INTEGRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORM

Paul POPA[1]

ABSRACT:
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVISTS, THE NORM IS BUILT UP BY INTERACTION OF THE AGENTS. SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVISM HAS REMAINED THE DOMINANT THEORY IN RECENT DECADES AND THE ONLY ONE THAT DESERVES TO BE EVALUATED WHEN WE SPEAK OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS IN THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SOCIAL-CONSTRUCTIVISTS, AN INTERNATIONAL NORM IS BASED ON THE CAPACITY AND OPENNESS OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS TO COLLABORATE AND INTERACT IN ORDER TO FORM THE NORM. THIS PROCESS PLACES THE INTERNATIONAL NORM ON A CENTRAL POSITION IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, AS OPPOSED TO RATIONALIST APPROACHES IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL NORM IS DETERMINED BY INTEREST AND IMPOSED BY POWER. A GOOD WAY TO DEMONSTRATE THIS CENTRAL POSITION OF THE NORM, AND THE WAY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS CRUCIAL ROLE IN THE PERCEPTION OF INTEREST AND POWER, IS TO CHALLENGE THESE THREE IN AN EXERCISE.

INTRODUCTION

In order to be able to dissociate the image of the norm from its origin and strength, that is, interest and power, I must put the international norm to prove its capacity in relation to the two. Interest and power come mainly from states, so one of the great challenges to the state's interest and power is the ability and willingness of the international norm to impose upon them by integrating it into the internal structures of the state. I understand from previous presentations that the international norm is a product of interaction and is the result of foreign policy formulated nationally. But the interest-norm-power relationship raises serious assumptions about how international norms can be embedded at national level. We can ask ourselves what are the international norms that are embedded at national level, and especially why? To what extent do international norms constrain national behavior or create obligations? To what extent do national policy actors resort to international norms to justify national policies or to How influential is the

---

international norm in the grinding of national political discourse and behavior? To capture how international norms can be integrated by a state, we must take the politics as the main benchmark. Both international political movements and national positions must be the starting point for the analysis.

Social-constructivists refer first and foremost to "rhetoric" and the discourse used by the national political elite about global business issues. In order to determine first of all a certain approach taken into account by these political factors, it is necessary to see how the internal policy, the discourse and the approach on a subject in which an international norm is to be adopted or not. It can be seen from the public outings of the national political elite that it will be the position on a certain field or norm. These political opinions can be a first sign, the importance of measures, the acceptance or not of certain international provisions within the national legal system. Also, one can not ignore that political discourse is by its nature an electoral responsibility, so it can be manipulative, misleading, vague or even a liar. But that does not mean that it can not be a first step to be seen in the next positions or a starting point when it is to be anticipated or projected what is to be decided, even if behind the "beliefs expressed, there are material interests ".[2]

The actors' strategy is to use the norm to pursue ideals but also to fulfill their interests. In this sense, States can establish institutionalized structures, procedural mechanisms or legal principles that allow the acceptance and integration of the norm in national structures without their ideals changing their trajectory or the material interests to be changed according to the instructions of the norm. Also, accepting and integrating the norm does not mean that the state really has the beliefs on that norm, but, very often, this integration of the norm can be marked by the existence of interests, a "computed acceptance" to gain benefits without high costs. The true aims of integrating process can be concealed due to the coercive mechanisms of the international norm. If coercion does not bring about change, the state considers this norm to be appropriate, it may be motivated to integrate it.[3] If this normativity coercion becomes or is gradually transforming into one that will influence national needs and interests, they will cause changes in national behavior and in its foreign policy.[4]

Even though social-constructivists have presented important criteria that are to be considered when a norm can be transposed in a state, criticism may be given to constructivist theorists in the sense that they must provide a mechanism for regulating the norm once accepted. It does not explain why there are some states that choose to integrate a norm, and others do not.[5] Toward social-constructivists, rational theoreticians have developed rational institutionalism that explains "the emergence of norms and institutions." Also, the institutionalism proposed by the rationalists deals with issues related to mutual norm, conditions for interaction, strategic cooperation, which all come to be constrained by social norms, determining a "limited rationality"

---

[2] Ideas found in Payne, Rodger A. (2000) `*Habermas, Discourse Norms, and the Prospects for Global Deliberation'*, Annual Meeting, International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California; Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'*, International Organization, p. 891*., ,* Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999a) *Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe'*, International Studies Quarterly 43: 83-144 .

[3] Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change. Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses* , Western Oregon University, (Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, London&Ney York, 2016), 10

[4] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, cited by Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change,* 24-25

[5] Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999a) *Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe,* 83-144.

of the actors. In the view of constructivist institutionalism, this constraint represents the point of differentiation from rational institutionalism, as they see the emergence and dissemination of the norm by "accepting it as it is" (and eventually changing or choosing in case of normative conflict) and creating it in a purpose-oriented process.[6]

STAGES OF INTEGRATION

For socio-constructivists, the theory of the process of emergence and dissemination of the norm proposes and presupposes the existence of the "life cycle of the norm", which is made up of three important and distinct phases: in the first phase, the emergence of the norm referring to the issues already discussed in the present research, and which have more to do with the way the norm is built, the component elements or the environment that determines its appearance and construction. The second phase I have proposed to call it the imposition of the norm or as considered in the doctrine as a "waterfall" through which the norm is promoted, acknowledged, or better said the lobbying process to the relevant actors in viewing their value and accepting them. Imposing seems to me a better concept precisely because it actually surpasses a process of persuading the recipients and whose purpose is to subsequently enforce their norm. The third stage is the internalization of the norm, a process through which internal norms are transposed by specific mechanisms. According to the constructivists, each of these stages captures "different social processes of logic and action". They are characterized by different actors, different motives[7] and "dominant social processes".[8]

According to Finnemore and Sikkink, two fundamental elements are found when it comes to creating the norm: "normative entrepreneurs" and "organizational platforms."[9] In the first phases, those of the emergence and the enforcement of the norm are considered suggestions on what could be normalized. Perhaps at first sight, the constructivists do not propose at the outset a clear strategy attributed to these phases, because they propose vague criteria about "human agencies, valences, chances, context, etc." exploited through the "genealogy filter".[10] When the analysis becomes concrete and a case study is provided, the constructivists talk about what "normative entrepreneurs" means to those who aim to persuade those directly affected by the importance of adopting such norms. This is a process of "normative persuasion"[11] achieved by

---

[6] Thomas Risse, *Let's Argue!Comunicative action in world* în *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations. Ideas do not float freely,*Thomas Risse(editor) (Routledge, New York&London, 2017), 254-255

[7] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*

[8] Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern. Norm Constrction in a Globalizing World, Non-State Actors in International Law,* Politics and Governance Series, Stockholm University, (Sweden, Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 26

[9] Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern.*, 895

[10] Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern,* 896

[11] Often, the key factors in this persuasion process are the status of agents who initiate such an approach, the network of contacts and lobbying resources. But this does not exclude elements of marketing and promotion, the platform used in Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998) *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*. Norms are more easily adopted by local agents if they fit with the needs, traditions and values they have in Amitav Acharya, *How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organization,* Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 168-170 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877858 cited by Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, *Security Community in South-Asia: India-Pakistan*, Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics, (London&New York, 2013), 29

considering the cultural and moral criteria of the recipients. Behavior in such a process, as proposed by the constructivists, is specific to the politics, but given the multitude of actors involved in such a process, as argued by social-constructivism, determines the development of an ample and complex mechanism. Actors, from individuals, communities, organizations, entities, forums to states and international organizations, can take part in such a process in order to adopt the most optimal solution, transposed into a set of norms.

In relation to the third phase, concerning the way of integrating the international norm, two constructive factors are taken into account by the constructivists: the coercion or the belief.[12] First of all, those who stand out as supporters of the norm can resort to coercive mechanisms in which to mobilize national and international resources, political or other, to force policy makers to accept such a norm . These steps can be carried out both by means of coercion, most often, material or political, and by launching campaigns designed to determine no contrary positions both in the political spectrum and across civil society.[13] A second mechanism taken into account by constructivists is that of the "education process" brought to the national leaders, through which the political leaders within a state must be convinced that the adoption of such a norm is a benefit to them and to the state they represent, and the effects that this norm produces are in line with the state's vision, ideals and interests.[14]

On the other hand, according to Mary E. Pettenger, this process of determining and persuasion of political factors can not exclude or disregard that the acceptance of the norm does not promptly imply a change in the behavior of that state. Policies for accepting the norm are important, but policymakers should not only be convinced of acceptance, but also of adopting and proposing mechanisms to enable it to be successfully implemented. Moreover, there are many situations where it is not only the politics who decides on the fate of the norm. There are some actors and stakeholders who can contribute to this process. Politicians are not the only category to address those interested in promoting and accepting the norm. There are many other representatives of all sort of entities that have to give their consent and support for such processes.[15]

---

[12] Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1997) `International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide', European Journal of International Relations 3: 473-495; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999a) `Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe', International Studies Quarterly 43: 83-144; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999b) `Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions', Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia cited by Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change. Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses* , Western Oregon University, (Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, London&Ney York, 2016), 9-10

[13] Risse, Thomas (2000) ` *"Let's Argue!" op. cit,* 1-39, cited in Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change,* 9-10

[14] Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999a) *Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe; Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1999b) `Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions'*, Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia citat de Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change*, 25-26

[15] Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change*, 25-26. In the analysis made by Cortell și Davis(Cortell, Andrew P. and James W. Davis Jr (1996) `*How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms'*, International Studies Quarterly 40: 451-478) which proposes eight options for the acceptance of the international norm by national political leaders: irrelevancy (non-recognition of the norm and non-justification of choice) rejection (I know but rejects the international debate) domestic relevance (rejecting the norm but continuing the national debate) rhetorical assertions (the norm is accepted conditionally, but with coercion accusations) the external impact (the norm is adjusted at international level to be transposed) the national impact (the international norm is found in the national dialogue, the changes are justified) the prominence of the norm

For constructivists, it is important that these three phases are supported from the very beginning by enough parties, entities, individuals or political leaders, yet sufficiently determined and convinced of their cause, so that they can gather supporters and later clarify the recipients of the opportunity of these adoptions.[16] Depending on persuasion capacity, even a small number of individuals can attract "a waterfall of statements"[17] by adopting means and instruments specific to civilized state discourse by which constraining mechanisms are proposed.[18] Once this clarification process has been completed and those who have been pressured or educated about effects of adopting the norm and have embraced the need to adopt that norm, the norm is considered to be "consolidated and internalized". It should be noted that this consolidation and internationalization is fulfilled when all the actors involved have accepted this norm. It becomes "a part of the actors' consciousness" is treated as such because its acceptance is, as we have seen, a reflection of their conscience. Their consciousness is in fact the culture and identity they are found in, so the position of the norm becomes a fixed one. Once this process has been completed, social-constructivists believe that even those who have been reluctant at first can accept and assimilate the norm, becoming perceptible with those who have supported it from the beginning.[19]

However, the modalities of distribution and dissemination of norms, their alternation and the changes that take place, but also the "intersubjective character" are situations that cause the analysis, study and evaluation of international norms to be challenging. As we have seen, one of the important features of international norms is that they are subject to a continuous process of adaptation, transformation and flexibility depending on the context in which they are located, doubled by the level of ongoing interaction. Despite some limitations, international norms remain "taken for granted". Adopting and integrating international norms most often involves debates about instruments used or instrumental rationality (which suggests analysis of the considerations that need to be made with regard to that norm, but especially the consequences that may arise). Functionality should also be considered in relation to the social or cultural environment, including with regard to impact opportunities. That is why the adoption and emergence of international norms is obligatory to consider a broad approach to culture, the definition of principles, characteristics and specificities.[20]

Interaction promoted by social-constructivists is able to elucidate those aspects of legal positivism that can not explain the aspects of clarifying the validity hierarchy. Custom is much better explained and clarified by the constructivists, especially with regard to aspects of the

transformation into national policies) taken as such (the international norm is part of national law and its observance is automatic) in Loren R. Cass, The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Standards, Domestic Politics, and Unaquiable Commitments in Global Environmental Policy) , 2006 quoted by Mary E. Pettenger, *The social construct of climate change*, 25-26

[16] Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998), *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change*, 902-904

[17] Timur Kuran, Cass R Sunstein, *Availability cascades and risk regulation,* Stanford University School of Law Stanford, Law Review, 1999, 683-768 cited by Geoffrey Brenan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, Nicholas Southwood(editors), *Explaining Norms*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), 168-170

[18] Geoffrey Brenan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, Nicholas Southwood(editors), *Explaining Norms*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013),168-170

[19] Geoffrey Brenan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, Nicholas Southwood(editors), *Explaining Norms,* 170-171

[20] Yosef Lapid, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Critical perspectives on world politics International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996 quoted in Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern*, 13-14

concepts of *opinio juris* and *jus cogens*. " Explanations of constructivists can give a new interpretation of the differences between norms, both in terms of contextual applicability and space-time details. These perspectives of constructivism, but also the broad approach of the functionality of the norm integration process, determine the better applicability of these mechanisms and a better inclusion of the international norm. The social constructivists manage to explain and establish the best connection between what rationalists claim to be important, as in power and interest, "with what they disregard, that is, identity, culture and norms." Interactive constructivism proposes and offers ample perspectives not only on how the norm has been built and related, but also about the dynamics and the future of some approaches or changes to the international norm.[21]

Some constructivists talk about the possibility of norms being violated, and how these violations can be made and later sanctioned. Any violation of the international norms assumed may be subject to the sanction of the other actors. It should be noted that these sanctions are enforced by the state's partners when these violations of the international norm are done to their detriment, or they affect them in any way. But in order not to revert to the rationalist dialogue, it must be noted that these sanctions brought by the other actors do not mean that the norms are of no importance.[22] Thus, we would break down any social-constructivist architecture. The process must be seen in its entirety, so for the beginning we have established that norms based on culture and identity become normative beliefs. They are not a strategy, and the persuasion process involving the three phases (the emergence, the imposition and the integration of the norm) should not be seen as phases of interest, but they are beliefs in which the supporters believe.

It should be noted that the norms are and must be "disseminated through normative persuasion and not by strategic considerations, imitation or copying." They are the design of cultural beliefs and identities, so these features are the basis for them to be accepted by everyone.[23] If they do not appear as a strategy, it would be thought that their emergence is spontaneous, or appear through the use of "positive (incentive) or negative (sanctions)" forms of coercion. However, in practice, Lisbeth Segerlund proposes two types of sanctions: those made by internal mechanisms and instruments, and those with external dimensions.[24] Internal imply rejection, while external sanctions made by policies of international entities (organizations, agencies, etc.) take into account legal pluralism as an institutionalized policy (as well as rhetoric in most cases), due to the fact that many of the sanctioning activities are granted in relation to the activity of non-state actors

---

[21] Jutta Brunnee și Stephen J. Toope, Jutta Brunnee și Stephen J. Toope, *History, Mystery and Mastery, International Theory* 2013, p. 3, Edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff și Mark A. Pollack(Temple University), (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), 138-140

[22] Geoffrey Brenan, *Explaining Norms*,168-170

[23] Geoffrey Brenan, *Explaining Norms*,168-170

[24] Lisbeth Segerlund, *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern*, 13-14. When the rule under the norm relates to behavior and behavior, external sanctions are those applicable; when regulation addresses standards and patterns, internal "sanctions". These two perspectives on the norm (as guidance or as standards) are contrary to the rationalist vision. The issue of sanction in international relations is a challenge for international organizations in the absence of centralized authority. See also Vincent-Joel Proulx, Institutionalizing State Responsibility. Global Security and UN Organs, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016).

and informal systems. For sanction, both state and non-state actors, it is intended to use the rule of law to formalize the relationship with these actors.[25]

The integrating of international norm nationally has seen that it involves some mechanisms aimed at ensuring integration based on the conviction of the main actors and agents that the state-level effects of that norm will be beneficial.[26] By means of persuasion, the norm can be integrated in a state. Here, there are strictly technical procedures and instruments that effectively streamline domestic law. States have jurisdictions within them, where the specificity of procedures for the application and interpretation of norms made through public institutions may differ from one system to another. Thus, once the international norm has been integrated, its manifestation must be observed, for example, before the courts, when they are informed of its legality, interpretation and application. In order to truly discover the legal nature of an international norm, account should also be taken of the legal systems to which they apply. Given the different legal systems, such as common law, the civil system, etc., the functionality of the interactive norm is also found when they have to integrate into these types of systems through the courts. I do not want to go into the details of the features of these systems, often technical, because it is not the subject of this theme, or maybe it would be a continuation of the research. That is why I mention that, each system has about the same mechanisms of technical integration of the norm, which are mostly linked and applied to each system.

Benedetto Conforti proposes that we should consider the integration of the international norm and those "national operators" that establish the binding force of the international norm. Through operators we understand all those public institutions, political entities, courts that transpose the compliance of international norms with domestic law. Hence, the compliance of the domestic law with the international norm is not based solely on its binding force, but also on the national instruments, on their capacity and willingness to integrate the norm. The international norm, seen as a result of the "socio-economic[27]-political dialogue", can be implemented as a "common ground shared by all individuals" irrespective of culture, nationality, citizenship and whose identity is reflected by "national operators".[28]

CONCLUSIONS

It might be said that an international ethical norm, taking into account the characteristics presented in the preceding sections, but especially on account of the *equation* whereby a *necessity* if supported by a *possibility* then becomes *mandatory*, should at first sight not requires hard

---

[25] Helene Maria Kyed, *Introduction: International Development Interventions, Journal of legal pluralism and unofficial law*, 2011-nr. 63, edited by Melania G. Wiber, Helene Maria Kyed, pp. 3-6. In analyzing a map of legal systems, it can be seen that there are two systems of domination: the common law system and the civil law system (or, more precisely, the romanian legal system), both from the European level to the former colonies in William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1-6, in The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficla Law, 49/2004, edited by Gordon R. Goodman. This mechanism helps international entities to formulate the necessary policies to implement the rules. That is why legal pluralism is used for this purpose to foster this process.

[26] Benedeto Conforti, *International Law and the role of domestic Legal System*(tradusă de Rene Provost), (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993), 10

[27] For more details on the economic dimension of the construction of the international norm, or its economic nature, see Joel P. Trachtman, *The International Economic Law. Revolution and the Right to Regulate*, Cameron May, (International Law and Policy, Cambridge, 2006).

[28] Benedetoo Conforti, *International Law and the role of domestic,* 10

integration mechanisms in a state. Ethical norms, as I have said, such as *jus cogens*, do not have limitations of applicability, but on the contrary they themselves are setting and imposing limits. Then why is there a need for persuasion mechanisms that can be adopted and integrated domestically? In this sense, I said that social-constructivism ignores some aspects of the relationship of norms with interest and power, the latter two can not be excluded in the analysis of the construction and manifestation of the norm. But in order to be resonant with the norm, it must be realized that power serves interest, as long as interest expresses ethical principles through norms. Power must become a means of the ethical norm to manifest itself, until the ethical norm is identified in the social consciousness with the power. It can be noticed that in ethical issues such as pollution, some norms can be perceived as economically challenging for internal policy but may be appropriate in terms of long-term image. In fact, I was saying that states should not be limited to short-term strategies, but must take into account long-term gains and the adoption of norms, such as environmental protection, may be a gain in image and then economically in the long run, compared to short and medium term strategic measures.

Just as I said in the conclusion of a previous section, no doubt that most interpretations of international law have a Western perspective.[29] The impact of the international norm and the role of international law have a more Western-European or transatlantic valence. The international norm must have the same role and the same perspective in all legal systems or any state. Comparing this relationship between the international norm and the national or legal systems is best done through legal sources (legislation, instruments, cases) plus other sources of secondary character (such as doctrine). These sources help to implement international norms in different legal systems. Therefore, incorporation may vary according to the nature of the issue governed by the norm and the opening of the state to international policies. Any kind of position on an international norm can at some point be reduced or embraced by constraint or belief.

The international norm has this role to help establish links between different systems. David Haljan proposes some issues that need to be discussed in terms of the norm and for ongoing analysis and research. First of all, it should be seen how national courts in different systems come to apply the international norm. Here I believe that the principles of legality of different legal systems or states should be discussed and debated. This analysis must consider that the international norm is constantly changing and the challenges it raises are permanent and continuous towards the national public authorities and institutions. Moreover, as David Haljan mentions, the more the international norm is seen as a solution and as a response to all international issues, the more it is considered to be entitled to take the place of national norms[30] that prove unable to resolve the dynamics of globalization. International norm often replaces national norm, and this is an increasing phenomenon, found in all legal systems or states, which affects all the actors.

It also causes a change of perception on internal norms, constitutional rights, which are often strongly supported, complemented or even added to the national system. Thus the international norm, once internalized, forces us to invoke it more often than the internal norm, which over time acquires less tasks. The role of the international norm is growing because it is inclusive and universal, therefore it has a cause for the detriment of the national norm. The

---

[29] David Haljan, *Separating powers: International Law before National Courts*, TMC Asser Press, Springer, (Institute for Constitutional Law, University of Leuven, Leuven Belgia, 2013), 4-6

[30] David Haljan, *Separating powers: International Law before National Courts,* 4-6

interaction between external and internal is always won by the outside, as it abolishes internal boundaries. National constitutionalism becomes a filter and not a source of rights, as it can invoke a new international constitutionalism that is captivating precisely because it offers more freedom and less limits.

REFFERENCES

1. **AMITAV Acharya,** *How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, International Organization,* Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), pp. 239-275, Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the International Organization Foundation, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877858 citat de
2. **BRENAN, Geoffrey, ERIKSSON, GOODIN, Lina, SOUTHWOOD Robert E. Nicholas** (editors), *Explaining Norms*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 168-170
3. **BRUNNEE Jutta şi TOOPE,Stephen J.**, *History, Mystery and Mastery, International Theory* 2013, p. 3, Edited by Jeffrey L. Dunoff şi Mark A. Pollack(Temple University), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 138-140
4. **CASS, Loren R.** The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Standards, Domestic Politics, and Unaquiable Commitments in Global Environmental Policy) , 2006
5. **CHECKEL, Jeffrey T.** (1997) `International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-Constructivist Divide', European Journal of International Relations 3: 473-495;
6. **CHECKEL, Jeffrey T.** (1999a) *Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe'*, International Studies Quarterly 43: 83-144 .
7. **CHECKEL, Jeffrey T.** (1999b) `Why Comply? Constructivism, Social Norms and the Study of International Institutions', Annual Meeting, American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia
8. **CONFORTI, Benedeto** *International Law and the role of domestic Legal System*(tradusă de Rene Provost), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London, 1993, p. 10
9. **CORTELL, Andrew P. and DAVIS JR James W.** (1996) `*How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms'*, International Studies Quarterly 40: 451-478)
10. **FINNEMORE, Martha and SIKKINK (Kathryn** 1998) *International Norm Dynamics and Political Change'*, International Organization, p. 891
11. **HALJAN,David** *Separating powers: International Law before National Courts*, TMC Asser Press, Springer, Institute for Constitutional Law, University of Leuven, Leuven Belgia, 2013, pp. 4-6
12. **KURAN, Timur & SUNSTEIN**, Cass R *Availability cascades and risk regulation,* Stanford University School of Law Stanford, Law Review, 1999, 683-768
13. **KYED, Helene Maria** *Introduction: International Development Interventions, Journal of legal pluralism and unofficial law*, 2011-nr. 63, edited by Melania G. Wiber, Helene Maria Kyed, pp. 3-6.
14. **LAPID, Yosef, KRATOCHWIL, Friedrich V.** *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, Critical perspectives on world politics International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996
15. **PERVEZ,Muhammad Shoaib** *Security Community in South-Asia: India-Pakistan*, Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics, London&New York, 2013, p. 29
16. **PETTENGER, Mary E.** *The social construct of climate change. Power, Knowledge, Norms, Discourses* , Western Oregon University, Routledge Taylor&Francis Group, London&Ney York, 2016, pp. 9-10
17. **PROULX, Vincent-Joel** Institutionalizing State Responsibility. Global Security and UN Organs, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.
18. **RISSE, Thomas** *Let's Argue!Comunicative action in world* în *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations. Ideas do not float freely*,Thomas Risse(editor) Routledge, New York&London, 2017, pp.254-255
19. **RODGER, Payne, A.** (2000) `*Habermas, Discourse Norms, and the Prospects for Global Deliberation'*, Annual Meeting, International Studies Association, Los Angeles, California;
20. **SEGERLUND, Lisbeth** *Making Corporate Social Responsibility a Global Concern. Norm Constrction in a Globalizing World, Non-State Actors in International Law,* Politics and Governance Series, Stockholm University, Sweden, Ashgate Publishing, 2010, p. 26
21. **TRACHTMAN,Joel P.** *The International Economic Law. Revolution and the Right to Regulate*, Cameron May, International Law and Policy, Cambridge, 2006
22. **TWINING, William** *Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective*, pp. 1-6, in The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficla Law, 49/2004, edited by Gordon R. Goodman.