CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NON-PROLIFERATION CHECKING MECHANISM

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ABSTRACT: *THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SEEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT IS COMPLEX; THE FUNDAMENTAL THESIS OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT SUSTAINING THAT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SHOULD DISCOURAGE OTHER STATES" AGGRESIVITY WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, PREVENTING NUCLEAR STATES FROM BECOMING MORE AGGRESSIVE. THE PROLIFERATION SPIRAL RAISES THE OBVIOUS PROBLEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY CAUSED BY THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER DUE TO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES THAT ALSO LEADS TO A SYSTEMIC RECONFIGURATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION IS TRIBUTARY TO A VERY LARGE PALETTE OF OPINIONS ORIGINATING IN BOTH POSSESSING AND NON-POSSESSING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME STATES APPROACH THE ISSUE CONSIDERING THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS – ESPECIALLY THE NON-NUCLEAR ONES, CONSIDERING THAT NPT HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT TOWARDS THEIR INTERESTS DUE TO ITS CONSEQUENCES.*

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NON-PROLIFERATION, NATIONAL INTERESTS, NON-PROLIFERATION CHECKING MECHANISM, ORDER UNIVERSAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

The nuclear issue could be approached under several aspects: the strategic dimension, proliferation and non-proliferation, disarming and institutionalization. This study will focus on both proliferation and non-proliferation aspects.

In 1945, the use of nuclear strokes redesigned the international relations: the nuclear dimension becoming the main issue within the balance of power; the bipolar strategic relations between the U.S.A. and Russia setting the tone for the international community orchestra, as well as for the issue of proliferation during the Cold War era. After 1990, the proliferation following the stopping of the South African Nuclear programme diversifies and reappears when India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran try to obtain and develop nuclear arsenals.[2]

The strategic significance of nuclear weapons as seen from the perspective of conventional conflict development is complex; the fundamental thesis of a potential conflict

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[2] See, Sagan, Scott D. 1996/1997. "Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb." *International Security* 21 (3): 54-86.

sustaining that nuclear proliferation should discourage other states" aggresivity while, at the same time, preventing nuclear states from becoming more aggressive. Possessing nuclear arsenals might generate an active offensive behaviour during conventional disputes while the opponent states become more cautious, adopting a more defensive conduct, aiming to non-proliferation. The implication of nuclear states in conventional conflicts will depend upon their nuclear capabilities.

Nuclear arsenals do not generate wars by themselves, but they cannot be ignored by the international policy. The owners of nuclear arsenals have an increased international influence and better chances to win the wars in which they decide to take part as well as the potential to calm down emerging conflicts. It is said that nuclear weapons inhibit the opponents, prevent escalation and decrees chances for conflicts.[3]

According to an opinion, proliferation depends on some factors: nuclear cooperation, the nature of conflicts (frequency, duration, intensity and closing) and on diplomatic meaning.[4] These factors establish a strategic perspective that takes under consideration both the causes and the consequences of nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear weapons don't influence the frequency of conflicts, but their beginning, duration, intensity and ending, by increasing the security and democracy of the nuclear states, so that the conflicts in which these states are involved are shorter and less intense and there are increased chances for these states to be victorious.[5] The diplomatic meaning of nuclear arsenals is that they discourage external aggressions and it also brings other security advantages.

Considering the consequences of nuclear proliferation, the spiral of nuclear proliferation is sustained by the advantage of the preventive stroke, the political and military crises and the accidental use of nuclear strokes. But this proliferation spiral raises the obvious problem of the international instability caused by the reconfiguration of the balance of power due to nuclear capabilities that also leads to a systemic reconfiguration of the international security architecture.

The current nuclear order favours some non-nuclear NATO member states as opposed to others that don't have the benefits of such a security "umbrella", fact that leads to an inequitable security situation.[6] Besides, there are new developments with major impact upon proliferation: there is a possibility of technology spreading, the existence of grey market, the probability that some other countries might produce nuclear weapons; the emergency of the "techno-nationalism" in the developing countries and the nuclearisation of some of the conflicts in South Asia, Middle East North-Eastern Asia.[7]

Despite the efforts of the international community, there is no non-proliferation checking mechanism monitored by the IAEA[8] and supervised by the Security Council.[9]

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[3] See, Waltz, Kenneth N. 1995. *More may be better. In The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate*, ed. S. D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. New York: W. W. Norton.

[4] See, Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, "A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation" *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 2, (April 2009), pp. 154-155.

[5] See, Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation: A quantitative model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (1): 167-194.

[6] See, John Steinbruner, *Principles of Global Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2011).

[7] See, Paul Bracken, ''The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age,'' *Orbis* 47, no. 3 (Summer 2003): pages 399—/413.

[8] IAEA - International Atomic Energy Authority.

[9] See also, "The instability or collapse of a WMD [weapon of mass destruction]- armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an occurrence could lead to a rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations." US Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2012, p. iv, <www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb12_ 1000.pdf>.(accessed 15 February 2014).

It should be remarked that the establishment of such mechanism for the defence field was strongly rejected by the nuclear powers.[10]

The starting point in understanding the concept of proliferation is represented by the nuclear arsenals possession as a result of the production capability of the respective state (see chart no.1) or as a result of purchasing the respective nuclear arsenal or deploying the nuclear arsenal on the territory of another country, without partitioning it with the host nation; also the procurement of nuclear weapons by the non-states actors for terrorist purposes should be taken under consideration.[11]

	STATE	Year
1	USA	1945
2	RUSSIA/RUSSIAN FEDERATION	1940
3	GREAT BRITAIN	1952
4	FRANCE	1960
5	CHINA	1064
6	ISRAEL	1967
7	INDIA	1988
8	SOUTH AFRICA	1982-1990
9	PAKISTAN	1990

Chart no.1 – Nuclear arsenals proliferation

THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS UPON NON-PROLIFERATION

The non-proliferation represents a solution to the major nuclear threats, a way to secure statal interests that allows for varied possibilities to balance the relations with strong opponents.

The main document reglementing non-proliferation issues (NPT), established in 1968,[12] is structured on non-proliferation, disarmament and the right to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. NPT principles are: proliferation is a negative phenomenon; usage of nuclear weapons is a bad thing; inspections and motorization are essential; decisions of NPT conferences must be consensual; universal participation to NPT is a core objective; countries NPT members respect non-proliferation considerents. This international document is both attacked and sustained within international conferences on adapting and development in accordance with the present reality.[13] At the 1995 Conference debating the enlargement of NPT it was decided that the first objective of the treaty should observe the eradication of nuclear weapons, not only the negotiation in good faith.[14] In 2000, under the name of ”the thirteenth step” towards disarmament, several nuclear powers initiate a series of measures in this respect, but take steps back later on, no longer considering this

[10] See, Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14, *Nuclear disarmament: Working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States*, March 21, 2013.

[11] See, Sagan, Scott D. 1996/1997. ”Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb.” *International Security* 21 (3): 54-86.

[12] Non-Proliferation Treaty - NPT

[13] See, Cecilia Albin, *Justice and Fairness in International Negotiations.* (New York: Cambridge University Press).

[14] Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.14,“Nuclear disarmament: Working paper presented by the Group of Non-Aligned States,” March 21, 2013.

initiative as an obligation. During the conferences in 2005 and 2010, the issue of forbidding nuclear tests was discussed along with the non-proliferation matter.

According to specialty literature, NPT is considered a viable document, setting in order universal nuclear security elements;[15] although there are voices accusing that it is full of inequities and does not cover all areas of interest.[16] Therefore, the non-nuclear states denounce the inequity of the treaty that allows the "Group of the 5"[17] to possess nuclear arsenal but forbids this right to the others.

"The Group of the 5" adopted the same position, denying access to nuclear technology for other states, and allowing only assistance for nuclear technology used for peaceful purposes. There are more and more voices from the non-nuclear countries denouncing double standards in applying NPT, thus assisting the interests of nuclear powers by emphasizing non-proliferation over disarmament.[18]

The improvement of the non-proliferation is tributary to a very large palette of opinions originating in both possessing and non-possessing of nuclear weapons. Some states approach the issue considering their national interests – especially the non-nuclear ones, considering that NPT has a negative impact towards their interests due to its consequences. Another problem with the treaty is the fact that it does not stipulate measures or regulations to block the further production of nuclear weapons.[19]

Specialty literature questions the legitimacy of the treaty, because of its yet unsolved problems.[20] NPT observes and legitimates the inequity between states based on their weapons possession and establishes rights and obligations in order to limit and eventually eliminate this inequality, within some time frame. As a consequence, many states consider that non-proliferation depends upon the progress of disarmament.[21]

At present, there is an obvious contradiction between the access to nuclear technology and the spreading of nuclear weapons. According to NTP, the usage of nuclear energy for military purposes falls under an inequitable regime allowing , on one hand, to the "Group of the 5" to possess nuclear arsenals for an undetermined period of time while, on the other hand, the other 189 states do not have the same right.[22]

According to NPT normatives, the majority of states cannot possess nuclear weapons as opposed to the ones in the"Group of the 5". This reality contradicts the states international

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[15] See, George Perkovich et al., *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security.* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007).

[16] See, Graham Allison warns that "the current global nuclear order is extremely fragile" and that it is marked by "growing cynicism about the non-proliferation regime." He concludes that the trends are "currently pointing toward catastrophe." Graham Allison, "Nuclear Disorder: Surveying Atomic Threats," *Foreign Affairs* 89 (1) (January/February 2010): 2, 7, 12.

[17] Permanent members of Security Council, USA, The Russian Federation, China, Great Britain and France. "a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967." *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, 1970, Article IX, para. 3.

[18] See, William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

[19] Like the case of Irak, Sirya, Iran and North Koreea

[20] As Jayantha Dhanapala, the Sri Lankan president of the 1995 conference and later The UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament, put it sharply in his memoirs of the conference, "There could be little hope for nonproliferation in a world structured by the rules of nuclear apartheid." Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell, *Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account.* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005).

[21] See, Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, "The Role of Legitimacy in Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," *The Nonproliferation Review* 13, no. 2 (2006),p. 233.

[22] "Middle East States Frustrated by Nuclear Treaty, Egyptian Delegate Says," Agency-France Presse, March 10, 2010.

system based also on the principle of the states sovereignty, according to which states also have the right to nuclear weapons; this breaking of sovereignty could only be possible if stipulated by other public international law principle. In other case, the legitimacy of NPT is seriously affected.[23]

A substantial and coherent non-proliferation demands for inspections of states' nuclear facilities, but this activity also creates the premises for knowing and using of the private economic and technological data of the owner inspected, endangering their security. Non-nuclear states have the obligation to let themselves checked, while the states forming the "Group of the 5" can be subjected to controls only if they agree and only in part.[24]

International provisions stipulate promoting both the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the one for military purposes, with a central mechanism to control exports. These aspects are strongly contested, giving the fact that there are strong impediments to exporting technology towards certain non-nuclear countries.[25] The universal checking characteristic of proliferation risks is incomplete since states that did not sign with NPT- such as Israel and India- as opposed to Iran, who signed NPT, are subjected to superficial checking, fact that creates the idea that it is better not to sign NPT.[26]

The causes of nuclear proliferation, according to speciality literature, are organised under different considerations: economic, internal policy[27], psychological.[28] Proliferation is seen under two dimensions: production and possession. Even if there is production potential-including testing – it is not mandatory to have production of nuclear weapons. The combinations between nuclear weapons production capabilities and possessing of nuclear weapons allow for classification: states that produce and possess nuclear weapons; states that might produce nuclear weapons and states that try to produce and possess nuclear weapons.[29]

The Production. The expansion of nuclear energy usage – despite the Fukushima incident-leads to more states producing nuclear weapons providing NPT's lack of reglementations regarding the continuous global nuclearization. Nuclear proliferation – production programs and arsenal possession-needs to be analysed regarding the quantity aspect as well as under the aspect of possession. NPT signing countries cannot initiate nuclear weapons development programs due to their security issues combined with technological potential, but this does not exclude their possession.

Nuclear weapons production has two phases: the production and the testing. During the first phase (predominantly scientific and industrial) – there are: researching, projecting, experimenting, testing, producing and assembling the weapons; preparing the plutonium, the enriched uranium and the tritium for the nuclear warheads. During the second phase, operational (military mainly) – there are: the military deployment, the exercises, the preliminary warnings and the command and control systems.

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[23] See, "Nuclear Disarmament: Working Paper Submitted by Brazil on Behalf of the New Agenda Coalition," April 15, 2013.

[24] See, Nina Tannenwald, „Justice and Fairness in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime", *Ethics & International Affairs*, 27, no. 3 (2013), p. 304.

[25] Why does India has access to nuclear technology and Iran does not see Christopher A. Ford, "The Nonproliferation Bestiary: A Typology and Analysis of Nonproliferation Norms," *NYU Journal of International Law and Politics* 39, no. 937,p. 957.

[26] *Ibidem*, p. 305.

[27] See, Solingen, Etel. 2007. *Nuclear logics: Contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[28] Hymans, Jacques E. C. 2006. *The psychology of nuclear proliferation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[29] See, Reed, William. 2000. A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation. *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (1): 84-93.

Nuclear proliferation is about nuclear countries increasing the number of war heads as well as about the acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states. A non-nuclear state can buy only from a nuclear country possessing nuclear weapons that were tested; the test being a proof of the nuclear weapons existence. It is also considered proliferation the assistance to produce nuclear weapons; we have to specify that assistance for civilian nuclear purposes is correlated with security standards, the states cooperating rather with friendly states, although the economic interests prevail for the nuclear states.[30]

Seen from the states 'potential, it is considered that "once the state has got the nuclear capacity it is just a matter of time until it will start producing them."[31] Speciality literature estimates that economic development and industrial capacity create premises for the nuclear capability.[32]

For most states, producing nuclear weapons is too expensive and not exactly beneficial: yet there are states following nuclear ambitions in order to achieve military supremacy over other threatening super-powers. The nuclear proliferation, function of the ability to produce nuclear weapons has contradictory aspects: there are states with nuclear capability that don't produce nuclear weapons-Japan and Germany- and there are states that long for nuclear weapons but cannot produce them: Egypt and Iran.

Nuclear states have got their weapons by developing national programmes, not by stealing or buying them. They threaten to use their arsenals when their sovereignty is endangered; most states consider it a slight probability and governs that feel insecure ask for protection from powerful states.

Producing nuclear weapons takes technology, nuclear material obtained internally or purchased and for economic capabilities to get control and targeted transport systems.[33]

Producing nuclear weapons is about a lot of resources; their absence being a serious limitation.it also attracts serious international pressure, due to the non-proliferation efforts, even if the efficiency of these efforts is questionable.

Producing nuclear weapons is also about striving for international political influence and not about a service to world peace, although it is a logical decision, given the power balance.

The possession. Possessing nuclear weapons improves international influence power, which is what every state desires, for security reasons. Nuclear states have a better fighting potential in case of a foreign invasion or if their interests are endangered. This kind of conflicts is settled in favour of nuclear states.[34]

Speciality literature mentions attempts of buying nuclear weapons; Egypt has tried to buy technology from China and Russia several times[35], and Libya has tried that with China.[36]

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[30] See, Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Political Science Review* 103, 1.

[31] See, Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way. 2004. "The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48: 859-85.

[32] See, Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. 2007. "Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation: A quantitative model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51: 167-94.

[33] See, Kincade, William H. 1995. *Nuclear proliferation: Diminishing threat?* INSS Occasional Paper 6. U.S. Air Force Academy: USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Colorado Springs.

[34] See, Jones, Rodney W., and Mark. G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz. 1998. *Tracking nuclear proliferation: A guide in maps and charts*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

[35] See, Bhatia, Shyam. 1988. *Nuclear rivals in the Middle East*. New York: Rutledge. p. 48.

[36] See, Heikal, Mohamed. 1975. *The road to Ramadan*. New York Quadrangle: New York Times Book Co.

Those states that had nuclear arsenals deployed on their territory- see the case of Russian weapons on the territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – didn't succeed in taking control over them, Russia deploying those arsenals on other locations.[37]

At the moment it seems there are no successful attempts of non-state actors in purchasing nuclear weapons, therefore nuclear terrorism is not considered a serious threat.

It is possible to discuss proliferation in the case of states possessing nuclear capabilities.

Nuclear weapons possession is encumbered by both internal and geopolitical conditions interacting with diplomatic pressure and international sanctions.[38] Nuclear states tend to dominate their partners using rather diplomatic than military means.

The factors implying upon proliferation are:[39] international security, including here the attitude and intentions of regional powers; internal politics and international regulations.

Conventional or nuclear insecurity can be a reason for nuclear weapons possession, aiming to discourage potential enemies from generating a conflict.[40]

Nuclear states cannot be considered as being more or less involved in international debates; even though the existence of nuclear arsenals don't generate conflicts, yet they increase the influence that nuclear states have. These states are successful in solving territorial and maritime debates; that is they are more influential internationally. In other words, nuclear proliferation has neither positive nor negative influence upon the probability of a conflict bursting.[41]

Outcast states - those being politically isolated on the international scene-can look at nuclear weapons as a barrier towards military and political adversities. It is obvious that the general perception is that the present state of things should be maintained; in other words, new nuclear states would lead to instability.[42] A state's positioning under a "nuclear umbrella" might reduce nuclear ambitions due to security risks, as in the case of South Korea giving up its nuclear programme in return for security warranty from the USA.[43]

Despite all these, there are experts [44] in favour of increasing the number of nuclear weapons, on account that a nuclear state will not be subjected to a military attack, its main interests being thus protected. The author considers that the spreading of nuclear weapons towards other countries might contribute to the strengthening, not the diminishing of both regional and global security. In the case of Iran it will lead to balance in the case of the present monopoly and to an implied increased regional stability. Internal politics determine nuclear proliferation by diverting focus from the internal affairs and promoting nuclear

[37] See, Jones, Rodney W., and Mark G. McDonough. 1998. *Tracking nuclear proliferation: A guide in maps and charts, 1998.* Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pp. 25-29.

[38] "Nuclear proliferation is a function of two variables: technological capability and political motivation . . . capability without motivation is innocuous . . . [and] motivation without capability is futile." Shimko, Keith L. 2005. *International relations: Perspectives and controversies*. New York: Houghton Mifflin.

[39] See, Sagan, Scott D. 1996. Why do states build nuclear weapons? Three models in search of a bomb. *International Security* 21 (3): 54-86.

[40] See, Quester, George H. 2005. *Nuclear first strike: Consequences of a broken taboo.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

[41] See, Jo, Dong-Joon, and Erik Gartzke. 2007."Determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation: A quantitative model." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (1): 167-194.

[42] "The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance', but that it is important to 'fight proliferation' (i.e. others getting nuclear weapons) with both 'political means and military capabilities." See, NATO's Nuclear Weapon Doctrine.

[43] See, Mazarr, Michael J. 1995. *North Korea and the bomb: A case study in nonproliferation*. New York: St. Martin's. P.27.

[44] See, Kenneth Waltz (2013), *Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability* The essay restates other essay's arguments written in 1981, Kenneth Waltz (1981) *Nuclear Weapons: More is Better*.

ambitions, using the nationalist sense[45] as seen in the case of India and Pakistan where developing nuclear capabilities lead to an increased nationalist awareness.

International bodies, especially NPT can stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons by adopting international normatives and by using international agreements as internal levers to prevent nuclear proliferation and also as a moral barrier for the nuclear coalitions formed by NPT states.[46]

Proliferation depends upon the regional or global status, nuclear weapons being a corollary of prestige even in the case of a major power, different standards being applied. Thus, there is a moral accountability in the case of the five permanent nuclear producing members of The Security Council towards the deprecation and sanctions applied to the nuclear ambitions of other countries.[47]

Nuclear weapons potential production capabilities depends on certain resources and production capabilities.[48]

There is a connection between crisis development, amplitude and the gained experience in the field of nuclear weapons' possession on the one hand and some certain response features in the case of international crises on the other hand. When a state considers an enemy state's development of capabilities as dangerous and potentially conflictual, the situation is problematic and could develop into a nuclear conflict due to the assertion that nuclear weapons improve the strategic positions of their owners. The purchase of nuclear weapons is more probable for the states correlatively involved in international disputes or reaching pretences towards one another; the states being less experienced in nuclear matters are more likely to involve into disputes. More experienced states are less likely to do so.[49]

The intensity of a conflict between nuclear powers is high; a balance between nuclear arsenals prevents an extended war but generates problems during the dispute. There is stability-instability paradox, nuclear weapons reducing the level of violence while creating conditions for a war on a large scale. The best solution is the adjustment of international relations so as to avoid the escalation of generalised violence. The ending of a conflict whose protagonists are nuclear powers should be asymmetrical, for symmetry is out of the question. In the case of an asymmetrical conflict, the non-nuclear state will make concessions to the nuclear state while the latter will shorten the conflict. A nuclear state facing another nuclear state is less likely to escalate the nuclear level. Nuclear states have a bigger diplomatic leverage as compared to non-nuclear states which will prefer ending a conventional conflict in which they might find themselves dragged together with nuclear states.

Even though Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had nuclear weapons on their territory, they were not their own; The Russian Federation was in control of the weapons, moving the nuclear arsenal on Russian territory. South Africa stopped its production in 1990.North Korea had a nuclear test in 2006, but it is not clear if it has a functional nuclear arsenal.

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[45] See, Waltz, Kenneth N. 2003. *More may be better. In The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate renewed*, edited by Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, 3-45. 2nd ed. New York: Norton.

[46] See, Scheinman, Lawrence. 1990."Does the NPT matter?" *In Beyond 1995: The future of the NPT regime*, edited by Joseph F Pilat and Robert E. Pendley, 53-64. New York: Plenum.

[47] See, Paul, T. V. 2000. *Power versus prudence: Why nations forgo nuclear weapons.* Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

[48] Uranium deposits, metallurgists, chemical engineers, and nuclear engineers/physicists/chemists, electronic/explosive specialists, nitric acid production capacity, and electricity production capacity; http://www .columbia.edu/~eg589/.(accessed 15 February 2014).

[49] See, Singh, Sonali, and Christopher R. Way 2004. " The correlates of nuclear proliferation: A quantitative test." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (6): 859-85.

Nuclear states consider that non-proliferation can be supported by controlling exports by means of enforcing strict regulations and up-dating the lists of restricted technology. This asks for an international nuclear order enabling a broader use of nuclear energy while reducing the potential proliferative risk. On the other hand, the states that don't have the technology to use nuclear energy oppose to both multilateral and unilateral control of nuclear exporting, considering that it is contrary to the rights of non-nuclear states and out of the frame of NPT provisions.

Access to technology and nuclear capabilities. The access to technology and nuclear capabilities is a cause that hasn't been studied enough, especially from the point of view of the states trying to produce nuclear weapons. Since the emergence of nuclear weapons some states have developed nuclear arsenals, although proliferation is a collective responsibility according to which they had to prevent from such enterprise. After six decades, most states haven't developed a nuclear arsenal, either because of the international reglementations leading to non-proliferation or because the pressure created by the great powers led to this result. The speciality literature considers that non-proliferation was determined by the high production costs as well as by the poor advantages offered. More than that, it is stated that even the pressure from the international community, including the great powers had only limited effects.[50]

Given the fact that purchasing nuclear weapons is very expensive and time consuming, proliferation turns to be unapproachable for the states who consider their security to be threatened as well as for richer states having enough money for defence. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis of the proliferation issue takes under consideration historical, official and statistical aspects, relevant for the nuclear threat. The statistical aspect examines all causes, based on a range of cases and elaborates probabilistically different trends disregarding the determinist conclusions. Specialty literature offers a variety of divergent opinions on the subject of non-proliferation, orbiting some major themes: how can nuclear weapons be obtained; why do states want to have nuclear weapons;(the power of diplomatic persuasion and the military power in the eventuality of a conflict); proliferation's effects upon international peace and security; the ratio nuclear threat - nuclear proliferation; the ratio nuclear weapons possession- nuclear arsenal development. A relation has appeared between the transfer of nuclear and technological resources and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. From here, the relation between nuclear assistance and proliferation, the assistance given to some countries being able to contribute to nuclear weapons producing, while other states lacking in assistance cannot reach to similar results.[51]

In 2008, USA and India signed an accord regarding the provision of nuclear material, despite the fact that the USA do not have agreements with non-NPT countries and violating a pre-existent provision. More than that, the coalition for export controls, constituted of 45 states as a reaction to the first Indian nuclear test disregards the principle of not signing with a non-NPT country. In return for its signing of NPT, India demanded to be declared nuclear power and to be given a period of time to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.[52]

[50] See, Gartzke, Erik, and Matthew Kroenig. 2009. "A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53:151 -160.

[51] See, Kroenig, Matthew. 2009. "Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance." *American Political Science Review* 103, 1.

[52] It is considered that for the Occident the possession of nuclear weapons is of no importance; who owns the weapons is important. What is acceptable to China is inacceptable to North Korea and Iran. Richard Price, "Nuclear Weapons Don't Kill People, Rogues Do," *International Politics* 44 (2007), pp. 232-49.

One nuclear assistance modality is the offering of nuclear technology projects by the nuclear states to the candidate countries. China has offered Pakistan the projects for implosive nuclear weapons.[53]

Another way of assisting is by building the facilities. The Chinese technicians worked with the Pakistani ones to help using the uranium technology.[54]

Low cost nuclear assistance or even for free happens due to some strategic interests. As a consequence, Russia assists China in preparing the uranium because it is afraid that the USA might attack China right after the Taiwan Strait second crises.[55]

Another case of assistance demands for confidentiality, as in the case of France assisting Israel in the attempt to transform a civilian nuclear programme into a military nuclear one.[56]

Nuclear countries can also benefit from assistance. Russia has given China not only nuclear material but also training for the Chinese technicians. Consequently, China helps Pakistan with nuclear material.[57]

Another situation is that in which states want nuclear weapons but are unable to obtain international nuclear assistance. Egypt has tried to get help from Russia and then from China;[58] it has tried with Pakistan, but in vain. Iran and Taiwan are in the same situation – although they received some assistance- being followed by Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Syria and South Korea.[59]

[53] See, Corera, Gordon. 2006. *Shopping for bombs: Nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and the rise and fall of the A. Q. Khan network*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
[54] See, Jones, Rodney W., and Mark G. McDonough with Toby F. Dalton and Gregory D. Koblentz. 1998. *Tracking nuclear proliferation: A guide in maps and charts*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[55] See, Lewis, John W., and Xue Litai. 1988. *China builds the bomb*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
[56] See, Richelson, Jeffrey T. 2006. *Spying on the bomb: American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea*. New York:W. W. Norton & Company.
[57] See, Corera, Gordon. 2006. *Shopping for bombs: Nuclear proliferation, global insecurity, and the rise and fall of the A. Q. Khan network*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
[58] Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Web site, "Egypt Country Overview," available at http://www.nti .org/research/profiles/ Egypt/index.html. (accessed 15 February 2014).
[59] See, Langewiesche, William, *The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007).

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