As it is known, the First World War is the phenomenon that had the deepest implications on the very dramatic twentieth century. Its impact was devastating and led to disastrous historical events such as the establishment of the communist regime in Russia, the great economic crisis of the interwar period or World War II. Obviously, considering the formation of Greater Romania in 1918, its historical, but especially its national dimension, it enabled the writings of an important number of Romanian historians, thus resulting in a significant proportion of historiographical productions dedicated to the subject. On the other hand, the quantitative side has been prevailing the qualitative side of our historical writings for too long, although, at least lately, some excellent works have appeared, which distinguished themselves primarily by a serene and, consequently, lucid approach. Even in these conditions, still, there was the lack of a study based, from a theoretical view, on the analysis of the concepts specific to the theory of international relations.

In this context, it is worth analyzing the work of the historian Hadrian Gorun, “Romania and the Great War. Introduction to a History and Theory of International Relations”, published by Argonaut and Mega publishing houses this year. In fact, Hadrian Gorun has a long activity dedicated either to the field of international relations or related to the history of Romania in the years of the World War I, an activity materialized in several works such as "International Relations in the Twentieth century: Fundamental Concepts, Schools of Thought, Historical Landmarks" (2011), “Romanian-French Relations in the Years of Romania’s Neutrality (1914-1916) (2006), “Romania’s Political, Diplomatic and Military Relations with France in the First World War” (2009) or “Romania and the Great War: Between the History and Theory of International Relations (Syntheses) (2016). However, this work represents, according to the author, "the restructuring, refining and processing of the raw form of all those syntheses".

I was, therefore, not dealing with a collective paper, which would narrate the tribulations of the Romanian Kingdom during the conflict, but an analysis of its directions of

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action from the perspective of international relations, which necessitated the use of specific concepts such as foreign policy, national interest, balance of power, regional hegemony, rationality, public opinion and others. Also, such a study needed to be based on a good knowledge of the main currents of thought, which have shaped the field of international relations. For example, liberalism, which emerged in the interwar period, also known as utopian idealism, and developed in the desolate context of the aftermath of World War II, interpreted the failure of the balance of power through the force policy that characterized international relations between 1815 and 1914. Or, the inherently conflicting nature of nation-states could be avoided by promoting the best interests of humanity, supported by morality. From this point of view, there was an urgent need to give up the old, worn-out and dangerous diplomacy, infavour of an open and especially rational approach, in the system of international relations.

On the other hand, after the World War II, precisely as a reaction to the liberal current, realism developed, an extremely well-articulated concept, which has remained dominant until today. Realist thinkers have emphasized the nature of the anarchic system of the international system, especially in the absence of a world government, which means that international relations can be understood in the context of the distribution of power between states. However, power has always been distributed unequally, which has led to a perpetual competition between states, governed by the selfish, therefore conflicting nature of man. Realists, as it is written, have always been fascinated by conflict. In his massive volume, "Politics between Nations", one of the most influential works ever written in the field of international relations, Hans Morgenthau set out the principles of political realism, to which the others are subsumed: politics is governed by objective laws, rooted in human nature; the main indicator of political realism is the concept of interest, defined in terms of power; this key concept is a universally valid category, but it does not have an immutable fixed meaning; political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action; political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of an individual nation with the moral laws that govern the universe; therefore, there are profound and real differences between political realism and other schools of thought.

By no means could the Marxist current be missing from this list, which obviously emphasizes the social character of the relations of production, while the system of international relations was dominated by capitalist states with obvious imperialist or expansionist aims. Unfortunately, in Romania, historiography has been subordinated to Marxist imperatives. At first, for example, our state was presented, especially in textbooks written by Mihail Roller, as an aggressor, who took advantage of Russia's weakness to annex Bessarabia, a tone which is rather reminiscent of the final note of the summer of 1940. Whereas, during the Ceausescu regime, Romania's participation in the First World War gained just and glorious values, while Greater Romania was the corollary of the centuries-old struggle for freedom and unity of the Romanian people, a thesis that continued to reverberate in our historiographical space even after the collapse of the communist regime.

Hadrian Gorun interprets Romania's foreign policy actions during the First World War from the perspective of the realistic current. First of all, the Romanian state pursued its national interest, materialized in the annexation of the nearby provinces, which had a significant Romanian population, if not a majority. Even if, as Lucian Boia pointed out, there was a not at all negligible "Germanophile" current, the option balanced towards an Alliance with the Entente, which would have materialized in the incorporation of Transylvania, Bukovina and Banat, under Austro-Hungarian rule. On the other hand, the period of neutrality must be a rational act meant to maximize the potential gains of the Romanian
Kingdom, a benevolent neutrality towards the Entente, to which the eyes of the Romanian ruling elite turned more and more. The entry into the war was to take place after obtaining firm guarantees in connection with the territorial clauses, but also at an unfavorable moment from the military point of view of the Central Powers. This is all the more so as Russia has always been reserved in connection with the wishes of the Romanian state: “In other words, Romania was to join the military alliance that would offer it satisfaction, in exchange for participating in the war, in terms of one of the most important aspects, namely that of territorial rewards. The moment of adopting the decision depended on the extent to which the Entente's powers would give a positive response to the Romanian requests, as well as on the promptness of the response.”

However, how can Romania's accession to an alliance of which Russia was a part be explained, in the context in which it had long been the most serious threat to Romanian statehood? As Hadrian Gorun points out, according to Stephen Walt, states are inclined to ally with the most threatening power, while ethical sentiments, it must be added, find no place in the process of negotiating the national interest. After all, this has been the case in Austria in modern times. Against Prussian aggression, Austria allied with France before the war of 1756-1763, despite a feisty past between the two states, just as, after Germany became the dominant power in central Europe, it allied with it. The context has always imposed this kind of musters, which should therefore not be surprising. Likewise, the beginning of the First World War found Romania in the camp of the Central Powers, followed by the alliance with the Entente and implicitly Russia and the attack on Austria-Hungary. At the end of the war, Romania was again in conflict with Russia after the unification with Bessarabia, an act that led to the rupture of diplomatic relations and the confiscation of the Romanian treasury. Alliances are, John Mearsheimer wrote, "only temporary marriages of convenience: today's alliance partner can be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy can be tomorrow's partner."

The whole attitude of Romania during the First World War must be understood, also, from a realistic perspective. IonelBrătianu, who firmly led the foreign policy, wanted for Romania, along with the eventual territorial gains, the acquisition of an international prestige, especially taking into account the previous status of the Kingdom. The author's assessment according to which, following the Peace Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, Romania became a regional hegemon must be nuanced, but it can be correct, in fact. However, the negotiation process between Romania and the Entente was a laborious one, long and marked by numerous promises, but also threats, as it usually happens in the power relations of the states. According to Hadrian Gorun, Romania aimed to pursue a rational foreign policy along with promoting effective diplomacy. The obvious goal was the maximum, but not intangible. Instead, our state was obliged to set its objectives according to its real military capability, correlated with the correct assessment of the potential of the opposing camp. Considering the military disaster of 1916, Romania does not seem to have correctly intuited these aspects or at least a fundamental one, that the Romanian army was almost incapable of coping with the rigors of a modern war. And, in this case, diplomacy, no matter how effective, could not make up for this fundamental shortcoming.

Finally, despite the recovery of the Romanian army through the French military mission led by General Berthelot and the victories of 1917, Romania could not escape capitulation, especially following the Russian defeat. This period was also diplomatically intense, especially as the member states of the Entente pressed for a refusal to sign a separate peace treaty. It is true that this was an express clause of the Convention signed by Romania in the summer of 1916, but the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, although ratified by the Parliament, was not recognized by King Ferdinand. Romania came into conflict again, formally, the day
before the armistice was signed, which had some impact. On the other hand, the Allies did not fully comply with their clauses on the delivery of ammunition or the launch of an offensive in the Balkans, while Russian aid was more than oscillating.

Hadrian Gorun's work focuses on the aspects that I have tried to outline above. Starting from the theoretical analysis of the field of international relations, going through the presentation of the main currents and specific schools of thought, the author deciphers two significant moments from a diplomatic point of view, first of all: the period of Romania's neutrality and the signing of the Bucharest Peace Treaty, bringing into discussion also relatively new aspects or, in any case, less discussed in the specific literature. The whole approach is, in fact, unique, which in itself represents an indisputable historiographical gain. Moreover, it can be unreservedly appreciated that the author managed to write a deeply necessary study with meticulousness and seriousness, a study that can only stand out in the multitude of mediocre works dedicated to Romania's participation in the First World War. Hadrian Gorun has the necessary distance of the professional historian in relation to the studied phenomena and, consequently, he shows lucidity and objectivity in a volume that will undoubtedly become a reference. If the history school in Iași offers us Claudiu-Lucian Topor, who wrote two exceptional works on Romania and the period of the First World War, the history school in Cluj does not sit back and proposes Hadrian Gorun and his rigorous interpretation of a decisive sequence for the evolution of Romanians in history.

Without being massive, Hadrian Gorun's work captures exactly the essence of this difficult period in the history of Romania as well as the tribulations of the relevant actors involved. In fact, at the end of the book, the author proposes further developments of some extremely important aspects, such as the issue of supplying Romania between 1915-1917 with war materials and ammunition from abroad, the extent to which the Allies complied with the clauses of the agreement signed with Romania, the preparation of critical editions of documents from the French and / or Romanian military archives, the publication of an anthology of fiction related to the First World War or even an extensive study to capture how the conflict was reflected in important universal literature of the twentieth century. Given the way in which this paper was conceived, these perspectives can only delight both specialists and history lovers.

Frederic Wilhelm (1713-1740), considered the founder of modern Prussia, had important health problems throughout his life, being affected by gout, migraines or cramps. When he became seriously ill again, which would bring him to his end, next to his bed, the mourners sang a verse from a favorite hymn: "I came into the world naked and I will leave it naked." The king awoke from a coma and he replied firmly: "It is not true. I will wear my uniform. ” It seems to me that the Romanian historiography was born empty of content and refused, for the most part, the gala dress for a long time, but it started a few decades ago, not without great difficulties, to wear the uniform, and accordingly to be governed by objectivity and scientific seriousness. At least Hadrian Gorun's work fully strengthens this conclusion.