

**CRISIS ANALYSIS PARAMETERS****Paul DUȚĂ<sup>1</sup>****ABSTRACT:**

*THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "COMMON CAUSE" OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE FACE OF THE GROWING UNREST WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY - WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INVASION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ IN 1991. ON THE CONTRARY, IN MANY CASES, SUCH AS THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, SOMALIA, AFGHANISTAN, RWANDA, IRAN THERE ARE RECORDED FRICTIONS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS, WITH CONTROVERSIAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AND, IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, A "COMMUNITY INDIFFERENCE" SEEMS TO HAVE REPLACED THE BIPOLAR ORDER. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE DISAPPOINTMENT BEGAN TO REPLACE THE EUPHORIA, A GROWING TREND OF THE MAJOR POWERS TO AVOID THE COMPLEXITIES AND CHALLENGES OF EMERGING POST WESTPHALIAN ORDER BEGINS TO EMERGE.*

**KEY WORDS:** *INTERNATIONAL CRISES, INTRASTATE CRISES, INTERSTATE CRISE*

**PRELIMINARY SPECIFICATIONS**

The excessively various literatures about the crisis, and also the computer-assisted research projects in the analysis and predictability of the breaking-out, the escalation and the extinction of crisis enable comparisons particularly useful for the understanding of their processuality. It is necessary to make some clarifications before revealing the similarities and differences between intrastate international crises and interstate international crises.

Firstly, the crises differ from conflicts and war; the criteria of making a difference are various, but for this study we will take into account the intensity of violence, the polemological criterion of the victims and the finality (extinction). Thus, after 1945 a series of non-violent crisis is recorded: Iran-Oil Concession (September 26, 1944 - December 9, 1944); Iran-Economic Development (September 26, 1944 - December 9, 1944); Kars-Ardahan - The Territory (June 7, 1945-April 5, 1946); Turkey-The Territory (June 7, 1945 - April 5, 1946); Communism in Poland (June 30, 1946-January 19, 1947); USSR-The Influence (June 30, 1946 - January 19, 1947); Turkey-Financial Hardships (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946); Turkey-The Territory (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946); USA- The Influence (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946).

Secondly, the difference between intrastate and interstate crises is based on the criterion of the number of participating states; in the case of the intrastate crisis it is about a single state while in the case of the interstate it is about at least two if not more states. Crises that degenerate into war: the Civil War 2 in Greece-Yugoslavia (November 13, 1946 -

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February 28, 1947); Greece-The Political Regime (November 13, 1946 - February 28, 1947); The First War in Korea-North Korea (June 25, 1950 - September 30, 1950).

Thirdly, the comparison is fitted on the criteria and on the indicators of operation in a computer-assisted analysis, where we intervened if we considered that there are some corrections to be made. Thus, the political regime is the triggering point of some crises: Truman Doctrine - The Political Regime of the USSR (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); Greece-The Political Regime (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); The U.S. Marshall Plan-The Political Regime (July 3, 1947 - July 11, 1947); Turkey-The Political Regime (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); Czechoslovakia-The Political Regime (July 9, 1947 - July 11, 1947); Cuba-the Dominican Republic-The Political Regime (July 26, 1947 - September 28, 1947); the Dominican Republic-The Political Regime (July 26, 1947 - September 28, 1947); Soviet Note-Finland-The Political Regime (February 22, 1948 - April 6, 1948); Finland-The Political Regime (February 22, 1948 - April, 6 1948).

Fourthly, the comparison reveals the psychosocial aspects of the decision-making act, less analyzed in the Romanian field literature through case studies, fully relevant to famous crisis but also suspected of personal interpretation. Crises due to the getting of influence without violence: U.S. (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); The Soviet Union (July 3, 1947 - July 11, 1947); US (June 25, 1950 - September 1950); The Baghdad Pact (February 24, 1955 - October, 1955); Egypt (February 24, 1955 - October 1955). Political regime oriented crises, accompanied by minor clashes: Costa Rica (December 11, 1948 - February 21, 1949); Cuba Luperon (June 19, 1949 - June 21, 1949); Dominican Republic (June 19, 1949 - June 21, 1949); Tunisia (May 31, 1957 - June 17, 1958); Central America-Cuba I (April 25, 1959 - December 8, 1959).

Fifthly, although we pay some attention to humanitarian crises as a subspecies of the intrastate crises, they do not represent the object of the study below. For such crises there should be a separate analysis.

After 1989, the wrong evaluations of the ratio of forces and especially the medium and long-term consequences have produced more serious events (more difficult to explain in rational terms) such as the fact that Saddam Hussein began a unwinnable war in 1991 and caused a devastating military incursion on his territory in 2003, resulting in the end of his regime and his own death. Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader in the Angolan conflict, began the crisis by ignoring the agreements concluded and the protection of the Nations, Slobodan Milosevic who started another unwinnable war in 1999, or the end of the regime of Mohammed Gaddafi in Libya.

The humanitarian crises, generally as a species of intrastate crises, have not been perceived as events with major political consequences, respectively the national and international public-including government leaders in service - do not any empathize with the critical situation of those affected by disaster and they do not really try to respond to these situations. The sufferings from remote places such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Guatemala have applied for considerable public support and empathy.<sup>2</sup> The food shortage plaguing the countries in Africa have made the donor governments as well as the international

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<sup>2</sup> Many argue that the response of the humanitarian aid system began as a consequence of the battle of Solferino in 1859, when Henri Dunant began formulating the concept of support-assistance that led to the founding of the International Movement of the Red Cross in 1863. This movement has generated a series of international humanitarian legal obligations-the Geneva Convention - which established the obligations of combatants with regard to the civilians and of 'non-combatant' parties. We can also say that, at the operational level, the Commission Hoover took the initiative of support in the period of famine in Europe at the end of World War I, which marked the „beginning” in the sense that the lives of hundreds of thousands of people devastated by the war depended on foreign aid.

organizations and the private humanitarian agencies aware of the consequences of political indifference towards human suffering-an aspect that mass-media presented "live"<sup>3</sup>

Humanitarian assistance is an activity distinctly different from development assistance. While humanitarian assistance is intended for a short period of time, as a response to the needs created by the emergency state, development aid is designed for a long-term economic and social support. Even if those actions are designed separately, we may encounter cases where the two are interwoven. An example of this genre is the post-conflict status, an extremely complex condition in which both actions are required and in order to effectively function it requires coordination and a highly rigorous management.

In an ideal world, the humanitarian assistance granted by emergency, will be quickly followed by an effective peace process (and vice-versa), and then followed by a new government helped by international rehabilitation programs. In this scenario, the humanitarian organizations would no longer be necessary. In reality, a humanitarian crisis can last for a very long time, thus even during conflict opportunities for rehabilitation and reconstruction of that state can be created. Choosing to resuscitate a particular sector of the health care system or choosing to support the efforts of local authorities to call in service the elementary education system, humanitarian organizations can assume responsibility for some tasks that have a long-term impact.

However, humanitarian crises are seen as collateral problems to the real political concerns.<sup>4</sup> According to some opinions, there is a stress on the characters of humanitarian assistance-the offered support should be neutral, impartial and independent, although international support is deemed to be too small, too sparse and having an insignificant impact in order to be considered an important weapon in any political arsenal. The variety of benefices promoted by variants of human security theories, generally "forget" to mention not only the financial resources but also the ideal vector of humanitarian operations.<sup>5</sup>

### **THE GREAT POWERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISES**

The year 1989 paved the way for some optimistic scenarios more rational than sentimental; a similar sense of common cause and universal optimism had no longer been known from the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, with the reintroduction of post-Napoleonic France in The Great Alliance.<sup>6</sup> But just as in that remote period, the 1990s began to reveal new or reborn outbreaks of conflicts and crises that have quickly stifled global aspirations in the bud. The ex-participating states in the Cold War have increasingly faced more grievances, with the prospect of civil conflicts, disintegration and even collapse. Military minor damage crises and minor clashes: Nicaragua Contras IV (September 9, 1989 -

<sup>3</sup> The UN Secretary-General was Juan Perez Cuellar at the onset of famine in Ethiopia in 1984. Jim Grant, who was at that time head of UNICEF and Jim Ingram, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme informed, in clear terms, Juan Perez Cuellar that if the United Nations did not respond to crisis in Ethiopia, the media reaction will have a devastating effect on the UN and its agencies or its programmes.

<sup>4</sup> See William Shawcross in *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979, the fact that the US were willing to sacrifice the people of Cambodia to bring home the war in Viet Nam.

<sup>5</sup> A sense of harmony or euphoria in the world seemed to precede the Fall of the Berlin Wall. As Michael Ignatieff noted the prospects for global context which preceded the Cold War, „it was not idealistic to expect a new method of robust but pragmatic collaboration between the superpowers designed to alleviate the proximity wars that impoverished many regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia.” View Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 89. Ignatieff goes further by suggesting the fact that „the possibility getting a glimpse of sustained growth for the support and development of the budgets of the Third World, in the context of the peace dividend of the Cold War, is not beyond the bounds.”

<sup>6</sup> Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor*, 85.

November 7, 1989; Honduras (September 9, 1989 - November 7, 1989); Ghana/Togo Border II (April 11, 1991 - October 5, 1991); Ghana (April 11, 1991 - October 5, 1991). Crisis for territory with minor clashes: Iraq Bubiyan (August 28, 1991 - August 1991); Kuwait (August 28, 1991 - August 1991).

The establishment of a “common cause” of the great powers in the face of the growing unrest was difficult to identify - with the exception of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. On the contrary, in many cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Iran there are recorded frictions among the great powers, with controversial alignments in the balance of power and, in the case of Rwanda, a “community indifference” seems to have replaced the bipolar order. Due to the fact that the disappointment began to replace the euphoria, a growing trend of the major powers to avoid the complexities and challenges of emerging post Westphalian order begins to emerge. Crises with serious clashes and minor military damage: Rwanda/Uganda (October 1, 1990- February 17, 1991); Rwanda (October 1, 1990 - February 17, 1991); Georgia/Abkhazia (September 25, 1992 - October 8, 1993); Georgia (September 25, 1992 - October 8, 1993).

In some cases, such as the recognition of Croatia by Germany in 1992, unilateralism has replaced the consultative processes, bypassing consensus among multilateral institutions, such as the EU or the UN. In many cases, when a high-powered task force intervened to promote peace and save hundreds of thousands of lives, the governments of other major powers have chosen to refrain or even to oppose to such intervention. Initially, this could be viewed as indifference towards the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as towards those crises in the former Yugoslavia. Later it becomes extremely obvious in the case of Rwanda.

“Humanitarian disasters in Srebrenica and Rwanda ended a brief period of hope which had caught a glimpse in 1989.”<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the situation in Srebrenica reflected disengagement and lack of harmony that, in a significant extent, symbolized the emerging reality in the period prior to the Cold War. However, the fate of Rwanda was largely linked to the events in Mogadishu, the capital of the collapsed state of Somalia, which occurred seven months before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While the U.S. refused to get involved in the Bosnian conflict, which had resulted in flows of refugees at a large scale, “ethnic cleansing” and concentration camps, the Bush Administration felt obliged to respond, in the final stage in January 1992, to the prospect of mass famine that threatened a number of up to 500,000 Somalis.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. military have been involved in Operation Restore Hope to provide logistical support and security for aid agencies in attempting to provide assistance in the midst of chaos and civil unrest that were propagating almost all over the country.<sup>9</sup> When the U.S. began to take actions to restore stability and governance in Somalia, one of the most powerful warriors of the despots of Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aideed, opposed to it. Thus, in a battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, 19 U.S. soldiers were killed, reality which showed not only the limits of United Nations rules and regulations, but also the hard to control effects of peace-enforcement operations.

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<sup>7</sup> Ignatiev F, *The Warrior's Honor*, 93.

<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that, while the agreement on population figures in Somalia has always been an ambiguous topic, the estimates of 1991 ranged from 6.5 million to 8.8 million. In this context, half a million people clearly indicates the dimension of threat. See Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> See David Halberstam, in his work *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, New York: Simon Schuster &, 2001, p. 251, refers to the senior officials of the National Security Council, suggesting that „the U.S. intervention in Somalia was Powell's way of making a humanitarian thing, but just as importantly, of not sending troops into Bosnia.”

Intrastate and international violence continued in many corners of the globe - Darfur, Somalia, Congo, situations in which the international community has shown a limited appetite to intervene. The reality was that the procedure to obtain a consensus has made difficult any direct intervention in a conflict which is extended beyond the point of no return.<sup>10</sup>

The efforts of the international community for the disengagement have pointed out, on the one hand, a general aversion to invest in so-called “peace dividend” of narrow interests, mostly internal. On the other hand, the disengagement has also shown a lack of interest in engaging in a complex diplomacy, which could threaten the false sense of harmony that reigned between powers. Discordant shades have been hidden; until, of course, unilateral actions have served the best interests of individual power. The political crises without violence were: The No-Fly Zone-Iraq (August 18, 1992 - September 8, 1992); Iraq (August 18, 1992 - September 8 1992).

The humanitarianism -in the perspective of UN rules and procedures-has become a decelerator, sometimes even antagonistic, for the stability of operations and state reconstruction as well as a reason for the end of hope in a “common cause” of the great powers.

### INTRASTATE CRISES AND INTERSTATE CRISES

In the complex and contradictory context of international relations in which crises are developing, a computer-assisted analysis research<sup>11</sup>, starting with the cases in which the nations see themselves as being in foreign policy crisis, while their opponents are not, can reveal the characteristics of the concept of crisis related to the types and intensity of international reactions. A crisis usually involves at least two parties on antagonistic positions, determined by a variety of reasons.

The RCI project is based on a combination of sources to determine a particular state-nation as an actor of a crisis.<sup>12</sup> Under this project, it is determined whether the leaders of state-nations involved in a particular crisis are or are not crisis actors.<sup>13</sup>

**The definition of crisis condition.** According to the perception of the concerned states which are part of a crisis, the respective situation is considered as unilateral crisis. It is to be noted that “unilateral crises” differ from the normal ones or from “bilateral” crises in many ways, especially with regard to the risk of an emergence of a violent crisis. Crises for the political regime without violence: Libya - The Expulsion of the Tunisians (August 21, 1985 - September 26, 1985); Tunisia (August 21, 1985 - September 26, 1985).

The absence of a common vision regarding the likelihood of future hostilities at the onset of the crisis is posited as the basis, in respect of the differences between the two types of crises. In the field literature, a series of assumptions about these differences are offered and they provide a basis for empirical analysis. A detailed analysis shows that the chances of an intrastate crisis to degenerate into acts of violence are small, even when obvious effects of the crisis are presented.

<sup>10</sup> See, Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for Policymakers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> See, *The Program Of The International Crisis Reactions (RCI). The project of the International Crisis Reactions (RCI)* includes data relating to 412 international crises and 895 actors of crisis for the period 1918-1994.

<sup>12</sup> Including diplomatic memoirs, government documents, historical sources (The New York Times and Keesings The Contemporary Archives), scientific articles and historical narratives. See Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

<sup>13</sup> For a complete description of the processes of data assembly from RCI project, see Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

The analysis of several international crises reveals that one-third of these have a unique feature, namely, the period of time during which an actor in the crisis is considered to be in crisis, due to a verbal or physical act of an opponent who does not consider himself as being in crisis. This means that, while some perceive “a threat to one or more fundamental values, they realize at the same time the reaction time to that threat and the increased likelihood of escalation of military hostilities”, and the opponent has a different position, based on a set of antagonistic assessments.<sup>14</sup>

Crises for the political regime without violence: Costa Rica-Nicaragua I - The Political Regime (December 11, 1948 - February 21, 1949); The Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia (August 19, 1949 - November, 1951); Yugoslavia (August 19, 1949 - November 1951); Iraq (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Panama (April 25, 1959 - May 4, 1959); USSR Soviet Note-Finland II (October 30, 1961 - November 24, 1961); Finland (October 30, 1961 - November 24, 1961); Cuba-Venezuela (November 1, 1963 -December 1, 1963); Venezuela (November 1, 1963 - December 1, 1963); The Iraqi Threat (June 9, 1976 - June 17, 1976); Syria (June 9, 1976 - June 17, 1976); Intervention in Libya-Gambia (October 27, 1980 - November 7, 1980); Gambia (October 27, 1980 - November 7, 1980); Jordan-Confrontation in Syria (November 25, 1980 - December 14, 1980); Jordan (November 25, 1980 - December 14, 1980); Iran, the Attempted Coup-Bahrain (December 13, 1981 – January 8, 1982); Bahrain (December 13, 1981 - January 8, 1982); Ethiopia-Tension in Sudan (November 20, 1983 - February 20, 1984); Sudan (November 20, 1983 - February 20, 1984).

Crises for the political regime with minor clashes: North Vietnam The Vietcong Attack (September 18, 1961 - November 15, 1961); South Vietnam (September 18, 1961 - November 15, 1961); The Critical Situation in Taiwan HI (April 22, 1962 - June 27, 1962); China (PRC) (April 22, 1962 - June 27, 1962); Beirut Airport (December 28, 1968); Lebanon (December 28, 1968 - January 1969); The Attempted Coup d'état in Sudan (July 2, 1976 - July 15, 1976); Sudan (July 2, 1976 - July 15, 1976); The Attack of South Africa on Lesotho (December 20, 1985 - January 25, 1986); Lesotho (December 20, 1985-January 25, 1986); The Rebel Attack on Sudan-Uganda (August 19, 1986-September 20, 1986); Uganda (August 19, 1986 - September 20, 1986); The attempted Coup d'état Ghana-Togo (September 23, 1986 - February 5, 1987); Togo (September 23, 1986 - February 5, 1987).

Crises for political regime with serious clashes: Cuba Che Guevara/Bolivia (March 23, 1967 -October 10, 1967); Bolivia (March 23, 1967 - October 10, 1967); Portugal the Conakry Raid (November 22, 1970 - December 11, 1970); Guinea (November 22, 1970 - December 11, 1970).

In these cases, it is about “intrastate crisis”. While most of them are cases with a single actor, such as Israel in “the crisis of the 1976 Syrian militarization” or Iraq in the context of the “crisis of No-Fly Zone of 1992”, others, such as the “crisis of the remilitarization of the Rhineland of 1936” for Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France and England, involved several actors, but not their main crisis opponent (in this case, Germany).

**The part as an actor of the crisis.** The analysis of the intrastate crisis starts from the idea that one of the parties involved in the crisis meets all three conditions required for membership crisis actor (risk perception, time perception, and perception of a likelihood of military hostility escalation). Thus, while a state-nation would trigger a crisis of another state

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<sup>14</sup> See Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997 'Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior'. *International Studies Quarterly* 21: 39-74.

through an action,<sup>15</sup> it may not be included as a crisis actor if the requirements for crisis actor are not met.

Of the three conditions that are generally associated with perception of crisis, the perception of a likelihood of military hostility escalation represents the fundamentals for the definition of the term. For example, Snyder and Diesing include this component in their own definition of crisis: "An international crisis is a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in a severe conflict, except for the current war, which involves the perception of a dangerously high likelihood of the outbreak of the war."<sup>16</sup> The centerpiece of the definition is the "perception of a dangerously high likelihood of the outbreak of the war," of the governments involved. "The perception of an increased likelihood of hostilities is also fundamental for the conceptualization of RCI research of foreign policy crises." While the presence of the three perceptions is needed, dangerously high likelihood of outburst of the war is the pivotal condition for the start of a military crisis, concerning the foreign policy security for a state ..."<sup>17</sup>

This definition of international crisis is the grounds for the differences between the two types of crisis regarding the risk of intensifying the violent acts. Out of the 412 international crises, 76 of intrastate crises triggered in the midst of a widespread war are excluded if they are focused on violence. In 120 crises, one of the actors is not included as a real actor of crisis. Eleven of these cases are excluded, because the non-crisis actor adversary is, in fact, a non-state actor. Thus, from 325 cases, 109 are unilateral crises and 216 are bilateral crises.

**The risk of the emergence of violence.** The main difference between intrastate and interstate crises stems from the perceptions of actors with regard to the risk of violence emergence in any type of crisis. A fundamental condition for a nation that considers itself as being in crisis is that it should estimate a higher likelihood of military hostilities in confrontation with an opponent. Where a nation operates a crisis for another nation with a foreign policy action, but it does not perceive itself to be in crisis, we might reasonably infer that there are no clear and immediate intentions to engage in a violent military conflict with another nation. Although its action has led another nation to believe that the likelihood of future hostilities is higher, however, the triggering nation perceives the situation differently.<sup>18</sup> Crises for the territory with minor clashes: Botswana (June 14, 1985 - June 21, 1985); Qatar the Incident in Al-Dibal (April 26, 1986 - June 15, 1986); Bahrain South Africa (April 26, 1986 - June 15, 1986).

It is to be noted that there is provided no explanation for what kind of differences in perception with regard to the likelihood of future hostilities are in these cases, but it is simply suggested that this difference involves a reasonable assumption about the likelihood of violent acts by the crisis in these cases. In other words, because the perception of an increased risk of military hostilities is not shared by the main opponents of the crisis, the risk of a higher level of violence is lower than in crisis situations in which this perception is shared by

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<sup>15</sup> For example, Germany through "the crisis of the remilitarization of the Rhineland of 1936" or Syria through "the crisis of the 1976 Syrian militarization."

<sup>16</sup> See Snyder, Glenn H. & Paul Diesing, 1977, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press), 6.

<sup>17</sup> See Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, 1991, 'Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1), 143-169.

<sup>18</sup> See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peace building*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace building, United States Institute of Peace, 2011.

all the nations (e.g. bilateral crises).<sup>19</sup> The absence of such common perceptions in the intrastate crises offers an opportunity to explore the extent to which this particular crisis has an impact on the possibility of escalation. It is necessary to have a more substantial theoretical approach on the role of such perceptions of the crisis. It is to be noted that there is a number of other expectations, resulting from the taking into account of the essential differences between intrastate and interstate crisis. Considering that the triggering entity of the intrastate crisis does not expect an evolution of violent acts as a result of its action, it is expected that crisis management technique adopted in the context of the crisis may be nonviolent.<sup>20</sup>

Intrastate crises can be managed by negotiation, mediation, or other non-violent measure in order to reach a settlement of the dispute. The gravity of the values at risk in intrastate crisis situations is relatively low, because of the unilateral nature of the crisis. The intrastate crisis occurs when the triggering entity does not consider itself to be in a crisis. However, through a specific action, the triggering nation caused the crisis of another nation. Despite this fact, the triggering nation continues to believe that the likelihood of hostilities did not exceed the average. In this scenario, the gravity of values at risk is relatively low and it would be inconsistent to expect that the nation could be triggering a high-level threat (for example, a threat of serious injury, or a threat to the existence of another state) without a reaction from the target nation which, in its turn, could cause crisis for the triggering nation.<sup>21</sup>

The low level threats are less likely to provoke a crisis for the triggering entity and the degree of danger in the unilateral statements of crisis is generally low. Similarly, it is expected that the level of stress faced by decision-makers on issues of crisis should be different in intrastate and interstate crises. In general, the levels of stress increase when threats become more severe and when the differences in status and power are getting bigger. The levels of stress in the intrastate crisis is expected to be lower due to the less stringent nature of the threats expected in these cases.<sup>22</sup>

The differences of the characteristics of intrastate and interstate crises are particularized depending on the degree of general violence that took place during the crisis (after the initial outbreak of the crisis), regardless of whether the violence was adopted as a technique for crisis management or not. Any crisis involving serious clashes or war at a large scale is known to be violent. Crises without any violence or minor clashes are referred to as non-violent. In intrastate crisis situations, the likelihood of crisis violence is lower than in the cases of interstate crisis. The crisis-management technique used during the crisis includes a series of tools of influence, including negotiation, other non-violent measures and violent military use of force. In this case it is important whether the fundamental technique of crisis management has been violent or non-violent. In intrastate crises, the likelihood that an actor of the crisis should use a violent crisis-management technique is less than in the situations of interstate crisis.<sup>23</sup>

The gravity of values at risk measures the degree to which basic values are in danger in case of a crisis. A low value threat implies political or economic threat. A big danger would include territorial, serious damage or life threats. Having in view the assumption that

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<sup>19</sup> See Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2000. *A study of crisis*. 2nd Edition (CD-ROM included). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

<sup>20</sup> See SIPRI yearbook, <http://www.sipri.org/>

<sup>21</sup> See Crocker, Chester, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. 1999. *Herding cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: U.S Institute of Peace.

<sup>22</sup> See Leng, Russell, 1993. 'Reciprocating Influence Strategies and Success in Interstate Crisis Bargaining', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1), 3-41.

<sup>23</sup> See Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, 1991. 'Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1). 143-169.

the triggering entity estimates a limited likelihood of violence escalation in unilateral cases, it is expected that this perception should be associated with a low level of threat in the context of the crisis. In intrastate crisis situations, the level of threat to the fundamental values is far more likely to be lower than in interstate crisis situations.<sup>24</sup> Crisis for existence without violence: South Korea (June 25, 1950 - September 29, 1950); Taiwan (June 28, 1950 - September 30, 1950); Egypt, Syria The Formation (RAU) (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Jordan (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Zambia (November 5, 1965 - April 27, 1966); U.S. Able Archer 83 (November 2, 1983 - November 11, 1983); Soviet Union (November 2, 1983 - November 11, 1983).

The level of stress experienced by the decision-makers during crisis; the nature of the threat is fundamental, with a separation of power between the actor and the main opponent of crisis. In intrastate crises, the level of stress experienced by decision-makers is smaller than in situations of interstate crisis.

In order to determine the likelihood of violence in a crisis, it is important to determine the moment when the military hostilities broke out, after or before the outbreak of the crisis, regardless whether it was considered the basic technique in crisis management. Crises with military damage or minor clashes: South Africa The Cross-border Attack (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Botswana (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Zambia (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Zimbabwe (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Mozambique Ultimatum (September 11, 1986 - December 18, 1986); Malawi (September 11, 1986 - December 18, 1986).

It is to be noted that there is a twice higher frequency of violence in intrastate crises. Deviant intrastate crisis analysis in which violence took place shows that most of these crises have had violent crisis triggers. In contrast, only one-third of the non-violent intrastate crises have triggered the violence. The hypothesis of "violence breeds violence," in the field literature of crisis behavior would lead to the idea that responses to violent triggers are also violent.<sup>25</sup>

Initiation-response is partly responsible for the rare occurrence of violence (after the initial outbreak) in intrastate crisis situations. The violence is more likely to be adopted as a fundamental technique of crisis management in bilateral crisis situations than in unilateral situations. Comparing the gravity of values at risk in intrastate and interstate cases, we notice that the level of threat in cases of intrastate crisis is slightly lower than in the case of interstate crises.<sup>26</sup> Intrastate crises are different from interstate crises in several different ways. The likelihood of violence in intrastate crisis situations is significantly less. The likelihood of adopting drastic measures as essential technical management of the crisis is less than in intrastate crisis situations. Although the differences are less substantial, the gravity of values at risk and stress levels are slightly lower in the case of intrastate crises. The possibility that the fundamental factors in cases of intrastate crisis could be associated with a lower likelihood of occurrence of crisis violence that could be caused by a number of other factors that are simply related to this type of crisis is of great interest. The above noticed differences between intrastate and interstate crisis, with regard to the possibility of violence, could be the result of a set of other factors which are considered to be important predictors of violence during the crisis. These factors include the geographic proximity of the actors of

<sup>24</sup> See Hopmann, P. Terrence. 1996. *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

<sup>25</sup> See Leng, Russell, 1993. 'Reciprocating Influence Strategies and Success in Interstate Crisis Bargaining', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1), 3-41.

<sup>26</sup> See Bremer, Stuart A., 1992. 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Inter-state Violence, 1816-1965', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2), 309-341.

crisis, the power differences between the opponents of the crisis, whether the crisis was violently triggered, the gravity of values at risk and the type of regime of crisis actors.<sup>27</sup>

**Specific factors of the crisis.** The contiguity indicates whether the crisis opponents are geographically neighbors or not. Crises can degenerate between the neighboring nations into acts of violence as opposed to the crises between the nations that are not neighbors. Geographical proximity can create more opportunities for conflict and for reducing the cost of mobilizing the army for long distances.

Crises with minor clashes: Sweden (June 16, 1952 - July, 1952); USSR Catalina Incident (June 16, 1952 - July 1952).

Crises with serious clashes with great injury: Ethiopia-Somalia (December 26, 1960 - 1961); Ethiopia (December 26, 1960 - 1961).

The power distribution indicates whether a balance of power existed between the opponents of the crisis or not.

The outbreak of crisis indicates whether a crisis was violently triggered or not. Violence in the crisis trigger proved to be a very strong predictor of whether a crisis would develop violently or not. Crises with minor clashes: the Jordan Regime (April 4, 1957 - May 3, 1957); Jordan (April 4, 1957 - May 3, 1957); France-Tunisia (May 31, 1957 - June 17, 1958); Nicaragua (June 1, 1959 - June 14, 1959); Dominican Republic (June 14, 1959 - December, 1959); Haiti (August 13, 1959 - September 5, 1959); Central America/Cuba II (November 9, 1960 - December 7, 1960); Nicaragua (November 9, 1960 - December 7, 1960); Guatemala (November 13, 1960 - December 7, 1960).

The nature of the threat measures the gravity of threat during the crisis. There are expected increases of crisis violence.

The crisis for the territory without violence: Venezuela Essequibo (July 9, 1968 - August, 1968); Guyana (July 9, 1968 - August 1968); Uganda Rights (February 15, 1976 - February 24, 1976); Kenya (February 15, 1976 - February 24, 1976).

Crisis for the territory with minor clashes: Goa India I (August 10, 1955 - September 6, 1955); Portugal (August 10, 1955 - September 6, 1955); Goa India II (December 11, 1961-December 19, 1961); Portugal (December 11, 1961 - December 19, 1961); Mali-Mauritania (March 29, 1962 - February 18, 1963); Mauritania (March 29, 1962 - February 18, 1963); Kenya-Somalia (November 20, 1963 - March 4, 1964); Kenya (November 20, 1963 - March 4, 1964); South Africa The Critical Situation in Caprivi (October 5, 1971 - October 12, 1971); Zambia (October 5, 1971 - October 12, 1971); South Africa Zambia Raid (January 19, 1973 - February 3, 1973); Zambia (January 19, 1973 - February 3, 1973); The Invasion of Iraq-Kuwait (March 20, 1973 - June 8, 1973); Kuwait (March 20, 1973 - June 8, 1973); South Africa Mozambique Attacks (January 30, 1981 - March 1981); Mozambique (January 30, 1981 - March, 1981); US Gulf of Syrte I (August 12, 1981 - September 1, 1981); Libya (August 12, 1981 - September 1, 1981); Lesotho (December 9, 1982 - December 15, 1982); South Africa Botswana Attack (June 14, 1985 - June 21, 1985).

Crisis for the territory with serious clashes: Oman-South Yemen (November 18, 1973 - March 11, 1976); Oman (November 18, 1973 - March 11, 1976); Litani Israel Operation (March 14, 1978 - June 13, 1978); Lebanon (March 14, 1978 - June 13, 1978).

Democracy is a proportionate measure of the number of democracies involved in a crisis. The increases are associated with declines in terms of likelihood of violence during the crisis.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See Rousseau, David L.; Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter & Paul K. Huth, 1996. 'Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88', *American Political Science Review* 90(3), 512-533.

<sup>28</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

The type of crisis indicates whether a crisis is intrastate and interstate. The likelihood of violence during crisis decreases in intrastate crisis situations, no matter the effects of the geographical contiguity of crisis actors, the power differences between the crisis opponents, the triggering factors of crisis, the level of threat of the values, as well as the regime's opponents.

Apart from geographical contiguity, the differences of power, the violence of the outbreak of the crisis, the severity of threat, and the regime of the crisis factors, the fact that a crisis is an intrastate one remains an important factor in explaining the fact whether the violence breaks out during the crisis or not. This thing suggests that regardless of the factors that lead a nation to believe that it is or is not in crisis mode (regardless of the factors that have led to the development of a unilateral crisis), these factors serve as an important component with regard to the phenomenon of violence during the crisis. Crisis for territory: Ethiopia the Incident in Todghere (February 12, 1987 - April, 1987); Somalia (February 12, 1987 - April, 1987); Cameroon-Nigeria (May 2, 1987 - September 26, 1987); Cameroon-Nigeria (May 2, 1987 - September 26, 1987). Crisis for the territory without violence: China (PRC) (June 27, 1950 - July 1950); Sudan (February 9, 1958 - February 25, 1958); Egypt-Sudan Border I (February 9, 1958 - February 25, 1958); Ghana (March 1960 - April 1, 1960); Ghana-Togo Border I (March 1960 - April 1, 1960).

In the studies that examine the factors of sudden surge of international crisis, there should be given attention to the potential impact of intrastate crises.

The variable of intrastate crisis, of the type of crisis, has a significant contribution in terms of statistics for explaining the differences in violence crisis. In brief, the statistical patterns that assess the relationship between the different types of independent variables and the violence in times of crisis by using the RCI data set may indicate a weaker relationship of variables than the patterns that include the control of intrastate crises.<sup>29</sup>

The definition of foreign policy crisis focuses on the point of view of the leaders of a nation-state with regard to future military hostilities, to the threat of fundamental values and to the moment when they should take decisions. The first of these attributes, the perception of a higher likelihood of military hostilities, is the central element of the definition. Considering the fact that the definition is perceptual, it is possible that a state-nation should be in crisis, while its main opponent is not in crisis. These crises, considered to be intrastate ones, have an important similarity.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike interstate crises, the nation states in intrastate crisis do not share the perception of the likelihood of escalation of future military hostilities. This fact constitutes the fundamentals for a number of assumptions about how patterns of intrastate and interstate crisis should differ. Data on international crises provide support for these assumptions.

There is a possibility of less intensification of violence during times of intrastate crisis than in interstate crises. In a multidimensional analysis, the fact that a crisis was an intrastate one has remained a significant predictor of violence (or the lack of it), despite the presence of other control variables. Multiple analyses suggest that there is an additional attribute of the intrastate crises, beyond the geographical contiguity, the sharing of power, the outbreak of the crisis, the severity of threats, or the regime of the contestants, which helps to explain the inclination of such crises towards nonviolence.

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<sup>29</sup> It is also worth noting that there may be cases when it is necessary that the unilateral crisis should be excluded entirely from the analysis. For example, in their study on the democratic peace theory, Rousseau et al. (1996: 532) exclude many of the unilateral crises from the analysis because there is "no strong evidence for the existence of the opponent who uses strength". See David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*, 512-533.

<sup>30</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

An evaluation of the theoretical significance of this additional attribute cannot be determined until the attribute itself is appropriately identified. This additional attribute represents the absence of common perceptions about the likelihood of military hostilities between opponents in crisis. The rules for inclusion of a state-nation as an actor of crisis facilitates the identification of actors who do not share the same perception of the risk of triggering hostilities military the same as other countries that are in a dispute.

It is to be noted that the fact that the theoretical attribute of one of intrastate crises is not the fact that they are unilateral, but the fact that the actors do not share the same perception about the risk of violence outbreak. This particular attribute is common for intrastate crises, but could also characterize a part of interstate crises. By applying this measure to all crises, a more thorough assessment of the impact of this factor on the intensification of the crisis might be possible. Although the variable of perception with regard to the type of crisis is only a representation of common perceptions, it strongly supports the idea that the congruent perceptions on future military hostilities could play an important role in explaining the violence of a crisis.

It seems that the common perceptions about the risk of military hostilities are a critical component in the network of factors that contribute to the intensification of violence. When one party in a dispute notices an increase of the risk of violence, the crisis is much less likely to intensify, even when we have control over other important predictors of crisis escalation.<sup>31</sup> Crises for the political regime with serious clashes: Libya Israel (October 14, 1953 - October 1953); Jordan (October 14, 1953 - October 1953); Taiwan the Infiltration in Burma (February 8, 1953 - October 15, 1954).

From the synthetic presentation of the parameters for the analysis of crises-the definition of a crisis, the quality of a crisis actor, the risk of the outbreak of violence, specific factors of crisis-we may notice that there is a coherent algorithm but the quantifying of parameters so that one can work with formulas is accompanied by inherent risks with vitiation consequences of the crisis diagnoses.

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<sup>31</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

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