "An experienced diplomat with a team of support staff could fulfill the UN role"¹⁸. He argued that "It is important that international waters do remain international waters"¹⁹.

Before such an idea is actually implemented, the danger of a piracy-sea terrorism association still floats in the air. True enough, only 2 per cent of terrorist attacks happened at sea. The overwhelming such instances were ground-planned and they claimed terrestrial targets. The pressure put on them both by the international campaigns against terrorist acts and by the huge presence of national military navy vessels in the most sensitive passages may have deterred an upsurge of violent attacks. Communication technology, easy access to more and more sophisticated weaponry and fast boats as well as improved fighting skills of pirates and terrorists may cause sleepless nights to security, intelligence and defence managers and decision makers.

Romania faces three major threats coming from the Black Sea and its 275 kilometres long coast. The most challenging, from a military point of view is the Russian attitude towards Romania's NATO membership and its commitment to defend the Alliance's eastern border. The Kremlin politicians have constantly objected to Romania's participation in NATO's ballistic missile defence and its joint naval exercises in the company of American battleships in the Black Sea. Russians argue that the US are setting up a permanent advanced naval task force, although its vessels come on a rotating basis.

¹⁸www.independent.co.uk, as quoted above.

¹⁹www.independent.co.uk,

Tensions reached their peak when the Bucharest government condemned Crimea's annexation by the Russian Federation. The US policy of leading from behind in Eastern Europe irritated Moscow even further, but things did not go beyond an exchange of statements and words.

A second danger looms over the waves and that is posed by a possible major terrorist attack in the Bosphorus strait. If a large commercial vessel is intentionally shipwrecked or sank by an explosion in the sailing channel, not wider than a mile in certain areas, the Romanian exports industry outside Europe is deprived of a major cheap venue for transferring goods to Africa, the Middle East and South-east Asia. Such a chilling perspective gives also nightmares to Bulgarians, to Turks and even to Russians who might see their access to the Mediterranean cut off for some time.

The third threat comes not from the Black Sea in particular, but from the Mediterranean. The apparent solidarity that Brussels strives to stage in the case of African migrants sailing towards the European shores can very well be labeled as a charitable and sympathetic approach to a major human tragedy. Unfortunately, the migrants' wave crashing against the northern shores of *mare nostrum* is not a European Union outright responsibility, as outrageous as it may sound. Those desperate people ending up on Lampedusa island, on the French and the Italian coasts come for a better life preached by their former colonial masters. Therefore, it should be Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Germany and Italy, which have to attend the matter as these countries enjoyed the spoils of the colonial rule for decades and even centuries. A time has come to pay back for those privileges and goods and it is only fair for those governments to assume their responsibilities as they did when the Commonwealth, La Francophonie and other postcolonial adjustments preserved some privileges for yesteryear's masters. In the long run, it is a matter of direct connections between the former powers and the territories they dominated and controlled until fifty years ago. It is not a concern of the EU or of its members like Romania, Estonia or Hungary.

There is slightly any reason for Romania to take in some 1,700 homeless Africans and other 700 asylum seekers from the same area. For 6,000 Euros each, the country is supposed to shelter, feed, educate, and provide medical assistance to the newcomers for no reason at all. Moreover, Romania has done its share in assisting the new African countries until the early 1990's by training 60,000 African students to become doctors, engineers, economists on the Romanian taxpayers' money in Romanian universities. No gains were involved, just a wide humanitarian understanding of solidarity among the poor and the poorer.

In the case of the migrants' take-over compulsory ratio, the project initiators did not set a timetable for negotiations with countries of origin for the return and reacceptance of those temporarily hosted by Romania and others. Besides, serious negotiations are most unlikely to produce acceptable results in the case of South Sudan, Central Africa, Somalia, the Democratic Congo or Nigeria, countries facing overwhelming domestic problems, which cannot be solved in the two-years suggested period advanced as bumper respite as a provisional shelter granted to their citizens by EU member countries. Even more aggravating is the unpredictable identity, convictions and allegiance of the African newcomers. Some migrated from Muslim dominated areas, some may very well be jihadists infiltrating into Europe to perpetrate their criminal acts. Romanian intelligence services already have a hard time to monitor Muslim expats who have set up business and camp in the country. In early May 2015, the Bucharest Court of Appeal expelled two Arab university undergraduates who preached the ideology of the terrorist group Daesh—the Islamic State²⁰. Earlier on, another

²⁰ www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/Jihadistii-isis-expulzati-din-romania-539856.html, accessed 14 June 2015.

seven Muslim businessmen were declared persona non grata and had to leave the country because of their propaganda supporting ISIS and its fighters²¹.

The new national defence strategy approaches the threats of terrorism in general terms. The day-to-day protection of Romanians and the country's national interests and identity demands more than that. Romania has proved throughout difficult times that it has the will and the power to preserve its sovereignty and to protect its civilian population in a conjoined effort with its allies that have stated their staunch commitment to all NATO members' security and stability.

²¹ www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/Jihadistii-isis-expulzati-din-romania-539856.html

REFERENCES

1. **Campbell**, John, *Nigeria. Dancing on the Brink*, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Lanham MD, 2011.
2. **Chalk**, Peter, *The Maritime Dimension of International Security*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica CA, 2008.
3. **Graf**, Andreas, *Countering Piracy and maritime terrorism in South East Asia and off the Horn of Africa*, Pirate_Working papers on maritime Security, Nr. 5, April 2011, p. www.maritimesecurity.eu/fileadmin/content/news_events/workinpapers/PiratT_Arneitspaper_No4_2011_Graf.pdf, accessed 13 May 2015
5. **Luft** Gal and Anne Korin, "Terrorism Goes to Sea"
6. <http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2004-11-01/terrorism-goes-to-sea> "In 2003 ship owners reported 445 attacks in which 92 seafarers were killed and 359 were assaulted and costs in 2004 amounted to \$16 billion per year".
7. **Laing**, Aislinn Mike Pflanz, "Kenya university attack: 'They were lined and executed'",
8. piracy-studies.org/terror-at-sea-exploring-maritime-targeting-by-terrorist-organizations www.maritime-executive.com/article/2014-Piracy-Terrorism-Diverse-Maritime-Threats-2014-03-14 *Piracy, Terrorism and Diverse Maritime Threats*
9. **Murphy**, Martin, *Contemporary Piracy and maritime Terrorism. The Threat to International Security*, Adelphy Paper 358, Routledge, New York, 2010.
10. <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3021104/UN-rights-chief--Boko-Haram-fighters-murdered-captive-women.htm#xxz23W8KkiNGV>
11. <http://foreignaffairs.com/articles/oceans/2004-11-01/terrorism-goes-to-sea>
12. **J Smith**, Jennifer, "Terrorists plan to blow up oil tankers and highjack cargo ships passing through Gibraltar to wreak havoc on global economy", www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article=2808633/Terrorists-plan-blow-oil-tankers-highjack-cargo-ships-passing-Gibraltar-wreak-havoc-global-economy.html
13. www.independent.co.uk/environment/oceans-need-their-own-seat-on-the-united-nations-says-royal-navy-expert-10302155.html
14. **Young**, Adam and Mark Valencia, "Piracy and Terrorism Threats Overlap", *The Washington Times*,
15. July 7, 2003.
16. www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/11514500/Kenya-university-attack-They-were-lined-up-and-executed.html
17. www.libertatea.ro/detalii/articol/Jihadistii-isis-expulzati-din-romania-539856.html ©