

## THE MIGRATION POLICIES AND MULTICULTURALISM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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**ABSTRACT:** *THE POPULISM OF SOME EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS DOES NOTHING BUT CONTRIBUTES TO AGGRAVATING THE SENSE OF INSECURITY NOT ONLY AMONG THE IMMIGRANTS BUT ALSO AMONG THE NATIVE CITIZENS OF THE RECEIVING COUNTRIES. ESTABLISHING A COMMON APPROACH TO MIGRATION MANAGEMENT ISSUES AND THE HARMONIZATION OF MIGRATION POLICIES OF THE MEMBER STATES IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGES OF MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. AT THIS MOMENT, THE CONFRONTATION THAT TAKES PLACE IN EUROPE ON THE TOPIC OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION HAS AS A SUBJECT THE SUCCESS OR THE FAILURE OF THE EUROPEAN MULTICULTURALISM, ACHIEVED THROUGH THE ADOPTION OF MIGRANTS WITH THEIR CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND.*

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**KEYWORDS:** FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS, MIGRATION, MULTICULTURALISM, SCHENGEN BORDERS

### MIGRATION POLICIES

The special literature indicates that environmental problems and humanitarian disasters, arising from military conflict, generate the vulnerabilities that indirectly affect the actors that trigger them. The migration of large numbers of people in war-affected areas in other non-conflicting areas has various consequences. We pass in review just a few: it destabilizes the economy of the countries of destination; it facilitates cross-border organized crime and acts of terrorism; it generates hatred and xenophobic and racial violence<sup>2</sup>. Such an example is the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, which has given rise to several streams

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<sup>2</sup> In the case of Schengen, the arrival of 30,000 immigrants from North Africa last year highlighted the weakness not only of the bloc's common border policy, but its immigration, immigrant-integration, asylum and refugee-resettlement measures too. Where common home affairs standards do exist, supervision mechanisms need to be improved EU - wide in order to prevent implementation failures. These must be backed with greater operational and financial support for weak and overstretched peripheral states in areas such as asylum and the control of the shared external border. And, as in the Eurozone, these long-term structural reforms must somehow be calibrated with short-term measures related to the leaky Greek-Turkish border, the Syria crisis as well as Romania's and Bulgaria's accession to the Schengen area, which would create a land bridge to the south-east for the first time. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 3.

of refugees to neighboring countries<sup>3</sup>. Among them there are the Romani people, an ethnic minority, who have been under the sign of poverty and social discrimination for centuries. Some of the Romani people from Bosnia and Kosovo have settled in Germany (about ¼ of the 200,000 registered by authorities)<sup>4</sup>.

Naturally, the main feature of the security environment remains the multiplication of asymmetric threats<sup>5</sup>. Political and military analysts emphasized the fact that the respect of citizens for human rights and human freedom, within the Western societies, has been speculated by those that threaten the democratic values system<sup>6</sup>. Proselytism achieved among refugees by anarchist or terrorist groups may give rise to serious problems of security for host countries. Free movement makes the risk of the use of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons by terrorists to be a real one. And as we have talked of terrorism, it is important to emphasize the religious and the psychological side of it. Multiplication of Islamic movements and the popularity they have enjoyed in Western Europe are based on the resentment of Muslims against Westerners, whom they consider responsible for their own failures. To this situation contributes the relatively limited opportunities of social and economic integration offered to them by the host countries. A sense of humility that they feel causes many Muslims to put their hopes and expectations in "the miracle of faith". To this it is added the absence of the feeling of belonging to the European Christian societies that hold the majority, and which have been trying to assimilate the Islamic immigrants as well. The result was contrary to expectations. All actions and gestures that tend to assimilate have contributed but to "amplifying the process of radicalization of Islam"<sup>7</sup>. Tom Hundley, a good observer of the Islamic phenomenon stresses the idea that Europe has all the chances to become, because of an increased growth of birth rate among Muslim immigrants and because of their marginalization within the labour market, "a mechanism of transforming

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<sup>3</sup> See, Alexandra Sarcinchi, *Migrație și securitate*, (București: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2008), 5

<sup>4</sup> Another stream of immigrants who were granted refugee status was represented by Bosniaks and Albanians. These, together with "renegades" from Asia and Africa have become, rather quickly, a burden on the Community budget and a factor of instability. And that is because among those who qualified for refugee status there were members of organized crime groups. <http://www.euractiv.ro/>

<sup>5</sup> See, Gh. Văduva, M. Șt. Dinu, *Crizele politico-militare ale începutului de mileniu*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2005, p.24. Also, In the Schengen area, the EU has been seeking to deepen integration already since 2009, aiming to improve the implementation of the Schengen acquis. The lack of progress was revealed last year in the wake of the Arab Spring, when northerners called for greater scope to reintroduce domestic border controls as the only means of protecting themselves from faulty standards in other member states. For a moment, it looked as though governments would begin rolling back the principles of free movement, but the European Commission quickly revised its proposals. It suggested ending the gentle system of peer-to-peer review amongst member governments, and replacing it with unannounced spot checks of its own. This put northerners in a dilemma. Whilst they are keen to improve supervision of the peripheral members, they remain hesitant to subject themselves to the same intensity of oversight or to hand over powers to the Commission. Under the Danish presidency in the first half of 2012, this became a matter of inter-institutional deadlock, with a sovereignty-conscious Council finally deciding to side-line the Commission and Parliament. See also, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 4.

<sup>6</sup> See, Stoica Ion, "Migrația internațională și securitatea—Noi provocări", in *Infosfera*, year I, nr, 1, 2009, 52-53.

<sup>7</sup> This is revealed by a survey conducted among the Muslims in 2002 in the United Kingdom, with subjects younger than 35 years old. A percentage of 41% of those questioned responded that "they feel only Muslims and not British and Muslims (one third of those over 35 years said they feel the same thing). The same trend was recorded in France." See, Stoica Ion, *Islamic Radicalism in Europe*, (București: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2007), 234.

frustrated individuals into fundamentalists or even into terrorists"<sup>8</sup>. In the name of religion, the acts of violence committed by terrorists against civilians become "justifiable" in the eyes of the members of the Islamic communities.

Recruiting their followers mostly from the middle class, from urban areas with a fairly recent rural past, fundamentalists are presented to them as defenders of the traditional interpretation of the "Scriptures" against "the metaphorical, symbolic, social and functional reinterpretations with the view of transforming religion so that it can be assimilated to the modern spirit"<sup>9</sup>.

The presence of a stream of immigrants, who share the vision of religion promoted by Islamic radicals, may become on the one hand, a potential threat to the security of the host country, and on the other, a challenge to the values, traditions and its cultural and linguistic customs. Specifically, the followers of the application of Islamic law (Shari'a) in France, in the United Kingdom and in Germany have requested, in the name of multiculturalism, some special rights for Muslims, which undermine the secular character of the State, the principle of protection against the law and the public schooling system.

Demographic estimates of the Muslim population that lives in Western Europe advance the number of 20 millions<sup>10</sup>. More alarming numbers are being estimated: in 2020, 10% of Europe's population will be Muslim. Hence the concerns of Western Governments are towards the rise of Islam in predominantly Christian Europe. Unfortunately, this situation is being politically speculated, as some political parties of the extreme right are rising to power and as the labour market inequalities are on the rise<sup>11</sup>.

The populism of some European governments does nothing but contributes to aggravating the sense of insecurity not only among the immigrants but also among the native citizens of the receiving countries<sup>12</sup>. For some politicians the short-term political gains are far more important than the maintenance of social cohesion. Naturally, the more stringent border control worsens the lack of immigrants' security and the native security leaves a lot to be desired as the Governments of States fail in their mission of "implementation" of policies aimed at a stricter monitoring of borders, within the limits of "reasonable cost"<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.revista22.ro/politica-si-redistribuirea-puterii-globale-3699.html>

<sup>9</sup> The leaders of these groups are good psychologists, having no hesitation to take advantage of the lack of material or spiritual matters of various categories, either under-privileged or not. Generally they have a great force of persuasion over the community, which allows them to easily create emotional real or artificial states. Through simple messages they know to manipulate those who have a rather poor schooling. See, Frunză S., *Religious Fundamentalism and the new clash of ideologies*, (Bucuresti: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2009), 134.

<sup>10</sup> See, Paul Dobrescu, Alina Bârgăoanu, *Geopolitica*, (Bucuresti: Editura Economica, 2011), 116.

<sup>11</sup> The Dutch parliamentarian Geert Wilders, founder of the Freedom Party, right extreme, when asked whether Ukraine should be included in the European Union, replied dryly: "No, I believe that no other country should join the European Union. I even support the excluding of Romania and Bulgaria from the European Union. In the Dutch Parliament, my party voted against ratification of the Treaty which has approved Romania's accession and Bulgaria". Furthermore, Geert Wilders states that "We should have a small Europe with limited tasks, instead of an extended one, even if they had a greater influence. I believe that these two countries are not prepared at all. They are not ready and they are extremely corrupt". With regard to Turkey's accession, the lawmaker has concluded firmly rejecting the idea, de facto, "Being a good neighbor is not the same as being a member of the family. And, in addition, Turkey is an Islamic country. "On the other hand, Turkey's accession would increase the costs for the Community budget and it would trigger the migration at a rather important rate – "the last thing we need". We want to make it very clear the fact that his party has gained 16 percent in the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands. So, an important segment of the electorate share his ideas with regard to the European construction and migration. See, I. Stoica, *International Migration and Security*, (Bucuresti: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", 2012), 54.

<sup>12</sup> Such an example is Italy. [http://www.ideiindialog.ro/articol\\_179/emigratia\\_clandestina.html](http://www.ideiindialog.ro/articol_179/emigratia_clandestina.html).

<sup>13</sup> A sustainable solution will instead require special measures in favour of peripheral countries. Northerners must offer operational, technical and financial support to those member states that still need to implement all

The speeches that circulate ideas such as "border closure" or "strengthening border control" are devoided of substance, because they do not solve the problem. In the coming decades, "reverse migration" will be difficult to control. "The frontiers of States or of the developed areas will create such a great pressure that it will not be countered by purely administrative measures. Developed areas are, or can be equated with the rarified areas in terms of demographic, and they will attract with the power of a law of physics the natural population from other areas. Mankind cannot live long torn apart by this demographic imbalance. In one way or another, it will generate movements and social rebalancing processes"<sup>14</sup>.

'Schengen Plus' Treaty<sup>15</sup> is made in the interests of more effective cooperation in the fight against terrorism, crime and clandestine immigration. The signatory States police will intensify cooperation with regard to the common borders, will multiply police stations and will allow border crossings for their investigations or prosecution of criminals.

At the heart of the device there still lies the possibility of putting together the genetic fingerprint and digital files, and this constitutes a European premiere. Traffickers, sexual delinquents, foreigners with illegal status, searched by the police of their country can leave traces in some other country. It is also necessary to create a process of consultations<sup>16</sup>. Following the events of 11 September 2001, Member States of NATO, but also those which have signed international agreements regarding transport security, have implemented new security measures to prevent possible terrorist actions aimed at economic or strategic objectives in the areas of ports, airports or semi-limited access areas. Accordingly, a port security program was concluded, which is generically called the ISPS<sup>17</sup>.

From the above, we can notice that in recent years the European migration policies have focused on illegal migration and the development of some repressive measures. However, The Hague program does not refer only to measures against illegal migration, but

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rules – but in exchange for credible commitments and tough but imaginative measures to avoid moral hazard. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 5.

<sup>14</sup> In the Schengen area, member states are putting the finishing touches to the reform of the Dublin regulation, under which asylum-seekers may be returned to the EU state by which they gained entry to the bloc. This measure has long been felt to put undue pressure on the border states, which are the first port-of-call for many asylum-seekers who would otherwise have aimed for northern members. This feeling that northerners are shifting the burden to peripheral states has undermined the latter's appetite for cooperation and implementation. The matter has come to a head. A series of court cases has obliged northerners to suspend the measure's application to Greece, with the European Court of Justice ruling that "an asylum seeker may not be transferred to a member state where he risks being subjected to inhuman treatment." The pressure is now on to agree a formal suspension-mechanism as well as to provide technical and financial support to struggling peripheral states. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 5.

<sup>15</sup> Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and Spain.

<sup>16</sup> States will create – contact points – and only access to the index files (the answer to the problem of known or unknown footprint) will be authorized. For further information, they will have to apply to the national police. The Schengen system Plus will be gradually extended to the new Member States. *The proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis* (COM(2010)0624), 4.

<sup>17</sup> The International Code for the Security of Ships and of Port Facilities. Romania has adopted the ISPS code and passed at implementing it in the port of Constanta. The first step was the creation of a new safety device in the port of Constanța, so that all port operators that have transport facilities in Constanta Harbor were forced by the port administration to fence off their perimeters from the area between land and ships berthing at the piers. It is compulsory that all the activity of these piers should be monitored, and their safety should be ensured by special trained agents. *The proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of an evaluation mechanism to verify application of the Schengen acquis* (COM(2010)0624), p.7.

also to measures for implementing common policies on immigration and promoting integration of legal immigrants<sup>18</sup>.

Establishing a common approach to migration management issues and the harmonization of migration policies of the Member States is one of the most important challenges of migration in the European Union<sup>19</sup>. Solving this problem has become acute as the economies and societies of Member States need much more migrant workers, in particular as a result of the aging of the population.<sup>20</sup> The dialogue at the global level can tackle some of the challenges and common concerns, but only at local, national and regional levels can each individual and each interested party take advantage of the opportunities brought about by migration flows<sup>21</sup>.

Migration is clearly at the top of the political agenda of the European Union. The Arab spring and the events in the South of the Mediterranean in 2011 highlighted the crucial need for a coherent and comprehensive migration for the EU. The European Parliament has already presented a number of proposals for policy and operational measures relating to migration, mobility, integration and international protection in the report on 4 and 24 May, 2011<sup>22</sup>.

These proposals were fully approved by the European Council in June of the same year and, starting that moment the European Union took immediate action on launching a dialogue on migration, mobility and security with the countries of Tunisia and Morocco at the beginning of October and initiated the necessary arrangements to start a dialog with Egypt.

To this effect and in total accordance with the Stockholm Program and the Action Plan on the Stockholm Program<sup>23</sup>, the European Council invited in June the P.E. Commission to present an evaluation regarding “global approach of migration” and to establish a way to accomplish a systematic frame of consistent and strategic politics for the European Union’s relationships with all the important countries outside EU. This political

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<sup>18</sup> See, Carrera, S., *Legal Migration Law and policy trends in a selection of EU Member States*, Briefing Paper for the European Parliament, 6.

<sup>19</sup> *Communication from the Commission of the European Union*, “Policy plan on legal migration”, COM (2005) 669, (21 December 2005, Brussels), 4.

<sup>20</sup> Nowadays, globalization, demographic changes and social transformation visibly affect the Member States of the European Union, but also countries all over the world. According to the United Nations assessments, there are 214 million international migrants worldwide and a further 740 million internal migrants. There are 44 million people forcibly displaced. About 50 million people are living and working illegally abroad. UNDP (2009), *Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development*, Report on human development, p.23; UNHCR (2011), *Global Trends in 2010*, 35.

<sup>21</sup> *Communication from the Commission of the European Union*, “The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity”, COM (2006) 571, (12 October 2006, Brussels), 3.

<sup>22</sup> Cohesion policy, an essential investment tool of the EU that plays an important role in the context of Europe 2020 strategy, which focuses on the accuracy of investment needs, locally, regionally and nationally, contributes not only to reducing disparities between regions, but also to the economic recovery of Member States, as well as to the efforts to ensure the sustainability and growth of job creation in the Member States throughout the Union; It is to be noted the fact that this makes the cohesion policy to be the best tool available for the recovery of jobs, as it would require the European Commission into AAC 2013; in this respect, it considers that any reduction of the budget of the cohesion policy would have negative consequences on the objectives of Europe 2020 and thus it insists that in the new programming period an adequate level of resources should be allocated to the cohesion policy in order to attain at least the level agreed for the current programming period 2007-2013; It also requires that it should cover all the regions of the EU; *COM (2010) 292/3: Communication in the context of "Dialogue on migration, mobility and security with South Mediterranean countries"*, 2.

<sup>23</sup> *The Stockholm Program: Council Document number 17024/09*, approved by the European Council on December 1<sup>st</sup>- 2<sup>nd</sup> 2009; the Action Plan on the Stockholm Program COM(2010) 171 finished on April 20<sup>th</sup> 2010, 12.

frame should include specific proposals in order to develop key partnerships for the Union; priority being assigned to the Union's neighboring states.

All indicators show that some specific qualifications that are necessary for future employment shortage in member states could only be found outside EU<sup>24</sup>. In order to ensure EU's policy coherence in migration field, the December 2005 European Council adopted the Global Approach on Migration. This concept integrates migration, external relations and development policy, introducing a global and comprehensive approach on migration in partnership with third countries<sup>25</sup>. The global approach of migration of the European Union has evolved from its enactment in 2005 in this context. It has been conceived to approach all the important aspects of the migration in an adequate and balanced way, in partnership with contingent countries. This global approach has been evaluated in the first half of 2011 through on-line conferences and more consultative meetings especially applied to this matter<sup>26</sup>.

In order to profit by the benefits which can be obtained through an efficient management of migration and to answer the challenges generated by the changes in the migrations tendencies, the EU will have to adapt its politics by creating a wider concept that demands a new Global Approach of Migration and Mobility (GAMM) especially conceived to meet the newly set of objectives. The Global Approach on Migration is the most consistent and concrete expression of the strong relation between Justice and Home Affairs and EU's external relation. This concept defines the adequate european instruments by which the EU can face the current international challenges in the field of migration<sup>27</sup>.

Romania initiated at european level the concept of a Cooperation Platform at Black Sea in the field of migration and development. The countries concerned by this initiative are Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Russian Federation, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia<sup>28</sup>.

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<sup>24</sup> See, The European Migration Network (2011), *Fundamental statistics of the European Union*; Eurostat (2011), *The population and the social conditions*, 38/2011, 34/2011.

<sup>25</sup> The Global Approach on Migration is the most consistent and concrete expression of the strong relation between Justice and Home Affairs and EU's external relation. This concept defines the adequate european instruments by which the EU can face the current international challenges in the field of migration. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf).

<sup>26</sup> *Report referring to a proposal for a Council decision on guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States* (COM (2012)0709–C7-0410/2012–2012/0335(NLE)) The Committee on employment and social affairs, 9.

<sup>27</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/87642.pdf). The main instruments of the Global Approach on Migration are the cooperation platforms in the field of migration and development, tools which brings together EU's member states, European Commission, third countries concerned and international organisations active in the field of migration. These instruments facilitate information exchange at local level and are intended to coordinate existing or future projects in the field of migration and development. [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/92202.pdf). The launching of this Platform was approved by Justice and Home Affairs Council the and General Affairs and External Relations Council in June 2007, endorsed by the European Council in June 2007, and politically reconfirmed by the Justice and Home Affairs Council and General Affairs and External Relations Council in June 2008.

<sup>28</sup> Romania promoted constantly the need of launching of technical projects in order to offer a concrete framework for the Cooperation Platform at the Black Sea in the field of migration and development. In this respect, Romania transmitted in June 2010, to European Commission, for financing, a regional project concerning legal migration in the Black Sea region. The project is currently under evaluation by the European Commission. <http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2037>.

## MIGRATION AND MULTICULTURALISM

At this moment, the confrontation that takes place in Europe on the topic of international migration has as a subject the success or the failure of the European multiculturalism, achieved through the adoption of migrants with their cultural and religious background<sup>29</sup>. On this subject there were formed two pros and cons on multiculturalism.

The first wave that promotes a restrictive policy referring to cultural and European diversity is supported by people who, at the moment, are at the head of major democracies of Western Europe and represent European engines<sup>30</sup>.

The second wave, the pro-multiculturalism current is supported by influential personalities of politics and Western European society, which, at the moment, consists of a pole of opinion and influence in the European Parliament and the Council of Europe.

This confrontation rises to polemics and it turns to some important segments of the population of the European Union, some insisting on the aggressions the committed civilizations of Europe have been subjected over the last decade and the others presenting and promoting the benefits brought by the international migration to the Western European countries and to the countries that represented the sources of emigration. As an effect of the anti-diversity and anti-multiculturalism current - after the attacks in the early 2000s in the USA and Europe, the public opinion in Europe no longer makes a clear distinction between terrorism and Islam<sup>31</sup>. There are reports that talk about the Muslim organizations in Spain and Greece and about what is going on inland of these countries<sup>32</sup>. These aspects highlight the need to have a clear definition of the values and customs that the immigrants must aspire to once inside the EU and which they need to preserve, as a cultural heritage of their country.

There are large differences in immigration and integration policies between EU countries, both in terms of substance and the decision. Yet state governments take precedence over the EU in setting policy. It is an area where the Council of Europe wishes to have the decision, although the current economic crisis has strengthened the role of the member states before the Council of Europe<sup>33</sup>.

The current global economic crisis poses a challenge to the way in which governments will know how to handle this situation. The difficulties stem from the fact that there is not any identical situation to analyze the historical data, insufficient information regarding the impact of the economic crisis on migration flows and on the labor market and

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<sup>29</sup> A mass influx of poor and needy immigrants from North Africa or the eastern neighbourhood is unlikely, even in the wake of Arab Spring-style uprisings. Recent projections of south-north migration point instead to the existence in poor countries of sizeable “trapped populations” that simply do not have the resources to move (UK Government Office for Science). Rather than concentrating on the threat of mass immigration, the EU needs to concentrate on the implications of the development of large and potentially disgruntled immobile populations just beyond its periphery. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 8.

<sup>30</sup> Germany, United Kingdom, and France. See, Münz, R., *Migration, labour markets and integration of migrants: an overview for Europe*, Hamburg Institute of International Economics, September 2007, 9.

<sup>31</sup> See, Y. Pascouau, 'Arab Spring and Migration: Will the New Global Approach to Migration and Mobility Respond to the Challenges?' in S. Biscop, R. Balfour & M. Emerson, *An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy?*, Academia Press, 2012, 6.

<sup>32</sup> While in France, Germany, Belgium and Spain there are many mosques, they are not allowed in the cities of Greece, where the prayer rooms of urban area are seen as a potential risk of formation of parallel communities.

<sup>33</sup> In the Eurozone, meanwhile, the debate on financial solidarity is likely to gain pace. Member states will face the costs of bringing the crisis countries on track, digesting possible losses from a debt restructuring and setting up a credible growth strategy for this and other southern European countries suffering from high debt levels and low growth prospects. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 6.

the fluidity of the global economic climate. This means understanding the motivations and the behavior of the immigrants, as well as the extremely complex nature of the relationship between migration flows and fluctuations in the business cycle, for an optimal evolution of policies relating to migration.

For the analysts, the current crisis poses the problem of the type of migration flows, a new problem, without any historical landmarks. Recent studies show a slowdown after the 2007 growth rate of migration<sup>34</sup>. The factors, which have improved overall migration flows, are: the increasing aversion to immigrants, the analysis of migration flows reversed, the evolution of migration policies, much firmer measures against illegal migration by strengthening border security, improving economic and political conditions of the source countries, worsening the economic climate in the developed countries, maintaining restrictions on the labor market in some countries of the European Union<sup>35</sup>.

The research relating to previous financial and economic crises has demonstrated that the processes associated with migration and remittances have a greater inertia and they are characterized by a specific gap depending on the country, towards the development of economic and financial phenomena. By evaluating the consequences of labor mobility can be outlined new policies in the field of migration. The existence of restrictions on immigration may be justified on the basis of maintaining the well-being, prosperity for the citizens of the immigrant countries or the policy basis for the impact of immigration on voters<sup>36</sup>.

Neither the relaxed policies on migration will be very quickly implemented, nor the countries of the European Union will fully open their labor markets to foreign labor force, so that the policymakers, who have as a landmark the development of international migration, should take into account of the composition of migrants and the way in which the literature makes reference to these issues<sup>37</sup>.

The European democracies, which have the purpose to maintain the control of illegal migration, are forced to engage themselves in forms of international cooperation to curb this phenomenon, since the measures taken by national governments had not had the expected

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<sup>34</sup> See, Human Rights Watch (2011), *World Report 2011: Events of 2010*, 2011, <http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011>.

<sup>35</sup> See, International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2010), *Internal Displacement: Global Overview of Trends and Developments in 2010*, March 2010, <http://www.internaldisplacement.org/publications/global-overview-2010.pdf>.

<sup>36</sup> The current shift from “negative integration” – the removal of national barriers to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital – to “positive integration” – the creation of flanking measures in areas such as borders or fiscal policy – brings with it the temptation of re-regulation. In the face of increasing populist and protectionist pressures at home, the northerners’ commitment to liberalism will be tested. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 7.

<sup>37</sup> There is nevertheless a means of making the case for these policies: the creation of European flanking measures based on solidarity is necessary to maintain intra-EU mobility. Policy-makers have identified mobility and freedom of movement as the bed-rock of the EU’s popularity. On an abstract level, this is because increased contact and exchange has seen European citizens grow closer, perhaps even transferring some of their loyalty from national governments to the EU. In more practical terms, mobility is a prerequisite for economic growth and a means of correcting economic and financial disparities within the internal market, whilst cross-border labour mobility is an important adjustment mechanism in the Economic and Monetary Union in the case of shocks. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 7.



success<sup>38</sup>. The international cooperation leaves sometimes to be desired when there is a need to ensure decent living conditions for refugees<sup>39</sup>. Although the migration, particularly the "migration of the brains" has positive effects on the economy of the countries of destination, it returns to the timeliness of the origin countries of migration as the main subject of election campaigns and speaks to the press. Under the terms of the current crisis, reducing or halting migration would only deepen the economic deficit of the countries experiencing labor market imbalances. The opponents of migration forget too easily that in some countries, most of their economic benefit development that their citizens rejoice is due to foreign work hand. At the same time, it should be recalled, however, that migration of highly skilled personnel represents a social risk factor for both origin countries and those of destination.

There is no doubt that nowadays the present civilization is heading with processes and phenomena which are extremely conservative and complex, whose evolution is much faster, even fulminatory in some cases and that, among them there can be found the migration phenomenon. The information presented in this paper are pretty sketchy, the phenomenon itself is too conservative for an approach at this level<sup>40</sup>.

In order to understand the phenomenon of migration there is a need in carrying out further research projects at national and international level<sup>41</sup>. Although it is desirable, it has even become a priority for the European Union, it is unlikely to succeed in catching the phenomenon of illegal immigration (probably there can be assessed the adverse effects up to a certain level and indirect data can be achieved), so as to act on the real causes of the phenomenon, at least to reduce it, being well aware that the eradication of illegal migration is impossible. To control the phenomenon there must be well known the causes; otherwise we will try to treat only the effect. So far, poor knowledge of the phenomenon and motivation has led to the establishment of some policies that have not led to the expected results<sup>42</sup>.

The problems that Romania is facing at this time in terms of employment, particularly the qualified labor force, are those that require little attention, and the migration phenomenon and its impact it is worth understanding it in order to try to solve it<sup>43</sup>. For that matter, the EU policy focuses on cooperation and collaboration between its member countries and stakeholders, and our country-level collaboration is needed at an international level with regard to this phenomenon (both at the level of knowledge and the level of control), and it is preferable to choose to support both the Romanian migrants and to support and monitor the foreign immigrants to promote the image of Romania on the international

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<sup>38</sup> See, Jaroszewicz, M. and Szerepka, L., *Migration Challenges in the European's Union Eastern Neighbourhood*, Warsaw 2007, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/DigitalLibrary/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9cbe1e2c24a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=105399>.

<sup>39</sup> See, Bertozzi, S., "Legal migration, time for Europe to play its hand", *CEPS Working Document No.257*, February 2007, 3.

<sup>40</sup> Some governments – like the one in Paris – may look at national and European interventionism as the best means of protecting themselves and the bloc from out-side pressures, even at the expense of the original mission to encourage internal mobility and exchange. This kind of re-regulation could, of course, undermine the very aims of the Schengen and Euro areas as well as disrupt moves by the EU to open these internal goods to the outside world. See, Roderick Parkes and Daniela Schwarzer, *The Divisiveness of Mobility: Fuelling Populism in the Euro and Schengen Areas*, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, (July 2012, Berlin), 7.

<sup>41</sup> See, Collett, E., *The Global Approach to Migration: Rhetoric or Reality?*, European Policy Centre, Policy Brief, (Brussels, November 2007),.2.

<sup>42</sup> See, H. Battjes, E. Brouwer, P. de Morree and J. Ouwerkerk, *The Principle of Mutual Trust in European Asylum, Migration and Criminal Law*, Meijers Committee, FORUM Institute for Multicultural affairs, (Utrecht, 2011), 31.

<sup>43</sup> Government Emergency Ordinance no.194 from 12 December 2002 on the status of aliens in Romania 05.06.2008; Law no.122 from 4 May 2006 on the Asylum in Romania.

market of labor according to the national interests and further study regarding the real causes of migration<sup>44</sup>.

If we fail to understand in depth the phenomenon of migration, with its mechanisms and with the essence of human migration, we will continue to treat the effects separately, without the consistency brought about by a unique co-operation and co-ordination, and we will always be at least one step behind the migration progress<sup>45</sup>. The migration as a phenomenon has had and will always have a beneficial effect on the immigration countries and the source countries, as long as the policies will be correlated and will be directed towards the protection of citizens, regardless of their culture and religion and towards the right to inform everybody involved about what migration represents, who forms it and what are the sectors that concern it<sup>46</sup>.

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<sup>44</sup> *Government Emergency Ordinance no.104 of 25th of June 2001 Regarding the organization and functioning of the Romanian Border Police; Emergency Ordinance no.105 of 17th of July 2001 on the State Border of Romania; Government Decision no.943 of 2001 on the establishment of the Romanian Inter-ministerial Group for Integrated State Border Management; Methodological norms for the application of the Government Emergency Ordinance no.105/2001 regarding the Romanian state border; Government ordinance no. 34 of 2006 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data.*

<sup>45</sup> From March 2011, the arrival of several thousand Tunisian nationals on the Italian shores of Lampedusa sparked off a chain of reactions that were excessive in every respect. Although the verbal blunders such as that of evoking the risk of a 'human tsunami' should be regarded as 'petty politics', national actions and European responses, however, created the conditions to call the Schengen system and its philosophy into question. See, B. Nascimbene and A. Di Pascale, "The 'Arab Spring' and the Extraordinary Influx of People who Arrived in Italy from North Africa", *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 2011, 341-360.

<sup>46</sup> See, Y. Bertoncini, "Migrants, 'Schengen area' and European solidarity", *Tribune - Notre Europe's Viewpoint*, June 2011, 12.

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