

THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEMARCATION OF BORDERS IN EUROPE, IN THE EARLY MODERN AGE

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ABSTRACT

EUROPE IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD HAS GONE THROUGH MANY TRANSFORMATIONS. ONE OF THESE CHANGES IS REPRESENTED BY A BETTER CONTOURING OF STATE BOUNDARIES. STATES ARE UNDERGOING THROUGH A PROCESS OF CENTRALISATION AND TERRITORIALISATION, WHICH IS REFLECTED IN A BETTER ESTABLISHMENT AND DEMARCATION OF FRONTIERS. AT A THEORETICAL LEVEL, THIS PROCESS IS INFLUENCED BY A REBIRTH OF ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS. THIS PAPER TRIES TO PRESENT SOME MODELS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEMARCATION OF BORDERS THROUGHOUT THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. MORE PRECISELY: PRINCIPLES OF BORDER DELIMITATION IN THE ITALIAN AREA; BORDER BETWEEN SPAIN AND FRANCE ON THE PYRENEES MOUNTAINS; NORTH-EASTERN FRONTIER OF FRANCE; THE FRONTIER OF EXPASION IN THE RUSSIAN STEPPES; ENGLAND'S BOUNDARIES WITH SCOTLAND AND IRELAND AND THE OTTOMAN-HABSBURG MILITARY FRONTIER. THE PAPER WILL ALSO DESCRIBE METHODS OF DEMARCATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF BOUNDARIES AND THE TRANSITION, THAT HAPPENS IN SOME INSTANCES, FROM JURISDICTION TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY.

KEYWORDS: FRONTIER, DEMARCATION, BORDER, LEGAL TRADITION, STATE

INTRODUCTION

Any political authority that wishes to effectively govern a territory, an area, a jurisdiction must have physical limits. The position and the role of these limitations affect the lives of people on both sides of the border. Frontiers, borders, practically represent an institution without which the political, social and economic life of complex societies could not hold. The higher control a ruler has over borders of a country, the stronger his domestic authority is, therefore the centralization of states in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is directly influenced by this.

In this paper I will make a brief description of establishing models, border demarcation and organization in Europe showing the changes that occur at the end of the Middle Ages up to the Modern Era. This period presents some characteristics in the evolution of political borders of the old continent. It is the time when the modern European nations have emerged, not only politically and culturally but also territorially.

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THE BORDER THEORY

In the theory of borders, the crossing to the linear model of the borders occurs. The notion of linear borders is specific mainly to the modern period, because until then, the borders were perceived more in a judicial sense or contact zones. Peace treaties signed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, sometimes contained clauses on border delimitation and demarcation lines. But as Peter Sahlins² specifies, the political linear borders of the pre-modern period were not identical to the political linear borders that develops in the eighteenth century. Prior to this period the borders were not designed as straight lines delineating territories and political sovereigntis. Borders in the modern sense, acquire importance with the emergence of territorial states, from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the borders become more *visible* and topographic elements begin to be clearly defined³. That does not mean that in the Middle Ages there was no concept of linear borders. The historian Marian Coman⁴ considers that, even if the majority of linear borders in medieval times were of estates, and not States, the emergence of the latter being influenced, to some extent, from the first, this does not mean that the medieval States were deprived of linear borders, but only that the interest in delimitation of territorial accurately was much lower. When there was a reason for a linear frontier, people from the middle ages have proven that they know very well how to do so. As follows, there is no need to question the existence of a border, but rather the importance that was granted to it.

The rebirth of the Roman legal tradition in the sixteenth century, gave rise to a new theoretical discussion about borders and how they are defined. The concept of borders became an issue of government and appeared in a number of legal documents. Since the sixteenth century until the eighteenth century, the idea of natural borders rooted in legal discourse and legal texts. In the early international law, the term *fines naturales*, which was associated with concrete natural elements such as rivers, mountain ranges, deserts and swamps, was becoming increasingly used to denote a particular type of political border lines in contrast with the artificial demarcations (finish, Limes). An important contribution to the dissemination of these terms, had the writings of Hugo Grotius (1583 - 1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694)⁵. But Johann Oetinger (1577 - 1633), in his *Tractus de jure et controversiis limitum*, using biblical arguments consider that it is the divine will that nations be separated by natural borders. In the early modern era, political, legal and historical discussions regarding the borders, was heavily influenced by the large number of pan-European conflicts, such as the war of 30 years of the eighteenth century, as well as the ones from the next century⁶.

THE ITALIAN BORDER

In the period under review there were several models of establishment, demarcation and management of borders, they had many common points as well as differences, they all

² Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (University of California Press, 1991), 6-7.

³ Maria Baramova, „Border Theories in Early Modern Europe” *European History Online*. accesat la data de 12.03.2010 - <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/border-regions/maria-baramova-border-theories-in-early-modern-europe>.

⁴ Marian Coman, *Putere și Teritoriu. Țara Românească medievală(secolele XIV – XVI)* (București: Polirom, 2013), 205-206.

⁵ Baramova, Border Theories, <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/border-regions/maria-baramova-border-theories-in-early-modern-europe>.; Hugo Grotius, *On the Law of War and Peace (De jure Belli ac Pacis)*, 2001, accesat la data de 05.03. 2010 - www.lonang.com/exlibris/grotius/.

⁶ Baramova, Border Theories, <http://www.ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/crossroads/border-regions/maria-baramova-border-theories-in-early-modern-europe>.

went through a process of evolution until the end of the eighteenth century, when they came to common standards reflected in international treaties of the time. Thus the Italian space at the end of the Middle Ages had precise demarcation rules about the borders that were mentioned in the legal science of the era. The witnesses in a process had to accurately describe the border route. If the witness's memory could not reproduce the border route, it was preferable to keep the initial situation, considering that the border has been strengthened over time, as they went on the principle that as older the boundary is the more just it is⁷. But witnesses were considered the most convincing proof of the veracity of a route, therefore the court panel tried to listen to many testimonials. Papers and documents could also prove useful. Then they moved to a detailed on-site investigation *inspectio ocularis*. In the case of borders marked by natural elements, the rules were clear, taking into account the central line of the rivers bed or lakes demarcation, and the line of *divortium aquarum* (water separation) in the case of mountains. But the stability of natural frontiers was only apparent, since rivers and lakes may alter their route or form, so it was necessary to analyze the morphological transformations. Even the mountains stable in their physiognomy, needed some clarifications to support the territorial division. Thus, such principles as *divortium aquarum*⁸ had only an indicative value and allowed for numerous exceptions.

In the legal treaties of the age the concept of *fines publici* is born, which defined the border lines separating territorial sovereignties of two States, a clear distinction from the borders between two private entities. The principle that constantly appears in the writings of lawyers concerned with the borders, is that of not debatable (*fines publici*) borders, not only in the case of a territorial encroachments, but after the passage of a sufficiently long periods of time, when there are no more complaints or doubts regarding the course of the border. *Fines publici*, were written by doctors in law of the era *praescribi non possunt*. This principle operates only when the borders have an original safe route. As signs of the border used to mark the Italian border lines we can mention: trees, boulders, tree-trunk branded with various incisions, stones arranged in a particular manner, but such signs should not be confused with signs bordering private propertis, in this case being *fines publici*. The exercise of jurisdiction⁹ is one of the most compelling ways to measure the expansion of possessions. The frontier militia, or even public execution rituals were used to mark their boundaries and that's because, as lawyers write, *limites territorii sunt limites iurisdictionis* and vice versa.

THE SPANISH AND FRENCH BORDERS

The peace of the Pyrenees, signed in 1659, between France and Spain divided the Catalan Valley of Cerdanya into two parts. The following year by the agreement from Llivia, Spain give France, 33 villages, not including the town of Llivia, which was surrounded by those villages. A memorandum prepared in 1660, for the Spanish Commissioner, Don Miguel de Save, stated that "*this division line, which should be almost mathematical, must necessarily be narrow*". But diplomats and commissioners did not think in modern terms about the notion of linear borders that separates two distinct national territories. Instead they put the problem in terms of jurisdiction. "*The division between France and Spain will be understood as a division between jurisdictions (towns) that will be transferred to France*

⁷ Paolo Marcheti, „Spazio politico e confini nella scienza giuridica del tardo medioevo”, *Reti Medievali Rivista* VII 1(iunie – iulie) (2006): 7.

⁸ Marcheti, Spazio politico, 8-9.

⁹ Marcheti, Spazio politico, 6-7.

and the ones that remain in Spain" specified the Llivia Treaty¹⁰. Sovereignty was also jurisdictional. Unlike most treaties of the 17th century, the text invokes a historical and natural border, so that next year the members of the Joint Committee discussed the geographical distribution of pre-Roman Nations and the administrative divisions of the Roman and Visigoth conquests of the region. But they did not manage to harmonize their distinct visions about the exact position of the *true* Pyrenees, but the 42nd article of the Treaty declares that *the Pyrenees mountains, which in antiquity divided the Gaels from the Hispanics, will therefore divide the two kingdoms*¹¹. The case of Cerdanya is just one permutation within a larger framework that combines elements of politics, ethnicity and topography.

The peace of the Pyrenees did not do a precise demarcation of the borders, nor has it respected the principles of the natural borders and jurisdictional conflicts continued into the next century, because their limits did not coincide with each other or with the territorial boundaries between the two countries. In regards with the methods used as indicators for the cut of the Cerdanyei Valley border, official documents and decisions of the courts for the demarcation of land, included descriptions of boundary markers: piles of stones called "oratories", branded with crosses, drilled, or with an iron cross on top¹².

For the northern and eastern limits of France¹³, the year 1678 and the Treaty of Nijmegen that ended the Franco-Dutch war (1672-1678) was a movement towards the consolidation of a new type of military border. *The gates open policy towards neighboring countries was replaced by the barrier policy*. The idea was of Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, the architect of new frontiers of France. Long before the Maginot line, Vauban designed and built *the iron border* composed of two lines of fortifications. The idea was to abandon the most upfront fortresses and cities, giving up most distanced outposts in the interest of smaller spaces (contoured), without having to renounce the claims of European hegemony of France. Vauban gave expression to this new border policy in a memorandum in 1673, suggesting to the King to think about shifting territories, being dissatisfied with the confusion that was created by the mixture of enemy and friendly fortresses nearby. In addition to organizing the two lines of fortification, the new military border required the eradication of enclaves inside France. Strengthening the territorial sovereignty has contributed not only to ensure the military border, but also to ensure the free transit and communications between French cities¹⁴.

THE RUSSIAN BORDER

Speaking further about the patterns of establishment and demarcation of borders, a special case is represented by Russia. In the 16th century, Russia laid his authority up to the line of meeting of forests and steppes. The Russian term approaching the most the notion of frontier is *ukraina* which means the peripheral edge or area, this border was different from border/boundary because it was flexible and very movable. It actually represented the North-Caspian and North-pontic steppes area, sparsely populated and controlled by the Tatars and

¹⁰ Peter Sahlins, „State formation and national identity in the Catalan borderlands during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries” in: *Border Identities. Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 36.

¹¹ Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France*, 20.

¹² Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France*, 40.

¹³ Daniel Nordman, *Frontières de France: De l'Espace au Territoire, XVI – XIX Siècle* (Paris: Gallimard, 1998).

¹⁴ Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France*, 68-69, Nelly Girard d'Albissin, *Genèse de la frontière franco-belge: les variations des limites septentrionales de la France de 1659 à 1789* (Paris : A & J. Picard, 1970), 160-235.

Cossacks¹⁵, the latter being paid by both Moscow and Poland-Lithuania to be the first defensive line against Tatar raids and expeditions.

The actual boundary was represented by a huge *zasechnaia cherta* fortification line or line of Abatis¹⁶, made up of fallen trees strengthened with soil ramps, which went from Kozelsk to Ryazan, nearly two hundred miles south of Moscow. The rationale behind these fortified lines (comparable only with the great Chinese wall or the roman Limes) was to protect from the Tatar invasions and to regulate migration¹⁷. Work on this line began on some segments at the end of the fifteenth century. In 1533 there were already 250 km of fortification, and until 1600 the line of defenses stretched for 1,000 miles, but it still was not continuous, including natural barriers such as some areas of swamps, very dense impenetrable forests, or sections of rivers that were hard to cross. There were also certain corridors where Tatar armies could penetrate the corridors which were closed by the Russians with field work, palisade, ditches and pitfalls with wolves¹⁸. The thinner forests were made less penetrable by sending workers in the depth of the forest, away from the open plain, to strike down trees, with the trunks and roots outwards. Such barriers may have had a depth between 20 and 130 m. At intervals some trees were not cut down, so that they could be used for signaling and observation platforms. Forts of wood or soil with artillery, with towers protected on the front side and the flanks with ditches and potholes against the cavalry, were built on the river sides and in the forests corridors, while thin forest stretches where small units could infiltrate were fenced with oak palisade and waves of soil.

Moscow has followed a planned strategy of military colonization, coordinated on a broad front, setting numerous garrison towns increasingly to the South, uniting them across the fortified lines, and then moving the main body of the army to defend the frontier in the new format of the fortified perimeter¹⁹. Moscow had no intention for the Abatis line to be impermeable, but was primarily a platform for signaling and supervision, which could also slow down the enemy's advance long enough for the army to come to the area to repel the Tatars. But in the year 1571, because of discord among the commanders of Ivan the IVth, the Crimean Tatars entered passed them and burned down Moscow²⁰.

Thus Russia gradually made the transition from an open border system to an infrastructure that demarcated its limits and gave a tangible expression of territorial sovereignty. After 1635, the Russians will have build a new line of fortification at two hundred miles farther south, the Belgorod line, a defensive scheme eight hundred miles long, incorporating forts, ramparts, moats and towers of surveillance. This enhanced boundary created from military necessity has contributed to the centralization of the Muscovite State in the seventeenth century and the functioning of an autocratic system. The army that guarded the frontier was doubled and the defensive measures were improved²¹. Completion of this line also moved the agricultural colonization limit 100-200 km further south. The towns located along the border were designed as *ukrainnye gorody*. The line itself marked

¹⁵. Initially Tatars but later Russian peasants, then the polish and Romanians who fled from feudal obligations to live from robbery and raids, as mercenaries.

¹⁶ The word has its roots in the term palisade

¹⁷ Brian J. Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities and Empire – Building in the Age of Peter the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 54-55.

¹⁸ Camouflaged pits with a picket inside.

¹⁹ Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities*, 40.

²⁰ Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities*, 47.

²¹ Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities*, 78.

the edge between the open steppes and the territory integrated directly into the Muscovite State administration, beyond it, there were the Cossacks or nomads²².

As a result of the Karlowitz peace, in the year 1700, Russia spread its control up to the fortress of Azov. In that context there was a demarcation of the border, showing how the boundary was in the North-pontic space. The Kuban River was proposed as a border, however, the Ottomans rejected the proposal. Since there were no other significant natural frontiers, the only remaining solution was to demarcate the frontier on the steppe. The Ottomans proposed a favorable solution for them, they wanted the border to be set at the distance of a "cannon ball" fire from the Azov. After intense negotiations it has been proposed that the border demarcation be made in terms of days away on horseback from Azov. Then the difference between hours and days was reduced. Finally, both sides have agreed to fix the border at a distance of ten hours south of Azov. Then, the speed of movement was taken into consideration. The Ottomans demanded that the speed be defined as the *moderate riding speed*, but the Russians countered by saying that riding in the steppe is made in a calm and orderly manner. Finally a settlement was reached when the two Commissioners came out on the field²³. The certainty big layout of the steppe, and the fact that there was no effective political authority there, led to the Russo-Ottoman border demarcation to be benchmarked so imprecisely.

In the case of the Russian border, an interesting aspect to review is the control upon the movements of one side of the border to the other. The two impressive lines of fortifications from the 16th-17th centuries, did not only serve to protect the front from the Tatar invasions, but also to curb the migration and runaway farmers into the steppe, where they could find freedom. To regulate the flow of people entering and exiting the Muscovite State, identification documents were used. Thus, as early as 1620, the government officials, made the distinction between the persons with documents, seen as the legitimate travelers, who traveled for a short duration abroad and the undocumented persons, without the authorization to travel i.e. fugitives. In the late 17th century, the Imperium border between Russia and the steppe began to have the characteristics of a modern border: travel documents issued by the state, patrols, customs, inspections and control points. Any Russian who wanted to travel beyond the Belgorod line, was obliged to obtain travel documents stating the purpose of the journey, the destination, and the return date to the country. To obtain such documents, the applicant had to appear before an official of the Government, with two witnesses who were meant to confirm the identity of the applicant and pay a fine if the traveler did not return to the country. But emigration was never completely stopped.

Some of the fleeing peasants were obliged to perform military services and maintenances of the border, as debt to the State. The selection for the border guard service was made as follows, one male from every third household in a village within a radius of 15 km, was obliged to perform military services, and in the case of villages within a radius of 16-25 km, a man from every fifth household²⁴.

THE ENGLISH BORDER

At the other end of Europe, the English Kingdom up until the dynasty Union with Scotland and the complete conquest of Ireland, during the Tudor's reign, had a number of difficulties in terms of managing and having a precise delimitation of their borders. The British borders did not present the level of antagonism as in the Christian-Muslim borders

²² Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities*, 59.

²³ Boeck, *Imperial Boundaries Cossak Communities*, 139 - 140.

²⁴ Brian Davies-L, *Warfare: State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500 – 1700* (Routledge, London and New York, 2007), 45 – 46.

nor does it reflect any type of conflicts as between sedentary and nomadic society like in the case of Russia. However, as in other parts of Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, the British frontiers were entire regions, where different populations lived in proximity, rather than clear borders. In fact there were brands of border.

In these circumstances, the Kings of England were forced to maintain in these regions a quasi-judicial decentralized system of governance, with special military administrators (baron) and lieutenants appointed to control the brands, which wielded enough legal and military power. The English border region was an area made up of several brands with a special status²⁵. I will discuss more specifically two border areas, Scotland and Ireland.

The English ruled in Ireland a territory²⁶ that started in Dublin, the English political centre, with rich surrounding plains that stretched up to the mountain areas in the South and West of Ireland. By comparison the Anglo-Scottish border had a much longer tradition and was closer to the political-geographical definition of borders. The Scottish border was a clearer border between two sovereign States. In Ireland there was no border line established by an understanding between the English barons and the Gaelic's from Ireland. Beyond this *border* the region was uninhabited. In an investigation of the Crown in 1541 there were identified large portions of land, situated at the edge, that were not cultivated due to the Irish incursions, therefore a parliamentary Ordinance required each brand leaseholder from the borderline with Ireland to build a double trench between the cultivated areas and the wasteland. It seems that only inhabited territories were part of the brands and the wastelands were a *no man's land* that fluctuate and upon which both the British owners and the Irish ones had claim²⁷. A similar situation existed at the border with Scotland as well, where constant raids have created vast swaths of territory with deserted towns.

Boundary surveys in 1542 and 1550, have revealed a series of border violations by the Scots, in some areas. The most important dispute was about the *Debatable Land* (literally the conflicting land), a long strip of land of 15 miles wide and 4 width. The land was finally divided by the two countries in 1552.

THE HABSBURG-OTTOMAN BORDER

Closer to our space, the Habsburg-Ottoman border was a military frontier, bounded by fixed fortified points, with up to 150 towns²⁸. At the beginning of the 16th century, the Hungarian defensive line was located on the Danube-Sava line²⁹, but after the defeat at Mohács in the second half of the century, the border was moved to the heart of medieval Hungary, bounded by the Mureş-Timiş region in the East, along the northern edge of the Pannonian plain, then Transdanubia, Slavonia, Central and South-West Croatia up to the Dalmatian coast. With a length of several hundred miles, it formed a line of fortification in the form of a semicircle³⁰. The border between the two empires had a long evolution over

²⁵ Davies-L, *Warfare: State and Society*, 155.

²⁶ In English, *Pale of Settlement*, the term *pale* coming from the Latin *palus* meaning pillar, but translated in English by: district, border, limitation.

²⁷ Davies-L, *Warfare: State and Society*, 160-161.

²⁸ Mihai Maxim, *Țările Române și Înalta Poarta. Cadrul Juridic al Relațiilor Româno-Otomane în Evul Mediu* (București: Enciclopedică, 1993), 124.

²⁹ Gunther E. Rothenberg, „The Origins of the Austrian Military Frontier in Croatia and the alleged Treaty of 22 December 1522”, *The Slavonic and East European Review* vol. 38, nr. 91 (1960): 494 – 495.

³⁰ Dávid Géza și Fodor Pál, *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*. (Brill, Leiden, Boston, Koln, 2000), XVI.

three centuries and was marked by certain key moments. One of these moments was the establishment of the Aulic War Council in Vienna between 1556-1566. Prior to 1556, the war theatre against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary was ruled by Supreme commanders of Ferdinand the 1st and his military advisers who were appointed only during the military campaigns. The control of the new defensive scheme has been hindered by the fact that the Supreme commanders had to share their money duties, from the border of Croatia-Slavonia and Hungary with *locumtenens*, and from 1554-1562 with *palatinus*, and with two general captains of the country. With the establishment of the Aulic War Council in 1556, the problem of centralized administrative and military leadership has been resolved. Thus the various parts of the defensive system were organized as a whole.

In the course of the Hungarian campaign of the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent in 1566, the Turks captured Szigetvár and Gyula. The loss of these two key fortresses led to the fall of a whole chain of castles. The main feature of the system was that defensive border segments were composed of a fortress-castle and a few minor subordinate castles. Gyula's fall marked the end of the history of the general-captain of the lower parts (*capitaneatus partium regni Hungarie inferiorum*), created by Matthias Corvinus, and the fall of Szigetvár has led to the loss of the South area of Lake Balaton. Thus the Royal defense system has been pushed back a few hundred kilometers to the Tisza line and the northern mountains, but the new alignment³¹ and geography of the terrain offered more favorable possibilities for the construction of a new defensive system.

The successes of the Turks in the 15 year war (1591-1606), broke the Habsburg defenses in a manner similar to the campaign from 1566. Although the advance of the Ottoman forces was not as spectacular this time, the fall of forts of great strategic importance such as: Bihács, Győr, Eger and Kanisza broke the defensive system of the border in several places. It must be remembered that the Ottomans had their own defensive lines made up of fortifications, either conquered from the Habsburgs, or newly built. And these defensive lines on either side were not always parallel. A few times the cities of Gyula or Bihács, were almost surrounded by castles and fortifications controlled by the Ottomans. The occupation of the cities of Győr, Eger and Kanisza were a hardship for the Aulic War Council. Because of it between Győr and Vienna there were no other castles capable of stopping a major Ottoman attack, but the city's re-conquest in 1598 permitted the reorganization of the border region that protect lower Austria³².

With regards to some aspects of the organization and border control, at the military frontier of the Habsburg-Ottoman lines, special status communities were used for the security. I won't go into details of military defense, but a very important element of this defensive system was represented by Vlachs³³, which formed the border guard unit, which were very effective in fighting the Turks. For them in October 1630, a document was emitted, entitled *Statuta Valachorum* whereby in exchange for tax exemptions, the border guards had a duty to guard the border, all men between 16 and 60 years of age were liable for military service. Their loyalty was to the emperor³⁴.

³¹ Géza și Pál, Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, 39.

³² Géza și Pál, Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs, 52-55.

³³ Fodor, Pál, *In quest of the Golden Apple. Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul, 2000), 285.

³⁴ Béla K. Király, Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Habsburg Military Border System: Some Reconsiderations, War and Society in East Central Europe*, vol. I, Special Topics and Generalizations on the 18th and 19th Centuries (New York, 1979), 364 – 365.

CONCLUSIONS

As it can be seen there were many common elements, in respect of the establishment and management of borders, across the continent in the early modern era, but also differences due to the different political and historical context of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The generalization of international law and the peace treaties signed in the 18th century, as well as developments in the field of topography and cartography, have resulted in the harmonization and standardization of the methods of delimitation of boundaries between centralized States. Within three centuries there have been remarkable changes, usages and customs practiced in the medieval period were gradually replaced by modern diplomacy. The monarch or sovereign jurisdiction lost its pre-eminence in favor of the territory of the State, and political and military frontier became one and the same.

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