

THE COMPLEX NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN CRISES: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

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ABSTRACT:

A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF LITERATURE CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, HAS RECENTLY EMERGED IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BUT THESE STUDIES HAVE NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AND VERY SELDOM EXAMINES THE ROLE OF ENFRAMING IN SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION.

THE CONFLICTS MOBILIZE A PLURALITY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ACTORS, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS THAT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO THE GOVERNMENT-REBEL RELATIONSHIP OR THE BINOMIAL ECONOMIC INTEREST OF BUSINESSES - THE OFFICIAL OR COLLATERAL CHECKOUT METHOD OF RESOURCES BY THE GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL POWERS OR MILITARY FORCES. THE OIL AND MINING COMPANIES HAVE THEIR OWN STRATEGIC GAMES THAT SEEK TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION AGAINST COMPETITORS, OFFERING IN RETURN FOR THEIR BENEFITS, FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO LEADERS OR REBELS THAT ARE LIKELY TO TAKE OVER.

KEY WORDS: HUMANITARIAN CRISES, ACTORS OF THE CONFLICT, INTERSTATE CRISES

The regulations and the ongoing practice of the United Nations' agencies in the humanitarian crises have a valuable share but at the same time have also disclosed its limited share part towards the catastrophic situation on the ground, especially since, in most cases, the local population' expectations were way too high compared to the potential of the donors.

On the other hand, the literature devoted to humanitarian activities, highlights the voluntariness and the detached character subordinated to some highly altruistic purposes which exonerate any suspicion of hidden intentions to take advantage of the affected population or even more, to seize control of both the general public and of the involved political power. For this reason, the unlimited participation of of the military outside the civilian control is particularly controversial, even though, in certain circumstances it represents the only possible solution.

The generalized effect of the human security theories and its corollary, and the responsibility to protect tug in the status and the role of both the United Nations and the international non-governmental humanitarian agencies in humanitarian crises which objectifies into a flood of pro and con arguments.²

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² In our opinion, the system of the principles of operations developed under the UN aegis is constituted by: the existence of the consent and cooperation of the warring parties; keeping an impartial attitude towards the

One view defines the humanitarian intervention as “injecting military power — or the threat of such actions undertaken by one or more states from the outside in the affairs of another state, action which is intended (or at least one of its main goals) to alleviate serious human suffering.”³ The cause of human suffering may involve “systematic abuse of human rights by a cruel and repressive regime” or simply “a general breach of the authority of the central government, leading to a state of anarchy which itself threatens these rights.”

Thus, the humanitarian intervention usually involves the use (or threatening to use) of military force to impose a sense of stability in what may seem to be a chaotic situation. No military forces are expected to provide humanitarian assistance themselves (although in some cases they offer initial help: medical and nutritional), but rather to restore some legal rules so that aid agencies can reach to populations that are in danger.⁴ Obviously, some humanitarian interventions will be more difficult than others. Whenever an intervention in a “failed state” takes place, in which the central authority has been damaged, the outside military forces will be facing a divided opposition having various military capabilities.

Whenever it takes place an intervention a humanitarian crisis, caused by a repressive regime, the intervention force may face the opposition of a modern and well trained army.⁵

The humanitarian interventions will clearly be viewed as “risky” by the policy makers and by the public in the states which take the intervention into account. The benefits of the intervention may be unclear and/or widely distributed among “free-riders” and the costs of the intervention both financial and human, can be substantial.⁶

When the public support for the humanitarian intervention decreases or when the public openly begins to ask questions about the operation (as it happened in the United States after the events in Somalia in October 1993), the democratic governments will have a hard time continuing its humanitarian activities.

A significant amount of literature concerning foreign policy frameworks and the use of military force, has recently emerged in the field of international relations, but these studies have not exclusively focused on humanitarian interventions and very seldom examines the role of enframing in shaping public opinion.

warring parties throughout the operation; the release the operation is performed the Security Council at the proposal of the Secretary-General; The Security Council has the power to adopt resolutions to open the operation, setting the limits of its mandate, its modification, whenever necessary; The Secretary-General shall inform the Security Council of the progress of the mission, the Security Council has as its competence to make the decisions; The Secretary General shall be responsible for its activity in front of the Security Council; The Secretary-General proposes, and the Security Council decides on the financial support of operation: by voluntary contributions (the most common), or out of the Organization funds in accordance with the stipulations of the Charter (the General Assembly determines how these costs will be shared between the member states). See, Duță Paul, *Instituții de securitate. Partea generală*, București, Centrul Tipografic Editorial al Armatei, 2006, 32-38.

³ This definition includes, but does not specifically mention military alliances interventions (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) and intergovernmental organizations (e.g. United Nations). It also includes interventions made by private military corporations when they are run and funded by a sovereign state. See Garrett, S. A. 1999, *Doing good and doing well: An examination of humanitarian intervention*, Westport, CT, Praeger.

⁴ For our purposes, the military units called in a foreign country to handle natural disasters do not constitute an “intervention.” Garrett, S. A., *op.cit.* p. 23. See also, Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Reciprocal Vulnerability*, Ottawa, International Development Research Center, 2002; United Nations Development Program, *An Account for Human Development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

⁵ The difficulty of every type of intervention can vary significantly. A Russia in “decline” in the midst of a civil war would involve greater risks than an intervention against an oppressive regime in Haiti. See Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 12 2012, available on www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf.

⁶ See Lepgold, J. 1998, “Problema actiunii collective a NATO,” *International Security* 23, 78-106.

TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Humanitarian crises can initially be divided into two types: those caused by a "systematic abuse of the most basic human rights by a cruel and repressive regime" and those caused by "the general collapse of the central governmental authority, which leads to a state of anarchy which threatens those rights."⁷ Unfortunately, many of the humanitarian crises of recent years have been the direct result of a misconduct intentionally committed by repressive governments.⁸

Within the classic experiments, there are three hypothetical scenarios involving a repressive regime and one that describes a virtual anarchy caused by warring clans. The issue A was built loosely on the situation in Rwanda, in 1994, but with the roles reversed. It describes an ethnic conflict in which a minority-led army demands vengeance on a rebellious majority that is trying to obtain political power.⁹ Issue B is based on the situation in Indonesia since 2000, but it enhances the religious violence between the Muslims and the Christians. In this case, the leader of the country has lost control over an army dominated by the Muslims. The issue closely follows the situation in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998. In this case, the paramilitary force quells an independence riot in a rejected province. Issue D offers a scenario similar to the one in Somalia in December 1992. In this case, the adverse effects of a 5-year drought are exacerbated by a civil conflict, which prevents the humanitarian agencies from reaching the endangered population.

One factor that affects the military intervention for public support in a humanitarian crisis is the ratio of lives saved\lost and foreign lives saved\lost.

The humanitarian assistance would impede the flow of refugees that otherwise would have fled over the borders in Western Europe, and would subdue the increasing wave of accusations of genocide and "ethnic cleansing" by the media: as a conclusion it was a course of action that a disabled and disparate group states could approve of.

"The isolation through charity" is the comment reported by an official of the United Nations; and as Reiff concludes, the UN deeply rooted institutional culture has turned it into the "perfect application partner" ... for the great powers since they needed an excuse for not intervening militarily".¹⁰

The humanitarian assistance has been increasingly used more as alternative to political solutions regarding the complex political issues, as it has been tragically proved in the past five years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this respect, the humanitarian

7 In these cases, it might be easier to be generated public support for a humanitarian intervention, if an offensive government can be easily discredited-the Clinton Administration's attempt to associate Slobodan Milosevic with Hitler's atrocities was somewhat effective in generating public support for U.S. policy on Kosovo. The ability to clearly identify a guilty villain, will undoubtedly increase the likelihood of public support, but it can also create a more difficult post intervention situation if the villain is allowed to hold the power. Of course, even in anarchic situations, we will try to publicly identify the persons responsible for worsening the situation. (ex. Farrah Aidid in Somalia). See Garrett, S. A., *op.cit.*, 54.

8 See Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, *Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama's Counterterrorism Policies*, in „Washington Post“, February 8 2012, available on www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/gIQAfrSEyQ_story.html.

9 This reversal of roles enables the comparison between the issue A (violence led by the minority against the majority) and the issues B and C (violence led by the majority against the minority) See, Dorman, A. M., and T. G. Otte, eds. 1995, *Military intervention: From gunboat diplomacy to humanitarian intervention*, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company.

10 See David Reiff, *A bed for the night: humanitarianism in crisis*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, 131. See also Michael Ignatieff, in *The warrior's honor*, he addresses the possibility that in fact the humanitarian operations to have extended the wars in former Yugoslavia. (pp. 102-3). This is how he comments over the humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo: "In fact, the West policy consisted in addressing the following: we will not fight against the chieftain of the aggressors and we will not support their victims to resist, but we will try to prevent the victims' extermination." (102)

assistance increasingly reflects the nature which is determined by the sovereignty itself, in which the UN supports more and more international actors that could violate this support of international order only where it existed just the grounds — for example, the need for humanitarian intervention.¹¹ This was demonstrated by the position that the UN Security Council had in the crisis in Darfur, Sudan.

A humanitarian crisis involves a series of value dimensions, and some of these dimensions will force the negotiations of this particular value. Thus, the decision whether to intervene with military force in a humanitarian crisis will involve not only the lives of the population in peril saved/lost, but also the lives saved/lost of the troopst hat intervened. The support for the military intervention in the humanitarian crises depends on the political elites, on the location and on the race/religion of the endangered population.

The humanitarian assistance has the following features: non-coercive operations, but the use of force authorized by the additional mandates; the deployed troops are considered "Blue Helmets"; and they were not statutory in the Charter: *Chapter VI and a half*; The belligerent agreement is not necessary, but the UN considers itself to be neutral; the UN flag and the UN Headquarters; the civilian and the military personnel is deployed during the conflict.

The military humanitarian assistance has the following features: coercive operations; the troops deployed are not considered "Blue Helmets". They belong to an international coalition or to some regional bodies; that are not statutory in the Charter since it represents an intrusion in ithe internal affairs, but iit has Chapter VII, article 42 as a support; the belligerent agreement is not necessary; it does not take place under the UN flag and command; the civilian and the military personnel is deployed during the conflict. At the level of humanitarian assistance operations, some military failures were obvious.¹²

The disarmament operations had been precipitated by the awakening of some primordial animosities that had been rather suppressed than resolved, during the call-off of the cold war that led to conflicts that were traced by the most unspeakable abuses regarding human rights, during anarchic conditions.¹³

The operations were not launched where there is no peace to be maintained, but where there is a strong international desire to bolster humanitarian assistance efforts while attempts are made to find political solutions to a conflict. The efforts of such peacekeeping missions have increasingly focused on the limited objective of providing humanitarian assistance rather than to impose a comprehensive agreement. What is more, the consent may be missing because the authority has fallen or it does not possess the essential attributes, due to the proliferation of some groups which require authority. The peace agreements are inexistent or unregarded and the international law and the conventions are openly ignored or despised.¹⁴

11 See for example Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

12 Within the type I operations, in Yugoslavia, the FORPRONU forces have been taken as hostages, and the Serbian forces occupied the security areas. The armed humanitarian aid granted in Somalia was a success, but the size of political UNOSOM II was a failure. In Rwanda, MINVAR I was a failure, as "the blue helmets" were unable to adapt to the overturning of the situation into violence and genocide. These failures are also due to the attitude of the member states, which are less likely to be willing to involve themselves in such conflicts, unlike the mindset of cooperation that characterized the start-up period of the „cold war“.

13 See Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, "A Clear and Present Safety", in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012.

14 See Gettlemen Jeffrey, *Forever Wars, Africa*, Foreign Policy, March-April 2010, available on www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars.

Two of the most typical examples of this type of operations are those conducted in Somalia¹⁵ and in the former Yugoslavia, while the Rwandan mission is recognised as being the most obvious failure.

Apparently ineffective nature of the third generation of peacekeeping had led to a number of attempts to reinvent the United Nations' concept of peacekeeping.¹⁶ Similarly there has been a modest hope that "the continuous process of reflection and analysis on this matter would lead to a consensus among the UN members on what peacekeeping means and what it doesn't." However, it is unlikely that a consensus will arise in the near future. Under certain circumstances, it appears that the UN will be doomed to failure if it acts, and condemned if it doesn't. This apparent contradiction is represented by the dilemmas of putting forward for both political and humanitarian reasons in a single mission.

Every time when the countries are hit by war, famine or natural disaster, the United Nations assist in the provision of humanitarian aid through their agencies.¹⁷ In addition, some non-governmental organizations fell in beside the United Nations agencies that have become increasingly important players in the humanitarian sphere and human rights.¹⁸ While this wide variety of participants who take part in the issue of uncoordination in UN peace missions, the humanitarian activities were considered to be a substitute for the UN peacekeeping, when the conditions are not perceived to be fair for the deployment of the troops. However, the international humanitarian assistance agencies and the non-governmental organizations do not have the power and the organizational structure needed to carry out operations in situations of imminent conflict. Furthermore, the help they bring that

15 The intervention which took 3 years in Somalia (1993-1995) proposes to change the way people perceived maintaining peace. Here, UNITAF, a multinational force under the leadership of the Security Council and empowered to have a wide power, extended resources and a short term in office, passed the operational responsibility to UNOSOM II, which has been granted a far less authority but on a much longer term. "The seminar on lessons learned" from UNOSOM concluded that the mandate of operation was vague, frequently changed during the process and that it was open to billions of interpretations. In August 1993, a commando force of 400 American army officers arrived in Mogadishu chasing Aidid. In September, 3 American soldiers were killed when Aidid's militia officers took down an American helicopter. In October 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed, and more than 70 wounded in a battle that lasted for 15 hours in Mogadishu. In a few days, President Clinton sent reinforcements and established a pullback date for the American troops. "There isn't a single event that influenced so much maintaining peace in the post-Cold War period that the Somali intervention." Five years later since the humanitarian mission had been dissolved in conflict; Somalia had a strong influence on the security American-like policies. See, Duță Paul, *Instituții de securitate. Operațiuni vol. I*, București, Centrul Tipografic Editorial al Armatei, 2007, 52 and the next.

16 There has been identified a need to establish ways of "transformation of an operation of maintaining peace into one of strengthening the peace; to develop a concept for the UN operations which are distinct from those for maintaining peace and strengthening against aggression; and, more generally, to produce policies with a certain intellectual, strategic and moral coherence" See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, 24-8.

17 A part of this help is also the assistance provided by the UN agencies and operational programs, such as: UN Development Programme (UNDP); UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA); World Health Organization (WHO); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO); World Food Programme (WFP). See Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towells, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23 2012, available on fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/183725.pdf.

18 Major organizations such as: CARE, Save the Children, Services of Catholic liberation, Doctors without frontiers, World Vision, as well as other less-known organizations, were situated in the first rows in relieving human suffering in armed conflict monitoring. In fact, in countries such as Burundi and Sudan, much of their work is carried out in unsafe conditions, without the presence of the peace keepers.

to maintain the areas often becomes a resource that will further serve as fuel, rather than to resolve an armed conflict.¹⁹

The negative impact of the humanitarian assistance (where warlike forces had gained control over the humanitarian resources), drew a significant indirect impact. The food and the money, in the absence of troops and diplomatic pressure, become important components in belligerent local tactics, as UN and other agencies operating in a political, military and diplomatic suction fan were diverted from their humanitarian goals.²⁰

Nevertheless, the future of peacekeeping will be decisively determined by the collective desire of the member states, rather than humanitarian reasons. The proliferation of the participants in the current interventions depends on the national governments; they are the ones who distribute the military forces and the money-the essential sources in all operations which aim at easing the effects of conflict or its end. And, left to the collective wisdom of the member states (some of which are more equal than the others), it is unlikely that the new generation of peace operations must have a similarity with the noble but less lucky (struck by fate) efforts in the early and mid '90s.

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

The East-West conflict has found its way in wars - first in Greece, then in Korea, Vietnam, South Africa, Central America, Afghanistan and other places, but, except Korea and Vietnam, these wars were generally limited regarding size and scope. As the inconclusive result of periodic conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors showed, according to many people, managing these conflicts generally meant secrecy and preventing the expansion, a matter which was best achieved by the power states. While it allegedly showed a commitment to the role of the international organizations in operating/managing conflicts, like the United Nations, it was clear that the ability to cease or manage conflicts belonged to the power states, not to the international or regional organizations.

The UN potential of managing conflicts was limited to those cases in which there were East-West allowance measures or consensus, and its actions consist mainly in the intervention, in the electoral support, in the process of decolonization, and traditional peacekeeping operations such as Cyprus, Israel, Egypt (Sinai Desert), or Israel-Syria (Golan Heights).

Since 1989 the security perceptions have changed, due to a strong growth of sectarian violence and a similar increase in conflict management in the broadest sense, unlike the objective of increasing the national security of state against direct foreign threats.²¹

19 In March 1997, in Zaire, for example, Kabila's rebel forces obtained the fuel they needed to raise the troops for an attack on the southern town of Lubumbashi from a UNHCR warehouse from Goma. More than 15,000 gallons of fuel have been repurchased for 300 rebels who successfully assaulted Lubumbashi, in April 1997. In addition to the fuel stolen, Kabila's army also relied on the stolen trucks to transport the stolen food. Moreover, the Mobutu army also hijacked UN Charter planes to carry weapons for the useless struggle against the rebels. The planes have entered a refugee camp and the weapons were distributed later to the Rwandan Hutu refugees who had become the first line of defense for Mobutu.

20 When the international agencies and the NGOs are trying to help the civilian population, their warlike governments and the opposition forces take them and use them as resources in order to keep the war going. The inter-group tensions are also raising when the NGOs provide external resources to certain groups and not to others or where workers from certain groups are employed thus excluding others. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incident of Civil War in Africa," *Centre of Development Research, ZEF Bonn, Facing Ethnic Conflicts*, December 2000.

21 In the immediate post-Cold War era, the world's attention has shifted from the pursuit of superpower rivalry, from the counting of nuclear warheads and from the "Star Wars" (as it was called in the press the Strategic Defense Initiative of President Ronald Reagan) to the assistance of the outbreak of the civil war on almost every

The internal geopolitical games, many of them taking place in the African territories, are related to the international environment, both for the cause and the consequences, as well as for their prevention and resolution. Africa is the continent where the number of victims of armed conflicts is the highest in the world. With a number of 13 million displaced people and 3.5 million refugees, it twice exceeds Asia, which has five times as many people.²²

The conflicts are vast, they differ in intensity, duration and territorial expansion; they can be intern, international or regional, civil or insurrectional, armed conflicts or terror tactics, conflicts between forces or terrorism.

The type of internal conflicts (civil wars, rebellions) differs from the traditional external conflicts (international); this distinction has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall.²³ While the conflicts between states have visibly decreased, the domestic ones have increased enormously. In these wars, the civilians suffer casualties at an alarming growth rate, falling prey to either government forces, or armies that fight against each other, or even the state fighting for control and power. The civilian population, who has no guilt, is caught in the middle and pays the price. Meanwhile, the international community, to her great shame, often sits on the sidelines and debates on how, why, when and where the intervention should take place. The power states are fighting for their own interests and vote for or against, and in the meantime people die.

As shown by the events in Rwanda from April to July, 1994, no government has been willing to take action to prevent the genocide planned by the Hutu regime, and within four months, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu were killed.²⁴ Instead, during and after the genocide, Rwanda has become a major target for bilateral and multilateral humanitarian operations.²⁵ Inland, internally, the displaced persons, and those who survived the genocide

continent-wars that normally spread over the state boundaries covering entire regions. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2012.

22 Armed colonial and precolonial conflicts subordinate themselves to conquests, raids or slave seizures; the wars of independence represented national liberation movements during the Cold War and took place in Biafra, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola and Mozambique. See Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *L'Afrique face à l'Islam. Les enjeux africains de la lutte contre le terrorisme*, ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 2003.

23 African internal conflicts are directed by regional and international networks, which are incompatible with the analysis of algorithm of the realistic theory within the terms of nation states which pursue goals of power, it can be observed a change of form and intensity. Cold war conflicts are characterized by an ideological opposition and the support of major blocks against intrafricane multiforme guerrillas that have a partial support from the great powers. See, Mary Kaldor, *Transnational civil society*, in „Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas J, (eds.) Human rights in global politics”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 203.

24 At this time there is not determined the exact number of Tutsis and Hutus who were killed during the genocide, which lasted for four months, but the figures vary between 750,000 and 1 million. Instead of responding to the acts of genocide, the most countries have avoided these obligations under the stipulations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide since 1951, referring to massacres as being similar to those belonging to the genocide, and they are incidents of genocide. France, Belgium and Italy sent troops into the area several times to recover their citizens. Furthermore, the action of France to set up the Turquoise Zone in June 1994 with a manpower of 2,500 troops can be seen as an effort to stop the genocide, but most of the analysts agree with Samantha Power in *A problem from hell: America and the age of genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 380, on the matter that, on the one hand “The French troops have been deployed extremely fast ... which illustrates the state of peace towards any state aims at”, but on the other hand the French did not do much to prevent the Hutus' tools for genocide, for example the racist radio station and the so-called "cleansing" exercises performed by the Hutu extremists.

25 In July 1994, while the genocide was acting destructively on all levels, 1 million Rwandans crossed the borders of what was Zaire at that time to seek shelter from the Patriotic Army of Rwanda, dominated by the Tutsis which had been found in Uganda. This exodus of refugees has drawn support operations in refugee camps along the borders between Zaire and Rwanda and Tanzania and Rwanda. Rwandan support operations were slower, but, nevertheless, many requests for support and recovery have been made since August 1994 to the present. See Mark Malan, *AFRICOM: A wolf in sheep's clothing?*, Washington, DC: International refugee

were the beneficiaries of the humanitarian assistance. Also, there were nearly a million refugees who had found refuge in the neighboring countries in July 1994, after the takeover by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army. If the humanitarian assistance has served as a kind of excuse for the failure of the international community to take action in order to prevent mass killings in Rwanda, it has similarly been used as an alternative to a political action to tackle serious crimes against humanity that occurred in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. The humanitarian support was a trigger used to connect the policy gaps caused by the inability of major powers to agree on political solutions regarding a profound political issue.²⁶ In these circumstances a new concept was, that of "responsibility to protect," or R2P defined as the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from certain specific crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes.²⁷

At the end of 2001, in Afghanistan, the assistance was given, with a little hesitation, from the same aircraft that, only one or two days before had launched bombs; and two years later in Iraq, the leading powers considered the providing of humanitarian assistance as a means of reconciliation between them and the Iraqi people. In both cases, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the provided amount of humanitarian assistance, went beyond the identified needs and it largely reflected more of an incentive to support the perceived foreign intervention.²⁸ Both cases also showed a clear distortion of the principles of international humanitarian law and were facilitated by the support of the United Nations humanitarian system.

It would be an illusion to believe that the functioning of the economy reduces the risk of violence, and trade would ensure peace. If not all conflicts have an economic motivation, they all need funding. War economies can be closed, financed from local resources, open and guerrilla war economies, externally funded as well as by political, military and humanitarian sanctuaries.²⁹

testimony before the Subcommittee on South African Issues, August 1, 2007, available on [foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Malan Testimony070801.pdf](http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Malan%20Testimony070801.pdf)

²⁶ Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Russia could not agree over a course of action. Moreover, France and Germany pursued some goals that have proved to be mutually destructive. For nearly three years, the United States of America was reserved in getting involved in these policies, in part, to focus on the agenda of the Clinton Administration. See Abel J. Esterhuysen, *Iraqization of Africa?*, in „Strategic Studies Quarterly”, Vol. 2, No. 1, spring, 2008, 119.

²⁷ The doctrine also includes aspects on prevention by any means. The polemics are based on issues such as the apparent subjugation of the sovereignty of the state, authorization, who can intervene and when it will occur and the aim of humanitarian interventions. This does not diminish the importance of the issues, but on the contrary they are the crucial issues that should not be overlooked. However, they refer to the proceeding, not to the purpose. The period in which we live and the existing conflicts make the R2P to be fundamental to the international community. See Alex Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention,” *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008).

²⁸ The main factors of the African wars are the raw materials which enable the financing of conflicts; there can be distinguished several types of wars depending on the nature of the raw materials: for oil (Angola, Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan), for diamonds (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo) for precious metals (Bunia, The Democratic Republic of Congo), for drug dollars and land games (Burundi, The Ivory Coast, Darfur, Rwanda) and for the control of water (Nile residents) or for forest resources. See for example Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, *Shifting sands: the search for “coherence” between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report no. 8, London, Overseas Development Institute, August 2000, 55 and the next.

²⁹ It is important to know the role played by the economic factors as opposed to other factors. The African states have military expenditures that represent 7% of the world’s expenditure (7.1 billion U.S. dollars out of a total of 975 billion dollars) for a quarter of major conflicts (5 of 19). Poverty, underdevelopment and the lack of security are the cause and the effect of the conflicts, all creating a vicious circle. Beyond this vicious circle, according to some authors, the old ideological conflicts were based on the desire to obtain the advantages of annuity; this thesis may be specific to the current armed conflicts in which the role of the economic factors is

Conflicts occur in weak states; there are rarely interstate conflicts, Eritrea-Ethiopia being an exception. Within the states, the opposition parties are regional (North-South: Ivory Coast, Uganda, Sudan), are particular for disintegrated states or resulted from implosion (The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia).³⁰

The conflicts mobilize a plurality of private and public actors, soldiers and civilians that cannot be reduced to the government-rebel relationship or the binomial economic interest of businesses - the official or collateral checkout method of resources by the government, political powers or military forces. The oil and mining companies have their own strategic games that seek to maintain their position against competitors, offering in return for their benefits, financial support to leaders or rebels that are likely to take over.

There was a search for diversification of risks related to maintaining the power of the government or the rebels' access to power; thus in Angola was supported by the French company ELF both in Dos Santos and in Savimbi, and in Congo both by Nguesso and Lissouba.

The conflicts are the result of the conjunction of several factors, each with its own development; ancient conflicts that were not fully extinguished are updated, even tooled by their own potential through the eruption of economic, social and political crises (Arab-Berber population vs. Black-African animism and Islam vs. Christianity, nomadic vs. sedentary farmers).

They are intranational, but with a regional dimension in that the militia involved in conflict is redeployed in the neighboring countries; this cause triggers an identity crisis accompanied by an institutional crisis and a territorial fragmentation. The conflicts can turn from violent into uncontrollable actions, engaging poverty, and even excluding the absence of the institutions that supports them.

The cultural and civilization factors play their well defined role over the African territory. Wars are very likely to happen when they appeal to religion and politics; the religious fundamentalism replaces the nationalist and socialist visions about society.³¹ The "black" Islam has flourished in the realm of poverty, exclusion and frustration.³²

Beyond the crisis, the ethnic or religious issues have become the main goals of political rhetoric and the complexity of the situation is reduced by framing the identities or the combatants among the forces of 'good' or 'evil'.

The conflicts are more present inside the systems where leaders struggle to monopolize wealth, and political adversaries for the redistribution, control and endorsement of those leaders. War can have a political purpose: the accession to power by force; it may

controversial, and there are enough arguments for a perspective of historical continuity. See, Jean-Christophe Rufin and François Jean (eds.), *Economie des guerres civiles*, Paris: Hachette, 1996, 23-31.

³⁰ The victory can not be clearly in favor of one party; consequently each party shall approach certain annuity. The wars allow the legitimacy of some actions of which, in peacetime, are considered crimes. The participants' economic advantages in civil wars are the hold-ups, protection fees, weapons, food and drug dollars' trade, the exploitation through forced labor, land control, the theft of foreign aid, etc. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incident of Civil War in Africa," in *Centre of Development Research (ZEF Bonn: Facing Ethnic Conflicts*, December 2000).

³¹ Africa was not too interested in treating the differences between civilizations, even though domestic violence in Sudan or Eritrea and Ethiopia may be regarded as expressions of conflict between Christians and Muslims. There are Islamic networks, more or less nebulous than Al-Qaida, implanted in the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Sahara. See Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *op.cit.*, 56.

³² In the Ivory Coast, as well as in other African societies, the Pentecostal movements are a proof of the confusion between morality, religion and politics, a politics of opposing religious phenomena by the Northern Iman of this state. The political factors are essential, determining the degree of legitimacy to the power, the disappearance of the socio-political compromise, the fight the rulers to accede to power, the desire to set up territories, the decomposition of the citizenship. See, Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *op.cit.*, 82.

take the form of an ethnic battle as far as the ethnicity becomes a game power. 33

The military aspects are various; the armed conflicts are closely linked to the government's military expenditure. The only conflict with the characteristics of a conventional war between states is that of Ethiopia-Eritrea.³⁴

The conflicts are fueled by the development of small weapon trafficking, present in Eastern Europe; it is estimated that, currently there are over 100 million weapons in the African continent.

The gun dealers are simultaneously involved in the vicious circle of drug dollars, diamonds, oil, money laundering. The cost of weapons has seriously fallen; in some states, an AK-47 costs less than \$ 10. The mercenaries, militias and child -soldiers play a crucial role in the African wars.

A cease-conflict in one area leads, sooner or later, to a conflict in the neighboring area - the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone to the Ivory Coast, the Rwandan Hutu displacement in The Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo and the southern Djandjawid militias to western Sudan.

Children who are in precarious situations enroll as a means of survival, being violently re-socialized; the military activities, especially for child-soldiers, encourage unemployment, de-socialization and lack of education for the youth.³⁵

A geopolitical dimension is particularly present. After the Cold War, the hegemonic powers began a withdrawal from this area. But, there are some exceptions: the UK in Sierra Leone, France in The Ivory Coast, the European Union in The Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis) and the presence of the United States (the military base in Djibouti present in Sahel and Sahara).

The end of the Cold War and of the bipolarity aspect is translated by means of a dynamic and territorial splitting.

A new hegemonic game about oil and the fight against terrorism is given birth.³⁶ Many African conflicts³⁷ generate the dissociation of the national territories uncontrolled by

33 Unequal access to the positions of responsibility and the competition for power and control of resources, create tension between groups on based on identity issues-ethnic or religious. Diaspora, regional powers or conglomerates are masses of maneuver for the political actor. There are many states which no longer control the territories, the respect for the law and the rules imposed by the monopoly of legitimate violence. See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding United States Institute of Peace, 2011.

34 According to official data, Africa, in 1985, represents 10% of the imports of weapons; in 1995, the percentage dropped to 2%; military expenditures fell from 10 billion, in 1985, to 8,1 billion in 1989. See, SIPRI yearbook, <http://www.sipri.org/>, accessed on 25.01.2014.

35 The regular armies and forces to maintain law and order are often without a minimum discipline. The phenomenon "solreb" has gained momentum (soldier during the day, rebel during the night.), mercenary-like status, cleavage between the clans, the private armies that affect a weakening of national armies and the mobilization of soldier-children. See Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Reciprocal Vulnerability*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002; United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Issue*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

36 The conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Angola were fueled by China by providing weapons, while exploiting its position as a permanent member of the Security Council, thus allowing some countries to bypass the sanctions of the international community. In Somalia, a state that in fact was undergoing a secession phase, after more than 18 years of war and more than 450,000 people dead, the Islamists supported by Eritrea and perhaps by an Al-Qaida faction oppose the senior war supported by Ethiopia and the United States. In June 2006, they took power in Mogadishu. See Elke Krahmman, *Security: Collective Good or Commodity?* in „European Journal of International Relations”, Vol. 14, No. 3/2008, September 2008.

37 In 2005, Zimbabwe was involved in the conflict in The Democratic Republic of Congo to counter the tendencies of leader of South Africa. Burkina Faso was involved in the conflict in the Ivory Coast, with Robert Taylor in Liberia. Some conflicts focused on conquests and on getting control over some territories, such as gaining access to sea for Eritrea and Ethiopia. See Paul Duță, *op.cit.*, 156.

a power state but by transnational associations (diaspora, conglomerate, regional powers) with alliances or occult support coming out of the control of that particular state and the international system.³⁸

The armed conflict areas in Africa are caused by the rebirth of ethnic, religious or national ambitions, the weakness of constitutional states and their sovereignty, by the interference of regional and international powers as well as the growing power of the international criminal organizations.

In the above mentioned conflicts the humanitarian crises are inherent, their treatment is postulated to solve the political and military matters in accordance with the United Nations regulations.

³⁸ In 2006, in Chad, the Zaghawa clan that ruled in that period, was threatened by the rebels who arrived in Sudan, respectively in the province of Darfur. The case of the conflict in Sudan has as a bias the clash of China's and the USA's interests related to oil, while France struggles to retain its positions defending francophonia by realizing a balance between the Arab-Muslim world and the black and Christian world in order to avoid the domino effect in the region. See Paul Duță, *op.cit.*, 159.

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