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CONTENT

I

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

II

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HISTORY

SOCIAL SCIENCES

MEDICINE

I

The first part of Supplement to the Research and Science Today journal brings together the papers presented at the Third Edition of the International Conference "Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In) Security" held at the Babes Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, by the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, May 31, 2016, as activity in the Jean Monnet Modules project "European Security, National and Ethnic Minority Issues", 2013-2016.

The event brought together leading specialists in this field from Romania and Western Europe, with the goal to transfer knowledge and expertise in migration, security, governance and social integration in the European Union. By thematic the conference was addressed both to academics, political scientists and stakeholders from the private and academic structures of security, order and public safety, involving a wide range of experts and specialists in an academic dialogue about international relations and security studies with focus on current migration trends. The event encouraged the exchange of best practices, experience and know-how between experts through a cross-disciplinary international conference.

The conference was organized in three sections, addressing in a comprehensive manner topical issues of migration and security, as the follows: Panel 1 - Governance, lobby and advocacy for a coherent European policy on migration, Panel 2 -Interdependencies between Migration and (in) Security in the European Union and at its borders and Panel 3- European Citizenship, Identity and Social Integration on the New Security Agenda of the EU.

In light of the terrorist events that ocured on the international arena and sense of insecurity created by these and in the context of changes taking place in European society at the level of transnational and transcultural communication,as european citizens, we can say that the papers from this volume are bringing a new perspective on migration - multiculturalism - in / security in the EU. The need for a thorough analysis of migration - security - European integration nexus, made by representatives of academia, is determined in the process of creating a secure environment powerd by democratic values of an inclusive society in the EU.

The "New Trends in Migration and European Dynamics (In) Security" section brings together a number of 12 specialized studies in the field of European studies, presented at the international conference. The articles included in this special issue fulfilled their scientific objective, giving readers an overview of potential vulnerabilities, risks and threats brought by migration to the security of the European Union.

The interdependence relationship between migration and security is indisputable: the migration process is without any doubt a source of both security and uncertainty for stakeholders. Of the five security sectors, analized by the Copenhagen School theoreticians, the societal security or "security identity" sector is mostly addressed in the articles of this issue. The complexity of this sector, the effect of migration flows on the cultural identity of the host country, in terms of survival of the nations demographics, living standards while favoring and an increase in organized crime and terrorist attacks in the host country, had secured an integrated, multidisciplinary, both in the conference and in the corpus of works brought together in this volume.

We wish to thank all those involved in the implementation of this Jean Monnet Modules "European Security, National and Ethnic Minority Issues" project and in organizing the international conference "Migration Dynamics and New Trends in European (In) Security" for their human and professional qualities, for the support offered and highly scientific work proved during the implementation of activities.

We invite you to read the pages of this magazine guaranteeing you a challenging and interesting reading about contemporary issues in the fascinating world of international relations and security studies.

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BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST SOCIAL EXCLUSION

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ABSTRACT:
THE GENERAL TREND WHEN IT COMES TO SOCIAL EXCLUSION, IS TO DIRECT THE ATTENTION TO A PERSON'S STATUS ON THE LABOR MARKET. IT IS TRUE THAT THE EXCLUSION FROM THE LABOR MARKET HAS EFFECTS ON SEVERAL PLANS: MATERIAL DEPRIVATION, HOUSING, LIMITED ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION, SOCIALIZATION, BUT JUST THE EFFECTS OF THIS DISCRIMINATION ARE THOSE THAT CONFER "POWER" OF THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION. WE CONTINUE TO RESEARCH THE SUBJECT OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION BECAUSE, DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF NATIONAL PLANS AND STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING EXCLUSION, THIS PHENOMENON STILL PERSISTS.
WE CONSIDER THAT GREATER FOCUS IS ONLY ON SOME OF THE AREAS OF EXISTING NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND PLANS, SUCH AS QUALIFICATION / REQUALIFICATION OF PERSONS. IN PRACTICE, WE FIND SEVERAL PROJECTS / INITIATIVES THAT HAVE AS PURPOSE THE QUALIFICATION / REQUALIFICATION OF PERSONS BELONGING TO VULNERABLE GROUPS, AND FAR LESS INITIATIVES IN TERMS OF SCHOOLING / ADULT LITERACY. WITHOUT FINANCIAL INCENTIVES, AS IN THE CASE OF QUALIFICATION / REQUALIFICATION COURSES, PROGRAMS LIKE "THE SECOND CHANCE", ARE SOMETIMES DOOMED TO FAILURE, STILL FROM INCIPIENT PHASE.
IN ORDER TO COMBAT EFFECTIVELY THE PHENOMENON OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION, WE MUST IDENTIFY THE AREAS IN WHICH IS NEEDED THE CHANGE OR THE ADAPTATION OF THE WORKING METHODS, OR THE VERY AREAS NEEDED TO BE ADDRESSED, IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECTS / INITIATIVES IN AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR GREATER EFFICIENCY.

KEY WORDS: SOCIAL EXCLUSION, LABOR MARKET, NATIONAL STRATEGIES, NATIONAL PLANS

INTRODUCTION

Why social exclusion and why not housing discrimination, educational discrimination, discrimination in health care? The phenomenon of social exclusion can be quantified, we consider, in the cumulative effects that these situations of discrimination have. Educational discrimination, is not just about the lack of access to education, its effects are going up to the absence of adequate housing. We consider that the process of social exclusion represents a vicious circle of processes discriminatory, which can be represented as follows: the lack of identity documents - impossibility to access to education / qualification - lack of a

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job - lack of access to medical services - lack of access to housing - lack of proper diet - decrease of the socialization - the emergence of the phenomenon of social uselessness. We do not consider this representation a complete one, which could cover all affected areas, but were represented some of the most significant.

We could look at these shortcomings as the consequences of the lack of a job, and so we could understand why the emphasis in the programs, projects falls on training / retraining / employment section. But not all projects have as objective employment, which leads to the inefficiency of the programs and projects. Qualification / requalification does not guarantee employment, what we can conclude that such programs are not effective, even if we refer to the implementation of social inclusion measures or at the programs to reduce poverty. Illiteracy, school non-participation and non-completion of compulsory education, represents phenomenons that the Roma population face. Being confronted with this phenomenon, the subsequent difficulties encountered in accessing a job have a justifying base of the problems faced, namely lack of qualifications or insufficient qualifications. And from here, we raise the question on insufficient emphasizing of solving the problems as the lack of a job and the effectiveness of this method, in the reduction or eradication of social exclusion.

1. **SOCIAL EXCLUSION, FROM ECONOMIC EXCLUSION TO EDUCATIONAL EXCLUSION**

When we talk about social exclusion, adjacent to the concept of income, we also refer to networks and prospects and opportunities in life. Is considered to be a very modern problem, and which, compared to material poverty is more harmful to the individual, more damaging to self-esteem more corrosive to society as a whole, and more likely to be passed on from generation to generation. Social exclusion, by incorporating of a broader understanding of social processes and their consequences, it expands beyond the concepts of poverty and deprivation. Deprivation can exist separately from the concept of poverty by restricting the access to certain goods or services, while poverty can be both a cause and a consequence[2]. The concept of social exclusion incorporates more than strictly financial side of the concept of poverty, "social" means more than the economic side, although the financial shortages is causing limited access to other areas. Here we can add the social relationships that can occur at school, at work, in the social relations / leisure.

Social exclusion is a concept partly derived from, and overlaps with several other constructs, particularly from poverty and deprivation. Poverty was considered to be the lack of a minimum income required to meet basic human needs. The World Bank has established poverty rates at a "dollar a day" and "two dollars a day" as a measurement standardized system of poverty, in its calculation being used the consumption of a basic package of goods and services, tailored to purchasing power parity of various countries[3]. Poverty rate per capita for Romania, currently set by the World Bank, is $ 1.90 per day[4]. The consumption of "one dollar a day" of subsistence sustains life at a minimal level, but is not considered a viable long-term solution; the consumption of "two dollars a day" can support life by adapting other essential basic needs, such as land, farm tools, and part of access to education and health; although it remains at a level associated with relatively low life expectancy and high infant mortality and maternal[5]. The guaranteed minimum income in Romania, for a single person is

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[2]Ronald Labonté et al., *Indicators of Social Exclusion and Inclusion: A Critical and Comparative Analysis of the Literature* (Ottawa, Él Exchange Working Paper Series, 2011), 19.
[3] Ronald Labonté et all., *Indicators of Social Exclusion and Inclusion*, 14.
[4] The World Bank, Country Dashboard, available at: http://povertydata.worldbank.org/poverty/country/ROM, accessed on 22.06.2016.
[5]Ronald Labonté et all., *Indicators of Social Exclusion and Inclusion*, 14.

142 lei / month[6], equivalent to $ 35.37 / month or $ 1.60 / day[7], this income is located somewhere in the middle of the thresholds "a dollar a day "and" two dollars a day " does not represent a viable solution in the long term, however, many persons, and it is believed that most of the beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum income are Roma population, become dependent as source of income for long periods of time. Another negative point is the lack of opportunities for training / retraining, their exclusion from the labor market is maintained, in the absence of abilities and knowledge required in accessing jobs. The lack of an income to ensure a decent living, the lack of opportunity for socializing, represents contributory elements to the installation of social exclusion phenomenon among the beneficiaries of guaranteed minimum income.

Ever since the emergence of the concept of relative poverty was highlighted the idea of fully participate in the society in which individuals live, in social, economic, political, cultural, recreational plan, but the indicators of income are those upon whom it is directed attention regarding the study of poverty. A deeper analysis of the effects of poverty, the lack of freedoms and violation of some rights, due to belonging to a particular group, to whom the rights and freedoms are violated, led, we consider, at the emergence of the concept of social exclusion.

In 1989, the negative effects, affecting the lives of a growing number of people, the phenomenon of social exclusion drew the attention of the European Commission, which adopted a resolution to fight "social exclusion" and the adoption of "integration". Within a short time this term of social exclusion has replaced, or at least threatened to replace as the dominant concept, the concept of poverty in the development and social policy speech in Europe. The spread on a large scale of the phenomenon of social exclusion, the analyzes of its effects, prompted the European Commission to "define social exclusion primarily in relation to the social rights of citizens", underlining the idea that every citizen has the right to a certain standard basic life and the right to participate in major professional and social institutions of society - employment, housing, healthcare, education etc. Social exclusion occurs when the citizens suffer from disadvantages and are unable to provide these social rights[8]. For a society to function, it is necessary that the components sectors, the economic one, the educational, the medical, the occupational, to provide equal opportunities for all citizens to participate in the society's life. Obstruction of access to one of the components sectors of society, has as well repercussions in the rest of the sectors, from financial repercussions, to the ones of psychological nature, affecting both the person and his family.

High prevalence of lack of employment and professional inactivity is the most important contributor to the persistence of widespread social exclusion. The effects caused by the lack of a job, beyond the financial and the actual loss of employment can be useful analyzed using idea of social exclusion.

The lack of professional activity contributes to the deterioration of professional abilities, loss of cognitive abilities due to lack of confidence and lack of control, determining the installation of a sub-qualification phenomenon, the risk of an exclusion from the labor market beeing higher because of these valoric de-appreciations. The exclusion from social relationships, from the community life, is another effect of the lack of a job, at the

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[6]Law no. 416 din 18 iulie 2001 (updated) on guaranteed minimum income, published in Official Gazette no. 401 of 20 July 2001.

[7] Romanian National Bank dollar exchange rate, available at http://www.cursvalutarbnr.org/curs-dolar.html, accessed on 22.06.2016.

[8]Rajendra Pradhan, *Understanding Social Exclusion and Social Inclusion in the Nepalese Context: Some Preliminary Remarks,* (Paper presented at the workshop "Understanding Social Inclusion and Exclusion: Theories, Methodologies and Data", Kathmandu, June 3, 2006, organized by Social Science Baha and the Social Inclusion Research Fund Secretariat/SNV), 3-6.

psychological level are installed feelings of insecurity, lack of self confidence, in their own abilities, in the system that does not offer opportunities to lead a decent life, imbalance in family life and in social relationships, by setting up a sense of dependency continues from others, from the insured income, where there is unemployment benefits, feelings that are sometimes taken to extremes, up to suicide, these relational failures lead to the installation the phenomenon of social exclusion, exclusion which can lead to privations in daily life[9].

Educational exclusion can be both a cause and an effect of exclusion from the labor market. As a cause of the exclusion from the labor market, educational exclusion causes lack of qualifications, hindering the process of qualification / retraining, and subsequent hindering of obtaining a job, and here we refer to a stable job, with a contract work, and we do not mean at the day laborers works, where qualification is not required. As an effect of exclusion from the labor market, social exclusion is due to lack of financial support to support access to education. Practically it becomes a vicious circle, of cause and effect, but not being single causes for social exclusion. Since 1992 the field of education represented a stringency problem, the study carried out in that period showed a weak participation of Roma children at the educational process[10]. We can deduce that those children participating in the study, now adults are most likely socially excluded with little or no chance of integrating in the labor market. Educational exclusion brings the exclusion from social relations and then the exclusion from community life and by the lack of a circle of knowledge to socialization, exclusion also applies to labor market exclusion.

The two types of exclusion, the educational exclusion and exclusion from the labor market are not the only determinants of social exclusion, our goal is to emphasize the idea that, solving or trying to solve the lack of a job, without being solved one of the most important causes, such as lack of education, the efforts are doomed to failure.

2. WHAT DO WE CHOOSE FIRST, QUALIFICATION PROGRAMS OR EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS?

The measures adopted at EU level have been transposed into normative acts at national level. Poverty, social inclusion, the socio - economics gaps between the Roma population and the rest of the citizens, labor market inclusion of the Roma minority, improving access to all levels of education, supporting farmers specific activities, the economic and social cohesion in order to promote social inclusion, represents some of the areas for which measures have been adopted by national legislation in the process of social inclusion and combating social exclusion.

At the national level the Romanian Government took a number of legislative initiatives aimed at reducing poverty, promoting social inclusion, in short, the fight against social exclusion. We are not going to detail these laws exhaustively, being available to the general public, but we will pursue which were their objectives and the current situation of the Roma population.

To achieve the purpose of the 2001-2010 period Strategy for improving the situation of Roma, inclusion measures have been established in ten sectorial areas: Administration and Community Development; Housing; Social security; Health; Economic; Justice and public order; Child protection; Education; Culture and Cults; Communication and civic participation[11]. Lack of an budget allocations have hampered the implementation of the

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[9]Amartya Sen, *Social Exclusion: Concept, Application, and Scrutiny*, (Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2000) 18 – 22.
[10]Cătălin Zamfir, Marin Preda coordinators: *Romii în România* (Bucureşti: Expert, 2002), 291-292.
[11] *Decision no. 430 of 25 April 2001 on the approval of Romania's Government Strategy for improving the Roma situation*, published in the Official Gazette no. 252 of May 16, 2001.

measures provided in these areas. As a positive result of the implementation of Strategy measures, was the creation of posts at central, county and local level, where they were employed Roma persons [12], where salary funds were allocated. In 2006, the Strategy has undergone a change by reducing to six of the structural areas, being maintained their content, being specified the establishment of budgetary resources from the budget of responsible institutions for implementation and realization of the measures of the Strategy[13].

In 2002, the Romanian Government approves by Decision no. 829 the National Plan against poverty and promoting social inclusion, having a distinct chapter intended for the Roma (Chapter 14). The strategic objectives were aimed at solving the problems faced by the Roma communities regarding: solving the lack of legal identity, access to reproductive health services, insuring the access to a minimal package of health care services, increasing school attendance of children from Roma population, stimulating employment of the Roma population into the formal economy, juridical regulation of housing / land situations without title deeds, fighting resolutely all forms of discrimination against Roma and promotion of a collective supportive attitude, rehabilitating the collective self and public image of population Roma[14].

In 2003, Romania joined together with 8 other states from Central and Eastern Europe, the international initiative Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015 (the Decade). The Decade is designed as an political commitment assumed at international level by governments of nine countries in the region (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Hungary). Their common goal is to reduce significantly, during ten years, social and economic gaps which separate the Roma population from the rest of the citizens, by promoting active policies for social inclusion of Roma, oriented towards four priority areas - education, health, jobs and housing in parallel with the transverse domains - the fight against poverty, discrimination and gender inequality, included in an action plan of each country. In terms of employment, the central goal proposed by the Romanian Government is to increase the number of Roma persons (becoming economically active) to be officially employed or run their own businesses[15].

In 2005, the Romanian Government and the European Commission signed the cooperation agreement on the Joint Social Inclusion Memorandum (JIM), elaborated in accordance with the Accession Partnership, for the period 2005-2010. As regards of the Roma, the main challenges of JIM make reference to poverty and social exclusion approach, by completing the implementation of Government Strategy and in particular to the elimination of cases of people without identity papers, supporting training and employment, education, healthcare, infrastructure development programs and housing, and continuing the fight against discrimination. Joint Social Inclusion Memorandum (2005) provides measures to support for the development and the labor market inclusion of the Roma minority: the development of economic opportunities and create jobs salary; improving access to all levels of education, supplemented by the access to minimum educational level for younger generations; identification and allocation of agricultural land in rural areas and land for

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[12] *2003 Regular Report on progress achieved by Romania towards accession Available at* www.anr.gov.ro/docs/rapoarte/Raport_periodic_privind_progresele_Romaniei_pe_calea_aderarii_183.pdf, accessed on 21.05.2016.

[13] *Decision no. 522 of 19 April 2006 amending and supplementing Government Decision no. 430/2001 on the approval of Romania's Government Strategy for improving the Roma situation*, published in the Official Gazette no. 371 28 April 2006.

[14] *Decision no. 829 of 31 July 2002 on approval of the National Anti-Poverty Plan and Social Inclusion*, published in Official Gazette no. 662 of 6 September 2002 Cap. 14.

[15] Roma Inclusion Barometer, Open Society Foundation, (Bucharest, 2007).

housing construction in traditional or modern system; supporting the activities with farmer specific by providing low-interest loans and other forms of support[16].

In 2005 have began the preparations for drafting of the National Development Plan, for the period 2007-2013 (NDP). NDP is the strategic planning document and multiannual financial programming, which aims to guide and stimulate by 2013, economic and social development of Romania, towards the goal of achieving economic and social cohesion. NDP provides the responsible structures at national, regional and sectoral level, and a national mechanism to promote social inclusion in Romania, formed by Government Decision no. 1217/2006. The Roma community represents one of the vulnerable groups to whom they are addressed explicit (Axis 6) and implicit measures[17].

Romania's Government Strategy for the inclusion of Romanian citizens belonging to Roma minority for the period 2012 - 2020, is experiencing financial difficulties in terms of implementation of the measures, as well as in case of the Strategy for the period 2001-2010[18].

We can observe how, in all documents adopted by Government of Romania, the focus is on the economic side, on the development of this sector, stimulating and increasing employment in the formal economy, support for the development and labor market inclusion of the Roma minority. We do not wish to contest the fact that this would not be a viable solution in the "struggle against" social exclusion. We would like, however, to emphasize the need for an educational training first, before the forming professional direct. Also in this case, the access to profesional trainings is conditioned by the access to educational training, as access to type of training.

Currently we can find people without identification documents, without access to minimum income guarantee system due to the lack of such acts, illiteracy among children and adults, which prevents access to a professional qualification to a stable job. Following the adoption of these measures of the Romania's Government, we could discuss in terms of the number of people affected, not of the disappearance of the difficulties faced by the Roma population. Lack of income in the family, a large number of members, leads the family in a state of severe poverty, in support of which the local authority may come more often by granting social benefits consisting of guaranteed minimum income and family support allowance, for the latter, with the condition that none of the children must not have repeated the school year or has dropped out of a form of compulsory education. We can see how the "school is conditioning' the successes or the alternative to a life without severe shortages.

CONCLUSION

The measures adopted so far have mainly been directed towards the employment segment, but without the expected results, taking into account the large number of people which still faced with the phenomenon of social exclusion and severe poverty. The years of practice in implementing the measures of reducing poverty, social inclusion and fight against social exclusion, it should serve us as a model of good practice or failure. We consider to be necessary the implementation of some projects and integrated measures encompassing both educational field as well as that of the labor market, also the adaptation to the labor market requirements which is in a continuos change, changing the educational offer, and new ways of attracting towards the educational system.

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[16] Joint Social Inclusion Memorandum, available at:
http://www.mmuncii.ro/pub/imagemanager/images/file/Domenii/Incluziune%20si%20asistenta%20sociala/Proi ecte_cu_finatare_externa/2%20-%20JIM_Romania.pdf, accessed on 27.05.2016
[17] *National Development Plan for the period 2007-2013*, the Government of Romania, (Bucharest, 2005).
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THE ROOTS OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION OF YOUNG MUSLIMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM. IMPLICATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM

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ABSTRACT:
IN THIS PAPER I WILL TRY TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ALTHOUGH SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS MATTER TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN THE PROCESS OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION OF SOME YOUNG BRITISH MUSLIMS, VIOLENT RADICALISATION IS A MUCH MORE COMPLEX PROCESS IN WHICH ALIENATION TOWARDS BRITISH SOCIETY AND ITS VALUES AND PRINCIPLES, ALONG WITH ANGER TOWARDS BRITISH POLICIES TO COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMISM, THE OPPOSITION IN THE FACE OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY STEMMING FROM PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION, MARGINALISATION CAUSES A STRONG IDENTITY CRISIS THAT FOR SOME YOUNG BRITISH MUSLIMS FINDS IT SOLUTION IN THE ADOPTION OF VIOLENT ISLAMIST FUNDAMENTALIST VIEWS.
I WILL TRY TO ILLUSTRATE THAT THE FEW YOUNG BRITISH MUSLIMS WHO DECIDE TO ENGAGE IN RADICAL VIOLENT ACTIONS AGAINST THE BRITISH STATE, OR DECIDE TO BECOME FOREIGN FIGHTERS AND GO TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE JIHADI GROUPS LIKE DAESH, ARE OFTEN WELL EDUCATED, BUT BECAUSE OF A FEELING OF NOT BELONGING TO THE BRITISH SOCIETY, BECAUSE OF THE CONSTANT PERCEIVED MARGINALISATION, THE LACK OF A PROEMINENT VOICE IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS THEY CAN BECOME VULNERABLE IN THE FACE OF FUNDAMENTALIST IDEOLOGIES THAT MANIPULATE THE IDEA OF THE ALTERNATIVE- THE GLOBAL ISLAMIC COMMUNITY, THE UMMAH- IN WHICH ALL THESE QUESTIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES SEEM TO FIND THEIR ANSWER.

KEY WORDS: BRITISH MULTICULTURALISM, ALIENATION, SEGREGATED COMMUNITIES, IDENTITY CRISIS, VIOLENT RADICALISATION

INTRODUCTION

In 2001, in the towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in the United Kingdom extremely violent race riots happened, triggered mainly by young British Muslims of South-Asian lineage, that moment representing the essential point that sparked the strong debate within the British State concerning the successful application of multicultural principles. It was considered that although British multiculturalism has tried to promote tolerance and integration of immigrant communities, while allowing them to retain their cultural identities and specific practices, this has happened at the expense of creating a common national identity, thus introducing the *parallel societies thesis*[2]-according to whom Muslim minorities

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have become isolated from the rest of society, self-segregating and adopting isolationist practices.[3] Trevor Phillips, once head of the Commission for Racial Equality warned that UK "*is sleepwalking into segregation*", that multiculturalism creates communities "*outside mainstream society*" that "*will grow quickly apart from the rest of us, developing their own lifestyles, playing after their own rules*"[4], these statements highlighting the possibility of a chronic cultural conflict and fueling the process of portraying the Muslim community as a threat to British society and values. Also, Ted Cantle stated in his famous report, Community Cohesion, that "*many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives; these lives don`t seem to meet in any moment, much less overlap and promote significant interchange".*[5] David Cameron has characterized British multiculturalism as a "*barrier that divides British society*"[6] and after becoming prime-minister he argued that the doctrine of multiculturalism "*encouraged culturally different people to live separately from each other and away from the British society*"[7], allowing segregated communities behave in manners that go totally against British values.

Then followed the 7 July 2005 London terrorist attacks, in which four young British Muslims became the first indigenous UK domestic suicide bombers, this being the first time that British Muslim citizens, born and raised in the UK have decided to undertake acts of terrorism of this magnitude on home soil. With the amplification of the Syrian civil war and the amazing advance of the jihadi group Daesh, self-proclaimed the Islamic State, many Western European citizens violently radicalized, attracted by the jihadi fundamentalist ideology of the group and decided to leave their families to become foreign fighters in the Middle East along with these terrorist group. Immediately after 7/7 bombings, Tony Blair said that "*being in a multicultural society was always implicitly balanced by a duty to integrate, to be part of the UK*"[8], and six years later, David Cameron reinforced this vision and promoted muscular liberalism doctrine in Great Britain considering that a forced commitment toward democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities is not an option but a way of life.

In addition to these developments, it is important to point out that a notable part of British and European literature has shaped a negative image of the various expressions of Muslim religious identity (the niqab, hijab) as signs of society's islamization that pose a threat to its fundamental values by being direct and irrefutable elements related to jihadist violence. In the British media there were important instances in which Islam was immediately connected with terrorism thus again fueling the image of Muslim communities as a cultural threat to UK. Also, at the level of political discourse after the Woolwich attack, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said there is a problem "*inside Islam*"[9] and former leader of the far-right nationalist party, UKIP, Lord Pearson warned that there is a "*growing dark side*" in

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[3] Alejandro J. Beutel, "Radicalisation and Homegrown Terrorism in the Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned for America" *Minaret of Freedom Institute*, August, 2007, 2.

[4] "Britain "sleepwalking to segregation", *The Guardian*, September 19, 2005, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/sep/19/race.socialexclusion.

[5] Ted Cantle, "Community Cohesion", 9.

[6] Matthew Tempest, "Cameron returns to Birmingham to adress Muslims", *The Guardian*, February 5, 2007, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2007/feb/05/conservatives.religion.

[7] David Cameron, "PM`s speech at Munich Security Conference", Cabinet Office, Prime Minister`s Office, 10 Downing Street, February 5, 2011, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference.

[8] Philip Johnston, "Adopt our values of stay away, says Blair", *The Telegraph*, December 9, 2006, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1536408/Adopt-our-values-or-stay-away-says-Blair.html.

[9] Cavan Sieczkowski, "Tony Blair says "There is a problem within Islam" after Woolwich attack", *The Huffington Post*, March 6, 2013, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/03/tony-blair-islam-woolwich-attack_n_3379251.html .

British Muslims[10]– all of these elements, strongly fueling islamophobe sentiments and anti-Muslim hate in times in which the various British Muslim communities needed to be reassured and there was a need to build society-wide confidence.

The internal view in the British state seemed to be that immigrants and ethnic minority communities are those that have the responsibility to integrate into mainstream British society, but not so clear was enunciated the responsibility of the state, of other British citizens to help in this process. Such a vision has determined that the structure of British policies to combat violent radicalisation relied on simple actions of issue securitization, of enhancing supervision over Muslim communities.

I believe that a truly comprehensive analysis of the phenomenon of violent radicalisation of young British Muslims that can provide more effective preventive measures must be based on a holistic approach, however, carefully nuanced of the process that takes into account the importance of socio-political-cultural-economic factors, society's atomization, disillusionment, the discrimination and marginalization felt, thus the individual psychology and subjective negative experiences[11] often fueled by mass media, elements that then open the path to an identity crisis, a search for understanding and purpose that sometimes finds its solution in adopting fundamentalist Islamist violent views, which provide the alternative of a close community, a clear identity which resonates with the existential needs of many young Western Muslims.

THE CONCEPT OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION

The working definition of violent radicalisation for this paper is "*socialization in extremist and terrorist acts*".[12] Radicalisation is defined in Britain's Strategy Prevent as the "*the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and extremism that lead to terrorism*", while extremism is "*vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs; also calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas*". [13]

There is a clear awareness that violent radicalism is a phenomenon related to context par excellence, that "*these developments and experiences are deeply rooted in a historical context.*"[14] A solid analysis of the phenomenon of violent radicalisation of young British Muslims citizens must take into account also the state's actions not only those of ethnic minority communities*, "radicalisation taking place in a course of action and reaction in which the action of the State often plays an important role".*[15]

It should be noted extremely clear from the outset that attempting to identify and predict a person's potential involvement in violent radical/terrorism activities based on

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[10] Ned Simons, "UKIP peer warns of Muslim "Dark Side", gets hit with rebuttal from "The West Wing", *The Huffington Post*, November 20, 2013, accessed June 20, 2016,
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2013/11/19/islam-ukip-warsi-west-wing_n_4305623.html.

[11] Sadeq Rahimi, "Power, self and psychosis: Examining Political Subjectivity Through Schizophrenia", *Psychotherapy and Politics International*, 2015.

[12] Fernando Reinares (coord.),"Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of Terrorism. A Concise Report prepared by the European Comission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation", *Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation*, May 15, 2008, 7.

[13] *Prevent Strategy,* Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her Majesty, Crown Copyright, June, 2011, 107-108.

[14] Jonathan Githens-Mazer, "Causes of jihadi terrorism: beyond paintballing and social exclusion", *Criminal Justice Matters, 2008, 73* (1), 26.

[15] Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalisation: Pathways Toward Terrorism", *Terrorism and Political Violence, 20* (3), 2008, 430.

ethnicity, religion, difficult economic and educational backgrounds has strongly failed[16], radicalized individuals often being *"unremarkable in demographic, economic and psychological terms"*.[17] There is no single cause or catalyst for violent radicalisation, this being a multi-dimensional process influenced by a complex array of internal and external factors, triggers and forces[18], thus contradicting the conventional wisdom that claims explaining the process of violent radicalisation in terms of mental or social fragility, abnormality or irrationality. What must be thus understood is that for an individual to violently radicalise there is a combination of various unique factors for that person, and we are not able to clearly state which factor prevails in front of others.[19]

It must be from the beginning mentioned that not every person with radical views becomes a terrorist and "*not all those who engage in acts of terrorism necessarily hold radical beliefs.*"[20] This clarification is extremely important for my paper because although many young Muslims face the same difficult socio-economic conditions, discrimination and marginalization, they don`t decide as the few members of their community to embrace Islamist fundamentalist visions but on the contrary, they are fighting against extremist and radical tendencies to demonstrate that Islam is a religion of peace, respect and tolerance, constantly demonstrating that they are citizens that comply with the basic principles on which the United Kingdom is built.

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS

Economic and social deprivation was considered a vital factor for the violent radicalisation of young Muslims in Western societies. With regard to the situation in Great Britain it should be noted that many young Muslims from various Muslim communities are living in segregated areas defined by poverty, strong spatial concentration[21], living in so-called ethno-religious universes, ghettos defined not only by physical segregation, but by economic, social, cultural, intellectual and polical segregation[22]-closed societies, where people are still anchored in the culture and traditions of the country of origin. Also in the process of analysing the social networks inside of these segregated communities we may identify their insularity that can contribute to a state of "*identity readiness*"[23]condusive to radicalisation processes, due mainly to the lack of solid interaction with other members of the wider British society, those outside one's own ethno-religious group.

On the other hand, many young British Muslims face difficulties of educational achievements, while others although have important educational achievements fail to convert them into social class mobility relative to other groups with similar levels of education, so

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[16] John Horgan, "From profiles to pathways and roots to routes: Perspectives from psychology on radicalisation into terrorism", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *618*(1), 2008, 80.

[17] *"Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism. A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence",* Youth Justice Board of England and Wales, 2012, 31.

[18] Thomas Precht, *"Homegrown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe. From Conversion to terrorism"*, Research Report funded by the Danish Ministry of Justice, December, 2007, 11.

[19] HM Government,"*Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom's Strategy"*, Crown Copyright, July, 2006, 10.

[20] John Knefel, "Everything You've Been Told About Radicalisation is Wrong", *Rolling Stone*, May 6, 2013, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalisation-is-wrong-20130506.

[21] Tufyal Choudhury, "Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report", *Open Society Foundations,* Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012, 5.

[22] Muqtedar Khan, "*Understanding Muslim Radicalism in Britain***"**, accessed June 20, 2016, http://islamicamagazine.com/?p=822.

[23] Dina Al Raffie, "Social identity theory for investigating Islamic extremism in the diaspora", *Journal of Strategic Security* 6, no.4, 2013, 66.

they are engaged in low graduate employment; there are also unemployment rates exceeding the national percentage general correspondent[24], with households where there is no adult in employment.[25] Some young British nationals, Muslim immigrants of second or third generation, born in the British society and socialised in British schools, or naturalised after years of residency and integration, endure frustrating barriers regarding their socio-economic mobility, sometimes face discrimination as members of an ethnic minority, and all these elements lead gradually to their alienation[26], to perceptions of being unfairly treated or discriminated against by state institutions, thus making them vulnerable in the face of the alternatives embodied by violent Islamist fundamentalist ideologies, radical extremists exploiting this victimization psychology. However, it needs to be extremely clearly understood that while in a few situations, economic deprivation can provide the emotional impulse and the basis for moral justifications of political violence, the overwhelming majority of young British Muslims who suffer from significant deprivations do not embrace at all such extremist attitudes even more, they strongly oppose extremist, radical Islamist ideologies.

II. DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN BRITISH POLICY

The fact that some terrorist attacks on European territory were made by doctors, engineers, highlights an extremely important aspect, namely that individuals with successful professional lives, well educated, with jobs and families and who appear to be active in their local communities may also be radicalised.[27] Thus it must be outlined that young Muslims, well educated, living in democratic Western Nations, are not necessarily struggling with the issue of poverty but with issues of identity, belonging and radical groups messages sometimes alleviate their meaningful frustrations.[28] The best known example is that of Mohammed Sidique Khan, one of 7/7 London suicide bombers, a university graduate that has constantly tried to disguise his Pakistani-Muslim identity by adopting the Western name of Sid, who was fascinated by Western civilization, at one point even fell in love with the USA, who had a general indifference towards religion and culture, his friends even describing him as "*very english*"[29], a totally different picture from the one in which he had strongly criticized Western foreign policy.[30]

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[24] Labour market status by ethnic group: annual data, *Department for Work and Pensions*, April 17, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/labour-market-status-by-ethnic-group-annual-data-to-2014.

[25] Office for National Statistics, Ethnicity and the Labour Market, 2011 Census, England and Wales, November 13, 2014, accessed June 20, 2016,
https://www.google.ro/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjPraq3iLzNAhXD6xQKHRGlBygQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ons.gov.uk%2Fons%2Fdcp171776_384463.pdf&usg=AFQjCNHSgwS865wWgV8RdnVRYknmGVqukg&sig2=prkZ9fnmduP1rMke6XREcA.

[26] Sara Wallace Goodman, "The Root problem of Muslim integration in Britain is alienation", *The Washington Post*, October 6, 2014, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/06/the-root-problem-of-muslim-integration-in-britain-is-alienation/.

[27] Marc Sageman, "*Understanding Terror Networks*", January, 2008, 15, accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.dialup4less.com/~gerald.atkinson/Terrorist%20Networks.pdf .

[28] "United States Presidential Task Force on Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism, Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counter Radicalisation", *Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, March, 2009, 4.

[29] Akil N. Awan, "Transitional Religiosity Experiences: Contextual Disjuncture and Islamic Political Radicalism", in *Islamic Political Radicalism. A European Perspective*, ed. Tahir Abbas (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 217.

[30] Mohammed Sidique Khan, Statement ('Martyrdom testament'), *Al-Jazeera*, 2005, accessed June 20, 2016, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/4206800.stm.

In a Report of the Home Office it was emphasized extremely clear that one of the main drivers of violent radicalisation phenomenon among young Muslims is that they *"feel they have no voice or a legitimate outlet for political expression, protest or dissent; leadership roles are traditionally held by elders, and youth may feel frustrated by their inability to get involved actively in decision-making structures"*.[31] Also, many young people consider that politicians talk about Islam as a problematic religion, political discourse is sometimes blamed for attacking the Islamic faith and otherising its underlying concepts[32], and they feel they can not express their political views, that their voices are disregarded by mainstream media, politicians, and the common element in all these cases is not poverty but the gap between these young people and conventional political processes.

Thus the perceived sense of exclusion from mainstream society and politics, that political impotence as the one illustrated in the attempt to alter the course of the Iraq war alongside the political legitimacy crisis of state institutions may lead to disillusionment with the political principles and processes, these structural elements being endemic and aggravating the distrust and isolation of young people with limited horizons, fueling antagonism and anger toward the state.[33]

It has been proven that grievances relating to the situation of the global Muslim community and the rage for "*perceived Western hegemony"[34]* are vital considerations in analysing the causes of violent radicalisation of young Europeans/Britons and here it is important to note that the common point is in fact the perception that there is an attack/strong discrimination against Muslims and Islam. Here there are examples like that of Mohammed Sidique Khan who stated that "*your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world; your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters; until we feel security, you will be our targets*".[35] For all of these individuals, images such as those at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, or the occupation of Iraq can serve as justification for their recourse to violence against the British State, underlining the role of political events in incubating and catalyzing violent radicalisation.

In this context of discontent against the manner in which the British State's foreign policy is designed and applied, extremist religious movements, such as Hizb-Ut-Tahrir who strongly criticized Western democracy and underlined the failure of preventing the Iraq war, have managed to increase their ability to alleviate the feelings of disempowerment of some young British Muslims.

III. DISCRIMINATION, ALIENATION, MARGINALISATION

In general, after every terrorist attack there has been a rise in anti-Muslim hatred. These incidents occurred in daily life where mosques were attacked, Muslim women who

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[31] "Preventing Extremism Together' Working Groups", *Home Office Report*, 2005, 15, accessed June 20, 2016, www.communities.homeoffice.gov.uk/raceandfaith/reports_pubs/publications/race_faith/PET-working-groups-aug-0ct05.

[32] "Environment of Hate: The New Normal for Muslims in the UK", *Islamic Human Rights Comission*, November 11, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.ihrc.org.uk/publications/reports/11559-environment-of-hate-the-new-normal-for-muslims-in-the-uk .

[33] Tahir Abbas, "Introduction: Islamic Political Radicalism in Western Europe", in *Islamic Political Radicalism. A European Perspective*, ed. Tahir Abbas (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 10.

[34] Youth Justice Board, 42.

[35] Report into the London terrorist attacks on 7 July 2005, *Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC),* May, 2006, 12, accessed June 20, 2016,
 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/corp/assets/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf.

wore a scarf or hijab, niqab had the veil pulled off their face, Muslim men were attacked and racist graffiti was written on Muslim graves and properties. There has also been an increase in attacks against Muslims in the online environment where they were the target of cyberbullying, cyber harassment, cyber incitement and violence threats.[36] All abuses suffered had a great impact on their self-esteem and confidence, leading to depression, isolation, anxiety, insecurity, fear, vulnerability, the attacks being regarded as attacks against their Muslim identity. These elements can lead to perceptions of being the "*other*" and might adversely affect the cohesion of the community because the victims feel alienated, isolated and that they *"do not belong to the British society".[37]*

Also, many young Muslims have pointed out the problematic way in which the media presents various events related to the Muslim community with an emphasis on highlighting the links between Islam and terrorism without providing the opportunity for moderate voices to show the true image of Islam. Thus they blame the willful ignorance towards the Muslim religion, dynamics that do nothing more than feed the us versus them rhetoric and continue portraying all Muslims as threats to British national values. The idea of a hidden enemy within Muslim communities and in British society is a recurring speech in the media.[38] Recent studies underlined that some young British Muslims feel a deep sense of inequality at the same time when they feel that they are unable to express their concerns, or to express dissidence, out of the fear of being categorised as "*unbritish*".[39]

IV. THE IMPACT OF BRITISH STRATEGY TO COMBAT VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES

An esential dimension of the British strategy of combating extremism and violent radicalisation was called Prevent and it was adopted in July 2006, putting an emphasis on addressing inequalities and improving educational performance, employment opportunities and living conditions for Muslims. It also stressed the need to increase community cohesion and strengthen community integration through, for example, the creation in June 2006 of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which was meant to address the segregation and barriers in front of cohesion and integration and to identify how local communities can be empowered to tackle extremist ideologies. It must be admitted that Prevent and the larger British government strategy meant to discourage young British Muslims from embracing radical fundamentalist views has had important results, numerous young people being directed away from the path of violent radicalisation.

However, Theresa May MP stated in 2010 that *"Prevent, the programme which we inherited from the last Government was flawed; it confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism; it failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at risk of radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist organization that Prevent should have been confronting".[40]*

The main problem with the manner of conceptualizing the Prevent strategy is that it has focused from the outset on the Muslim community as being collectively the only community under the threat of violent radicalisation, stressing that terrorism is a specific

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[36] Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, "We Fear for our Lives:Offline and Online Experiences of Anti-Muslim Hostility" , October, 2015, 6.

[37] *Ibidem.*, 7.

[38] "*Suspect Communities? Counter-Terrorism Policy, the press and the impact on Irish and Muslim communities in Britain*", London Metropolitan University, July, 2011, 17.

[39] Sughra Ahmed and Naved Siddiqi, *"British by Dissent", The Muslim Youth Helpline (*MYH), February 6, 2014, 31, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.myh.org.uk/sites/default/files/Research%20Report%20BBD.pdf.

[40] *Prevent Strategy,* Foreword, HM Government, June, 2011, 1.

problem of the Muslim communities, turning them into suspect communities. There have been warnings that allegations of espionage, intelligence gathering and surveillance under Prevent are spread and that "*Muslim communities have felt unjustly targeted and named as potential terrorists, the strategy has contributed to a sense of frustration and alienation among Muslims which can increase the risk of making some individuals more vulnerable to radicalisation*".[41]

In what regards British counter-terrorist legislation, the surveillance practices, along with British police increased powers of stop and search, increased controls at borders, these were considered excessive and disproportionate fueling among some members of the British Muslim communities a strong perception of discrimination on the part of British authorities which has affected their confidence in state authorities, strongly diminished their cooperation with the police. The narrow focus on Muslim communities may have fueled social divisions within the Muslim communities and between Muslims and the rest of British citizens, and the actions perceived to have violated the privacy of some British Muslims is considered to have contributed to deterring them from taking part in political dynamics, making them more vulnerable in the face of violent islamist ideology.

V. IDENTITY CRISIS THE ALTERNATIVE- ISLAMIST FUNDAMENTALIST IDEOLOGY

The violent radicalisation process often begins with a search for identity in a time of crisis when the individual feels that he does not belong to society, that he is marginalized, discriminated against by the socio-political system that should have protected him and in which he has put his entire confidence, and this "*shakes potential radical`s psychological frames of reference and lead them question what it means to be a Muslim*". [42] There is a strong tension and competition between the values of secular Western states and the traditional religious values of ethnic communities, and young British are often trapped between the contradictions between the values of the society in which they were born and those of their parents. The identities of resistance[43] are created by disempowered youth as a solid opposition in the face of the principles that underlie the British society.

An extremely important aspect is that consistent answers to questions of identity of young Muslims in an environment defined by islamophobic behaviors in which they perceive themselves as "*ever-beleaguered by a popular culture that regards Islam and Muslims in antithetical terms; a neo-Orientalism that places Islam as the bogey of society*"[44] can no longer be given by traditional Muslim religious institutions/organizations. That's mainly because they explain traditions and customs of their culture of origin with which many Muslim young people born in the UK have no connection, often presenting them in another language and not in English. Although there are Muslim leaders who promote the values of multiculturalism and make all possible efforts to combat radicalisation, there are also traditional leaders, with strong immigrant roots, which are sometimes culturally izolationists, theological conservatives-the so-called traditional ulema. They are no longer able to connect with today`s youth and to respond to their questions of identity, they are not considered

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[41] "*Preventing Violent Extremism*", House of Commons, Communities and Local Government Committee (CLGC), March 30, 2010, 11–17.

[42] Darren Thiel, "Policing Terrorism A Review of the Evidence", *The Police Foundation*, 2009, 23.

[43] Basia Spalek, "Disconnection and Exclusion: Pathways to Radicalisation", *Islamic Political Radicalism. A European Perspective*, ed. Tahir Abbas (Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 192.

[44] Spalek, Disconnection and Exclusion: Pathways to Radicalisation, 192

representative, and there is also a strong divergence linked to "*who holds the legitimacy of religious authority, who has the moral authority to guide*".[45]

In this higly complex context, in the process of radicalisation we must pay special attention to the radical religious ideologies because in adopting radical Islamic fundamentalist views, the whole worldview of those young people changes, everything that fails to conform to this perceived moral clarity is doomed and this perspective is facilitated by a almost manichean separation of reality in good and evil, often accompanied by a worsening/breaking family relations, social contacts. The concept of ummah, the abstract, transnational *"community*" of all Muslims is largely manipulated by radical islamist organisations because the concept manages to offer the sense of membership, collective identity, purpose and meaning[46], security, self-esteem, trust for young Muslims, which were confronted with identities void of meaning, feelings of powerlessness and lack of self-determination, perceived societal disconnectedness, an absence of a cultural attachment toward the state they were born in and their parents origin country.

There are, however, some European citizens who decide to violently radicalise out of pure desire for adventure, the risk assumed in the theatres of war in the Middle East alongside the various jihadi groups being one highly intriguing on the one hand and on the other hand allowing these individuals to strengthen their status among friends, family, community, of obtaining glory and reputation in front of others.[47] Grievances are not sufficient for an individual to violently radicalise, and as Jamie Barlett and Carl Miller argued, other factors are important such as: *"an emotional desire to act in the face of injustice; enthusiasm, status and the internal code of honor, peer pressure*".[48] It should be clearly noted that although the role of extremist religious ideology is an important one in the violent radicalisation of some European citizens, providing a really important vehicle for engaging individuals in terrorist acts, articulating jihadi groups narratives and offering consistency to the group and its beliefs, this is not always the primary reason that young Europeans decide to violently radicalise. Much of Western foreign fighters entering the process of radicalisation, do not hold religious extremist ideologies, at least not initially, violence against enemies being initially legitimized "*through less reference to ideology or political strategy and more through diffuse feelings*".[49]

CONCLUSIONS

What must be understood is that although the overwhelming majority of British Muslim communities is composed of citizens that have fully internalized the rules and principles on which the British state is built, loving and cherishing Islam as a peaceful and tolerant religion, there are also some young British Muslims who feel they do not belong to

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[45] Robert W Hefner, "Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim Politics", in *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, ed. Hefner, R. W (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 6.

[46] Brendan O' Duffy, "Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK", *Political Science & Politics*, Vol. Issues 1, January, 2008, 38.

[47] Scott Attran, *"Pathways to and from violent extremism: the case for science-based field research*", Statement before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 10, 2010, accessed June 20, 2016, http://edge.org/conversation/pathways-to-and-from-violent-extremism-the-case-for-science-based-field-research.

[48] Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller, "The edge of violence: Towards telling the difference between violent and non-violent radicalisation', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol.24, No.1 (2012); Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "*Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalisation*", in *Protecting the Homeland from International and Domestic Terrorism Threats: Current Multi-Disciplinary Perspectives on Root Causes, the Role of Ideology and Programs for Counter-radicalisation and Disengagement*, ed. Sarah Canna (College Park: START, January, 2011) 89.

[49] Fernando Reinares (coord.)*,* "Radicalisation Processes", 13.

the British society, passing through significant identity crises. In this paper I have tried to show that the violent radicalisation process that is developing within the framework of Western European States and within the British State is a highly complex process that cannot be attributed exclusively to the socio-economic difficulties faced by young British Muslims because many British homegrown terrorists and radicalised British individuals were actually educated, seeming to be integrated into Western society. However, regardless of these appereances, the perceived feelings of discrimination, marginalization, lack of belonging to British society, the counter-terrorism surveillance policies considered to be excessive and disproportionate, the British foreign policy approach, determined them to adopt violent radical views, some young British Muslims choosing as justification for their political violence, the fundamentalist Islamist doctrine. The identity fluidity, the identity crises, the society`s atomization are essential elements with which some young Muslims in Western societies are confronted. They are estranged from their parent`s origin countries culture and principles, they seem to not find their place in the society in which they were born, and thus are determined to seek alternatives to resolve the need for meaning and belonging, appreciation, and in the current strongly unstable international context, fundamentalist Islamist organisations with jihadi worldview are likely to draw them on their side.

I do not believe that multiculturalism has failed as it is strongly promoted even by British leaders, but that it was thought and applied according to some incorrect assumptions, and a revival of its principles will require a radical rethink of British policies to combat extremism, policies to combat terrorism, social, economic, cultural, political policies that would take account of the views of moderate, though critical voices of young people in the different Muslim communities, an admission that there is a solid existential dimension of the violent radicalisation of young British citizens, that violent radicalisation is not a problem of Islam, or even of the poisonous ideology of Islamist fundamentalist views, but of the alienation felt by some young Muslims due to the discrimination and marginalization from their everyday lives.

What is nedeed is a political and a public media discourse to promote a solid inclusion of all British Muslim communities, to try to alleviate feelings of being perceived as the threatening other in order to rebuild trust and respect between Muslim communities and the state, to enhance cooperation and communication with young Muslim people that could then have the courage to express all anger and beliefs, to meet their need for knowledge and identity rediscovering, to demonstrate that the British State does not question their loyalty. I conclude that the United Kingdom should no longer rely so much on the rigid construction of the extremely vague concept of *"britishness "* previously considered a vital element that had to be demonstrated by the Muslim communities often at the expense of their own identity, because Muslim people in Great Britain through their constant dedication towards the basic pillers of British democracy demonstrate in the most simple and natural way what it means to be truly British. This battle for the hearts and minds of young Muslim people can truly be won!

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HAS THE EUROPEAN UNION DONE ENOUGH? MIXED REACTIONS FROM THE DYNYMICS OF THE MOST RECENT MIGRATION CRISIS

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ABSTRACT:
THIS CONTRIBUTION AIMS AT DEPICTING THE DYNAMICS OF CURRENT MIGRATION CRISIS, INSISTING ON THE EU`S RESPONSE TO AN EVER CHANGING CLIMATE OF INSTABILITY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE AEGEAN SEA. BESIDES DESCRIBING THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE EU TO CONTAIN THE MASSIVE WAVES OF REFUGEES AND ASYLUM SEEKERS, THE ARTICLE ALSO IDENTIFIES THE GAPS WITHIN THE COLLABORATION AMONG EU MEMBER STATES AND OTHER REGIONAL PARTNERS.
THE SCHENGEN AREA, AS WELL AS THE AREA FOR LIBERTY, SECURITY AND JUSTICE HAD TO FORGE SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO LIMIT THE CONSEQUENCES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION CAUSING A GREAT DEAL OF PRESSURE UPON THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE STATES DIRECTLY ON THE PATH OF THE TWO MAJOR ROUTES OF ACCESS TO EUROPE. THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS IS EXPENDING ITS AREAS OF CONTROL IN AN ATTEMPT TO BUILD A COMMON IDENTITY, THIS BEING A TEST TO THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY. IN ORDER TO HAVE A BETTER APPROACH TO BORDER CONTROL THE EU INSTITUTIONS AND MEMBER STATES MUST REACH A COMMON GROUND IN TERMS OF TACKLING THE ROOD CAUSE FOR THESE CONFLICTS, AS WELL AS GAINING A LONG TERM AUTHONOMOUS STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL IDENTITY, THAT ALLOWS THEM TO IMPOSE THE CORE VALUES ALL DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES SHARE AND PROTECT.

KEY WORDS: CSDP, MIGRATION CRISIS, SCHENGEN ACQUIS, BORDER MANAGEMENT.

INTRODUCTION:

Migration all over the globe has always been perceived as a security problem. Every major actor of the international scene has designed plans and methods to make this transition far less difficult to both the migrant, as well as for the adopting neighborhood.

Although blamed for doing too little, too late, the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union has managed to alleviate the desperate status for millions of refugees and asylum seekers. It is hard to tell if the EU serves its civilian power doctrine to its fullest potential but there are strong arguments to demonstrate such propensity. Still,

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following the trends of migration, European countries should have predicted[2] its outburst taking into consideration that the Arab Spring took place just a few years ago.

The migration crisis affected not only the perception on conflicts taking place in different geographical areas but also the core of European democratic values and their accountability within highly developed societies.

Despite an intensive border control conducted by Frontex, EU`s external border control agency, a real containment for the intensive migratory fluxes hasn`t been achieved yet. And that is a clear consequence of the fact that no international organism has been able to tackle the roots of this phenomenon, which is far from being stabilized.

EUROPE FACING THE SPILLOVER EFFECT OF A POORLY MANAGED REGIONAL CRISIS. IS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WISDOM STILL IN HIGH DEMAND?

The migration phenomenon has proved to be a difficult issue to deal with especially because we live in a highly globalized world where the spillover effect amplifies the very nature of all destabilized regional complexes.

Many international organizations like the United Nations, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union and the states themselves have increased their awareness and defined their strategies in order to cope with the demands of such vulnerable groups.

The migration crisis which unfolded between 2014-2016, being still a pressing issue on the international agenda, has shifted also the distinction between domestic policies and external ways of action.

Only in 2015, more than 1 million people arrived by sea in Europe, according to, out of with 50% were men, 19% were women and 31% were children. The larges wave came in April, and since then the numbers have increased rapidly from almost 30.000 people to 118.687 in December, the pick was registered in October when 221,374 migrated to Europe.

At the beginning of 2016 the number of arrivals in Europe started to decreased from 73,135 persons in January, to 36,923 in March and 25,244 in July, the statistics showing an obvious trend of stabilization. [3] In 2016, until the August 10th there were 275,857 arrivals to Europe, out of which 264,513 were made by sea.[4]

The IOM statistics also show that the migrant crisis has also took the lives of 4,216 people this year alone, the death toll reaching almost 10,000 from 2014-2016 just within the Mediterranean Area.[5]

There are lots of factors determining individuals to migrate, some related to the economic status, others related to the importance of social groups or networks. The paths to migration have become much more fragmented, thus determining an ever`going process to adapt the means of controlling the migrant routes in an effort to reduce or eliminate irregular movement.[6]

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[2]   Thomas Spijkerboer, *Europe`s Refugee Crisis: A perfect Storm*, 2016, available at https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2016/02/europe%E2%80%99s-refugee, accessed August 9, 2016.

[3]   Report of UNHCR- *Refugees/Migrants Emergency Response-Mediterranean*, available at http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php, accessed August 13, 2016.

[4] http://migration.iom.int/docs/WEEKLY%20Flows%20Compilation%20No22%2011%20August%202016.pdf, accessed August 13, 2016.

[5]   https://missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/default/files/Mediterranean_Update_9_August_2016.pdf,   accessed Aaugust 11, 2016.

[6] M. Collyer, Hein de Haas, "Developing economic categorisations of transit migration", *Population, Space and Place*, Vol 18(4), 2015, 471.

On behalf of the migrants decision making about following a certain migratory path there are a few variables that should be taken into account: the economic growth of the welcoming country, its labor market structure, levels of education, inequality and even conflict.[7] The process of migration is deeply embedded in the social moves that take place all over the globe, these movements being pushed forward by the patters of inequality visible worldwide.

When dealing with root causes these can range from poverty, to ethnic conflict, discrimination or unlawful practices, due to the state`s incapacity to maintain order and its normal governing abilities.

The EU, through its High Representative, has close ties to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and also with the Organization for Migration (IOM). Its role is strengthened also by its collaboration with Europol and Frontex.

In terms of strategic endeavors of the EU towards its close neighborhood there are clear signs that EU`s partnerships and initiatives are already redefining the rules of commitment.

EU`s external strategic role is visible through its regional partnerships with African Union, the G5 of Sahel[8] and also with states from Middle East or with Turkey, although lately there have been a few tensions regarding this state.

The refugees had two major routes to arrive in Europe, one located in the South-Central Mediterranean Area and the other circumscribed to the Aegean Sea. EU`s role in containing the migration crisis started in 2014 dates back with one year and a half before. At the end of 2013 an Italian initiative was meant to determine the High Representative for Common Security and Defence Policy to establish a naval rescue operation combined with a border police cooperation to stop trafficking.

Greece joined Italy in this initiative but with little success just because other countries in the EU weren`t interested in participating to such operations; that caused also the failure of Mare Nostrum rescue operation.

This lack of solidarity between European nations on the migration crisis deepened especially during the official meetings within the EU institutions. Placing the migration crisis and the refugee crisis on the European agenda was rather a difficult objective.

The Foreign Affairs Council of March 2015 decided to organize some meetings to reach a common position towards the migration crisis which before it was neglected for more than a decade, although previously there have been a few head of states meetings within the European Council in order to strengthen a Frontex Operation, called Triton, organized in the South Central Mediterrane.

Only in the summer of 2015 the EU launched a common military response called EUNAVFOR MED, that was very quickly implemented attracting lots of critics on behalf of the international community and especially from a few NGOs fighting for human rights.

In December 2015 the European Commission has started to take legal action against states like Greece, Croatia and Italy for failing to correctly register the migrants. All these countries have failed to follow Eurodac Regulation , which was recast, being applicable since 20 July 2015.

The Commission also launched an infringement case against Hungary over its asylum legislation. Before the infringement procedures were launched the Hungarian government

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[7] Mathias Czaika, Hein de Haas, "The efectiveness of immigration policies", *Population and Development Review*, Vol 39(3),2013 , 488-490.

[8] The G5 of Sahel is an institutional framework of coordination and surveillance for the regional cooperation in terms of development and security, created after the Summit of 15-17 February 2014 by the following states: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad, who in December 19th 2014 adopted also a Convention.

sent a questionnaire to its citizens asking them how its cabinet should deal with the migratory crisis. The text of the survey had references to Charlie Hebdo and even had ISIS mentioned, so the answer on behalf of the population somehow empowered the government to adopt a very restrictive position towards this crisis.

Although EUNAVFOR MED started without a clear mandate, its first phase dealing with surveillance and assessment operations seemed to be a great success for the CSDP preparing the real capacities of the EU for the other stages of the mission which dealt with the identification, capture and disposal of vessels used in smuggling and trafficking activities.[9]

The legal mandate for EUNAVFOR MED came within UNSC Resolution 2240 issued in October 2015, which provided the participant states and other regional partners the ability to intercept, inspect, seize and dispense vessels on the high seas of the coast of Libya for a period of one year. The Resolution is also very strict about the circumstances, practices and course of action that should be followed in order to provide assistance to the migrants, mainly to protect their human rights. The Resolution doesn`t authorize any actions within Libyan territory or internal water. Probably the biggest political impediment of EUNAVFOR MED was the fact that Libya had 2 centers of power fighting for supremacy(one in Tobruk, and the other one located in Tripoli). In December 2015 a Libyan political Agreement was reached supported by UNSC Resolution 2259.

In October, EUNAVFOR MED entered its second phase saving the lives of almost 15.000 people in its first year of existence. Given the positive outcome of the operation the Council for Foreign Affairs, has decided, in June 2016, to extend the mandate for one additional year. Two new tasks were added to the operational menu, one relates to the training of Libyan coastguards and the other one refers to providing assistance to the UN arms embargo on the high seas.

EUNAVFOR MED was one of the first missions developed within the EU framework that managed, independently of NATO to carry and sustain a wide variety of military and rescue missions.

The Aegean migration route also needs a close inspection due to the refusal of Greece and Turkey to work together. In this case NATO came as a link between the Turkish and Greek coastguards and Frontex. NATO and CSDP should have a complementary role within this geopolitical complex[10], but their relationship has serious drawbacks due to different institutional cultures and of course the lines of control and command.

HOW IS THE SCHENGEN AREA HOLDING ON AFTER 3 YEARS OF MIGRATION CRISIS?

Lunched in 1985, as an intergovernmental agreement, the Schengen Agreement became a symbol for the freedom of movement. The Schengen Agreement was then incorporated into the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997. Only 22 Member States are part of this Agreement, the UK and Ireland still enjoy the opt-out clause, while countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Cyprus already apply Schengen acquis, but they are not de jure members. There is another group of 5 states (Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein) that also applies the Schengen acquis but they do not undertake controls to their internal borders.[11]

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[9] Council Decision 2015/778/CFSP of 18 May 2015, OJ 2015 L 122/31, Art. 1(1).

[10] S. Blockmans, G. Faleg, *"More Union in European Defence",* report of the CEPS Task Force, chaired by Javier Solana, CEPS 2015.

[11] Yves Pascouau, Foundation Robert Schuman, *European Issues*, No 392, May 18th 2016, available at: http://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0392-l-espace-schengen-face-aux-crises-la-tentation-des-frontieres

During the migration crisis there have been a few moments when the Schengen area was under assault giving the Member states no choice but to limit the volumes of migrants that entered or transited their territories. Taking into consideration that the migration fluxes to Italy and Greece were very difficult to deal with, Germany guaranteed that it will take 800,000 asylum seekers on its territory, and furthermore it won`t send back the Syrian refugees that applied for the humanitarian clause.

This decision has caused a reorientation of migrants to Germany, applying a great amount of pressure upon the states of transit, that culminated with Hungary`s decision to build a fence at its border with Serbia.

The most difficult episode in the migration crisis took place in the fall of 2015 when Germany decided to temporary close its border with Austria, which in return closed its borders with Italy, Slovenia and Hungary, causing a similar effect on the neighboring countries. Luxembourg Presidency for the Council of the European Union managed to save the Schengen Agreement, when the general views of the Member States were rather skeptical towards its current evolution.

The terrorist attacks in Paris and in Brussels determined many European nations to introduce emergency controls. The Schengen Code in article 26 includes the measure of reintroducing internal borders controls, but this procedure involves also the Council and the Commission. The idea of border control is not new, it dates back to the Laeken Declaration of 2001, when the possibility of establishing a European border police was advanced. Only at the end of 2015 the Commission laid down the main components of its initiative to establish a new European Border and Coast Guard.[12]

Most European countries have seen this migration crisis as a serious threat to their sovereignty and to the well-being of their own citizens, very few stakeholders being aware of the opportunity they had by absorbing these migration fluxes into their own societies. Although the costs of integrating refugees are high at the beginning, once integrated they can produce greater benefits to the adopting countries. It is also true that from this equation some countries bear more costs and responsibility and others might get the benefits[13], that is why it is highly important to integrate migrants without a constant pressure on the figures and balance sheets.

Besides creating animosity among them, many European states have placed a great deal of pressure on their own national administrations in solving the issues. EU`s philosophy of containing this migration crisis had much to do with changing priorities. If in the case of Turkey, the EU signed an agreement with the government from Ankara in order to provide 3 billion euros in return of its cooperation in limiting the migration process. In the case of Greece, at the end of January 2016, the EU threatened to expel this country from the Schengen Area, a similar scenario to that of the third bailout Greece reached in the summer of 2015.

Stopping the people from entering Europe cannot be a long term solution, making the EU fortress a current reality might discourage the very sense of sustainable growth on behalf of the European Nations. Recent studies have shown that the migrant and refugee crisis has

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[12] This initiative was made through a Communication of the Commission called "A European Border and Coast Guard and effective management of Europe`s external borders" available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/fact-sheets/docs/a_european_border_and_coast_guard_en.pdf, accessed: August 8, 2016.
[13] Joakim Ruist, "Fiscal Cost of Refugees in Europe", 2016, available at: http://voxeu.org/article/fiscal-cost-refugees-europe, accessed August 10, 2016.

been fueled also by the industry that grew up around them[14], because new routes are created, a new wave of smugglers emerges and the circuit creates shape again.

CONCLUSIONS

The Schengen area should be preserved because in the past three decades it brought lots of advantages on behalf of the European nations, staring from an improved framework from the free movement of people and goods, an extensive security shield to counter security threats and why not a common strategy to transfer sensitive sovereign issues to European Institutions.

The integration of migrants is first of all a security problem. There are ways to improve security, starting with the European agencies which can become active without the demand of a member state. Another step in making this process smoother would involve a further delegation of staff from the national agencies, as well as sharing information at the early stages of an investigation. Engaging in fast operational interventions like it happened in the Mediterranean Area should become a rule.

Such initiatives need also larger budgets, so the Europol and Frontex resources should be enriched according to their needs. This migration crisis has even advanced the possibility of creating a common European border and coast guard that can intervene in emergency situations.[15]

There are still lots of pressing issues that need further attention. Some of them refer to the common mindset of most European nations, others assume that this anxiety associated to strangers makes them less responsible and un-engaged into pursuing the right paths for action. Instead of seeking a closed borders policy why not opening up legal routes for people in search of work or shelter? European democratic societies face an even greater danger, due to the rise of far right parties and organizations, so tackling racism and xenophobia should remain a priority.

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[14] R. Andersson, *Illegality, Inc: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*, (Berkley University of California Press, 2014), 7.
[15] GIancarlo Corsetti, Lars Feld et al., *Reinforcing the Eurozone and Protecting an Open Society*, May 2016, p.45, available at: http://voxeu.org/content/reinforcing-eurozone-and-protecting-open-society, accessed August 9, 2016.

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FREEDOM VS. SECURITY IN EUROPE: THE PHENOMENON OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

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ABSTRACT:
THE ANALYSIS CONDUCTED IN THIS ARTICLE IS MEANT TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SECURITY. EU CITIZENS HAVE BEEN FEELING LESS SECURE SINCE THE START OF THE MIGRANT CRISIS IN 2011. THE MAIN CAUSE OF THIS PHENOMENON IS THE THREAT OF VIOLENCE, WAR AND STARVATION THAT PUSHES PEOPLE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO VENTURE THROUGH THREE DANGEROUS ROUTES TO COME TO EUROPE SEEKING ASYLUM. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE EU IS FORCED TO FACE BOTH A MORAL AND A PRAGMATIC PROBLEM WHETHER TO TAKE ACTION STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY APPARATUS AT THE COST OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM OR WHETHER TO KEEP THINGS AS THEY ARE AT THE COST OF A POTENTIAL ESCALATION OF TERRORISM. IN THIS SENSE WE HAVE ANALYZED THE BENEFITS AND RISKS OF THE POSSIBLE MEASURES THAT EUROPE COULD UNDERTAKE.

KEY WORDS: SECURITY, FREEDOM, ILLEGAL MIGRATION, EUROPEAN UNION, TERRORISM

INTRODUCTION

The European Union has always been an institution that promised security, freedom and prosperity for all. In a large sense the EU is a functional model of democracy that applies sets of policy granting the common individual freedom in a secure environment. After two devastating and costly world wars the current state of affairs in this geopolitical area is optimistic showing constant economic growth and important advances in social reform. Security is also a priority for the EU together with Nato they have created a well thought out European Security Strategy implementing policies that develop a defensive adaptive response to old and new threats. In this sense, we could consider that the EU is safer than ever.

THE PHENOMENON OF ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Even though security measures have for the most part proven for most part effective there is a trend of insecurity rising in Europe. Due to challenging new problems like the increase of terrorist activity, refugees fleeing to Europe from Syria and the Middle East and the after effects of the financial crisis, the European citizen tends to feel less secure. The most discussed issue in the media is the problem of migrants and how will this affect the well-being of Europe. There has always been a minority of people that views immigrants as a threat to economy, jobs, culture and religion. This niche is growing slowly but constantly and

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represents a category that could divide Europe and cause a serious breach in what we know to be democracy. More and more radical right and left-wing parties are starting to gain ground in elections.

This trend can only be understood and correlated in the context of the European migrant crisis. Since 2015 more than a million individuals have crossed into Europe. According to Eurostat, EU member states received over 1.2 million first time asylum applications last year, a number more than double that of 2014. About two thirds of all EU asylum application target only four states (Germany, Hungary, Sweden, and Austria) with Hungary, Sweden, and Austria being the top recipients of asylum applications per capita. Most migrants come from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq[2]. The flow of migrants hasn't stopped with the 135,711 people reaching Europe by sea since the beginning of 2016, according to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).

Illegal migration is a complex phenomenon that has become an increasing problem in the European Union. According to the Frontex's Annual Risk Analysis of 2015 about 283,532 people have crossed illegally at border crossing points. That is a 264% increase compared to the previous year[3]. There are multiple factors and causes for this ranging from war, terrorism, starvation, poverty, infringement of human rights and socioeconomic distress. Compared to the United States of America where illegal migration is also a problem, Europe seems to be more afraid and conflicted by this situation. According to a Gallup poll, 54% of Europeans want lower immigration levels compared to 34% of U.S citizens[4]. In this regard it is clear that the topic of illegal migration is relevant to the present situation.

From a conceptual point of view human migration can be considered the movement of people from one geographical place to another with the clear intentions of settling temporarily or permanently in the new location. This movement is often over long distances and from one country to another. However, migration is also possible internally within the same country. Migration should not be confused with Nomadic movements. These cannot be considered migrations, as there is no intention of settling and the movement is mostrly seasonal. Illegal immigration is the migration of people across national borders in a way that violates the immigration laws of the destination country.[5]

Migrants coming to Europe risk their lives subjecting themselves to inhumane conditions to relocate from their states. Often the journey proves to be deadly. There are three main routes that migrants take to reach Europe. The most common one is The Central Mediterranean Route, which leads to Italy or Malta. Migrants travel on smugglers' ships (usually small boats) departing from Egypt, Tunisia or Libya. Often this journey ends in tragedy. In 2013 we saw the Lampedusa disaster were a migrant boat shipwrecked causing 600 deaths. Due to increasing tensions in Libya, the use of this route has diminished but still remains a frequented one. The second route, called the Eastern Mediterranean Route, leads to Greece or the Aegean Sea, and was the most traveled route by migrants in 2015. According to estimates, close to 350,000 individuals have crossed from Turkey to Greece. This shift is justified by the change in migration pattern by the Syrians, who find this route easier and safer to travel by. The last important route is through the Western Balkans that leads to

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[2] Eurostat newsrelease 44/2016, March 4, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6

[3] Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2015, 16,
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf

[4] Neli Esipova, Anita Pugliese, Julie Ray, "Europeans Most Negative Toward Immigration", October 16, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/186209/europeans-negative-toward-immigration.aspx

[5] Carrie Dann, "By the numbers: How America tallies its 11.1 million undocumented immigrants". NBC News. Aprilie 11, 2013, http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/04/11/17691515-by-the-numbers-how-america-tallies-its-111-million-undocumented-immigrants?lite

Hungary. Close to 160,000 people traveled this route from Serbia in the first 8 months of 2015 and most migrants that reach Greece through the Eastern Mediterranean Route will depart for Central Europe through the Western Balkans route. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), over 3,770 migrants were reported to have died trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2015. On the second route in the same year over 800 died crossing from Turkey to Greece.

It is imperative at this point to take in consideration the basic factors and causes of illegal migration in the current geopolitical context. For example, the arrival of refugees from Syria to Europe started when the civil war erupted in March 2011. There has been a significant escalation in the number of Syrian citizens seeking protection in Europe since the outburst of the Syrian war. These arrivals uncovered the sever inconstancies and flaws in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which almost failed in the summer of 2015 due to the inability of policymakers and the public to respond appropriately. The sudden growth of migrants in 2015 can only be explained by analyzing a series of push-and-pull factors.

Firstly, the dramatic increase of violence, instability and lack of personal security in the migrants' home countries has made a return to their homes in the near future unlikely. Secondly, there is a lack of alternative destinations since Libya is no longer an option. Of course we must also consider the increased brutality and violence of terrorist and militant groups towards civilians. Another factor is the lack of economic possibilities, poverty and starvation. Europe has always been an attractive environment for migrants seeking work in order to sustain their families back home.

From another point of view illegal migration is not just a European problem, it is an international crisis. According to The UNHCR the number of forcibly displaced people worldwide reached 59.5 million at the end of 2014, the highest level since World War II, with a 40% increase taking place since 2011. Of these 59.5 million, 19.5 million were refugees (14.4 million under UNHCR's mandate, plus 5.1 million Palestinian refugees under UNRWA's mandate), and 1.8 million were asylum-seekers. The rest were persons displaced within their own countries (internally displaced persons).[6] At this point we could assume that people in trouble areas have lost faith in the potential of conflict resolution and are afraid of possible outcomes. According to A. Maslow, Security and sustainability are fundamental psychological needs so migration is an understandable worldwide phenomenon.

For the average European citizen giving asylum and aid to migrants and refuges is a problem between the ideology of freedom and rights for everyone and the ideology of keeping society secured. This is not a new debate; security versus freedom has been analyzed as a paradigm at the highest level for centuries. Among the first to question this paradigm was Thomas Hobbes, who believed that security is above freedom, imagining what it would be like to live without government, laws, or society. In this 'State of Nature' you would have plenty of freedom; but you'd live in constant fear. So objectively there is a correlation between the two, when a society adopts norms that strengthen security the individual will feel less free. When a society adopts norms that strengthen personal freedom, the individual will feel a lack of security.

This paradigm is not just a well thought out hypothesis, it is the reality of present day Europe. People adopt either a tolerant view towards migrants or quite a radical opposite. Polls show that the average European citizen feels insecure and threatened by the potential of terrorists disguised as migrants from Syria fleeing to Europe to commit abominable acts. This fear has led unexpectedly to a new rise of xenophobia, racism, extreme-nationalism and

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[6] Patrick Boehler, Sergio Peçanh, "The Global Refugee Crisis, Region by Region". The New York Times, updated August 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/migrants-global-refugee-crisis-mediterranean-ukraine-syria-rohingya-malaysia-iraq.html?_r=0

radical political parties that have won elections in European states previously known for a balanced political climate. Ironically, the fear of aggression and intolerance from radical Muslims has led to the same social reactions from European citizens.

From another point of view we could draw a parallel between the insecurity that Europeans are starting to feel demanding and that of the migrants. In Europe, this insecurity has led people to demand tougher security measures against the migrants whose own insecurity has led them to leave their countries, where they are threatened by war, death, and tyrannical regimes. Both Europeans and migrants that have fled their countries are searching for the same principles. They are looking for a secure medium in which they can prosper and have a good degree of personal freedom. There are three problems that arise from our point of view in this context first, it seems that there is a trend of intolerance towards migrants which could lead to severe conflict. Secondly we do not know if Europe can afford economically a higher number of migrants. Lastly, we do not know to which degree the migrants will be able to adapt to western culture or to what degree western culture can assimilate theirs.

When discussing the issue of freedom and security, we should take into consideration cultural fear. Most of the illegal migrants that flee to Europe are part of a very different culture than ours. This is a valid point of concern considering the fact that their beliefs have generated the biggest threats to security against terrorism. It is a common concern that among the helpless refuges, there could also be sleeper agents and members of dangerous terrorist cells. This fact poses a serious problem to the security apparatus of the EU. From another perspective Europe has its own ideological system being which has been shaped for over a thousand years by Europe's mainly Christian faith. Thus it has woven a completely different social fabric than that of the migrants. The individual that come from the Middle East are Muslim and belong to a culture that is opposed to its European counterpart. We value freedom and equality above security while the Muslims value doctrine and security more than freedom. It is evident that we cannot fully know what to expect do not know what can be expected from the high number of Muslim migrants coming to Europe. In this sense the feeling of insecurity is justified.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the European Union is facing an existential crisis having to confront violent acts of terrorism like the Brussels Bombing, a high number of migrants and a crippling economical debt. This situation is complicated even more, taking into consideration the fact that the only viable solution is to enforce more drastic security measures. This enforcement goes against the idea of freedom above everything else and has split Europe in two distinct groups. On one side are those who are skeptic of the continuation of a European Union and on the other are those who want to compromise for a more secure future.

Illegal migration in Europe could represent either a problem that will cause severe unbalances on all levels, including the basic social structure, or it could be a model for transformation. The migrant's desire and actions to flee a home that is dominated by war, violence and terrorism for a home that is described by freedom, opportunity progress and sustainability would be seen as a model that could transform the Middle East. We believe that if we can find solutions to integrate and assimilate the migrants in our culture and offer them what they lack (namely security, opportunity for progress and adequate living conditions), we will give birth to a precedent that could change world politics.

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3. **Frontex Annual Risk Analysis 2015**, page 16, http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S ROLE IN DEVELOPING AN EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION FLOWS.

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ABSTRACT:
IN THE LAST DECADES EUROPEAN UNION WAS FORCED TO COPE WITH MULTIPLE EXTERNAL CHALLENGES. NOWADAYS, THE PROFOUND TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALISATION AND INTERNATIONALISATION ARE MAKING THE RISKS AND THREATS HARDER TO MANAGE. FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE A HUGE PRESSURE IS EXERCISED ON THE DECISION MAKING SYSTEM, BOTH AT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVEL. THIS ARTICLE FOCUSES ON THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IN DEVELOPING AN EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT OF MIGRATION FLOWS. OUR ANALYSIS IS CONSIDERING THE STATUS OF THE E.C. WITHIN THE E.U.`S STRUCTURE AND THE INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE FOR NOW.

KEY WORDS: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, MIGRATION FLOWS, MANAGEMENT, POLICY, GOOD GOVERNANCE.

INTRODUCTION

Since ancient times people have sought better living places, more stable and more favorable for their personal development. It is in the human nature to explore, to travel, to search and most of the times, when it comes about large masses of individuals that moved from one space to another, all these desires were activated by contextual or specific events. For example, issues like lack of food or drinking water, epidemics, natural disasters, wars or other types of conflicts always resulted in population moving to a different place, looking for a safer and stable environment. In the last decades, due to globalization and internationalization, migration has become more diverse and dynamic. Nowadays, the most common reasons why people migrate are related to environmental, economic, cultural and socio-political aspects of their daily life. These factors, that can be placed in one of the aforementioned categories, may act both as pushing or pulling factors. More than this, there are very rare cases in which we can talk about forced or involuntary migration, but more often we can identify situations of impelled migration.

Regarding the European space, it was over time one of the most preferred destinations for individuals, when it comes about migration. In the last two decades, except the most recent massive flow, the Old Continent received people from Asia, Africa, Middle East and so on. According to Sander, Abel and Bauer, between 2005 and 2010, the most significant

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migration flow to Europe was from Africa, and they talk about almost 2 million people.[3] If then, the issue of migration was not considered a high-priority one, in the last year it claimed the first place on the list.

EUROPEAN UNION AND THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE

Over time, European Union developed a specific interest, mostly at a theoretical level, on what concern the migration flows, but because major issues were not recorded at regional level, the member states and the decision makers cope with the topic in a relaxed way. Starting with the `80`s the immigration flow started to increase substantially, especially in the western countries, and the main reasons for immigration resulted from the growing global inequalities between poor and rich countries as noticed by Patrizia Calefato.[4]

More than this, in the last decades the European Union made efforts to adopt a common approach in what concern the immigrants flows. Instruments and policies were created to be useful for both Member States and for the community as a whole. This is because in 2000 Jef Huysmans brings into discussion the securitization of migration at EU level. After more than two decades of intensifying immigration, the author recognize a reluctant European trend related to this phenomenon[5] and in an indirect way the fact that the member states started to understand that for the long term migration is not only about benefits and advantages. He said that the third pillar - Justice and Home Affairs, the Schengen Agreement and also the Dublin Convention indicated an increase of restrictiveness in terms of migration and a more intrusive way on how is managed at community level. It was a turning point when the European Union became more aware that the security issues and the challenges to national identity and European resources were not isolated situations but a more frequent reality.

We can say that 2000 was the specific point in time when the European community has realized its cultural and societal vulnerability in front of external elements. At that time, during an intensive process of enlargement and horizontal integration (between 1990 and 2005), the European Union realized that immigration can only be managed through joint efforts and should not be seen as a private issue that belongs to each member state. That happened because immigration was not seen anymore as a need for covering the national needs of workforce or an instrument that helps economic growth. Moreover, although the approach was not a new one, the European community became more aware of the effects produced by the immigration flow recorded between the 80`s and 90`s. Even if, two decades before the labor immigration was intensively restricted, individuals were allowed to come to Europe on the basis of family reunion[6]. The effects and the effective adaptation of the European Union occurred in the same time, but in some aspects it was already too late.

Refocusing our attention to aspects related to joint management of the immigration issues, we must mention that in its earlier phase this approach was first put into practice through the establishment of TREVI, the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration and the Schengen group. Although these entities were not formally part of the process of European integration they have helped to unite all the national approaches into a single migration policy. As noted by Huysmans, following on from the Single European Act (1986) and the momentum developed in the Schengen group, the Treaty on European Union (1992) introduced the Third

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[3] Guy Abel, Nikola Sander, "Quantifying Global International Migration Flows", *Science,* 343 (6178), 1520-1522.

[4] Patrizia Calefato, *Europa Fenicia: Identità linguistica, comunità, linguaggio come pratica sociale*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1994), 80-81.

[5] Jef Huysmans,"The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 38(5), 2000, 751-777.

[6] Russel King, "European International Migration 1945-1990: A Geographical and Statistical View", in King, R. (ed.), *Mass migration in Europe*, (London: Belhaven), 1993, 19-39.

Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs in which migration was explicit subject of Intergovernmental regulation Within the European Union[7]. But, in few years dissatisfaction with the approach promoted by the Third Pillar emerged, intergovernamentalism being the main reason for disputes. Like this, in the Treaty of Amsterdam all the section referring to immigration, asylum and refugees were communitarized.[8]

After that moment, at European level an intense struggle started in order to achieve a common immigration policy. But that did not happened and today we are having two sets of laws concerning this issue: one represented by the EU rules and the other containing the member states national rules. Even if, since 2009 the member states and the European institutions are developing a common immigration policy for Europe, most of the work was made on the immigration and visa rules that should be valid all across the 28 member states (27 if Brexit will happen). From this perspective the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2009) includes common rules on: entry and residence conditions for migrants; procedures for issuing long-term visas and residence permits; the rights of migrants living legally in an EU country; tackling irregular immigration and unauthorized residence; the fight against human trafficking; agreements on the readmission of citizens returning to their own countries and incentives and support for EU countries to promote the integration of migrants.[9] More than this, nowadays there are specific measures at European level that cannot be fully implemented inside the member states because there are some aspects that rely entirely on national decision: the total number of migrants that can be admitted to the country to look for work, the rules on long-term visas (more than 3 months) and all the conditions to obtain residence and work permits when non EU-wide rules have been adopted. Additional to those mentioned above all the final decisions related to migrant applications are taken by the national states.[10]

In 2016, due to the most recent immigration flows we faced, immigration became one of the biggest concerns. More than this it was related with the latest terrorist attacks and used by the far right groups to promote and motivate their position and ideological beliefs. Even the debate for BREXIT in the United Kingdom was rigged out with the challenges to security and welfare caused by the old and new immigrants. Like this, the phenomenon became also a tool and a ground to redesign and recalibrate former instruments and policies designed to administer the flows of immigrants. Is not that what was elaborated before is useless or not good enough to manage the new challenges, but the fact that the previous measures and instruments were not transformed into functional and accessible mechanisms, is the main reason why the entire European political class is now looking for different approaches. No one asked how the current laws and tools can be adapted and streamlined to face the contemporary challenges.

However, to better understand what was done and the role of the European Commission in this whole context in the following pages we will identify and analyze the most recent policy developments.

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[7] Abdelmalek Sayad, "L'asile dans "l'espace Schengen": la définition de l'autre (immigré ou réfugié) comme enjeu de luttes sociales" in Caloz-Tschopp et all. (eds), *Asile- Violence - Exclusion en Europe. Histoire, Analyse, Prospective,* (Geneva: Section des Sciences de l'Education de l'Université de Genève), 1994, 193–238.

[8] Theodora Kostakopoulou, "The "Protective Union": Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38(3), 2000, pp. 497–518.

[9] http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/who-does-what/more-information/explaining-the-rules-why-are-there-eu-rules-and-national-rules_en

[10] http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/who-does-what/more-information/explaining-the-rules-why-are-there-eu-rules-and-national-rules_en

RECENT POLICY DEVELOMPENTS AND THE ROLE OF THE E.C.

The Treaty of Lisbon brings a new approach and represents a step forward in the management of migration flows. By entering into force in December 2009, the procedure of codecision and qualified majority voting on legal migration and a new legal basis for integration measures were introduced. As mentioned on the official website of the European Parliament „*(now) the ordinary legislative procedure applies to both illegal and legal immigration policies, making Parliament a co-legislator on an equal footing with the Council. It may be noted, however, that the provisional measures to be instituted in the event of a sudden inflow of third-country nationals are to be adopted by the Council alone, after consulting Parliament (Article 78(3) TFEU). The Lisbon Treaty also clarified that the competences of the EU in this field are shared with the Member States, notably concerning the number of migrants allowed to legally enter a Member State to seek work (Article 79(5) TFEU). Finally, the Court of Justice now has full competence in the field of immigration and asylum.*". All these, as a result of the previous policy developments registered at european level until then.

One of the most important step taken by the European Commission was the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, adopted in 2011. The document establishes the general framework for the relations between the European Union and other countries in the field of migration. An important aspect is that the document was based on four pillars: legal immigration and mobility, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings, international protection and asylum policy, and maximizing the impact of migration and mobility on development[11]. From our perspective it was an essential step in order to better organize the dialogue and the "mobility partnerships" between the community and other actors. Its limitations were determined by the level of involvement presented by other actors in relation with the European union and by the willingness of the member states to become involved. Overall, the initiative was designed to promote a concept broader than migration and, in the same time to keep the European Unions interests above all other good intentions.

However, the approach has drawn criticism from Member States, some of them showing themselves reticent, especially with regard to receiving refugees and asylum seekers. Despite assurances that the program wanted the partner states to reach a level of development sufficiently high that those who wanted to move to no longer do, it was felt that issues of development and instability institution in states where they wanted to signing agreements (Tunisia, Ghana, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco) are more serious to be solved from the outside. Also in close proximity to the European Union states were frequently violated human rights and demonstrating indifference to the rights of migrants, which caused concern among critics of GAMM program.

On the other hand, the Stockholm Programme - An open and secure Europe serving and Protecting Citizens, adopted in December 2009, represents a new phase of the programs adopted at Tampere in 1999 and The Hague in 2004, is a plan that ended in 2014. Even if it represents a framework for action in areas such as citizenship, justice, security, asylum, immigration and visa policy were not noticeable results that contribute to better managed migration flows. It should be noted that at that time, the European Union was not faced with the situation in 2016 and pressure on policy makers was not so great. Moreover, in institutional terms, the organization meet the requirements. Another blockage that was identified was that Member States were not struggling to implement the European provisions and despite political steps were not taken the necessary measures. For example, a report on the program made the following recommendations:

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[11] ***, E.C. website, *Global approach to migration*, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-migration/index_en.htm

- Strongly endorses the European Council's call for Frontex's role to be reinforced in accordance with the Stockholm Programme in order to increase its capacity to respond more effectively to changing migration flows;
- Calls on the Member States to make use of the current provisions of the Visa Code and the Schengen Borders Code allowing the issuing of humanitarian visas, and to facilitate the provision of temporary shelter for human rights defenders at risk in third countries;
- Acknowledges that the recent changes and turmoil in Northern Africa and the Middle East have intensified the pressure on the EU's eastern and southern borders;
- Stresses the need to encourage voluntary return policies;
- Urges the Commission and the EEAS to take practical steps to ensure greater coherence and consistency between internal and external EU policies;

However, even if institutional and political demarches were made consistent, bureaucratic bottlenecks have contributed to the materialization of this program ineffective. At the end of the implementation period, in March 2014, the Commission published a new vision called - An open and secure Europe: making it happen - to allow the European Council and Parliament to discuss strategic proposals in June. In conclusions issued on 26 and 27 June 2014 the Council defined the*''strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice' for the period 2014-2020. These no longer constitute a programme but rather guidelines focusing on the objective of transposing, implementing and consolidating the existing legal instruments and measures. The guidelines stress the need to adopt an overall approach to migration, making the best possible use of legal migration, affording protection to those who need it, combating irregular migration and managing borders effectively".[12]*

However, we find that the steps taken at Community level have been rich and complex, but their implementation was done poorly. Clearly, the decisions taken by the Council and Parliament are more numerous than previously presented but relationship between the Commission and institutions above was hit by bureaucratic and logistical bottlenecks. Furthermore, migratory phenomena occur increasingly unannounced, which puts even more pressure on the European institutions. Another element that contributed to management immigrants inefficacy it was the reluctance of Member States. In the flow of migration, many have chosen to manage the problem individually through its own resources and its own decision-making system. This is an evidence that the importance and role of the nation state has not been reduced but experienced new dimensions.

Regarding the role played by the European Commission we must reiterate that this institutional instrument is the executive body of the European Union and that national interests are not represented particularly through her. Executive powers it has makes it most competent actor in the European internal terms of responding effectively to new challenges such as illegal immigration, be it refugees or asylum seekers. As evidence, in relation to the refugee crisis in 2016, the European Commission's answer was one we consider effective. Thus, in April 2016 were released about 83 million euros for emergency support Projects in Greece, Turkey has ben given over 450 million euros (from early 2011) to manage the refugee situation from Syria and Iraq and there were sent humanitarian aid to Serbia and Macedonia to provide the necessary logistics and transit points registration facilities. At the same time, funds and assistance was granted to Libya, especially from mid-2014 to prevent flows of migrants and to help local actors to better manage the situation in the country. In all these activities, the Commission has supported and assisted by UNHCR, Red Cross,

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[12] ***, E.P. website, *Fact Sheets on the European Union* , available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.12.3.html

International Rescue Committee, Danish Refugee Council, Medecins du Monde, OXFAM, Save the Children and Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund.

Thus, the role of the Executive Council is indisputable, but in the coming period this Institute must assert itself more consistent on the European scene. That's because, in addition to "the fight" that must lead to legislative wing of the European Union, the Commission is the only entity that can provide collective action to the detriment of national measures, especially in managing migration flows. At the same time, the Commission is likely to contribute effectively to long-term,, federalization "European conferring unity of action and decision-making while respecting national options.

In the current regional and international context the European Commission should materialize decades-old desire of Europeans to form a European identity based on facts and results, where the national interest is positioned as being second when in report with the Community. Clearly, the contribution of Member States is necessary but they must be convinced that there is capacity to initiate action at European level and that national approaches must be seen as a last resort.

As evidence of flexibility, the Commission continued the role it has in the effective management of immigrants and established a new Partnership Framework-oriented deeper on results. On this occasion Frans Timmermans First Vice President said:

"To stop the unacceptable loss of life in the Mediterranean Sea and bring order into migratory flows, we need to rethink how the EU and its Member States join efforts to work together with third countries. The Commission proposes a new partnership framework: starting with a first group of priority third countries, compacts tailored to the circumstances of each of them will mobilise all our policies and tools to achieve these objectives, tapping into the EU's collective influence in close coordination with Member States and focusing our resources including through the swift deployment of €8 billion over the next five years. We will also work on an ambitious External Investment Plan to help create opportunities and tackle the root causes of migration. Without concrete results from our partners in managing migration better, we should collectively be ready to adapt our engagement and financial aid."[13]

Thus, this approach is intended as a tool to contribute to enhance convergence of efforts at European level and has implications for domestic policies and external action instruments. It is intended that the effective management of all available actions and instruments to be adapted to contribute to:
- Focused engagement
- Enhanced support
- Breaking the business model of the people smugglers
- Creating legal routes
- Implementing all the financial instruments
- Working together.[14]

Of all these objectives hardest hit will be the last of them: working together. That's because it requires better coordination and increased coherence between Community actions and Member States. However, there were few cases when at the Community level a position was promoted and the next day the national decisions were diametrically opposed.

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[13] James Crisp, *Commission asks member states for 3.6 billion to tackle refugee crisis,* available at http://www.euractiv.com/section/trade-society/news/commission-asks-member-states-for-e3-6-billion-to-tackle-refugee-crisis/

[14] ***, E.C. website, availbe at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf

The central issue that faces European Commission is a delicate one and is related to the inconsistency that lies within widening participation of the member state to deepening the European integration. Clearly, this is not new, but it was manifested much stronger in the current context when joint efforts were needed to counter the effects of a genuine, palpable threat. Also, for the first time in decades, several Member States face the same problem and in some way it was expected from them to act as a group, but the national decisions had primacy in front of the group decision, aspect that proves the inexperience Member States are presenting in terms of teamwork.

From another perspective, related to the effective management of migration flows, the European Commission must ensure, together with Parliament and the Council that Member States will not suffer from fatigue donor`s phenomenon. Despite the instability on the European political scene and counter with national political trends (increasingly nationalist and radical) economic support should be constant and supplemented as appropriate. While so far the Member States were conferring legitimacy and cohesion of the European Union, it is time for the Union to be the one that holds states together and facilitates cooperation and coordination. Thus, the Commission's roles, in addition to executive and political one, is to demonstrate that it can achieve a new level of efficiency and that the participation of Member States is embodied in the common approaches that have measurable effects for/in each Member State.

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THE ASCENSION OF THE THEOLOGICAL ELITES WITHIN THE ROMANIAN ACADEMICS INSTITUTIONS: CASE NICOLAE DOBRESCU

Florin ONICA[1]

ABSTRACT:
THE APPOINTMENT OF THE FIRST PROFESSOR IN THE DEPARTAMENT OF HISTORY OF THE ROMANIAN CHURCH AT THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN BUCHAREST HAS INVOLVED NUMEROUS DEBATES, CONVERSATIONS WITH PASSION AND WITH A LOT OF EXPENSE OF THE INK AND PAPER. THE CANDIDATES REQUESTS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT WERE SENT BY THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO BE INVESTIGATED BY THE HOLY SYNOD. ALSO IT WAS ASKED AND UNIVERSITY SENATE TO MAKE A RECOMMENDATION IN THIS REGARD. THE COLLEGE SENATE WITH THE TEACHING COUNCIL OF THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN BUCHAREST, RECOMMEND DUMITRU STĂNESCU, WHO WAS ELECTED AND BY THE HOLY SYNOD. BECAUSE THERE WERE COMPLAINS ABOUT THIS DECISION, THE UNIVERSITY SENATE ASKED THE COMMISSION TO REPORT MORE RESEARCH. THE CONCLUSION THAT WAS REACHED WAS INAPPOSITE FOR ANY OF THE CANDIDATES PROPOSING KEEPING A AGGREGATION CONTEST. BUT THE MINISTER OF CULTS AND EDUCATION, MICHAEL VLĂDESCU, ON THE BASIS OF RIGHTS THAT WERE GRANTED THEM BY LAW APPOINTS NICOLAEDOBRESCU SUBSTITUTE THE ROMANIAN CHURCH HISTORY DEPARTMENT.

KEY WORDS: Professor, Nicolae Dobrescu, University Selection, Career, Theology.

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ROMANIAN CHURCH HISTORY AT THE FACULTY OF THEOLOGY IN BUCHAREST

The statute of the Faculty of Theology in 1899which was implemented from 1st October the same year provide separate study of Romanian Church History of Universal Church History as predicted until then. So, the duration "up to 1700" will teach students of first year, and "from 1700 to the present" second year students. A department of Romanian Church History was provided even in the first project to establishing a Faculty of Theology within the University of Bucharest[2]. Though in the first 25 years of the establishment of this faculty, among disciplines has not included the Romanian Church History, because the project of V. A. Urechia from 1881, did not foresee this chair but only one "Ecclesiastical History with special looks at the Romanian Church"[3].

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[2]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod[The Holy Synod Archive], File no. 58, 102.
[3]Article 4. See *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [The Romanian Orthodox Church], 1880-1881, 825-826.

Article Three of the Regulations from 1899 stipulate that unlike other "studies" that had to "expose by owners of the eight Departments, Romanian Church History, Patristic Exegesis and Reading is expose by an aggregate"[4], which involved the appointment of a new professor in the staff of the Faculty.

On the basis of these regulatory provisions, in its meeting on the 17th of January 1900, Council of the Faculty decided to ask the Ministry to publish "competition" to occupy the new aggregates of Romanian Church History. According to this decision, on 20th of January 1900, the deanship, addressing the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education wrote: "Romanian Church History Department by Article 2 of Regulation, it is provided with the start of the year 1899-1900 between courses, and by Article 3 of the same Regulation, this Department following to be occupied by an aggregate, We have the honor to ask you to publish aggregation contest to complete it"[5]. On the 25th of the January 1900, Ministry replies that "has no funds for this department", so they remained forth just a purpose[6]. However, beginning with the 1902-1903 school yearand until the creation of the Department of Romanian Church History, although he was train by the same teacher, appear separately in the syllabus and even on other days than those of the History of the Universal Church.[7]

With the beginning of academic year 1902-1903 on the 28th of october 1902 the deanship of the Faculty of Theology, invoke again the Minister to approve the unanimous request of the Teaching Council, comply with rules "to provide for the proper payment of an aggregate budget of Romanian Church History, Reading and Patristic Exegesis,starting from the 1st of october 1903"[8]but again with no immediate result.

Only after the deanship's intervention to the Ministry in the year 1905 begin to change the situation. On the 4th and 29th of April 1905 it was voted *Law for the separation and establishment of Chairs at the Universities of Bucharest and Iasi from the 1st of November 1905,* which sanctioned by King Charles I with decree no. 2863 from the 13th of May 1905. The article IX of this law provided that on the 1st of November 1905when it was to implement:*"It divides the current Chair of Church History at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest in two,namely: one of Romanian Church History and one Universal Church History".*[9]Although for now the new Chair it was not provided in the budget[10] on the 12th of october 1905, it was requested by the deanshipto refill, by Stefan Dinulescu, doctor of Theology and graduate of the Faculty of Philosophy and Lawwho in the fall of 1904 demand the Holy Synodto intervene at the Ministry for the establishment of a post of aggregate for Romanian Church History.[11] This time refer to Holy Synodwith the request to recommend

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[4]*Regulamentul pentru Facultatea de Teologie din Bucureşti*[Statutes for the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest], (Bucharest, 1899), 3-4.

[5]Toma G. Bulat,*Contribuţii la istoricul Facultăţii de Teologie şi Institutului Teologic Universitar din Bucureşti* [Contributions to the History of Faculty of Theology and University Theological Institute from Bucharest],*în Biserica Ortodoxă Română* in[The Romanian Orthodox Church]no. 11-12/1957, 1135.

[6]Nicolae Şerbănescu, *Profesorul Nicolae Dobrescu(1884-1914)* [The professor Nicolae Dobrescu] in *Studii Teologice* [Theological Studies] no. 7-8, 1974, 571.

[7]Nicolae Şerbănescu, *Catedra de Istoria Bisericii Române de la Facultatea de Teologie şi Institutul Teologic Universitar din Bucureşti* [Romanian Church History Department of the Faculty of Theology and University Theological Institute from Bucharest],in *Studii Teologice* [Theological Studies], no 7-10, 1981, 515.

[8]Toma G. Bulat, and Al. I. Ciurea, *75 de ani de la întemeierea Facultăţii de Teologie din Bucureşti*[75 years since the founding of the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest] in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [The Romanian Orthodox Church], LXXV (1957), no 11-12, 1140.

[9]See *Monitorul Oficial* [The Official Monitor], no. 33 from the 19th of May/1st of June 1905, 1485.

[10]Arhiva de Stat Bucureşti, Ministerul Cultelor şiInstrucţiunii Publice [State Archive Bucharest, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education], File no. 518/1905, 15, 16, 25.

[11]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The Holy Synod Archive], File no. 113, 15.

him to the Honorable Ministerfor compensatingthis Chair now become apart chair until occupancy it according to the law.At the same time he offered as if the Ministry will not grant for supplant any feeto fill for free, up to the competition[12].

During November 1905NicolaeDobrescu "Doctor of History at the University of Vienna bachelor of Theology and graduate of the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest and the Faculty of Theology in Chernivtsi he was a fellow of the Ministryto specialize in the study of Romanian Church History" recently returned from studies abroad, request the Ministry of Educationto be given until other instructions filling the Chair of Romanian Church History created on the 1st of November 1905 at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest by law promulgated in Official Monitor no. 38 of the 19th of May 1905[13]. On the 24th of November 1905 reapply Ministry to authorize him to beginfrom now on to fill - for free up to April - Department into cups, because now being in the first part of the yearcan be done ,incontestable,by long chalk than if they start only from Aprilwhen the school year is coming to an end[14]. The Ministry has responded: "The application can not approve; The Department is not budgeted, only with start on the 1st of November 1906".[15]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Nicolae Dobrescu was born on 20[th]of July, 1874, in the village of Popa Șapca's, Celeiul Romanaţilor[16], from parents peasants who lived in a hut[17]. During primary school, which he finished in the native village, he has received the name of Dobrescu, after his father's baptism name (Dobre D. Diaconu). The young "vigorous and with the handsome face, trustworthy person, cut from the rock", as characterized him the succesor in the chair, professor and academician Niculae M. Popescu[18], continued to prepare for eight years on Central Seminary in Bucharest, where he acquired the diploma in the year 1896, being in all these years among prizewinning pupils.From the school transcripts it can be observe that during the Seminar, in all eight classes he promoted in second place, most of the times after his colleague Georgescu Nedelea. And he has passed the diploma examination in the Session of June 1896 with 8,88[19] the arithmetic average. Two years later, in 1898, he graduated also the "Secondary course".

After graduation of the seminar, he has enrolled at the faculties of Theology and Letters of the University of Bucharest. During his student years he lived in the theological boarding school in the Capital, being secretary for a while at the School for boys and Society for the teaching of the Romanian people[20].He obtain the Bachelor degree of the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest on 1[st]of June, 1902, presenting the thesis *Apology Octavius*, by Minucius Felix, which he has translated and printed into Romanian, accompanied by anintroductive critical study and a biographical contour of the author[21]. The same year he will graduate in the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest[22].

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[12]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The Holy Synod Archive], File no. 386.
[13]Arhivele Statului din Bucureşti [State Archives of Bucharest], Bucharest, File no. 518/1905, 15.
[14]Arhivele Statului din Bucureşti [State Archives of Bucharest], Bucharest, File no. 518/1905, 16.
[15]Arhivele Statului din Bucureşti [State Archives of Bucharest], Bucharest, File no. 518/1905, 16.
[16]See: Dumitru Buzatu, *Despre Celeiul Romanaţilor*[About Celeiul Romanatilor], în *Mitropolia Olteniei*[Metropolis of Oltenia], XIV, 1962, no.7-9, 473-479.
[17]Nicolae M. Popescu, *Comemorări. Nicolae Dobrescu (1875-1914)*[Commemorations. Nicloae Dobrescu] in *Mitropolia Olteniei*[Metropolis of Oltenia], VI, 11-12, 1954, 627.
[18]Ibidem, p.627. See also the specifications by Nicolae Șerbănescu, *op.cit.,*572.
[19] The Diploma no. 7 of 29th of June 1896.
[20]P. Gârboviceanu, *Profesorul N. Dobrescu* [Professor Nicolae Dobrescu],in *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* [The Romanian Ortodox Church], XXXVIII, 1914, 383.
[21]The Diploma no. 2746 of 11th of July 1902.
[22] With Certificateno.226 issued by the Dean at24[th] ofoctober 1902.

As a theological student, in 1902, he won the Hillel prize, granted by the Bucharest University for the paper "Status of the Romanian Church from 1850 to 1894"[23], title fixed by the Council of the professors of the Faculty of Theology for the contest of that year.

In the autumn of 1902 he obtained by contest a scholarship to study abroad. He chose to study at the Faculty of Letters in Vienna where he attends the courses of the famous Czech history teacher, Constantin Jireček, aa great connoisseur of Balkan and Byzantine history.Here has followed the courses of Church History at the Catholic and Protestant Faculty of Theology at the University of Vienna[24]. He has consulted hundreds of original documents relating to the political past of the church and of the Romanians, kept in the archives of the Imperial City.

In the framework of the Viennese prestigious cultural institution he has claimed the PhD examination in History[25], exam preceded by the presentation of a dissertation in German:*Anfänge der Kirchenorganisation in den rumänischen Fürstentümern*. For the developing of this dissertation he has used the original documents of the Ecumenical Patriarchate concerning the beginnings of organizing church life of the Romanians, documents found in the library of the Court of Vienna. Also in Vienna he studied and copied other documents relating to the History of Romanians, documents which had not been collected by Hurmuzachi and which it will be published later[26].

Later he will research also the library of the Faculty of Theology in Chernivtsi and he will attend the Universal Church History courses and History of the Church in Bucovina. Nicolae Dobrescu has rebuilt his PhD dissertation by prolonging the research until the tenth century, studying at the same time the problems related to the establishment of the first monasteries in the Romanian lands.

Since 1903 he investigated, in Budapest, documents relating to the history of the Church in Transylvania publishing some of them in the "Luceafarul" magazine. More than 1,000 priceless manuscripts have been copied by him from the archives from Vienna and Budapest.So there are two contributions very important young Nicolae Dobrescu in the field of church history of Romanians:*Întemeierea mitropoliilor şi a celor dintâi mănăstiri din ţară* [The establishment of the metropolitan church and of the former monastery in the country],

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[23]The work will be published in 1905 with title: *Istoria Bisericii din România (1850-1894)* [The history of the Church in Romania]*,* 206pages.

[24]Gabor Adrian, *Studia ecclesiastica: contribuţii în domeniul Istoriei Bisericeşti ale profesorilor de la Facultatea de Teologie Ortodoxă din Bucureşti: 1881-1989* [Studia ecclesiastica: contributions in the field of Church History of teachers from the Faculty of orthodox theology in Bucharest: 1881-1989], (Bucureşti, Editura Bizantină, 2003), 26.

[25] As confesses into the memorial submitted the Ministry of Public Instruction, professor Jirecek has examined him on the history of the Church of the peoples of the orthodox church: Romanians, Polish, Bulgarians, Greeks, Russians, etc.(See:Nicolae Şerbănescu, *op. cit.,*575. The Diploma has been released with the date of 3 April 1905, and equalized at the Faculty of Letters in Bucharest with his doctorate in History.

[26]*Istoria Bisericii Române din Oltenia în timpul ocupaţiunii austriece (1716-1739), cu 220 acte şi fragmente inedite culese din arhivele din Viena* [The history of the Romanian Church in Oltenia region during the Austrian occupation (1716-1739), with 220 papers and unique fragments collected from the archives of Vienna], (Editura Academiei Române, Bucureşti 1906), 385pages, and*Documente şi registre privitoare la Constantin Brâncoveanu* [Documents and records relating to Constantin Brancoveanu], with coauthorC. Giurescu, (Bucharest 1907), 434.

whose introduction has signed it at Vienna on12[th] ofApril 1905[27], and *Fragmente privitoare la Istoria Bisericii Române*[28][Fragments relating to the history of the Romanian Church].

In September 1905, in the Romanian Orthodox Churchmagazine, prof. P. Gârboviceanu make a presentation with praise for two printed works of the young romanian historian and mention also that he is expected to return to the country for the new department of the Romanian Church History.

THE MECHANISMS OF SELECTION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ROMANIAN THEOLOGICAL ELITE

The appointment of the first professor at the Romanian Church History Department of the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest involved numerous debates, discussions with passion and with a lot of consumption of ink and paper.For his frequent applications, Stefan Dinulescu was considered to be a "perpetual and unhappy candidate"[29]. On 12[th]of October 1905 he address a new request to the Holy Synod, through which he demanded to temporary substitute for free the recently established Department until to the organization of the examination of occupying. In the reply received on 21 ofOctober 1905[30], the Holy Synod informed him that it had decided "to put in mind of the petitioner to file the application to Mr. Minister of Religious Affairs, which, if find it necessary, will advance it to the Holy Synod, to take a decision in accordance to the law of the education"[31].

In accordance with the response received, Stefan Dinulescu, on 24[th]of November 1905, he addressed the Ministry, requesting him to supplant the department concerned and offering him to teach "free of charge, because funds not exist". Ministry has not fulfilled this wish, because "the Department was not budgeted"[32]. The same response receives also the former scholar of the Ministry, Nicolae Dobrescu, who had been to specialize in the study of the history of the Romanian Church in Vienna.

Other requests to substitute this new department came from another candidate, named George M. Ionescu, who graduated in science and letters, licentiate in Letters and Philosophy, which on 12th of December 1905, requested him also the dean's of the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest the approval to support a free course of Romanian Church History to the students. The same thing is repeated by Stephen Dinulescu himself. The deanship of the Faculty of Theology responds both to February 22, 1906 that they can fulfill the requests because "the newly established Department of Romanian Church History, soon will handle by a holder"[33].

In The Official Monitor appeared on 13[th]of March, 1906, the Ministry of Instruction makes the following announcement: "The Ministry, in accordance with Article 69 of the Law on Secondary Education, informs the general public that there is vacant the chair of Romanian Church History at the Faculty of Theology Bucharest".Aspirants have had a period

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[27]The paper will appear in the periodical: *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*[The Romanian Ortodox Church], year XXIX (1905-1906), no.2, 175-188,no.3, 270-278, no.4, 423-434, no.5, 531-546, no.6, 597-606, no.7, 756-796, no.8, 939-944, no.9, 985-1000, no.10,1110-1125, no. 11, 1210-1221 (and then at Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, București 1906), 128 pages.

[28] Published at the Institute Print "Luceafarul", Budapest 1905, p. 84, with a preface signed in Budapest on 1st of July of the same year.

[29]Toma G. Bulat,*Contribuţii la istoricul Facultăţii de Teologie şi Institutului Teologic Universitar din Bucureşti,* 1146.

[30]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The Holy Synod Archive], Fileno. 113,384.

[31]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The Holy Synod Archive], Fileno., 377.

[32]Arhiva de Stat București [State Archive Bucharest], Fileno. 518/1905,18.

[33]Toma G. Bulat,*Contribuţii la istoricul Facultăţii de Teologie şi Institutului Teologic Universitar din Bucureşti,* 1146.

of two months at their disposal in order to address to the Ministry their applications accompanied by a statement in two copies on their attributes, titles and scientific work. It also had been asked them two copies of their scientific work, which have been printed, and the acts and their supporting documents which they would have believed it necessary to satisfy the request[34].

In the contest had signed up four candidates: George M. Ionescu, Nicolae Dobrescu, Stefan Dinulescu and Dumitru Stănescu, which, in 22 and 27th April 1906, have deposited at the Ministry the applications and the pleadings referred to in the communication of the Official Monitor. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Instruction, on 2nd of May 1906, with address No 24/1906, has sent it to the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church with the request that: "in accordance with the provisions of the Law on secondary and superior education and Regulation to the appointment of the docents, aggregates and professors, to pronounce on the work of the presented" and to "notify the result"[35]. On the same day the Ministry sent such requests and memories - with the same purpose - the Rector's of the University of Bucharest[36].

The Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church at its meeting on 4th of May 1906, has entrusted these documents to a special commission made up of bishop Safirin Gherasim of Roman, Sofronie Vulpescu Craioveanul and Nifon Niculescu Ploiesteanul. After the "Research works of the candidates willing to be appointed teachers at the Department of Romanian Church History of the University our Faculty of theology, finds that the work of the Mr. Dumitru Stanescu accomplish all of the conditions required", trough the ratio of 7th May 1906, the Commission has concluded that the Mr. Dumitru Stanescu to be recommended from the Holy Synod as a holder professor in the Department of Romanian Church History, created by the law promulgated in the Official Monitor No. 263 of 28th of February 1906 at the Faculty of Theology of the University of Bucharest[37]. At its meeting on 8th of May 1906, the plenary session of the Holy Synod approved unanimously the conclusions reached by the Commission to be recommended Dumitru Stanescu for employment of the Department of the history of the Romanian Church[38].

The University Senate together with the College of the teaching staff of the Faculty of Theology, on 6th of May 1906, appointed a commission composed of the dean of the faculty, dr. Constantin Chiricescu, and of the professors Dragomir Demeterscu and Dimitrie G. Boroianu to analyze the titles and scientific works of the same candidates at the free chair of Romanian Church History.On 12th of May 1906 the Rector of the University of Bucharest asked to the deanship of the Faculty of Theology that as soon as possible the Commission to commence work. During the day of May 16 the Commission was convened in its first meeting for this purpose.After a further two sessions, on 2nd of June 1906, its members have drawn up a report which expressed their opinion to be recommended as aggregate at the Department of Romanian Church History the candidate Dumitru Stanescu, who, after them, gave evidence of authorisation and by the fact that he is the secondary teacher of religion and he is entered in the education system through the contest. That same day, they communicated to the Rector their decision[39].

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[34]Arhiva de Stat București, Ministerul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii Publice [State Archive Bucharest, Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education], Fileno 1452,9; *Monitorul Oficial*[The Official Monitor],no. 263 of 28 februarie/13 martie 1906, 9349-9350.

[35]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod[The archive of the Holy Synod], Fileno. 114,147.

[36]Arhiva de Stat București[State Archive Bucharest], Fileno. 1452/1006,10.

[37]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The archive of the Holy Synod], Fileno. 114, 145v-146.

[38]With adressno. 100 din 18 mai 1906. Arhiva Sfântului Sinod [The archive of the Holy Synod], Fileno. 114, 142.

[39]With adressno. 538 of 2/15th of June 1906.

There were dissatisfaction in connection with this Decission, the University Senate has applied to the reference Commission detailed examination. On 19th of June 1906 the Rectorate demanded deanship to submit as soon as possible an analytical and detailed report on the titles and the work of the candidates in the manner set out in the Article 61 of Regulation[40].They held several meetings, but it always has been postponed a decision. The Commission requested further postponements for submitting of such referral, the debates were extending to the end of November 1906, during which some of the candidates have presented new works.

Only after more than half a year of work, through the protocol signed on15[th] of November 1906, the report Commission has been found that two of the candidates: George M. Ionescu and Dumitru Stanescu, which he had recommended for the first time, do not hold the titles required by law and consequently would not have been analyzed the works.Of the other two candidates, Stefan Diculescu has the title required by law, and Nicolae Dobrescu only "in interpretative reserve" has such a title. The conclusion consists in: any of the candidates are not recommended and proposing to keeping a contest of aggregation[41].

Minister for Religious Affairs and Instruction Mihail Vladescu had a different opinion, and on the basis of the rights conferred by the law, has taken different measures from the conclusions of the two commissions. On 25th of October 1906, with order 61474/1906 has entrusted to Nicolae Dobrescu the leading of the Department of the Romanian Church History at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest.On 3rd of November it started the course becoming the first professor in the specialty mentioned. Some think that the decision of the minister has been influenced by the professors at the Faculty of Letters of Bucharest headed by Nicolae Iorga.

Nicolae Dobrescu has worked as a substitute to this Department only in the university year 1906-1907. Having the University of Bucharest Senate's approval met with the College of the teaching staff of the Faculty of Theology, during the month of May 1907, minister finalized the appointment of Dobrescu at his desk in the history of the Romanian Church, calling him permanently aggregate.On 9th of May 1907, King Carol I sanctioned the decree, countersigned by the minister SpiruHaret and published in the Official Monitor No. 34: "Mr. Nicolae Dobrescu, Licentiate in theology in Bucharest and doctor in philosophy in Vienna, is called on the day of 1 November 1907, definitively aggregate to the Department of the Romanian Church History at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest, in accordance with Article 69, paragraph d and art. 71, paragraph I of the Law on Secondary and Higher Education"[42].

The Ministry replied to the Holy Synod only on 11th of May 1907 arguing the different decision from the Holy Synod in which opinion it ought to be chosen Stefan Dinulescu: "Considering that this opinion is not valid, because it is not based on thorough and reasoned research of all the work presented from all candidates; Then considering that Article 71 of Law cited gives us the right to do, we, the appointment at a university department in the case when the recommendations are not made in the rule and in the legal deadlines.On all these reasons, we have the honor to make known that I recommended to His Majesty King, on Mr. Nicolae Dobrescu, to be called permanently aggregate to the Romanian Church History at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest and His Majesty was pleased to

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[40]With adressno. 267 of 19th of June 1906.

[41]ArhivaInstitutuluiTeologic din Bucureşti, *Actele Concursului de agregaţie* pentru Catedra de Istoria Bisericii Române 1905-1906 [The Archive of Theological Institute in Bucharest, the acts of the aggregation contest for the department of the history of the Romanian Church 1905-1906],adress of registration no. 1101 from 22 of november 1906.

[42] The Decreeno. 2260/1907, in *Monitorul Oficial*[The Official Monitor],no. 34 of 15/28th of may 1907, 1305.

approve this appointment with the decree No 2260 of 9[th]of May 1907". Faced with this situation, the Holy Synod, in its meeting of 14 May 1907 has taken note of the permanently appointment of Nicolae Dobrescu at the Department of the history of the Romanian Church at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest[43].

After more than four years of operation as definitive aggregate, on 1[st]of July 1911, has been raised to the professor rank[44], keeping this quality to death. Following the example of Iorga's history school, which commemorated with piety, Dobrescu was regarded as the most authoritative expert and developer of the Romanian Church History, enjoying by chosen consideration in the scientific world. Following the example of his famous teacher Jireček, he not used to speaking freely in front of the students but used to read the courses that were always based on reliable sources and good books.

Constantin Tomescu stated about him: "When he teached at the desk was severely, cold as a monolith, without digressions, he didn't make the ironies against someone,nor jokes, and he didn't shown us tired. The system at the exam was: call for the first bank 6 students, in alphabetical order: if a student did not respond satisfactorily he passed to the neighbor, leaving him the one to formulate a better answer;After listening to all the others, he returned to the first and so continue with 3-4 questions but without to help you with answer, but neither hurry. Almost all the students were afraid to go to the exam and they postponed the presentation on another session. But Professor Dobrescu demanded only matter that was surrendered and was a righteous man"[45].

Appreciated by Nicolae Iorga and Vasile Pârvan, loyal friend of Nicolae Titulescu, Nicolae Dobrescu was part of the elite of Romanian historians, being known and abroad. But he has failed to highlight the value of everything that had accumulated because his activity was interrupted unexpectedly.

The professor who was imposing by his stature, through the power to work, as well as through the physical construction has gone beyond the borders of this life on 10th of July 1914 due to a cancer in his stomach. Although he was not even forty years old, in almost eight years in which he taught at the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest, he managed to let to his discipline and to Romanian history generally quite rich heritage.

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[43]Arhiva Sfântului Sinod[The archive of the Holy Synod], Fileno. 115,444.
[44] With the Decreeno. 2361 din 5 iulie 1911 (See: Toma G. Bulat,*Contribuţii la istoricul Facultăţii de Teologie şi Institutului Teologic Universitar din Bucureşti,* 1156).
[45]Constantin Tomescu, *Jurnal, manuscris*[Journal, The manuscript],147.

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HUMAN TRAFFICKING ROMANIA – ITALY

Alexandru GUŞETOIU[1]

ABSTRACT:
ORGANISED CRIME IS ONE OF THE BIGGEST THREATS TO ALL COUNTRIES IN THE BEGINNING OF THIS CENTURY. THE PHENOMENON KNOWN A DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION ESPECIALLY WHEN DEVELOPING AT CROSS-BORDER AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL. TRAFFICKING HAS BECOME ONE OF THE BUSINEST AND MOST PROFITABLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES COMMITTED BY ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS. UNFORTUNATELY, HUMAN TRAFFICKING HAS BECOME A HIGHY DYNAMIC ACTIVITY AND WORRYING SOURCE OF INSTABILITY, BEING PERCEIVED AS A VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND A THREAT TO THE SECURITY AND INTEGRITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL HUMAN BEING.
A LARGE NUMBER OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS IN THE WEST ARE COMING FROM ROMANIA. VICTIMS ARE TRAFFICKED FROM ROMANIA TO COUNTRIES IN EUROPE, INCLUDING ITALY FOR FORCED WORKING, BEGGING AND THEFT. WOMEN ARE VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING FOR FORCED PROSTITUTION AND ABOUT A THIRD OF THE VICTIMS IN ROMANIA ARE MINOR.
ARTICLE "HUMAN TRAFFICKING ROMANIA – ITALY" SHOWS HOW THIS ACTIVITY TAKES PLACE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE PERSONS LIKELY TO BECOME VICTIMS, STATISTICS, CASE STUDIES AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PHENOMENON.

KEY WORDS*:* ILLEGAL MIGRATION, CRIMINAL ORGANIZED GROUP, VICTIMS OF TRAFFICKING.

Ensuring individual freedom and respect for fundamental rights is a goal, since they are the main targets of national and international political actors but also civil society. Guaranteeing freedom of the individual and respect for his life have become today, more than ever, fundamental values, which increasingly more people worldwide report to, while becoming part of social policy.

Simply take a look at today's criminal policy to notice the importance that human life and individual freedom have taken on a current societies. It is therefore normal that the plight of individuals and modern forms of slavery are likely to cause concern and to determine the mobilization of collective action for their elimination. [2]

Human trafficking is a violation of human rights and an offense to human dignity and integrity, a threat to individual security and social and moral values. Although it is on the international agenda since 2000, trafficking, as criminal and social phenomenon, remains a reality that requires a sustained and continuous effort from international organizations, to

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[2] Margareta Fleşner, *Human trafficking: modern form of slavery in a world vulnerable*, (Bucharest: Bren, 2010), 140.

individual countries but also the whole society. This type of crime directly affects the individual through the impact it has on one of the fundamental individual rights, individual freedom, societies having to deal, at the same time, with the negative influences of the growing corruption, and violent antisocial acts, the creation of criminal mechanisms profiting substantially from this type of activity, affecting economic stability and regional security. Awareness of the negative effects of the destructive impact that this scourgehas on children, youth, women, the disabled and other social groups becomes a fundamental requirement of the institutional approach in modern rule of law.

Economic and social reality over recent years and the economic crisis that has affected European states have increased the vulnerability to trafficking of certain social groups. Increased demand for sexual services, cheap labor, the desire to make profits with minimal investment, are all factors that directly influence the increased activity of trafficking networks. [3]

According to Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking, human trafficking can be defined as following: *"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or reception of persons, including the exchange or transfer of control over those persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation."[4]*

The purpose of the crime of trafficking is the exploitation of victims. Although you might think that there is an overlap between the texts of trafficking offenses and the offense of slavery and subjection to forced or compulsory labor, there is , however, an etiological connection because a crime is committed, with the purpose of committing another.[5] Exploitation of persons means, according to law number 678/2001, *"the execution of a work or performance of services, forcibly, in violation of legal rules on working conditions, wages, health and safety, enslaving or other similar deprivation of liberty or servitude."[6]* Slavery is, accordingto the Penal Code *"putting or keeping a person in slavery and the slave trade"[7], an offense to submission to forced or compulsory labor "act of subjecting a person, in cases other than those provided by legal provisions to perform work against his will or compulsory labor."[8]*

Human trafficking becomes operational around the following elements: passenger transport; It presupposes the existence of two sides, the victim and the trafficker; the two parties have a clearly defined status; action is targeted to the purpose of exploiting the victim; Every trafficking action is based on coercion; activities resulting in the action do not derive from a consensual activity, which allows differentiation from other forms of trafficking; It is identified as a form of modern slavery; Crime parameters vary due to political, economic and social conditions of each country.[9]

Human trafficking is one of the most profitable activities of organized crime in the EU, according to Europol, ranking , depending on income, third in the world, surpassed only

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[3] National strategy against human trafficking for the period 2012-2016, approved by H. G. no. 1142/2012.

[4] Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, art. 2. 1.

[5] George-Cristinel Zaharia, *Human Trafficking*, (Bucuresti:C.H. Beck, 2012), 150.

[6] Law no. 678/2001, Chapter I, Art. 2, paragraph 2, a), b).

[7] The new Romanian Penal Code, Slavery Trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable persons, Art. 209.

[8] The new Romanian Penal Code, Submission to forced or compulsory labor trafficking and exploitation of vulnerable persons, Art. 212.

[9] Alina Anghel, Modern slavery violence and trafficking in women - sociological perspective, (Bucharest: Universiatara) 2011, 31.

by drug trafficking and the arms, with an illicit profit between 6 and 9 billion. However, according to UNODC, traffickers in human beings annually have illegal profits of about $ 8 billion, comparable to profit from drug trafficking. [10]

In Romania the monitoring, evaluation and research of the many dimensions of human trafficking is the responsibility of the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons, with strong performance and strategic continuity.

Margaret Flaşner's sociological research into human trafficking in Romania, has the following data on the profile of the victim and her family:

The area of origin, 65 of the 80 victims interviewed come from the urban areas with a precarious social and economic development which no longer offers chances on the labor market (Haţeg, Calarasi).

The interviewed victims were first involved in trafficking at ages between 14 and 25 years. Experts in this field share the same opinion that recruitment age for women is between 18 and 25 years old.

Educational and professional status. 68% of victims interviewed only attended secondary education, 15% arehigh school graduates, 10% vocational school. This proves older diagnoses which were performed, showing that most victims are people with low and very low education.

The family situation. Most victims more respect from families with children (4-7 siblings) with several relatives, the number of those who bring money into the house is reduced. Low living standards and a tense atmosphere in these families determine victims to leave home with the desire to obtain a better life at any cost. In terms of material status 54% of them were unmarried, 23% living in cohabiting relationships, 12% married, 11% divorced.

Another European institution with the mission to support and strengthen coordination and cooperation between national authorities in the fight against serious cross-border crime is Eurojust. In the 2013 report we were presented a case of human trafficking for prostitution and Eurojust intervenes at the request of the Anti-Mafia Office in Florence. Most suspects of the organized crime group were of Albanian nationality who were in Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Albania. Following joint Eurojust actions, 19 people in Albania, France and Italy were arrested and the organized crime group was neutralized. [11]

TESTIMONIES OF VICTIMS EXPLOITED IN ITALY

"An acquaintance of mine told me that peoplewere recruited for picking potatoes. They called me, they asked if there are other willing and they came here in the village. We met at my place , about 30 people, adults and children "(victim exploited in Italy). [12]

The recruitment happens in the online space through various websites apparently mediating the labor market, but also by telephone or social networks (most commonly for sexual exploitation):

"I found the ad on Mercador, saying that people need to pick tomatoes."
(Victim exploited in Italy). [13]

"We had a good phone conversation a few weeks, then, we met via the Internet, and we decided to meet in person. Since it was the holidays season, I decided to go and get to know

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[10] Report on the situation of human trafficking in 2012, the National Agency against Trafficking in Persons, Bucharest, 2013, p.5.

[11] Eurojust Report 2013, 32.

[12] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, Éva László, Imola Antal, Situation of human trafficking for purposes of labor exploitation in agriculture in Romania research report produced within the AGREE, 2014, 28.

[13] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 29.

her... He said he dialed a random number. He simply said, "Hey, I want to get to know you." We confided. How we are, what we hope from life, from people. We met. What was actually talking on the phone was not so in reality... He seemed a serious person on the phone, not at all showing how he really proved to be. Greedy for money, profiteering, misleading..."(victim exploited in Italy). [14]

"Somewherenear the town of S there is a farm., where currently some workers are picking potatoes. They live in barns, in conditions not quite appropriate." (Victim exploited in Italy). [15]

"When she saw that I was packing , she made a scene and called her parents, brothers and in-laws. From that moment, it was hell. I was no longer able to get in touch with my family, tell them I'll be back. I was always accompanied by her father and her brother-in-law and nephews that were about 20-23 years old. But they were massive, well built. As if I had bodyguards at all times ". (Victim exploited in Italy). [16]

"When I said that, however, he should give us some food that we could eat, he began to hit us saying that he is going to show us what complaining means. I could understand some Italian, but it was in that Sicilianaccent. They told me that if I wanted to try to flee or do anything stupid in there,or go to the carabinieri, I have no chance because the owner's son... was a carabiniere and it was a rather isolated area. " (Victim exploited in Italy). [17]

They told us not try to run away, sincehe is president of Roma in their county, that he has connections everywhere, Police, even the Parliament." (Victim exploited in Italy). [18]

"We found that Italy, in the South of the European Union has for years held a disguised form of slavery based on threats and constraints. Let's not forget it's the land where the mafia was born and still exists. There are stories of Romanians working correctly, in difficult conditions, "apart" from families that await them at home. There are dramas in this respect, because we are talking of parents who do not see their children in the country for years." journalist Rares Nastase.

Italy is a country of destination and transit to other European countries for trafficking persons for sexual exploitation. Italian authorities discovered many victims of trafficking originating in Romania. Albanian pimps' networks are prevailing in street prostitution in cooperation with the Italian mafia. The Italian government fully comply with minimum standards for elimination of trafficking . The government holds a strong legal framework that incriminatestrafficking , with particular focus on human rights. Italian anti -trafficking law operates effectively both nationally and internationally. Jurists are involved and concerned that the laws to be adopted on immigration could conflict with the existing strong system concerning victims' protection.[19]

The largest agricultural basin in Italy is in the province of Ragusa , on the island of Sicily. We speak of a place with more than 17 thousand hectares of greenhouses , farms and fruit orchards . A place where there areofficiallyover 40 thousand immigrants, of which only

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[14] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 29.

[15] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 30.

[16] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 33.

[17] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 34.

[18] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 34.

[19] Gheorghiţă Mateuţ, Tiberiu Rudică, *Human trafficking offenders, victims, offenders*, (Iaşi: Social Alternatives Association, 2005), 181-182.

5000 are officially Romanians. It is estimated that the number of Romanians is however three times higher. This means that for every Romanian with contract , there are other two who work illegally.[20]

Housing conditions are generally below minimum standards. Often, people are accommodated in halls and barns, cellars or in tents, sometimes locked in so as to be prevented from leaving. The foodthey have been promised turns out to be inexistent, or it is very scarce and of poor quality, only enough for them to survive and be able to work.[21]

Sometimes victims work extremely long hours: 14-17 hours / day. Payment does not coincide at all with what they have been promised in the recruitment phase: it is either very little, or inexistent. Or, the facilitator is paid, but the money does not reach the workers. It is typical of the recruiters to promise different people different amounts of money for the same job.[22]

Attempts to request help even from authorities have sometimes failed, since escaping is difficult. Victims do not know whom to trust, they are frightened and isolated. Neighbourswho witnessit, rarely get involved since they are generally afraid of the employer or they do not want to come up against the employer, or their family. Sometimes, the authorities do not react, becauseof prejudices regarding the Romani ethnic group, while in Italy or Spain because of prejudice against Romanians. Victims even accuse the police of not acting on own initiative as well as of ignoring the illegal acts victims are subjected to.[23]

Isolation in which these people work, especially constraints to which they are subjected when accepting illegal work is a form of modern slavery. In Sicily there were mysterious deaths which have been or are still being investigated, but in Romania there is no mention about them, about Romanians missing or having been killed. Romanians are kept away from the civilized world and are forced to accept living in solitude among Sicilian greenhouses.

Journalist Rares Nastase conducted a journalistic investigation complex in the TV show "Romania, te iubesc" ("Romania, I love you") on PRO TV that presented the story of modern slaves, the isolation these people work in and most importantly the constraints they put up with when they accept undocumented jobs from the mafia who seized the destinies of Romanian workers. The investigation reports on the circumstances in which the shift from agriculture to the underworld is made in Sicily, how Romanians become carriers in drug trafficking or how vegetable greenhouses may serve as a cover for other illegal business.[24]

"I believe that she consented. Even though she denied afterwards! If I go with a woman, it is not sexual exploitation, I'm exploiting if I ask you to work by going with other men and make money. If we consent to making love, it is not sexual exploitation! "The man who said this is 66 years old and has been married for 35 years. He claims that unlike other immigrants, such as Albanians, Romanians do not know how to keep their women close, as a business owner stated while being filmed with a hidden camera.

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[20]http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/international/retea-de-trafic-uman-pe-relatia-romania-italia-situatia-disperata-a-romanilor-care-muncesc-in-fermele-din-catania.html

[21] http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, Éva László, Imola Antal, Situation of human trafficking for purposes of labor exploitation in agriculture in Romania research report produced within the AGREE, 2014, 30.

[22]http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 32.

[23]http://www.cnslr-fratia.ro/media/8631/raport_de_cercetare_calitativa__exploatare_munca_in_agricultura.pdf, 36.

[24]http://www.protv.ro/stiri/noul-sezon-romania-te-iubesc-debuteaza-duminica-la-ora-18-00-cu-povestea-sclavilor-de-pe-pamantul-mafiei.html.

The owners are middle-aged men who employ mostly younger and naïve women, whom they are trying to conquer by doing them various favours on the farm, or sometimes by even trying inappropriate physical contact.

There are nationalities such as the Americans, where a look and a word may be considered sexual harassment, followed by a criminal punishment. In Italy, however, there are different ways of understanding the notion of "conquering" a woman, even at work, where employer - employee relationship may involve advances, touching and even constraints, in the case of the Sicilians who cannot take no for an answer.

The police from Ragusa periodically send crews to check buses that bring workers from Romania. Women receive leaflets written in Romanian in which they are advised to make denunciations. Without a denunciation sexual exploitation and human trafficking are difficult to prove, especially when the woman agrees to live at the farm where the owner has authority.[25]

For some women coming from a poor environment, some attention matters. Some are tempted to give in to their insistence, especially in exchange for a privileged status that Sicilian owners are willing to pay for an adventure with those who will accept them. The problem is that even real cases of sexual exploitation are not taken seriously if a woman agrees to go with Italians and when the authorities are interested in such cases there are several situations in which Romanian women prove to have accepted this form of sexual exploitation. Italian owners, Sicilians who live in the countryside, without much education, think Romanian women are 'easy', being regarded as sexual objects, which they can exploit at the farms, considering themselves entitled to take advantage of them beyond agricultural services. The big problem is that some of them do not know when to stop, do not accept being turned away and resort to constraints. Romanians who live on the greenhouses premises, especially young people have fun at nights by dancing and drinking at their discretion, so the owners see this and consider it a good opportunity to break every barrier that should exist between an employer and its employee. None of these situations is an excuse for aggression. Looking at the problem from every angle, it indicates sexual exploitation. Overall, the owner is to be blame as he is the one who exploits, he is the one who has vulnerable women as his subordinates while his desire to conquer does not justify any abuse or coercion. There might be women who do not complain, hoping that at some point they will have a better life. The Catholic priest from Vittoria says that these women are constrained, as long as they are noton an equal footing with their employer.[26]

The promises made before employment differ from the actual situation and this problem occurs when the employer does not pay on time female employees, this becoming a rule in many Sicilian farms, Romanians being dependent on the person who permanently owes them money, and offers them free accommodation in return for their work. This is the background in which the modern form of slavery, based on constraints, appears .

As it is known, it is in Sicily where many mafia groups are rooted so the temptations to join are strong. Therefore, not all Romanians are satisfied with the earnings from agriculture. Some men are attracted to commit crimes in various underworld networks run by mafia clans, who require carriers to transport drugs or weapons**.** Those who speak with the police take an enormous risk. In Vittoria ordered executions take place regularly 10 shots

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[25]http://romaniateiubesc.stirileprotv.ro/emisiuni/2015/sezonul-1/sicilia-locul-unde-romanii-veniti-la-munca-ajung-sa-lucreze-pentru-mafie-te-vede-ca-esti-amarat-te-ia-de-copilul-lui.html?fb_comment_id=721185871327440_724748807637813#fe7027333c307.

[26]http://romaniateiubesc.stirileprotv.ro/emisiuni/2015/sezonul-1/sicilia-locul-unde-romanii-veniti-la-munca-ajung-sa-lucreze-pentru-mafie-te-vede-ca-esti-amarat-te-ia-de-copilul-lui.html?fb_comment_id=721185871327440_724748807637813#fe7027333c307.

were fired at one of the victims, a Tunisian, who used to work in greenhouses. Sicilian mafia leaders of families do not want to be regarded as dangerous people. Their territories are home to business with drugs, weapons and prostitution. Though many Romanian women are called under the pretext that they are needed in greenhouses, they actually get trafficked for prostitution. The discos within the greenhouses premises from agricultural areas play an important role. Restaurants areclosed during the day, but get very busy in the evenings becoming a meeting point for the customer looking for paid sex.

At night, away from the city, police raids are rare. Young women working on farms know exactly how recruitment is done. Each disco owner hires a Romanian as head of the place. Their job is to find girls in greenhouses, willing to give up on farming. Some of these intermediate persons already have convictions for pimping in Romania.[27]

One of the clients of the discos, and elderly person with a family agreed to speak about it under protection. He says there are lots of women to choose from, and some of the women who prostitute work in the greenhouses during the summer season.The man also states that outside the greenhouses the women paradoxically feel more free, although they end up in prostitution networks. The Italian says he is a greenhouses owner himself but he had only been interested in the women who did not sell themselves, never forcing any of his employees.

A young woman who worked in one of the pubs agreed to tell us what happens in the discos from the greenhouses premises. Romanian women are taken from farms to work as waitresses, everything is only a cover..." To their view, Romanian women are very cheap women, who do everything they are asked to do and that's all." The woman claims that many times women who work in Sicily together with their husbands or partners end up practising prostitution. Unbelievably as it may sound, some of them are even encouraged to do so.

In the summer the young prostitutes are sent to the sea resorts. Only then does the police interfere and find them in apartments rented by their bosses. Moldovans working in greenhouses say that many farms function as cover for the fortunes they made from prostitution. Locally there is silenziostampa and young people who know girls trafficked on farms area are reluctant to notify authorities. Large chains of prostitution are disturbed only when Anti-Mafia Squad from Rome are involved.

It is equally true that Romanians who mind their own business, do not end up in the illegal networks. They choose smaller profits, undocumented, in greenhouses with a work programme from morning until night rather than much higher tempting sums but having their risks accordingly.[28]

Amnesty International,which is an organization that fights for respecting human rights, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, drew up a report under the title "Exploited Labour: Migrant workers in Italy 's agricultural sector", which focuses on the problem of exploitation in labor of migrants in Italy.

Over the last decade the Italian authorities have contributed to increased public anxiety , saying the country's security is endangered by "clandestine" uncontrolled migration thereby justifying their severe migration measures . They put migrant workers in a precarious legal situation, which makes them easy prey to exploiters. Italian policies on migration are trying to control the number of migrants by assigning quotas for different types of workers and

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[27]http://romaniateiubesc.stirileprotv.ro/emisiuni/2015/sezonul-1/sicilia-locul-unde-romanii-veniti-la-munca-ajung-sa-lucreze-pentru-mafie-te-vede-ca-esti-amarat-te-ia-de-copilul-lui.html?fb_comment_id=721185871327440_724748807637813#fe7027333c307.

[28]http://romaniateiubesc.stirileprotv.ro/emisiuni/2015/sezonul-1/sicilia-locul-unde-romanii-veniti-la-munca-ajung-sa-lucreze-pentru-mafie-te-vede-ca-esti-amarat-te-ia-de-copilul-lui.html?fb_comment_id=721185871327440_724748807637813#fe7027333c307.

issuing residence permits under the contract of employment , but those odds are lower than actual demand for migrant labor . This system is a risk that can enhance labor exploitation, besides being inefficient and open to abuse . Under Italian law "entry and illegal residence" is a criminal offense, which stigmatizes illegal migrant workers and triggers xenophobia and discrimination. This puts them in a situation in which they are unable to report abuse by being paid less or not at all, or by being forced to work more because if they complain to authorities, they will be arrested immediately detained and expelled, having irregular status. The Italian authorities should focus primarily on the rights of migrant workers regardless of their status in the development of migration policies, by doing this offering them effective access to justice. All this should help migrants not to be afraid of being arrested or deported abusively while a safe and accessible mechanism that workers can use to file complaints, including civil enforcement actions against employers, should also be included. Labor exploitation of migrant workers in the agricultural and construction fieldsin some regions in southern Italy is widespread. They earn 40 percent less although they work more than Italians. The victims of this are migrants from Africa and Asia, as well as EU citizens (mainly Bulgarians and Romanians), as well as people from outside the EU from Eastern Europe (including Albanians).[29]

The National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons deals with the prevention and combating human trafficking and supports victims or potential victims of human trafficking. The Agency provides a free telephone line - help line 0,800,800,678 where those interested can receive general information about going abroad to work, as tourists or they may announce a possible case of human trafficking. The National Agency against Trafficking in Persons is National Coordinator of implementing policies in the fight against human trafficking with the purpose to carry out prevention and monitoring of this criminal phenomenon .

Under the slogan "Don't be taken in", The Agency against Trafficking in Persons held various prevention activities, focusing on sexual exploitation. Romania is among the countries of origin of this phenomenon on European level and this campaign informing citizens about trafficking and exploitation of persons, as well as the prevention of this phenomenon, is needed. It is not great news, but by getting informed and being cautious , this can be changed!

Italian authorities also use a system for those who know and want to denounce abusesthat took place in Italy, for victims of abuse to get information, to be assistants or receive advice on the options that the Italian rules offer to those in situations of exploitation and trafficking. This system is Numero Verde Antitratta - 800 290290, active 24 hours per 24.[30]

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[29]http://old.amnesty.md/news/italia-timpul-de-solu%C5%A3iona-problema-exploat%C4%83rii-lucr%C4%83torilor-migran%C5%A3i.

[30]https://www.migreat.it/ro/rom%C3%A2ni/roma/munc%C4%83/trafic-persoane-h9712.

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PREVENTING AND COMBATING ILLEGAL MIGRATION

Alexandru GUSETOIU [1]

ABSTRACT:
COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT. ILLEGAL MIGRATION HAS NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE COUNTRIES OF DESTINATION THAT IS WHY THE EU MUST BE CONCERNED WITH PREVENTING AND LARGELY COMBATING THE CONSIDERABLE INCREASE IN THE ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GROUPS IN ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS AND OTHER RELATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES.
COMBATING MIGRANT TRAFFICKING IS A PRIORITY FOR THE ROMANIAN POLICE. THE STRUCTURES FOR COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS FROM THE GENERAL INSPECTORATE OF ROMANIAN POLICE PERMANENTLY ACT TO COMBAT THE FORMS IN WHICH HUMAN TRAFFICKING, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION, LABOR EXPLOITATION MANIFEST THEMSELVES. ROMANIAN POLICE CONTINUES TO CARRY OUT A SUSTAINED COOPERATION WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES FROM CIRCUMSCRIBED COUNTRIES TO A TRAFFICKING ROUTE, NAMELY THE TRANSIT OR DESTINATION STATE BY IMPLEMENTING PROJECTS AND JOINT OPERATIONS AND MAKING PERMANENT EXCHANGE OF DATA.

KEY WORDS*:* ORGANIZED CRIME, SANCTION**,** ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING OF MIGRANTS, MEASURES TO COMBAT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION.

"Migration is a process to be managed rather than a problem to be solved." National Immigration Strategy for the period 2015-2018.

Illegal migration is a major factor in the development of organized crime, becoming a threat to socio-economic security and stability of states, so the states must fight to combat this practice by severe penalties. Because of criminal networks and the ingenuity of criminals, illegal migration has become an increasingly broader and more difficult to controlscourge. Illegal trafficking of migrants is one of the most acute manifestations of cross-border crime with long-term side effects. This often blends with other aspects of organized crime such as drug trafficking or arms trafficking. More and more complex networks of human traffickers, (organized in groups) with close connections worldwide are being found.

The European Union aims to ensure a high level of security, freedom and justice for its citizens by developing common actions among the Member States in the field of police and judicial cooperation. Therefore, steps must be taken to combat the aiding of illegal

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immigration, regardless of the purpose in which they practice it, whether it is illegal border crossing, or supplying the networks of exploitation of persons.

Preventing and combating illegal migration involved EU countries in drafting laws, collaboration and consensus actions. As a result of the policies implemented and the efforts to combat this phenomenon it has been noticed that the number of people who return to their home countries has increased in recent years.

According to Romania's National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, illegal migration is one of the risks and vulnerabilities identified on national level by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, brought to EU level.

„Illegal entry" shall mean crossing borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal entry into the receiving State.[2]

The European Union has adopted two important pieces of legislation in combating illegal migration:

Return Directive (2008/115 / EC) establishes common European rules and procedures on the return of third -country nationals who are illegally staying. Among the main areas requiring further action are the promotion of practices consistent and compatible with fundamental rights, improving cooperation between Member States and increasing the role of Frontex.[3]

Ensuring effective returns is one of the key tasks of the teams supporting the national authorities on the " access points " (hotspots) level in Italy and Greece. On the other hand, on 9 September 2015 the European Commission published an action plan of the European Union on returning.

Directive 2009/52/EC specifies sanctions and measures to be implemented by Member States against employers who violate the ban on employing third country nationals who are illegally staying. EU negotiates and concludes readmission agreementswith countries of origin and transit for the return of irregular migrants and works with these countries to combat trafficking. Those agreements include reciprocal cooperation commitments between the EU and third country partners . Negotiations with the following countries have led to the entry into force of such agreements : Hong Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Pakistan, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey.[4]

U.E. SANCTIONS APPLICABLE TO PERSONS WHO COMMIT OFFENSES ON ILLEGAL MIGRATION.

Each Member State shall adopt appropriate sanctions applicable to persons who adopt an unlawful conduct , which consciouslyhelp a person who is not a national of a Member State to enter the territory of a Member State or transit through that territory, in violation of the state law concerning the entry or transit of foreigners, or to those who knowingly assist in profit, a person who is not a national of a Member State to reside in the territory of a Member State, in violation of its law on the stay of foreigners.

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[2] Council decision, of 24 july 2006, on the conclusion, on behalf of the european community, of the protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the united nations convention against transnational organised crime, article 3, letter b).

[3] FRONTEX - European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union.

[4] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/ro/FTU_5.12.3.pdf

When the behavior explained above aims at giving humanitarian aid to a person , each Member State may decide not to apply sanctions under EU law, applying their laws and practices.[5]

Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the infringements referred to above are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.[6]

Member States shall ensure the implementation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary. Member States shall immediately inform the Commission thereof. Member Statesshall communicate to the Commission the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field. The Comission promptly informs the other Member States thereof.[7]

Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that the infringements are subjected to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal sanctions, which may entail extradition.

Where appropriate, criminal sanctions may be accompanied by the following measures: confiscation of the means of transport used to commit the offense; a prohibition on practising directly or through an intermediary the occupational activity in the exercise of which the offense was committed; expulsion.

Each Member State shall take measures to ensure that the infringements, if they are committed for profit , should receive custodial sentences with a maximum which cannot be less than eight years, if committed in one of the following circumstances: offense was committed as an activity of a criminal organization; the offense endangered the lives of people who have been the object of the crime.

To preserve the coherence of the national penalty system in question, the acts listed may be subject to custodial sentences with a maximum which can not be less than six years, provided that it is one of the maximum most severe penalties for crimes of comparable gravity.[8]

Regarding legal persons, each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that legal persons can be held liable for the infringements committed for their benefit by any person acting individually or as part of an organ of the legal person which meets a leading position within the legal person. Liability does not exclude prosecution of individual perpetrators, instigators or accessories in offenses.[9]

Each Member State shall take the necessary measures to ensure that a legal person shall be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, including criminal or non-criminalfines and may include other penalties such as exclusion from opportunity to receive a public benefit or aid; temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of commercial activities; placement under judicial supervision; a judicial dissolution.[10]

Each Member State from which a national, alleged to have committed one of the infringements in another Member State, originates, which does not extradite that person to

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[5] Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 3.

[6] Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 3.

[7] Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 4.

[8] Council framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 1.

[9] Council framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 2.

[10] Council framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 3.

that other Member State solely on the ground of nationality, shall notify the authorities responsible for the case in question, for them to beginprosecution as appropriate. The plaintiff Member State is informed of the criminal prosecution and its outcome.[11]

A national is the natural or legal person of a State, under the protection of another State. Third-country national refers to a person who is not a citizen of the European Union according to the term used in the European legislation.

In the European Union , a number of predisposing factors and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminal elements in carrying out illicit activities were identified as follows: the economic crisis, the important nodes of transport, diaspora communities, corruption and legally established entities serving as a means for illegal activities, the attitude and behavior of the public concerning some crimes, the balance between risks and benefits after committing a particular type of crime , the ease crime entities penetrate the markets with , the Internet, electronic commerce, legislation and cross-borderopportunities, identitytheft, fraud by using forged documents.

Europol cautions that Romania may be affected by these vulnerabilities. After analyzing all the developments in this respect, Europol has identified seven threats current Member States will have to take into account when formulating courses of action in the fight against organized crime, first of them being illegal migration followed by trafficking human beings; counterfeiting of goods or healthcare and pharmaceutical products; economic crimes committed through "ghost" companies - illegal reimbursement of VAT; production and trafficking of synthetic drugs; cybercrime; money laundering.[12]

Transnational organized crime, illegal migration, cybercrime and softwarepiracy have evolved continuously taking advantage of the freedoms and modern technologies offered by the EU internal market.[13]

There are forms of organized illegal migration, encouraged by specialized organizations or criminal groups, aimed at achieving material gains from immigrants that have been developed in order to facilitate the entry or stay of migrants in a specific country in violation of its laws.

Romania is a transit country for migration flows, not the destination country, benefiting from an efficient system of border surveillance which raises problems for those who want to use it as a transit country. However, due to the fact that Romania is crossed by three main routes of migration to Western Europe, namely: the Eastern route, the Eastern Mediterranean route and the Western Balkans route, illegal migration manifests itself in various forms, the most common being the illegal crossing of the green borders between the checkpoints of the transition, the use of passports andforged or counterfeit visas, with the help of collective transit and entry visas obtained for touristic purposes, or motivated by trade purposes and the use of false documents on behalf of renowned multinational companies for a target country or requesting asylum status, followed by staying illegally in the country; using false identity documents; by hiding in auto,rail or barge international transport means; under the pretext of ensuring transport and accommodation for participation in sports competitions; under the cover of religious confessions.[14]

Trends and risk factors for illegal immigration mentioned in the National Public Order and Safety focus on groups of organized crime exploiting quickly the various changes made

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[11] Council framework Decision of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, article 5.

[12] National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 5.

[13] National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2.

[14] Sandu Frangulea, *The phenomenon of migration and trafficking, Romanian Association of Humanitarian Law,* http://www.arduph.ro/domenii/refugiati-persoane-disparute-2/fenomenul-migratiei-si-traficul-de-persoane/.

to the structures of law enforcement, legislative changes and the opening of new routes or the least financially costly ones as well as the opening of new border crossing points. Organized criminal groups that facilitate illegal migration are characterized by a high degree of flexibility and a greater capacity to collaborate effectively via their networks created across borders. Also, immigrants coming from communities with fundamentalist Islamicguidelines, inserted into smuggling groups, using clandestine route reach the destination countries, may become beneficiaries of some form of protection recognized in countries of transit and destination and asylum seekers. These criminal networks involved in organized forms of illegal migration often extend their work by developing other forms of crime, such as counterfeiting of travel documents, drug trafficking, money laundering, arms trafficking, human trafficking etc. Amplification of illegal migration can have negative effects on the population, both in terms of access to the legal labor market and in socio-economic terms.

By analyzing trends, it is predicted that we will have a significant number of cases of illegal crossing at the external land and maritime borders of the European Union, caused by the context of political instability in neighboring countries or the Middle East.[15]

The same document, the National Strategy 2015-2020 Public Order and Safety, deals with establishing objectives and courses of action at EU level as a result of analysis within the Standing Committee on Internal Security, the proposals from the Member States and the SOCTA 2013 report, establishing priorities that are part of EU policy cycle 2014-2017, as follows: 1.Illegal migration 2.Organised crime against property 3.Drugs 4.Fire guns 5.Human trafficking 6.Counterfeit goods 7.Cybercrime 8.Fraud in excise duties and value added tax in intra-Community acquisitions.

As we see illegal immigration tops the list. So in terms of illegal migration overall goal number 5 was established: Strengthening state border managing the issues of illegal migration, asylum and integration of foreigners with the following specific objectives: combating illegal migration and development of appropriate return policies as well as the related courses of action:

1.Strengthening the administrative capacity of the structures responsible for combating illegal migration 2.Strengthening cooperation and exchange of information between law enforcement structures with competencies in preventing and combating illegal migration 3.Supporting EU efforts in implementing policies in the field of return and readmission 4.Strengthening the legality of the stay of citizens from third countries in Romania and the implementation of return and restrictive measures 5.Increasedcooperation with third countries with migration potential.[16]

MEASURES TO COMBAT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION NATIONWIDE

Police officers within the General Inspectorate for Immigration, according to the integrated cooperation mechanism to combat illegal stay and migrant trafficking, organized specific activitiesat national level aimed at ensuring order and safety of citizens by exercising permanent control over the observance of legality of foreigners' stay in Romania and combating illegal migration in order to maintain a climate of order and safety among our community.

This year 81 actions and checks were carried out fromin 1st to 12th February, both through own efforts and in cooperation with structures having competencies in the field of public order and security, in preventing and combating illegal stay of foreign citizens at national level. Following in the action, 92 people were found in illegal circumstances, mostly in Bucharest and across the competence of Timis, Arad and Satu Mare. Of these, three have

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[15] National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, 8.
[16] National Strategy for Public Order and Safety 2015-2020, 17-18.

met the conditions required to extend the right of residence, 61 of them received decisions or communications to leave the territory of Romania, 5 of them applied for a form of international protection while other measures were taken for 23 of them. 14 people were escorted to the point of crossing the state border where the measure of interdicting the entry in Romania was issued on their name, according to Emergency Ordinance No. 194/2002 on foreigners in Romania. Police applied 263 warning and fine sanctions on foreigners who have not complied with the legislation on migration, amounting to 63 350 lei.[17]

In March this year, trained officers within the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Border Police, the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police, representatives of the Romanian Road Authority and the Financial Guard organized, across all the crossing points of the border, actions for combating illegal migration of Romanian citizens to the West, the Schengen area, carrying out thorough checks on persons and international tour operators transiting the Romanian border in both directions. Simultaneously, the management of the General Inspectorate of the Border Police has taken re-enforcing steps concerning Westernborder crossings by increasing the number of police officers who were brought here from the Eastern border. The measure was taken in order to implement tight Control rules against Romanian citizens who want to leave the country, or to prevent acts of corruption among workers of the Border Police Directorate in Oradea and Timisoara.

For a more efficient work in this area, similar authorities in the Member States of the European Union cooperate by the effective participation of EU experts in the checks performed at Romanian border control points. Two Spanish officers, two French, one Austrian and one Italian currently workat the control point from Oradea. Here border policemen check the veracity of the declarations of persons leaving the country if they have indeed joined the hotel booking voucher, if the hotel exists, if the foreign citizenswho have sent invitations to Romanians really exist etc.[18]

These actions to combat illegal immigration nationwide aim at the following objectives:
- verifying whether trasnportation/ tourism tour-operators comply with the specific legislation with a view to tracking the natural or legal persons who organize such activities without having the necessary authorization as well as taking the required steps against them;
- exposing violators of the financial accounting legislation - by not recording the amounts of money collected from passengers for their services (transport or tourism) , or deliberately making wrong records of it - in order to obtain illegal income;
- following the legal provisions on public roads and road traffic safety;
- field documentation of the number , area of origin and mode of operation of the offenders who are thus facilitating illegal migration of Romanian citizens in the Schengen;
- verification of the fulfillment by all Romanian citizens who intend to travel abroad, of domestic and international legal provisions in force.

Following measures which took place over 9 days in March, of all Romanians present at checkpoints intending to leave the country, Border Police have taken the measure of forbidding a total of 23 416 Romaniansto continue their journey, due to the fact that they did not meet the conditions provided by law. The main causes for resorting to the measure of forbidding exit from the country were lack of medical insurance (3,486 people), the fact that they did not have a round trip ticket (1,890 people), they did not have the "Green card" of the

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[17]"Action to combat illegal immigration at national level", Curierul National,
http://www.curierulnational.ro/Eveniment/2016-02-
13/Actiuni+pentru+combaterea+migratiei+ilegale,+la+nivel+national
[18]http://arhiva.gov.ro/actiuni-pentru-combaterea-emigrarii-ilegale-a-cetatenilor-romani-catre-
occident__l1a47012.html

car (121 persons), no means of support amounts held in foreign currency required by law concerning performing trips abroad (15 608 persons), 4 people had false or forged passports/visas; 2,307 were forbidden to travel for other reasons such as unjustified real purpose of the trip, being suspects of committing illegal acts in Schengen.

Regarding sanctioning individuals or legal entities that carry, without complying with the relevant legislation, Romanian citizens in the Schengen area, to combat illegal migrant trafficking, border policemen sanctioned them by drawing two criminal cases for committing the crime of tax evasion, 60 criminal cases for carrying unlicensed transport or without legal documents ; 89 sanctions were applied, for not following specific legislation in the field, with a sum amounting to over 260 million; the illicit activities of 36 transportation / tourism tour operators or individuals that carry out activities of transport undocumented have been reported to the competent authorities, so that legal measures would be taken.

Romanian Border Police will continue to take firm measures to ensure that all Romanian citizens traveling abroad comply with the regulatory requirements for leaving the country.[19]

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[19]http://arhiva.gov.ro/actiuni-pentru-combaterea-emigrarii-ilegale-a-cetatenilor-romani-catre-occident__l1a47012.html

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8. 7.http://arhiva.gov.ro/actiuni-pentru-combaterea-emigrarii-ilegale-a-cetatenilor-romani-catre-occident__l1a47012.html
9. 8.http://arhiva.gov.ro/actiuni-pentru-combaterea-emigrarii-ilegale-a-cetatenilor-romani-catre-occident__l1a47012.html

A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL APPROACH TO ISIL ACTIONS

Gabriela LUCA[1]

ABSTRACT:
THE ANALYSIS UNDERTAKEN IN THIS ARTICLE IS MEANT TO EXPLORE THE COMPLEX SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DYNAMICS THAT LEAD TO THE CREATION OF ISIL. THIS TERRORIST GROUP IS BY FAR THE MOST VIOLENT, CRUEL AND ALSO THE MOST MILITARY DEVELOPED OF ALL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS UP TO PRESENT DAY. WE HAVE EXAMINED THE SPECIFIC IDEOLOGICAL, RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ISLAMIC STATE AND THE GEO-POLITICAL CONTEXT THAT LED TO THE VACUUM OF POWER THAT HAS CREATED ISIL. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLORED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DRIVES OF THE MUJAHIDEEN AND THE RELEVANCE OF THEIR CULTURAL BACKGROUND. IN THE END OF THIS STUDY WE ANALYZE THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF THIS TYPE OF TERRORISM ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WESTERN INDIVIDUALS.

KEY WORDS: ISLAMIC STATE, TERRORISM, MIDDLE EAST, AL-QAEDA, PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

People tend to regard terrorism as the biggest threat to mankind, democracy and society. This perception is easily justified looking at current world events. We all saw from 9/11 how a terrorist group can bring even the strongest state to its knees. Also in more recent times we have seen a level of cruelty, violence and aggression never before reached. The terrorist organization that is responsible for this dread calls itself ISIL. As far as Islamic terrorist organizations go, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant differs from others due to a high level of military expertise and tactical preparation, strategic planning, recruitment of foreign resources and very high level of financial funding. At this time there is a major debate on what causes this kind of phenomenon whether it is the radical ideology of Islamic culture or, if there are there bigger interests at stake.

A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL APPROACH TO ISIL ACTIONS

First of all, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. From a historical perspective, it can be dated back either to the 1st century Sicarii Zealots or later to 11th century Al-Hashshashin. According to the U.S. Department of State there are now 59 active foreign terrorist

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organizations and 12 delisted ones[2]. Since 1970 there have been over 140 000 terrorist attacks 58,000 bombings, 15,000 assassinations, and 6,000 kidnappings[3]. For example 2014 saw an 80 percent increase in terrorist activity, with the number of deaths rising from 18,111 in 2013 to 32,685 in 2014. The number of deaths due to terrorism is nine times greater than it was 15 years ago. 57 percent of all attacks and 78 percent of all deaths have occurred in only five countries; Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria.[4]. Over half of these deaths are attributed to ISIL and Boko Haram. A particularity of ISIL is the fact that they kill three times more people on the battlefield than in terrorist acts. An estimate shows that they inflicted over 20,000 deaths by war killing combatants and civilians alike and close to 6000 by terrorist acts.

ISIL is a salafi jihadist group that has adopted a fundamentalist and radical Sunni Islamic doctrine of Wahhabism. Their purpose is to create a caliphate that will havepolitical, religious and military authority over the muslim world. Today, this group has occupied a vast part of Iraq and Syria, imposing their own interpretation of sharia law. It is important to note at this point that their agenda is far more complex than that of any other terrorist group, with inflicting terror being second to creating their own state.

From a cultural and psychological point of view, it is important to examine the specific ideological elements of their beliefs first of all. ISIL is a jihadist group, which means that they justify the whole range of violence and aggression through specific parts of the Quran. Jihad is a term that appears quite often in their holy book; it means to struggle or to strive in the name of faith or God-Allah. Even though it is often translated by the mass-media as "holy-war", it has a double significance- jihad is at the same time a symbol for inner spiritual transformation and the fight against the enemies of their culture. A follower of jihad is called a Mujahideen.

Secondly ISIL is a Salafi group, which means they identify with a specific political and religious ideology that considers jihad as being a physical fight against all those who do not conform to their view of "true Sunni Islam". Salafism from a sociological point of view was developed as a distinct ideology by the so called Afghan Arabs who fought as volunteers against the Soviets in the Soviet-Afghan War. The most prolific Salafi terrorist group was al-Qaeda. ISIL has adopted Wahhabism as their main doctrine. This doctrine which is also called the Wahhabi Mission is the most extreme, austere and fundamentalist religious branch of Sunni Islam. The main drive of this branch is the implementation of what they consider to be pure Islam.

Understanding this set of views, ideology and doctrine it is pertinent to consider that at this time there is no bigger threat than ISIL to global security. An ISIL adept based on this structure will not only think but will believe with strong conviction that any other human being who does not adhere to his own set of beliefs deserves to die. There is no third way for this type of radical fighter- either someone is ISIL, or God (in their opinion) wants that person violently destroyed. Chaos above order could be used to describe the way of thinking of the ISIL Mujahideen. This inner psychological drive, of the truth detaining individual who wants to transform the world into a better place through the destruction of opposition is not unique or new. It has been used before in the most brutal and tyrannical political movements such as Nazism and Communism. There is an important difference between the two, even though in other tyrannical regimes ideology was the motivational factor for killing others, it

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[2]US Departament of State- Foreign Terrorist Organizations, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
[3]Overview of the GTD, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/.
[4]Global Terrorism Index 2015, page 2, http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf.

was imposed by the state or the dictator, who didn't present himself as being God. The ISIL radical fighter considers that his actions are justified, rewarded and requested by a higher authority than any man-Allah. In this sense we could consider that the ISIL mujahideen has a lack of reason and moral structure to his personality being capable of the most horrific acts in the name of his self-imposed image of god. In our opinion this cocktail of fundamentalist ideas mixed together with the vast geographical spread and high number of resources available to ISIL can only give birth to threats far greater than any radical movement ever seen before.

At this point it is important to examine the sociological origins of this terrorist group. After the events in 9/11, the United States and its allies started a war against terrorism. Very rapidly they took control of both Iraq and Afghanistan. What is often considered to be The Second Gulf War led to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime, the collapse of the government and the dismantle of the army. All things considered, this set of events should have led to a stable political environment going towards democracy. What experts failed to take into consideration was the brittle social fabric in the area were the Sunni-Shi'ite conflict played a significant role. During the period between 2003-2011when the U.S Army was stationed in the region they failed to create effective security forces in the new Iraq Army. Another factor that played a vital role in what would be ISIL was the alienation of the Sunni citizens who traditionally had influence and control over the country (even though they were a minority) by forcing a Shi'ite regime under Nouri al-Maliki with the support of the United States.

From a historical point of view, ISIL was a branch of al-Qaeda which was created and coordinated between 2004 and 2006 by Musab al-Zarqawi. Their first name was „al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia" and their purpose was to wage a terrorist guerilla war against the U.S Army and the Shi'ite population. After his death in June 2006 this organization continued to grow under a new name: The Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). A large number of jihadist organizations joined their call and fought against Shi'ites and the U.S Army. Thanks to good policy that strengthened the Sunni regime and well planned military operations ISI was seriously weakened at the end of 2011. After the U.S Army left Iraq ISI recovered and grew becoming far larger and more powerful than anyone had ever anticipated. In this same year the Syrian civil war started and ISI formed a support front in Syria called the Al-Nusra Front. Soon after this some dissension appeared between al-Qaeda and ISI that led to the establishment of a new organization called The Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS).[5] After 2014, this terrorist organization managed to achieve some very important military victories. For example Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq was taken on June 4–10, 2014, ISIS defeated the Iraqi army and announced the beginning of the creation of the Islamic Caliphate under the rule of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

The Middle East and especially Iraq and Afghanistan differ psychologically and as a culture from much of the rest of the world. People in these cultures are driven by particular mechanism and dynamics that cannot be easily understood by people not from those cultures. According to ITIC attempts by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to help, as well as the Israeli intervention in Lebanon have all failed, to create political stability and opportunity for democracy. In all this three instances external intervention led to what could be considered far worst events such as the creation of ISIS, al-Qaeda and Hezbollah that still exist today and represent a real threat to the entire world.

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[5]"The Historical Rootsand Stages in the Development of ISIS",originally published by The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, http://www.crethiplethi.com/the-historical-roots-and-stages-in-the-development-of-isis/islamic-countries/syria-islamic-countries/2015/.

From a cultural point of view, by understanding the history, psychology and ideology of ISIL, we can infer that this militant group is a culture against all culture. Even though they pretend to despise western society and any other which is not their own they profit from the objects of their hatred. ISIL is probably the first terrorist organization to use extensive video and internet technology to recruit western civilians as resources, and to promote their propaganda through media. Violent and non-violent videos have been made public presenting either horrific acts (beheadings, shootings and torture) or terrorist and ideological threats with a high degree of Hollywood-like video editing. In the same paradoxical manner, ISIL is known for destroying ancient monuments, museums, mosques and churches that do not align with their beliefs. They claim that this is for creating their own pathological utopia when in fact a large part of their financing comes from smuggling looted artifacts.

Certainly ISIL has impacted the whole world raising a series of important unsettling red flags. The first concern to note is the high number of terrorist attacks linked to this militant group the most recent of which was the March 22, 2016 Brussels bombing which resulted in 32 deaths. This caused panic and uncertainty in the western population. Before this, a 2014 poll showed that 47% of U.S citizens feel less safe now than before the 9/11 terrorist attack[6] a more recent one shows that 7 out of 10 Americans consider ISIL to be the biggest threat to the security of the world[7]. It is interesting to note a parallel between the Middle East and the western world. In the fragile sociocultural fabric of the Middle East, the population does not feel secure. As a result, they tend to support tyrannical regimes. In the western world, the feeling of individual security is also dropping, and we see more and more extreme political parties winning elections. As an example, both Donald Trump in the U.S. and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) are gaining ground, running on xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Another red flag is the high number of foreign fighters that flow towards Iraq and Syria to join either ISIL or affiliate terrorist groups. An estimate shows that almost 30, 000 fighters have joined the war since 2001. This number is rapidly growing, The Global Terrorism Index (2015) shows that 7,000 individuals joined the militant group just in the few first months of 2015. The foreign fighters are motley from the Middle East and North Africa but an alarming 21% account for European citizens. This fact represent a serious cause for concern unveiling the fact that ISIL has constructed a well thought out system of recruitment and radicalization, targeting psychological vulnerabilities in the western world. This indicates a level of complexity that has never been reached before by any other terrorist organization. One example is a series of videos that shocked the world showing a number of beheadings performed by a European individual later called Jihadi John.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion the world is facing not only a war between terrorism and democracy but a war that challenges society and culture as a whole. ISIL came to power as a result of a very vulnerable socio-economic climate and a vacuum of power and stability. The Middle East has always presented a particular and unique socio-psychological profile in which the individual is more prone to archaic and tribal thinking than to an orderly system of government. Islamic culture does play a role in the justification of ISIL's brutality, violence and aggression taking

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[6]S.A. Miller, "Homeland Insecurity: American sfeelless safe than any time since 9/11, pollfinds ", The Washington Times,*September 10, 2014*, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/10/america-feel-more-unsafe-anytime-911-ready-militar/.

[7]Jonathan Martin, Dalia Sussman, "Fear of TerrorismLifts Donald Trump in New York Times/CBS Poll", The New York Times, December 10, 2015, http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/politics/fear-of-terrorism-lifts-donald-trump-in-new-york-times-cbs-poll.html?referer=.

into consideration that this terrorist group bases its ideology and doctrine on an extreme interpretation of the Quran, however this doesn't completely account for the grotesque acts which they have committed. For the first time in history a terrorist organization has managed to occupy a vast territory and since June 29, 2014 they have declared their occupied territory The New Islamist Caliphate with a population close to 8 million according to most sources.

If we identified the 3 most pressing socio-cultural problems of the current situation they would be: the high number of European citizens who flee democracy to go fight for ISIL, the winning streak of radical political parties around the democratic world and the high percentage of people that feel insecure and afraid we could conclude that this is not a fight between good and evil but in fact is a fight between a culture that values freedom, development and human rights and a culture that tries to impose an archaic and traditional view by force.

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3. http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/politics/fear-of-terrorism-lifts-donald-trump-in-new-york-times-cbs-poll.html?referer=.
4. **Overview of the GTD**, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/.
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6. **"The Historical Rootsand Stages in the Development of ISIS"**, originallypublishedby The MeirAmit Intelligence andTerrorism Information Center, http://www.crethiplethi.com/the-historical-roots-and-stages-in-the-development-of-isis/islamic-countries/syria-islamic-countries/2015/.
7. **US Departament of State- Foreign Terrorist Organizations**,
8. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.

FAILURE OF THE MIGRATION POLICY AND OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE EU? THE 'CALAIS JUNGLE'AND THE SETUP OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES

Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS [1]

ABSTRACT:
DURING THE CURRENT MIGRATION CRISIS VARIOUS LEADERS FROM CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE HAVE RAISED THEIR VOICE AGAINST MULTICULTURALISM AND THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS, SUSTAINING THAT ON THE LONG RUN IT'LL LEAD TO THE FORMATION OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES. ACCORDING TO THESE STATESMEN, ONCE IN THESE IMMIGRANTS WOULD KEEP THEIR COMMUNITIES BASED ON THE VALUES BROUGHT WITH THEM AND THEN SOONER OR LATER, EVEN IF THESE VALUES ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE EUROPEAN ONES, THE EUROPEANS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT THEM FOR THE SAKE OF COHABITATION. THIS WOULD LEAD TO THE EROSION OF THE COMMON EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND OF THE JUDEO-CHRISTIAN LEGACY. LINKING MULTICULTURALISM WITH THE SET UP OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES IS NOT A NOVELTY IN THE EU'S POLITICAL SPACE, AS A FEW YEARS AGO THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON OPENLY ADMITTED IN ONE HIS SPEECHES HELD IN 2011 IN MUNICH, GERMANY THAT THE "STATE OF MULTICULTURALISM" HAS FAILED IN THE UK, REFERRING TO THE INCAPABILITY AND UNWILLINGNESS OF MOSTLY MUSLIM COMMUNITIES TO INTEGRATE, ACCUSING HIS COUNTRY OF ENCOURAGING DIFFERENT CULTURES TO LIVE SEPARATE LIVES. HE OBJECTED TO ALL KINDS OF EXTREMISM AND RADICALIZATION, URGING FOR A STRONGER NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE UK. ONE OF THE MOST VIVID EXAMPLES OF THE FAILURE OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE MIGRATION CRISIS IN EUROPE AND ALSO THE MATERIALIZATION OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES AND THE SELF AND OTHER DELINEATION SET UP BY IRREGULAR AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS, IS THE SO CALLED CALAIS JUNGLE. THIS ARTICLE AIMS TO ANALYSE THE EU'S MIGRATION POLICY IN THE PRISM OF THE IMPROVISED REFUGEE CAMP AT CALAIS, NICKNAMED BY THE MEDIA AS "JUNGLE", DEPARTING FROM THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IF THE CURRENT MIGRATION CRISIS WON'T BE HANDLED PROPERLY, THE CONTINUOUS INFLUX OF IMMIGRANTS WILL CONDUCT TO THE CREATION OF OTHER CALAIS 'JUNGLES' IN VARIOUS STATES OF THE EU, THUS LEADING TO THE SET UP OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES.

KEY WORDS: GATED COMMUNITY, CHRISTIAN EUROPE, EUROPEAN IDENTITY, SELF AND OTHER, SPACE CONSTRUCTION

MUSLIM POPULATION IN NUMBERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Before speaking about the improvised migrant camp in Calais I shall start my analysis with a census of Muslim population in Europe/EU in order to reveal the invalidity of the *Christian Europe* concept.

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In the midst of the current migration crisis *religion* is more and more echoed as a major dividing line between the Europeans with a Judeo-Christian legacy and the predominantly Muslim immigrants. Already the founding fathers of the European Communities rendered to Christian values a very important role when putting the basis of the United Europe project, Robert Schuman epitomizing in 1958 that "we are called to bethink ourselves of the Christian basics of Europe by forming a democratic model of governance which through reconciliation develops into a 'community of peoples' in freedom, equality, solidarity and peace and which is deeply rooted in Christian basic values".[2]

The recent migration crisis has lead to the revival of the *Christian Europe* concept, appearing in the rhetoric of various European leaders, such as the prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, who emphasized in multiple speeches that migrants represent a threat to the European identity and to the Christian values. In October 2015 in an interview given to the Spanish Intereconomia Television he urged the closure of the borders of the European Union in front of these migrants, as according to him the only way to defend "Christian Europe is if don't let them in".[3]In his discourse delivered on the occasion of the celebration of the Hungarian National Day on the 15th of March 2016, he described Europe as a pot of coexisting Christian, free and independent nations, based on equality between men and women, fair play and solidarity, pride and humbleness, justice and mercy, stressing out that "[...] masses of people arriving from different civilizations pose a threat to our way of life, culture, customs and Christian traditions" [...] and that "those arrived earlier instead of integrating, have built for themselves a separate world, with their own laws and their own ideals, which straddle the thousand year old European framework".[4]

Looking at the statistics provided by the Pew Research Center it can be ascertained that the *Christian Europe* collocation is not totally accurate, as in Europe today there are more than 44.1 million Muslims. Since 1990 (29.6 million) the share of Muslim population in Europe has grown about 1% per decade and is forecasted that in the upcoming years (by 2030) it will reach 58 million, thus the Muslims would make up 8% of Europe's population.[5]According to the projections mostly Western and Northern Europe will experience a considerable growth in the number of Muslim communities in the upcoming years fostered predominantly by migration.

As map no.1 shows the biggest Muslim community from the European Union is living in Germany, 4.760.000 people, representing 5.8% of the country's total population, while France is on the second place, shortly lagging behind with 4.710.000 Muslims, and accounting for 7.5% of the population. In the UK reside approximately 2.960.000 Muslims, accounting for 4.8% of the population, thus the UK becoming the third in the line of EU countries with the biggest Muslim inhabitants, followed by Italy (2.220.000) and Bulgaria (1.020.000).[6]Furthermore, is forecasted that by 2030 Muslims will account 8.2% of the UK's population reaching 5.6 million, this trend also continuing in France (with 6.9 million) and in

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[2]Philip Fountain, *Deeply Rooted. The Forgotten Vision of Robert Schuman* (Heerde: Initial Media Global, 2010), 5.

[3]Barbara Thüringer, "Orbán: A keresztény Európát úgy lehet megvédeni, ha nem engedjük be őket [Orbán: We can defend Christian Europe if we don't let them in]", *Index.hu*, November 23, 2015, accessed June 10, 2016, http://index.hu/belfold/2015/10/23/orban_kereszteny_europa_menekultek/.

[4]Magyarország Kormánya [The Government of Hungary], „Orbán Viktor ünnepi beszéde 2016. március 15 [Viktor Orban's Festive Speech 15th of March 2016]", accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/beszedek-publikaciok-interju, k/orban-viktor-unnepi-beszede.

[5] Pew Research Center, „The Future Global Muslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030", January 15, 2011, 121, accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/future-of-the-global-muslim-population-regional-europe/.

[6] Pew Research Center, The Future Global Muslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030, 15.

Germany (5.9 million). According to these statistics by 2030 France will outrun Germany in terms of Muslim population.[7] However, analysing other resources it can be observed that these statistics may vary, identifying France as the country with the biggest Muslim community from the EU numbering 6.263.658 in 2010, forecasted to increase to 6.635.327 by 2020.[8] As a consequence of the recent migratory influx, however the exact data is not known, it can be ascertained that the biggest number of Muslim migrants arrived to Germany (approx. 1 million), adding to the already existing community in the country.

Map 1. The percentage of Muslim population in the EU countries [9]

FAILURE OF MULTICULTURALISM IN THE EU AND THE FORMATION OF PARALLEL SOCIETIES

Analysing the emergence of Muslim communities in Europe (apart from the Balkans) from a historical point of view drives us to the conclusion that they mostly appeared as a consequence of migration, especially after World War II. Driven by the labour shortage experienced by the countries devastated by war, in the 50's-70's' various programmes were created for guest workers from outside Europe/European Community. The need for cheap, unskilled workforce tripled the number of foreigners in Western Europe in the 70's, reaching almost 11 million (15 million in 1982, 19 million 1992) experiencing a significant increase from the 4 million in the 50's. This tendency has continued despite the anti-immigration and nationalist policies of the Western European states from the 80's, finalizing with the

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[7] Pew Research Center, The Future Global Muslim Population. Projections for 2010-2030, 127.
[8]Houssain Kettani, "Muslim Population in Europe: 1950-2020," *International Journal of Environmental Science and Development*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2010): 157, accessed June 15, 2016, http://www.ijesd.org/papers/29-D438.pdf.
[9]Pew Research Center, „5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe," November 17, 2016, accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/.

establishment of new Muslim communities. We may state that today the second/third generation Muslim migrants and their families are omnipresent especially in the Western European demographic landscape.[10] Their presence is incontestable in this part of Europe/EU but their level of integration raises a few question marks. The descendants of the early immigrants were already born and raised in Western Europe, but due to the influence of their family and community they have kept the traditions and culture of their country of origin, thus nurturing a double identity, representing the minority in a mainstream society. There assimilation is difficult mostly because of the lack of the will to integrate both from their part and from the part of the native population. Some of them are not willing to learn the language, or to live by the laws of the host country, hence contributing to their self confinement and marginalization by the society.[11]Those who in lack of alternatives turn away from the mainstream society revive the religion of their ancestors and reinvent for themselves a new identity can easily take the path leading to radicalization. This so called *self induced isolation* can conduct to violent manifestations in the form of terrorist attacks, as the ones committed in Brussels and Paris by second/third generation migrants born and schooled in the EU, whom the French and Belgian state has failed to integrate. Actually, this is a collective failure, that of the nations states and that of the European Union as whole.

With this brief quantitative and historical inquiry I intended to highlight the prevailing problems concerning the integration of third country nationals (outside Europe/EU) into the EU body, leading to the formation of parallel societies in the EU.

As the integration of mostly Muslim communities hadn't realized as expected, in various Western EU states the "multiculturalism has utterly failed" collocation has begun to spread in the EU, in 2010 making the headlines of various newspapers. Surprisingly, the lead voice was given by Germany, perceived earlier as the *model country of multiculturalism.* Horst Seehofer the Bavarian prime-minister, president of the CSU Party pointed out in a speech delivered in Potsdam in October 2010 the indispensability of knowing the German language for a successful integration. The importance of Christian values and of respecting the German *Leitkultur[12]* was also highlighted in his rhetoric. Reference was made to the pressure triggered by the immigrants on the national welfare system, Seehofer stating that his country does not want to be "welfare office for the whole world".[13]Back in 2010 also the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel openly admitted that the concept of "multiculturalism has failed and failed utterly" and the idea of Germans and foreigners coexisting „happily side by side" with each other was nothing but an illusion, stressing that the entire German governmental apparatus and also the German society kidded themselves when they thought that once in the guest workers who were invited to revive the German economy would leave the country after the expiration of their contracts.[14]The "multiculturalism is failure" rhetoric was taken out of the dustbin and reloaded by Angela Merkel in December 2015, her rather polemic interjection coming shortly after Germany's open doors refugee policy launched in

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[10]Csiki Tamás and Justh Krisztina, "Az iszlám Európában- integráció vagy konfliktus [Islam in Europe-integration or conflict]," *Nemzet és Biztonság. Biztonsápolitikai Szemle* 10(2010): 39, accessed June 18, 2016, http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/csiki_tamas__justh_krisztina-az_iszlam_europaban_____integracio_vagy_konfliktus_.pdf

[11] Csiki Tamás and Justh Krisztina, Az iszlám Európában- integráció vagy konfliktus, 40.

[12] Leading culture.

[13]Die Welt, "CSU-Chef Seehofer erklärt Multikulti für tot [CSU Leader Seehofer Declared Multiculturalism is Dead]," October 15, 2010, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article10326616/CSU-Chef-Seehofer-erklaert-Multikulti-fuer-tot.html.

[14]Jess Smie, „The World from Berlin: Merkel's Rhetoric in Integration Debate is Inexcusable," *Spiegel Online,* October 18, 2010, accessed June 18, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-merkel-s-rhetoric-in-integration-debate-is-inexcusable-a-723702.html.

the summer of 2015. After being praised by the UNHCR, human rights activist groups for her stamina and being named by the *Times* magazine *the person of the year*, her affirmation concerning the significant reduction of the number of refugees arriving to Germany came as a cold shower. In line with other EU leaders, such us UK's David Cameron, Hungary's Orbán or Slovakia's Fico, she also underlined that multiculturalism is a *life lie* or *sham* because it has led to the setup of parallel, isolated societies within Germany, and it also illustrates the failure of the German administration to assimilate the immigrants.[15]

Operating with certain terms such as m*ulticulturalism* or *parallel society* would also require a conceptual framing, thus in the following passages I shall offer the reader a succinct description of these connotations in use.

Encyclopaedia Britannica defines *multiculturalism* as a view according to which „cultures, races, and ethnicities, particularly those of minority groups, deserve special acknowledgement of their differences within a dominant political culture".[16] Thus, with other words multiculturalism is the policy of maintaining a diversity of ethnic cultures within a given community. Founded under the aegis of the "united in diversity" motto, the EC/EU is fostering multiculturalism likewise by bolstering the promotion of a sense of community and belonging among European countries with different nations, cultures, religions and traditions.

Concerning the term *parallel society* is in fact a neologism, originated from the German *Parallelgesellschaften*, attributed to Professor Wilhelm Heitmeyer from the University of Bielefeld. He used this concept for the first time in 1996 in a scientific analysis referring to secluded, mostly Turkish or Islamic communities of immigrants in Germany.[17]

Heitmeyer understands by the concept of *parallel society* a voluntary or so called *self induced isolation* or segregation of mostly Muslim people reluctant to integrate into the German society, thus posing a threat to the cohesion and democratic pillars of Germany. Segregation could also lead to fundamentalist groups gaining prominence within the mainstream society, hence creating a *friend versus foe* situation between the migrant communities and the native population. According to Heitmeyer "there is that danger that religious-political groups could form 'parallel societies' on the edges of the majority society", which could lead to the disintegration of the society.[18]The term itself has also some negative connotations being perceived as the substitute for the *state within the state* neologism, which is considered a politically incorrect and ambiguous term used by the Nazi propaganda against the Jews during the 2nd World War.[19]

Thomas Meyer, professor of political science at the University of Dortmund took Heitmeyer's basic idea and developed a matrix formed of five criteria of which cumulative fulfilment would lead to the emergence of a *parallel society*.

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[15]Rick Noack, „Multiculturalism is a Sham, says Angela Merkel,"*The Washinton Post*, December 14, 2015, accessed June 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/12/14/angela-merkel-multiculturalism-is-a-sham/.

[16]Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Multiculturalism," accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/topic/multiculturalism.

[17]Adamantios Karytianos, „Parallel Societies: An acknowledgement of failure or a step towards integration? The Greek paradigm," The London School of Economics and Political Science European Institute, Hellenic Observatory, The 3rd Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium Contemporary Greece: Structures, Context and Challenges, 14-15 June (2007): 2, accessed June 23, 2016, http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/3rd_Symposium/PAPERS/KARYTIANOS_ADAMANTIOS.pdf.

[18]Wilhelm, Heitmeyer, „Für türkische Jugendliche in Deutschland spielt der Islam eine wichtige Rolle", *Die Zeit* 35 (1996) apud William Hiscott, „'Parallel Societies' – A Neologism gone Bad," *Multicultural Center Prague* (2005): 5, accessed June 21, 2016, http://aa.ecn.cz/img_upload/3bfc4ddc48d13ae0415c78ceae108bf5/WHiscott_Parallel_Societies.pdf.

[19] Karytianos, „Parallel societies,*"* 2.

The criteria are the following:[20]
- ethno-cultural or religious-cultural homogeneity of an immigrant group
- economic segregation and civil society segregation
- duplication of majoritarian institutions
- self-induced isolation as a result of discrimination
- spatial segregation (such as isolation within a specific area of the city, usually at the periphery)

After presenting these criteria later I shall try to implement them in the realm of the *Calais Jungle*, analyzing whether the five indicators identified by Meyer are being fulfilled or not.

WHAT IS THE 'CALAIS JUNGLE'?

Before becoming the subject of public hysteria and one of the many testing grounds of the EU policies concerning immigration, the history of the 'Calais Jungle' has begun in 1999, when the French Red Cross established a centre for migrants in Sangatte, a small French commune from Pas-de-Calais province nigh the Euro Tunnel entrance. The motive behind setting up this centre was to manage the growing problem of third country nationals who were continuously trying to fraudulently reach the United Kingdom using the Tunnel.

Amongst the most important pull factors attracting people to Calais were/are:[21]
- geographical proximity to the UK
- the belief that due to the flexible economy and skill shortages in the UK once in they could easily get a job
- migrants already have friends, relatives in the UK
- knowledge of the English language
- possibility to work illegally as many British employers hire undocumented people in order to evade taxes, being estimated that 10% of the UK's GDP comes from back economy
- belief that they won't be caught and sent back.

The number of people residing in Sangatte was fluctuating, in 2002 the Red Cross and UNHCR numbered over 3000 migrants, but the average was 1700 individuals with approximately 100 arrivals daily. Since 2001 riots and attempts to break out from the centre and to reach the UK have been very frequent, hence triggering the outrage of the French inhabitants of Calais and of the private operator of the Euro Tunnel, who initiated legal proceedings twice, claiming the closure of the centre, in the end its appeal being turned down by both the French and the British local authorities. As a consequence of the riots the British have decided to increase security measures on their side of the border, raising a double fence, installing CCTV cameras and increasing the number of police patrols in the area. In an attempt to break the deadlock the British and French authorities have signed a burden-sharing agreement with the purpose of shutting down the centre and transferring its residents. As a part of the deal the British committed themselves to host 1000 Iraqi Kurdish and 200 Afghan refugees, while the French promised to take care of the remaining 300 residents and of the third country nationals from the vicinity. By November 2002 no new arrivals were permitted to the centre, and it was officially closed by the end of the same year.[22]Various organizations,

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[20] Karytianos, „Parallel societies", 3.

[21]Migration Watch UK, „Lessons from Calais,"*Immigration System & Policy: MW 368*, August 13, 2015, accessed June 20, 2016, http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/368.

[22]Jessica Reinisch, „Forever Temporary: Migrants in Calais, Then and Now,"*The Political Quarterly* 86 (2015): 516, accessed June 17, 2016, doi: 10.1111/1467-923X.12196.

especially human rights groups and also the British Refugee Council had pointed out that this was only a superficial solution for a more deeply rooted problem, and with the dismantling of the camp the cause, the trigger pushing migrants towards the UK will not disappear. Their forecasts have turned out to be right, as even after the closure migrants were continuously arriving, setting up new improvised camps close to the Euro Tunnel. The problem management plan of the French authorities was rather ambiguous, hesitating between two scenarios of providing shelter and covering basic needs or deliberately making living conditions unbearable in order to halt new arrivals. Finally the situation has deteriorated in such a manner that a newly improvised camp had to be demolished again in 2009, Eric Besson[23]clearly stating that the establishment of a new Sangatte was totally out of question, as it would be an open invitation to new migrants, hence fostering the activity of migrant smuggling networks.[24]

In April 2014 Calais has come again into the attention of the media when the French border police had detected an increase in the influx of mostly African migrants coming through the Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur region. According to the Bridging Europe poll[25] by August 2014 the number of migrants camping nigh the industrial zones of the port of Calais and the ferry terminal reached 1500, while in the statistics provided by the Prefecture of Pas-de-Calais[26] appear only 1100 in the same period. The most important desire of these third country nationals is to reach the UK at all costs and for this Calais is the perfect place, as it is close to the Channel Tunnel, from where they can easily sweep by clinging on lorries transiting the Tunnel. According to prefect of the Pas-de-Calais region Dennis Robin the modus operandi of the migrants has changed, because in comparison with the previous years when they were using more discreet methods, trying to sneak into the UK undetected, in 2014 they were operating in plain sight and in groups, being more aggressive. This change is mostly due to the growing number of refugees/migrants and to the increased security measures which made their transit more difficult.[27]

If we put ourselves the question why did this situation occur in the vicinity of Calais, and why the French authorities haven't been able to resolve it for years, the answer might not be that simple. First of all, from a geographical point of view this is the closest point from where the migrants can reach *Eldorado*, their land of desire the UK. Secondly due to binding international and EU agreements, such as the UN's Geneva Convention from 1951 concerning the status of refugees and the Dublin Convention, based on the *non-refoulement principle* France cannot send back people to their countries of origin if their lives are in danger. Thirdly, the French authorities are caught in a so called *legal limbo* which limits their sphere of action, as the return policies cannot be easily enforced. If the French authorities find irregular migrants during their control activities, they cannot immediately push them back, but have to redirect them to the *French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons* (OFPRA) where they can apply for protection. If a third country national decides to apply for asylum, the review of the application procedure can take up months, period during which the applicants are being transferred to the official refugee centres (*Centres de Reception pour demandeurs d'Asile*' (CADAs) from France. In case of a negative

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[23]The French Minister Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Mutually-Supportive Development.

[24] Reinisch, „ Forever Temporary," 3.

[25]Pierre Tositti, „The Migration-Related Emergency in Calais, France," *EU Migration Policy Working Paper* 8 (2014):3, accessed June 19, 2016, http://www.bridgingeurope.net/the-migration-related-emergency-in-calais-france.html.

[26]„Official Site of Pas de Calais Prefecture," accessed June 16, 2016, http://www.pas-de-calais.gouv.fr/Publications.

[27] Tositti, „The Migration...", 3-4.

review, the third country national has 1 month under the provisions of the OQTF (*Obligation de quitter le territoire francais*) to leave the territory of France. However, the enforcement of these decisions is an arduous task, because most of the OQTFs are voluntary return obligations. In the vast majority of the cases these peoples will continue to remain on the territory of France, trying to sneak into the UK.[28] On the other hand, there's another problem in Calais that many of the migrants do not even apply for international protection, thinking that this might jeopardize their chance of getting to the UK, continuously preferring to live in improvised tents and slums, instead of the official housing arrangements put on their disposal by the French authorities, as for the accommodation registration for be necessary.

In September 2014 the international and especially the British media has picked up again the story the *Calais* improvised camp after the ferry transporting people to the UK was invaded by 235 migrants, causing public outrage amongst the British people. Natacha Bouchart, the mayor of Calais called for an emergency meeting with Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Minister of Interior to tackle the existing situation. Sadly the creation of the Jules Ferry centre in January 2015 providing migrants with meal, water and electricity and that of a night shelter aiding people sleeping in the cold didn't put an end to the prevailing situation.[29]Due to the degrading and unsanitary conditions the media had nicknamed the improvised refugee camp as *Jungle* invoking an imagined spatial geography in its debates of national interest.[30]In 2015 the number of new arrivals to the camp skyrocketed, in June reaching 3000 souls, their number doubling by October.

On the 20th of August 2015 the French Minister of Interior, Bernard Cazeneuve and his British homologue, Theresa May signed a *Joint Ministerial Declaration on the UK-French Cooperation concerning the Management of Migratory Flows in Calais*.[31]The agreement was practically a package of guidelines concerning the smooth and efficient management of the migrant crisis by the French and British partners in the upcoming years. The major points of this agreement are being summarized in Figure nr. 1, emphasizing on security measures, collaboration between the law enforcement agencies, the creation of human conditions for migrants, common European and international action for addressing the migration challenge. During these months the British position had remained firm allotting an extra 7 million pounds[32] to bolster the security of the Channel, James Brokenshire, the British Immigration Minister highlighting that "Security at the UK Border is our priority and we will continue to strengthen it to stop those who do not have the right to enter the UK. If people have a genuine need of protection they should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach. If they are just seeking to evade immigration control they need to know that they are risking their lives and that they will get caught."[33]

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[28] Tositti, „The Migration...", 5.

[29] Reinisch, „ Forever Temporary,"3.

[30]Yasmin Ibrahim and Anita Howarth,, "Space Construction in Media Reporting. A Study of the Migrant Space in the 'Jungles' of Calais, *Fast Capitalism* 12 (2015): 2, accessed June 20, 2016, http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/11323.

[31]Ministère de l'Intérieur - Ministère de l'Intérieur du Royaume-Uni, „Managing migratory flows in Calais Joint Ministerial Declaration on UK-French Cooperation," Calais, August 2015, accessed June 23, 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/455162/Joint_declaration_20_Au gust_2015.pdf.

[32]Natural Hazards Observer, „Refugees in Crisis," Volume XL/33, (2016): 12, accessed June 21, 2016, https://hazards.colorado.edu/natural-hazards-observer/volume-xl-number-3.

[33]Tositti, „The Migration...,"9.

Number of immigrants in Calais 'Jungle' 2014-2016

	Jul-14	Aug-14	Sep-14	Dec-14	Mar-15	Jun-15	Jul-15	Aug-15	Sep-15	Oct-15	Feb-16
Number of immigrants	800	1100	1500	2500	2000	3000	3000	3000	3500	6000	4000

Graph 1. Evolution of the number of migrants in the Calais Jungle 2014-2016 based on data provided by the Prefecture of Pas-de-Calais

| 1. Ensuring effective security at the Channel Tunnel and the Port of Calais	• Strong, visible and effective security, at the Channel Tunnel railhead at Coquelles and at the Port of Calais • Considerable investments in policing infrastructure by France since 2014 , additional financial resources from the UK; 12/15 million Euros Joint Fund High Security Fence , CCTV, 24/7 freight search teams
2.Collaboration between French and UK law enforcement agencies	• Nomination of a "gold commander " • Exchange operation intelligence, collaboration with Europol • Joint command and control against organized immigration crime • Interior ministers receiving monthly report from gold commanders
3. Managing migrants in Calais	• Day centre provided by France made from EU fund (daily meal, shower, sanitary care and legal advice) • Fast track process for migrants to claim asylum locally/1000 immigrants had left • Correcting misapprehensions about life in the UK
4. European and international action	• Exploit and mobilize all available European instruments to address the migration challenge • Proposals for strongly co-operative approaches to tackling the root causes of mass illegal migration/ fight against criminal networks • To accelerate the implementation of a multi-purpose centre for migrants in Niger,

Figure 1. The summary of Joint Ministerial Declaration on the UK-French Cooperation concerning the Management of Migratory Flows in Calais[34]

    In order to pursue the people living in the *Jungle* to move to the white container camps from the Temporary Reception Centre, the French authorities have started to demolish again the improvised tents on the 29th of February 2016, completing the destruction of the Southern

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[34] Own elaboration based on the data from Ministère de l'Intérieur - Ministère de l'Intérieur du Royaume-Uni, „Managing migratory flows...", 1-7.

part by the 17th of March. During the European Football Championship in June 2016 there have been multiple attempts by the residents of the *Calais Jungle* to storm the lorries heading to the UK, British soccer fans going home being stuck on the road because of the clashes between the law enforcement authorities and the migrants.[35]

Picture 1. The mini city of the Calais Jungle[36]

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this article was to examine the EU's migration policy in the prism of the improvised refugee camp at Calais, nicknamed by the media as "Jungle", departing from the hypothesis that if the current migration crisis won't be handled properly, the continuous influx of immigrants will conduct to the creation of other Calais 'Jungles' in various states of the EU, thus leading to the set up of parallel societies. At the beginning of the research I have aimed at implementing Meyer's matrix in the realm of the Calais Jungle in order to demonstrate that although not totally, but partially it shows the characteristics of a parallel society. Concerning the first criteria the ethno-cultural or religious-cultural homogeneity of an immigrant group is not totally fulfilled because at Calais there are various

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[35]The Telegraph, "British Euro 2016 fans stuck in Calais after hundreds of migrants stormed lorry routes", June 21, 2016, accessed June 26, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/21/british-euro-2016-fans-stuck-in-calais-after-hundreds-of-migrant/.

[36]Josh White, „How Calais' 'jungle' migrant camp has now become a mini city - complete with restaurants, a theatre, book shops and free wifi,"*Dailymail*, December 6, 2015, accessed June 23, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3348594/Restaurants-theatre-free-wifi-Calais-Jungle-migrant-camp-mini-city.html.

nationalities with different religion, but there exists a sense of belonging amongst the arrived refugees, creating for themselves a new identify, identifying themselves as people/inhabitants of the *Jungle*. The media had a central role in creating this social imaginary of migrant space, by using speech acts, socially, materially and discursively creating spaces, thus nurturing the *us* versus *them* delineation. As Picture nr. 1 illustrates there has been an attempt to emulate the everyday life of a normal society, creating similar conditions by establishing imitations of state institutions such as a school or a church, or of other entities such as shops, theatres, restaurants, kids playground, nightclub, artist area, barber shops etc. The isolation as a result of discrimination and the spatial segregation are fulfilled, thus it can be concluded that the improvised camp in Calais has the characteristics of a *society in society*. Of course that the parallel societies created by the second/third generation migrants in various EU countries are of a different nature but with this analysis I wanted to project the future risks of allowing the entrance of uncontrollable numbers of third country nationals from Africa and from the Middle East to the EU. The EU and the Member States are not able to give proper housing, jobs to these people or to integrate them into the European society, as they weren't able to assimilate the foreigners who arrived to Europe decades ago with valid contracts. There's a chance that due to the high influx of migrants the detention centres might become overcrowded and people would be set loose to wander on streets as it happened years ago in Greece, or they could simply break out/disappear[37] of these facilities, forming groups and settling in the periphery or border regions of towns and cities, on the long run creating a new form of *parallel society*.

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[37]Ian Drury, "More than 130,000 Migrants Have 'Vanished' in Germany - 13 per cent of arrivals in the last 14 Months - the Government Reveals, Dailymail, 27 February 2016, accessed 27 June, 2016, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3465171/More-130-000-migrants-vanished-Germany-13-cent-arrivals-14-months-government-reveals.html.

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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN THE NORWEGIAN SOCIETY

Ruxandra NUȚ[1]

ABSTRACT:
ITS STABILITY AND NOT BEING AN EU MEMBER HAS HELPED NORWAY AVOID THE ECONOMIC DISRUPTION AFFECTING SO MANY COUNTRIES GLOBALLY. THE HIGH LEVEL OF SECURITY AND WELFARE ENSURED BY THE NORWEGIAN STATE HAS ATTRACTED MANY IMMIGRANTS IN SEARCH OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES, BETTER THAN IN THEIR HOMELANDS. SUDDENLY, THE SMALL, HOMOGENOUS STATE HAS FACED NEW CHALLENGES SUCH AS THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS AND RESHAPING THE POLICIES IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE EQUAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS FOR ITS DIVERSE POPULATION, NOT AN EASY TASK FOR A CONSISTENT AND UNIFIED SOCIETY. HOWEVER, THE NORWEGIAN STATE HAS CREATED A FRAMEWORK TO MANAGE THE ISSUE WITHOUT ANY DISCRIMINATION. THE MINISTRY OF CHILDREN, EQUALITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY TO COORDINATE THE POLICIES AND LEGISLATION CONCERNING EQUALITY, DISCRIMINATION AND INTEGRATION.
THE PRESENT STUDY INTENDS TO ANALYZE THE ROLE OF THE MINISTRY OF CHILDREN, EQUALITY AND SOCIAL INCLUSION IN THE PROCESS OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION, ESPECIALLY THEIR NEED OF BEING INVOLVED AND CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT.

KEY WORDS: IMMIGRATION POLICY, INTEGRATION, CULTURAL DIVERSITY, EQUAL RIGHTS, NON-DISCRIMINATION.

INTRODUCTION

According to Statistics Norway, there are 698,600 immigrants and 149,700 Norwegian-born to immigrant parents in Norway, at the beginning of 2016. The largest group comes from Poland, followed by Lithuania, Sweden, Somalia, Germany, Iraq, Pakistan, Denmark, Philippines, and Vietnam, representing 13.4 per cent of the total population. Immigrants from Syria have increased their number from 5,400 in 2015 to 9,700 in 2016. The main reason for immigration is still labour, followed by refuge, family reunion and education.[2]

The new wave of immigrants represents challenges that come along with this rapid growth of the minority population and presupposes solutions to face issues such as integration, cultural diversity and immigration.Thus, the state sought to create a coherent

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[2]Statistics Norway, accessed June 23, 2016,https://www.ssb.no/en/befolkning/statistikker/innvbef/aar/2016-03-03.

policy to regulate this process as a framework to ensure equal rights and opportunities for all people who live in Norway, regardless of their background, without any discrimination. The development of the Norwegian statein the economic, political, social and cultural f.ields needs an active contribution of the minorities, using their own knowledge, skills and capabilities

THE NORWEGIAN INTEGRATION POLICY

It is well known that Norway has a high level of stability, security and welfare which makes it attractive for immigrants in search for better living conditions. Trying to reduce inequalities, the country fights to ensure the same opportunities for immigrants and the majority population and to help them integrate and participate in the labour market, educational system or various social activities.

"To achieve solidarity and cohesion among its inhabitants, several measures are required:

• Strengthening unity and citizenship: government should ensure equal treatment for all members of society

• Promoting diversity in a Norwegian framework of values: national identity that is not based on ethnic identity must be credible to all citizens; cultural and religious diversity should support and not undermine the fundamental values associated with the Norwegian society

• Representing diversity: the state must ensure minority representation in important positions in politics, bureaucracy, media, academia, healthcare, education etc. Also, immigrants should be encouraged to participate actively in public life through volunteering, sport activities or employment

• Prevention of discrimination: ethnic segregation trends in the labor market must be prevented, and anti-discrimination legislation should be implemented."[3]

Employment is the only way to obtain financial independence, prevent poverty and social gaps, therefore the state intends to increase the rate of employment by helping immigrants find a good job according to their skills. In order to support that, they provide language and qualification trainings in different fields, making their integration easier. Moreover, the recognition of their homeland education is and important step forward.

Immigrant children and young people should have an educational system adapted to their needs and diversity, from kindergarten, primary, secondary or high school to university studies. In this respect, the Government intends to:

- "improve multicultural competence for employees in kindergartens, primary, lower and upper secondary school and for those who teach adults
- strengthen the knowledge base relating to the learning environment of students with minority language backgrounds
- recruit more persons with immigrant backgrounds to teacher training."[4]

In the healthcare area, the state struggles to provide the same services and to adapt to specific health problems that immigrants may have.

Regarding housing, a Norwegian Government agency offers financial support to buy or rent a house.

In relation to public authorities, they have the responsibility to adapt their services to the needs of the new diverse population and offer support in their own language.

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[3]Thomas HyllandEriksen, *Immmigration and National Identity in Norway* (Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2013), 1.
[4]*A Comprehensive Integration Policy. Diversity and Community,* Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2013, 10.

In Norway, the Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion has the task to ensurethe integration of immigrants and their families. Therefore, an integration policy was established, in order to help them adapt, get involved and contribute to the Norwegian society. The best way to achieve that is by learning the language for an easy communication and by becoming active on the labour market.

This policy is regulated by three main documents, the Immigration Act, the Introduction Act and the Nationality Act. Norway intends to facilitate de integration process by paying attention to the basic needs of the immigrants, such as an educational system, jobs, health services and housing.

"The Directorate of Integration and Diversity (IMDi)implements the integration policy and is the Ministry's expert body. IMDiprovides professional advice and act as a competence center for the municipalities and sector authorities.

VOX, The Norwegian Agency for Lifelong Learning has the responsibility to teach adult immigrants the Norwegian language."[5]

The Act of 15 May 2008 on the Entry of Foreign Nationals into the Kingdom of Norway and their Stay in the Realm(the Immigration Act) establishes the conditions for foreigners to enter and reside in Norway. A residence permit grants the foreign nationalthe right to stay in Norwayand take employment here. Initially, this is a temporary residence permit. A permanent residence permit may today be granted after three years of legal residence in Norway if certain conditions are satisfied.[6]

The Act on an Introduction Programme and Norwegian Language Training for Newly Arrived Immigrants (the Introduction Act), in force since September 2003, has as purpose "to increase the possibility of newly arrived immigrants participating in working and social life and to increase their financial independence."[7]

"The right and obligation to participate in an introduction programme applies to newly arrived foreign nationals between 18 and 55 years who have been granted:

a) asylum.

b) a residence or work permit after being given leave to enter the country as a resettlement refugee.

c) a renewable residence or work permit.

d) a residence or work permit as members of the family of such persons."[8]

Newly arrived foreign nationals have stayed in Norway for less than two years.After threemonths of living in the country, the authorities must provide an introduction programme.

The introduction programme aims to:

a)"provide basic Norwegian language skills;

b)provide basic insight into Norwegian social conditions;

c)prepare for participation in working life."[9]

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[5]https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/immigration/integrering/hvem-gjor-hva-i-integreringspolitikken/id2343464/, accessed June 23, 2016.

[6]"The Act of 15 May 2008 on the Entry of Foreign Nationals into the Kingdom of Norway", accessed June 23, 2016,https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/immigration-act/id585772/.

[7]"The Act on an Introduction Programme and Norwegian Language Training for Newly Arrived Immigrants (the Introduction Act)", accessed June 23, 2016, http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20030704-080-eng.pdf.

[8]"The Act on an Introduction Programme and Norwegian Language Training for Newly Arrived Immigrants (The Introduction Act)", accessed June 23, 2016, http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20030704-080-eng.pdf.

[9]"The Act on an Introduction Programme and Norwegian Language Training for Newly Arrived Immigrants (The Introduction Act)", accessed June 23, 2016, http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20030704-080-eng.pdf.

The programme lasts two years usually, and every participant has an individual plan, adapted to their needs.This training comprises 550 hours of Norwegian-language studies and 50 hours of social studies.[10] During this period, the participant is entitled to a sum of money.

Section 7 of the Act mentions that: "The right and obligation toparticipate in Norwegian language training and social studies free of charge for a total of 300 hours shall apply to foreign nationals between 16 and 55 years of age who have been granted:

a) a residence or work permit pursuant to the Immigration Act that constitutes grounds

for a settlement permit, or

b) collective protection in a situation of mass outflow pursuant to section 8 a of the Immigration Act."[11]

The introduction programme has as main goal the training in Norwegian language and social studies, preparing the participant with the necessary skills and competences for entering other educational programmes or the labor market. Also, the newly arrived need to know and be informed about their rights and duties.

The Nationality Act explains how an immigrant can become a Norwegian national. Applying for Norwegian nationality presupposes that the person:

a) "has provided documentary evidence of or otherwise clearly established his or her identity

b)has reached the age of 12

c)is and will remain a resident of the realm

d)fulfils the conditions for a settlement permit laid down in section 12 of the Immigration Act

e) has spent a total of seven years in the realm in the last ten years, with residence or work permits of at least one year's duration, residence during one or more application-processing periods to be included in the seven-year period.

f)satisfies the requirement regarding Norwegian language training

g)has not been sentenced to a penalty or special criminal sanction or has observed the waiting period

h)satisfies the requirement regarding release from another nationality."[12]

Moreover, the applicant requires a good character certificate from the police and a 300 hours Norwegian training. The Nordic nationals can apply for Norwegian nationality after two years of residence. Foreign nationals who are covered by the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the EEA Agreement) and the Convention establishing the European Free Trade Association (the EFTA Convention) can apply after three years.[13]

CONCLUSIONS

A unified, secure and wealthy community is a desirable model. Thus, the Norwegian integration policy emphasizes the main values that represent the core of the society: "gender equality, equal rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion and belief, solidarity, socio-

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[10]https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/immigration/integrering/introduksjonslov-og-arbeid/opplaring-i-norsk-og-samfunnskunnskap/id2343471/, accessed June 23, 2016.

[11]https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/immigration/integrering/introduksjonslov-og-arbeid/opplaring-i-norsk-og-samfunnskunnskap/id2343471/, accessed June 23, 2016.

[12]"The Act on Norwegian Nationality (The Nationality Act)",accessed June 23, 2016,http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20050610-051-eng.pdf.

[13]"The Act on Norwegian Nationality (The Nationality Act)",accessed June 23, 2016,http://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-20050610-051-eng.pdf.

economic equality, tolerance, participation in working life, democracy and civil society, protection of children's rights, diversity and multilingualism as a resource."[14]

As the integration policy reinforces, "no person can be described according to only one dimension, as all of us have many characteristics and identities. You may be a woman or a man, immigrant or born in Norway, young or old, employed or unemployed, religious or atheist, homosexual or heterosexual, or have a disability. Categories and labels attached to individuals or groups may have a stigmatizing effect and contribute to exclusion from the community. It may put individuals into a category which may create and reinforce differences which lead us to think in terms of "us" and "them". Language must be inclusive. There must be acceptance for the fact that there are many ways of being Norwegian."[15]

The integration can be achieved only with the acceptance of diversity, human rights and democracy as the founding principles of the Norwegian state. The policy intends to approach sensitive issues such as access to educational and professional development,social protection and inclusion, housing or health services. These represent the basic needs for every community in order to feel secure and at home in the adopting country.

In conclusion, the Norwegian welfare model is a success because of the high employment rate and the relatively equal distribution of incomes, helping them escape the economic disruption that occurred at continental and global level. Also, the social crises are less dramatic than in other European countries. But to maintain this high level of economic and social comfort, Norway has to rely on a constant integration policy.

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[14]*A Comprehensive Integration Policy. Diversity and Community,* Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2013, 14.
[15]*A Comprehensive Integration Policy. Diversity and Community,* Norwegian Ministry of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion, 2013.

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TERRORISM AS A THREAT TO EUROPEAN SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES. SCHENGEN AREA AND THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

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ABSTRACT:
BEING GIVEN THE CURRENT SITUATION AT EUROPEAN LEVEL, THE ARTICLE REPRESENTS AN EFFORT TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIO-POLITICAL STRUCTURES. FOR THIS WE CHOSE THE SCHENGEN AREA AND WE ANALYZED ITS MAIN ISSUES ON THE ONGOING CONTEXT AND AFTERWARDS WE TRIED TO FIND THE BEST SUITABLE OPTION AVAILABLE (REFORM OR DISSOLUTION).

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM, EUROPEAN UNION, SCHENGEN AREA

INTRODUCTORY PERSPECTIVE

On an overall look, the complexity and dynamism of socio-political construction that actors of international system have established in recent decades are relatively easy to identify. Internationalization and globalization are just a few elements that contributed to the improvement of such entities and, simultaneously, have facilitated the emergence of new challenges to them.

When we refer to a socio-political construction, be it the one located within a State or one designed internationally, we must have under consideration the complexity and the dual nature that presents such a factor. Naturally, a socio-political structure is one that involves both political factors and social factors. Moreover, it is impossible to independently consider one of those two categories, given that within the entity, in terms of quality of construction that underlies entity, they are interdependent and can't exist without each other.

In the present paper we bring to the fore the Schengen area, in terms of socio-political role that it plays in Europe, and later to identify the main influences that contemporary terrorism manifested on it.

Thus, an overview of the Schengen Area we can see that this sociopolitical construction is the most tangible embodiment of the motto, "United in diversity" and a cornerstone of European construction. Moreover, at present, the area in question plays an important role in the process of deepening European integration. The signing of the Schengen Agreement in

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1985 involved the gradual abandonment of the joint border control between the five signatory countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) and the introduction of freedom of movement for citizens of signatory states. Even if in the beginning, Schengen was conceived as a useful tool in promoting tourism and temporary mobility over time, construction has grown in terms of quality and has become a staple in labor mobility, ideas, initiatives and goods, with direct impact on European economic development.

From another perspective, the construction is considered a success over the national state as the main core of the international system and that because it was the first time in history when states have pledged to give up control over their borders and give up to its control over a fundamental element of national sovereignty. However, the existence of Schengen involves a high degree of confidence between Member States and is an important step towards European federalization.

It is also important to consider the fact that, with time, Schengen has become more than a sociopolitical construction. It is, after all, a central element in building a European identity and, we think, an indispensable tool in the further development of the European Union from the perspective of the community building. Moreover, freedom of movement of individuals and opportunities within the community gave rise to a sense of belonging which is manifested more with the youth population behaviour. In other words, if two decades ago we talked about Schengen as an opportunity that can be tackled by individuals or not, today, it is part of the universe of many individual citizens. Personal development plans, social interactions, ways of building experience, access to knowledge, etc. are based in one way or another on the right to free movement materialized in the Schengen Area. As such, we deal increasingly more, not with a political and economic construction, but with a social structure which integrates / equalize (chances, not individuals) and brings together communities.

Overall, the essence of the Schengen area is shown in an inscription at the museum dedicated to this entity, namely: "The suppression of internal borders of the European Union is recognition that all the Citizens of the states Concerned belong to the same space, that they share a common identity."[3]

However, recent events have caused damage to idealism and optimism existing few years ago, replacing it with fear and insecurity. Contemporary realities have changed the outlook on the Schengen area, making it become from a driver of economic growth, social inclusion and a guardian of freedom on the European continent, a vulnerability which entails risks and threats to the signatory states. Increasingly often, the European political discourse is sprinkled with skepticism, criticism and negativism in regard of the strengths of Schengen space.

We must remember that it is not the first time the existence of the building is put to the test, but the last decade has contributed to the conjugation of several factors that put unprecedented pressure on the future of Schengen. Thus, the decline in optimism related to the Schengen began with the economic recession in 2008 when the Euro - another pillar of European economic integration resulted in a successive deterioration of the economies of the old continent. However, bear in mind that the economic relationship between countries is not a given element of the Schengen area, and increasing interdependence has not occurred as a direct result of participation in this construction. Despite the importance that it has, globalization and internationalization were concerned more about the intense spread of the harmful effects of the economic crisis than the space itself. By the time mentioned above, we are dealing with another destructive factor, namely the emergence of nationalist political

[3] Ian Traynor, „Is the Schengen dream of Europe without borders becoming a thing of the past?", *The Guardian,* 5 ianuarie 2016, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/05/.

parties and an increasingly more intense activity of the supporters of these principles. Then, following the security context within the proximity of the European Union, we started to deal with an exponentially stream of migrants or refugees who, heading towards community put an intensive pressure on external borders (eg in the case of Italy and Greece) and have aroused concern in the economically developed states such as France and Germany.

It is the first time when intense debates over the usefulness of the construction are born in the community, about how the external borders are managed and the measures taken by states that were in their care are criticized. However, it appears increasingly frequent a speech related to the suspension of the Schengen Agreement and closing the borders. We are dealing with the first such moments in EU history when national populism exercises, catalyzed by external challenges, prevail. It is the first time that supporters of closed communities gain ground in front of the open regimes, the liberal ones.[4] Simultaneously there is a debate between the countries situated on major migratory routes and those that are intended country of destination, discourse that made criticisms of the lack of collaboration and communication between them. Moreover, additional resources are required to ensure forces to protect the borders, particularly from countries such as Greece and Italy. The debate continues between Schengen states and the non-member ones, given that migration flows have not been stopped at partenets` borders or territories. The best example is the dispute between France and Britain, on the situation in the port of Calais, where hundreds of immigrants stepped out of the Schengen area to the United Kingdom. At the Schengen states level and non-member states of U.E., the Hungarian initiative to build a fence on the border with Serbia and the possibility of launching possible militarization of the area gave birth to deep debates about the EU's ability to manage current challenges.

The problems mentioned above occurred in 2015, when migration flows have increased and diversified, and it continues until nowadays. Moreover, the issue of terrorism perpetrated by immigrants and the probability that among the great masses of people Islamic State fighters will infiltrare, have sparked controversy in the European dialogue polarizing Member States and giving rise to diametrically opposed solutions to problems. Terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels confirmed the fears of Schengen-skeptics and contributed to find more easily arguments supporting radical measures, such as redeploying national borders.

SCHENGEN AREA ISSUES TODAY

If we look critically on the situation in the Schengen area which appears at the present time, we must focus our analysis on two levels. The first relates to pinpoint problems that occur within the community, and the second is focused on the challenges and threats of external nature. Thus, from external perspective, because it is more natural to analyze this level first, given that internal state is determined by external development, can be identified the following problematic elements:

- Migration from areas neighboring the European Union - especially those who come from areas of conflict or post-conflict - Syria, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Libya, Gambia, Senegal, Somalia. We believe that in the next period will signal the intensification of migration on the next routes: the Western Balkans (with the waiver route Serbia - Hungary and increases flow on the route Bulgaria-Romania) and Central Mediterranean (returning to a flow similar to that 2014 [170760 individuals[5]] on the deteriorating situation in Libya and Algeria[6]);

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[4] Ian Traynor, „Is the Schengen dream of Europe without borders becoming a thing of the past?",
[5] According to Frontex statistics, available at http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/central-mediterranean-route/.

- International terrorism and potential similar events based on local disagreements in relation to international initiatives (eg NATO expansion and growth potential instability in the Balkan states based on qualitative deterioration of leadership[7]);
- A possible new recession in the US would affect the financial evolution of the European Union at the end of 2016;
- A Brexit that would cause economic imbalances on the European scene (especially on countries such as: Netherlands, Cyprus, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Germany, Spain and the list goes on);
- The reorientation of Russia over the situation in Ukraine, due to reduced involvement in Syria could cause an escalation of the conflict and deterioration of security across Ukraine;

Internally, the Schengen Area must face, in our opinion the following challenges:
- Rethinking and adjusting immigration policy at European level - difficult element since it involves a consensus among Member States with divergent interests;
- Completion of the debate on the Dublin Regulation on processing asylum claims - while completing debate on the status of those within its territory en route to U.E. - immigrants or refugees;
- Reaching an agreement on quotas of immigrants and the countries that have the capacity to engage directly in managing the situation;
- Increase the human resources to manage the crisis and to ensure the security of immigrants citizens in the current context;
- The emergence of nationalist parties that are positioned in opposition vis-a-vis the reform of Schengen and existing tools useful in solving problems - both migration and the issue of terrorism;
- Border control or the introduction of these practices;
- Deficient cooperation of intelligence services and law enforcement organs;
- The limits on flows of European citizens, goods and capital as a result of restriction of freedom of movement;
- Lack of consensus and open dialogue on issues of common interest and national interests that prevail sometimes in relation to shared needs;
- The polarization of communities with respect to immigrant groups and use these positions to support public campaigns to obtain political capital;
- Lack of flexibility in terms of social mechanism that it involves political existence and functioning of the Schengen area;
- Failure to control and block illegal activities, or cross-border mobility of suspects wanted for illegal activities;
- Repatriation of European citizens who have joined forces with ISIS or Kurdish and supporting the radicals views or who criticize and challenge the organization and functioning of European society;

Analyzing from a rational perspective the relation between Schengen and terrorism in recent months, would be more than absurd to contend that recent events had as the main

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[6] The Algerian president, aged 79, controls increasingly difficult the power rivalries in the area and did not achieved a sustainable reconciliation after the civil war ended in 2002 and the riots in 2010-2011 (the Arab Spring).

[7] Besnik P., „The Budding Autocrats of the Balkans", *Foreign Policy*, 21.04.2016, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/15/.

facilitator precisely the benefit of the European construction. Moreover, further research showed that behind the attacks were Europeans, in their second or third generation here, which, in our opinion, were not integrated properly. From another perspective, it is equally absurd to suppose that a waiver of the Schengen Agreement will stop or limit the mobility of terrorists. From our point of view, the Schengen area should be used as an indispensable tool in the fight against terrorism and that because such a phenomenon can be overcome only through joint efforts. We emphasize this in the following proposals regarding the future agreement.

SCHENGEN: REFORM OR DISSOLUTION?

Abolishing the Schengen area would be an irreversible blow to everything that the construction and European integration means. Efforts in recent decades would be for nothing and the feeling of belonging to the community would be irreparably damaged, both to individuals and to communities. Moreover, it would be an admission of powerlessness in the face of European external threats and a polarization of the Member States. Therefore, mini-Schengen areas is not a solution.

In our opinion and following the analysis that underlies this material, the only viable option is to reform the Schengen area, with the old principles but with new practices.

Thus, we believe that across the European community (both Member States and those non-States, but part of Schengen) structural reform have to be based on the following objectives (converted into solutions to solve current problems and further ones):

- Avoiding the acceptance of new members and the qualitative development of the partnership;
- Acceptance of new conditions of the application of border controls and facilitate collaboration between Member States;
- Develop concrete and specific legal frameworks for each border side (we refer here to the internal ones) and external border areas (both marine and terrestrial) regarding their management;
- Standardization of procedures and increased interoperability of forces;
- Assuming proportionate financial involvements in terms of managing external borders for all Member States;
- Creation of tools for direct communication between all Member States by institutions with attributions in border protection, law enforcement, etc. making able the direct dialogue and punctual non-formal problem solving;
- Application of Need-to-share at the expense of Need-to-know principle when it comes to cross-border intelligence sharing (valid for national intelligence services and for eventual supranational structure at European level);
- Reducing bureaucracy and streamline procedures;
- Application of CIRAM model (the model on which the FRONTEX analyzes the risk) on an extensive database involving all Member States and institutions with security;

In conclusion, it is easy to evaluate the usefulness of Schengen Area both for further argumentation of the European construction and also for deepening the European integration at the community level. It is also important to address the sustainability of socio-political construction in a general way, taking into account any external changes that may affect its durability and reliability. Furthermore, recent events have shown the need for an increase in pragmatism at European level, in terms of joint efforts between the Member States and not in terms of promoting national interests on the benefits of belonging to such a supranational structure.

Simultaneously to continue the European project, is required a transformation of how future socio-economic structures are designed and how further efforts related to increased individual participation are going to materialize the motto "United in diversity". It is imperative to be cultivated in Europe an evolved sense of belonging and communities have to recognize and assume the role they can play in the development of the European idea.

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II

HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Andreea Emilia DUTA[1]

ABSTRACT:
MANY CONFERENCES ARE ORGANISED REGARDING THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THESE CONFERENCES AIMS ARE FOR THE NPT MEMBER STATES TO ENGAGE TO BAN AND ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
THE CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MUST CONSIDER THE HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATION IN THE DISARMAMENT PROCESS; THE THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE CONSIDERED CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.
IN THE DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION, THE NUCLEAR TEST SCENERY BAN PLAYS THE CRUCIAL; ACCORDING TO THE EU REGARDING THE TREATY BANNING NUCLEAR TESTING MUST BE RATIFIED BY EU STATES. IN THIS RESPECT, THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, THE EU IS MAKING BOTH POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL EFFORT SUPPORTING THE PROVISIONAL TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT, THE VERIFICATION REGIME, NUCLEAR EXPLOSION DETECTION SYSTEM, TRAINING IN CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS IN THE FIELD.

KEY WORDS: THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

HUMANITARIAN IMPACT

In March 2013, the Norwegian Government is organizing the first Conference concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, with the participation of representatives from 127 countries.

A conference dedicated to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, from Espen Barth Eide, organized by Norway, underlines the catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, presented by several experts (preparation of emergency interventions, the effects on people and the environment, the development in the medium and long term). [2]

Several conclusions emphasize: emergency intervention is unlikely to be adequate and sufficient, the establishment of such capabilities being questioned; the destructive consequences of the nuclear tests that remain, even if political circumstances change; the detonation of nuclear weapons effects, which do not stop at national borders, the effects can be regional and even global.[3]

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[2] *Findings of the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March 2013*, Working paper submitted by Norway, *New* York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.
[3] *Chair's summary of the Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo on 4 and 5 March 2013,* The Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, held in Oslo.

In February 2014, a second Conference was organized by Mexico with the participation of 147 state delegates and 120 NGOs.

In December 2014, the Austrian Government organized a third Conference on the topic of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, involving delegates from 158 countries. These conferences aimed to ensure that the NPT member states commit to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

The major interest of the international community is a concrete and urgent progress in favor for nuclear disarmament, being underlined by the Vienna Conference concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear[4] weapons through the eight key conclusions.[5]

Thus, the effects do not stop at national borders; they may potentially be irreversible and more complex than the common understanding; the effects of the nuclear tests have induced a long-term radioactive contamination; as long as nuclear weapons exist there is the possibility of nuclear explosions and the danger of access of non-State actors; nuclear deterrence is viewed as a potential nuclear war stint that involves risk; the intervention measures and emergency humanitarian assistance are not and may not be appropriate especially for populated areas, prevention is the only viable measure against humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons; there is no universal legal regulation concerning nuclear weapons; ethical and moral dimension become very important.[6]

The conference on the "humanitarian perspective" was attended by representatives from Great Britain and the USA, even though, usually, the P-5 is highly suspicious of humanitarian movements, because of the potential for the development of actions in favor of disarmament that can very easily escape control.[7]

The effects of promoting humanitarian aspirations in the field of nuclear weapons induce a state of nervousness in the relations between the P-5 and their allies,[8] who cannot observe the contradictions between humanitarianism and the nuclear deterrence strategies.

Catastrophic consequences of the use of nuclear weapons must take into account the humanitarian considerations in the process of disarmament, bearing in mind that the threat of use of nuclear weapons can be regarded as a crime against humanity.[9]

The New Agenda Coalition (NAC)[10] was formed in response to the permanent threat towards humanity, that is presented by the possession of nuclear weapons by the P-5 and the

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[4] www.hinw14vienna.at; (accessed February 19, 2016).

[5] *The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (8-9 December 2014) and the Austrian Pledge: Input for the 2015 NPT Review Conference,* Working paper submitted by Austria, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 29.

[6] "*The Urgent Need for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free World*", The Special Declaration of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the Third Summit of HERBERT, held in Belén, Costa Rica, on January 28 and 29, 2015. www.bmeia.gv.at/update-pledge-support; (accessed February 19, 2016).

[7] *Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons* held in Oslo, in Nayarit, Mexico, and in Vienna.

[8] Paul DUȚĂ, "Human security and the phrase „Partnership for Security" for NATO"s strategic concept", *Strategic Impact*, Issue: 4/2009, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare "Carol I", București, 2005, pp. 55-64.

[9] The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty reaffirms the validity of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the withthe picture of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, that "there is in neither customary international law of conventional ABR cloud specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict , and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law." www.hinw14vienna.at; (accessed February 19, 2016).

[10] The New Agenda Coalition, formed in the NAC-1999 to Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa, proposes a series documents NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP 18 (on "effective measures"); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. WP III/19 (on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC.

three other States that are in possession of nuclear weapons and have not signed the NPT. It is against the law to hold indefinitely these weapons for security reasons, even though the disarmament process is not simple, unrealistic or impossible to implement.[11]

NAC calls for RevCon to highlight the possible humanitarian catastrophe, as well as the compliance with humanitarian law regulations, noting the increasing fear to this path within the international community. Furthermore, the legal instruments which are needed to ensure that "effective measures"[12] required by art. VI NPT (the Main task of the Committee I) should be pragmatically implemented, as well as in the organizing of forums for disarmament but also in the framework of the United Nations General Assembly.

India, Israel, and Pakistan are imposed to become signatory states to the NPT as NNWS and to commit to respecting the IAEA safety standards for their nuclear plants without raising objections; NAC calls for Korea to return to the NPT and to comply with the IAEA safety standards.[13]

RevCon 2015 diplomatic preparations include a re-evaluation of the ethical dimension of the NPT, to make nuclear weapons incompatible with humanitarian law, based on a provision of the 2010 NPT final document.[14]

Thus, the ICRC has adopted a number of resolutions emphasizing the lack of any adequate humanitarian response capacity to the use of nuclear weapons.[15]

The humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons constitutes the subject of another document of RevCon 2015, being considered a central imperative of NPT by three-quarters of NPT member states.[16]

It presents a series of recommendations, *inter alia*, the risk of a nuclear explosion being higher than in the past due to the proliferation, the need to comply with international law becoming acuter, including international humanitarian law and the implementation of the obligations under the NPT through effective measures.

THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

2016 marks the 20th anniversary from the opening for signature of the treaty banning nuclear[17] tests, the entry into force depending on the signature of the eight states form Annex

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III/WP 25, 2015 NPT/CONF./PC./WP-27 and NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. I/WP. 29 (on nuclear disarmament); NPT/CONF. 2015/PC./WP-26 (transparency); and NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. I/WP. 30 (on verification).

[11] *Taking forward nuclear disarmament*, Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 8.

[12] NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP 18 (on "effective measures").

[13] *Taking forward nuclear disarmament*, Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 8.

[14] "The Conference expresses deep concern at the STI catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirms the need for all states at all times to comply Nr with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law." www.hinw14vienna.at; (accessed February 19, 2016).

[15] The International Committee of the Red Cross ICRC. the Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement in 2011 and 2013 adopted resolutions noting the lack of any adequate humanitarian response capacity to the use of nuclear weapons and the need for concrete action leading to the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and their elimination". www.hinw14vienna.at; (accessed February 19, 2016).

[16] *Working Paper on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons*, submitted by Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Egypt, Holy See, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 30. View the *2010 NPT Review Conference* resolved in Action 1 of the 2010 Action Plan that "All States parties commit to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons."

2 of the Treaty; however, demonstrating its viability verification system (detection of three Korean nuclear tests).[18]

In 28th September 2013, the Resolution 68/32 of the General Assembly of the United[19] Nations calls the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiating a convention on the prohibition of the possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, storage, transfer, use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

By 2018, the United Nations will hold a high-level conference on nuclear disarmament as a concrete way to achieve the objectives of nuclear disarmament.

Although within the RevCon 2010[20] there are discussions about the condition of the Conference on Disarmament to establish a subsidiary committee for nuclear disarmament, linked to the existence of a work plan negotiated and agreed upon, the opposition of some NWS is blocking the emergence of this structure.[21]

Achieving an agreement to remove nuclear weapons enjoys widespread support, even if the Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)[22] acted for the format of the Conference on disarmament, a direction in which progress is almost nonexistent.

On a non-governmental level, the initiative of negotiating an agreement on the prohibition of the possession of nuclear weapons is led by The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons.[23]

Negotiating an agreement concerning the possession of nuclear weapons may call into question a future agreement on the elimination of nuclear weapons; such an initiative is based on the lack of results in compliance with the obligations laid down in article VI of NPT.

In NAM view, the elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the threat of using nuclear weapons, expressing the concern that the request made a long time ago as NNWS signatories to the NPT to receive negative security assurances from P-5 through legal unconditional commitments, non-discriminatory and irrevocable, has not been done.

The unilateral commitments each NWS agreed upon, which granted security assurances, are limited, conditional and inadequate and are not rising to the requirements of the universal character, the legal relevance, effectiveness, non-discrimination, and irrevocability.[24]

Moreover, it calls for the removal of the threat of using nuclear weapons from military and security doctrines of NWS and from NATO Strategic Concept, which involves a

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[17] The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. View *The ninth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, September 2015; the Group of Eminent Persons by the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

[18] *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty*, Working paper submitted by Australia, Hungary, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan and Nigeria, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 23.

[19] Follow-up to the high level meeting of 2013, of the General Assembly on nuclear disarmament.

[20] The action 6 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament.

[21] *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

[22] The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty. Non-Aligned Movement, the Non-Aligned States-NAM. Further we will be using this acronym, because the position in relation to the NPT of the Group of non-aligned States parties to the NPT is similar to that of NAM.

[23] The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons-ICAN.

[24] *Security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons*, Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 2

deterrence policy. The NAM document expresses its dissatisfaction with the lack of NWS political will in relation to the concerns expressed in NPT.[25]

It notes the need for NPT to regain credibility to eliminate the gap between disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation through the establishment of "effective measures" of disarmament in accordance with article VI, NPT, developed under serious discussions relating to legal framework expanded and prohibitive.[26]

Thus NAC propose a number of options:[27] a) a convention on nuclear weapons irreversible and verifiable nuclear disarmament within a limited period of time; b) an agreement banning nuclear tests accompanied by practical implementation agreements; c) a framework agreement on mutual support instruments establishing key prohibitions of nuclear disarmament; d) a hybrid arrangement which would include the above variations or other working hypotheses.

Achieving the above objectives circumscribed in art VI NPT can be done through a dual approach: combining technical and political advantages and disadvantages in negotiating a long-term agreement.

NAM stresses concern over to the seriousness of the threat to humanity, the existence of nuclear weapons and potential threats of using them, advocating for simultaneous efforts for non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament through: a) a general reduction of the overall nuclear weapons arsenals; b) reduction should not be dependent on the type, location; c) reducing the significance and roles of nuclear weapons in the concepts, doctrines and security policies (supports and promotes the threat of use of nuclear weapons aimed at the concept of security of military alliances and nuclear deterrence policies);[28] d) promoting policies to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, to reduce the danger of a nuclear war for the simulation of non-proliferation and disarmament; e) the future operational status of nuclear weapons systems; f) reduce the risk of use of nuclear weapons; g) increase transparency and mutual trust.[29]

NAM is worried by the lack of progress in the implementation of disarmament obligations of NSW[30] inaction, which puts under a question mark the subject matter and the purpose of the NPT non-proliferation credibility, but also underlines the importance of multilateralism and multilateralism's solutions accepted in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

According to NAM, it is appropriate to negotiate and establish timelines for the elimination of nuclear weapons and track the progress so that is respected.

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[25] *Nuclear-weapon-free zones Working paper submitted by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 4.

[26] *Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, the Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa), New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.

[27] NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP. 18, para. 29.

[28] The Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty also remains deeply concerned at the "Strategic Concept for the defence and security of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

[29] *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13. According to the obligations under article 4. VI, para. 3 and 4 letter c, decision from the NPT "Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament" (1995), "The plan of the 13 practical steps" (2000), "The action plan on nuclear disarmament" (2010), "The action 5 of the Final Document of the Review Conference of 2010.

[30] Referred to as "The action 3 of the 2010 Final Document."

To be noted that NPT signatories of NNWS agree to assume legal obligations not to produce the materials needed for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Unilateral or bilateral declarations to reduce nuclear weapons cannot cover the lack of progress in the elimination of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the modernization of nuclear weapons, their infrastructure and transport systems must cease in NAM's vision.[31]

The entry into force of the agreement signed by Russia and the USA has not eliminate general concerns related to continued modernization of nuclear weapons, which cover the gap left in the reductions of the nuclear arsenal which was agreed (by improving qualitative, the development of new types of superior quality, broadening the spectrum of more options for the targets concerned).

In terms of reducing deployments and those with operative status, they cannot replace irreversible reduction, as being necessary to respect the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification of these reduction, due to a lack of correlation between the unlimited character of the NPT and the unlimited character in time of possession of nuclear weapons regime deriving from both vertically and horizontally.[32]

NAM advises against negative effects of development of anti-missile defense systems[33] and the space militarizing atmospheric, calling for the commencement of negotiations on the space militarizing atmospheric.[34] Consequently, NNWS are entitled to effective security guarantee, universal, non-discriminatory and unconditional, irrevocable threat of use or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance;[35] it has been proposed that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be considered "crimes against humanity" and the possession of nuclear weapons to not be covered by international humanitarian law. Corollary, military doctrines should not talk about the "threat of use" or "use of nuclear weapons".[36]

NAM proposes the commencement negotiation in the form of a Convention on the elimination of nuclear weapons accompanied by an action plan with clear deadlines, divided into three five-year phases – each with the duration of five years.[37]

The first phase of the action plan (2015-2020) is devoted to the negotiation and signing of the Convention with the prohibitory obligations, procedures of destruction through an integrated system of monitoring. Also in this phase the measures agreed by RevCon in 1995, 2000 and 2010 will be implemented. The SRSG will periodically inform the preparatory sessions of RevCon 2020 about the progress.

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[31] In order to comply Nr with their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as well as with their commitments under the 13 practical steps and 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament. *Nuclear disarmament*, the Working paper submitted by the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 13.

[32] The action 4 of the 2010 Review Conference action plan on nuclear disarmament for the full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

[33] The anti-ballistic missile defence systems.

[34] At the Conference on Disarmament, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/31.

[35] View The advisory opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International Court of Justice on the *With the picture of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* that "there is in neither customary international law of conventional ABR cloud specific authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons" and that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law".

[36] See also, "Elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons", which was submitted to the 2010 Review Conference in document NPT/CONF. 2010/WP. 47.

[37] *Draft elements for a plan of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons,* Working paper submitted by the Group of the Non-Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP.

The second stage (2020-2025) follows the ratification and entry into force of the Convention and the action plan with deadlines that are set: the multilateral verification integrated system, the declaration and inventory of the contents of the nuclear missile arsenals, decommissioning, storage, and regulation of transfers of nuclear material in "peaceful purposes". The exercise of these measures and the vector is designated taking the IAEA as an example.

The third stage (2025-2030) includes a range of irreversible removal measures and verification of nuclear weapons, conversion to "peaceful purposes" and generalization of application of IAEA safety standards for all nuclear installations.

It is necessary to develop technologies and procedures of verification and control of nuclear weapons through an international effort to establish an international verification regime overall.[38]

The principle of transparency is a condition for the existence of the principle of verification of disarmament to ensure that disarmament measures are met in accordance with the principle of irreversibility.[39] Transparency can be achieved, in the case of NNWS, through periodic reporting according to a certain pattern,[40] and for the NWS through reports submitted to the Committee of Governors of the IAEA.[41]

In 2014, the NWS presents a "common framework" to avoid "relating to a standard reporting form" agreed in the action plan RevCon 2010, Japan, by giving a series of proposals in regards to this "oversight": in preparation for the RevCon 2020 a standard form for reporting the completion of the disarmament obligations shall be set; the presentation of numeric information for the measurements of nuclear warheads, means of transport, weapons decommissioned, fissionable material for military purposes, measures for diminishing the importance of the military and security concepts, doctrines, policies.

The reporting mechanism built by 2020 will be subject to improvement by 2020 RevCon.

In 2007, the international cooperation initiative of the British (NWS)-Norwegian (of NNWS) to check the overall nuclear weapons (UKNI)[42] has provided the first way of checking for equipment of NNWS and procedures for inspection and analysis of the results of the inspections.[43]

The project has revealed, in a holistic vision of verification, the complex issues that can be exceeded by constructive partnership, avoiding transferring information favorable to the proliferation. Furthermore it suggested that NNWS use their own nuclear experts knowledgeable in the restrictions and specific constraints on nuclear installations, subjected to verification inspections.[44]

UKNI project can be considered the starting point for future nuclear verification procedures in compliance with the protection of information barriers and the overall

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[38] View the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

[39] NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. III/WP.

[40] NPT/CONF. 2015/PC. WP/12.

[41] *Transparency, Reporting and Strengthening the Review Process,* Working paper submitted by Japan, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 32.

[42] The UK-Norway Initiative-UKNI.

[43] *The United Kingdom-Norway Initiative: Further Research into the Verification of Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement*, the Working Paper submitted by the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 2015 NPT/CONF. 31/WP.

[44] See Mărcău Flavius Cristian, "Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area," Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi" din Târgu - Jiu, nr. 4/2015, Seria Litere şi Ştiinţe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuşi", pp. 77-85.

improvement of nuclear missiles and widening access agenda contextualized in nuclear installations being laid open to verifications.

With regard to the pillar of nuclear disarmament, Egypt notes that over a 25-year period since the signing of the NPT, it has not seen the Elimination of nuclear weapons and for over 45 years from its entry into force, as a fault of the prolongation of the NPT indefinite, the progress is minor. [45]

RevCon improved the provisions for the NPT[46] and on the follow-up conferences regarding the catastrophic humanitarian utilization of nuclear[47] weapons by creating conditions, in Egypt, for the negotiation of a Convention on nuclear weapons simultaneously with further work of the Conference on disarmament.

The fact that there are no time limits for the enforcement of the obligations of disarmament is a serious reason for restarting the negotiations on an agreement for the prohibition and irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material, under the control of effective multilateral international powers, in a specific period of time, within the framework of the Conference on disarmament.

In April 2009, in Prague, President Obama declares support for nuclear disarmament through concrete steps, even though the objective will not be achieved rapidly.[48]

In 2013, President Obama, announced in Berlin, that he is ready to reduce by one-third of the strategic nuclear warheads, determined by the New START, and to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, measures which must be negotiated with Russia.

In 2014, 85% of the 31,255 (1967) nuclear warheads and 90% of non-strategic missiles have been reduced.

The role of nuclear weapons in American politics is to deter a nuclear attack against USA and its allies and partners. The U.S. will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against NNWS signatory of the NPT which comply with their obligations regarding non-proliferation; their use will be decided only in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, allies and partners. The programs are for upgrading nuclear safety, to reduce the risk of nuclear[49] catastrophes and not to increase striking powers.[50]

The rigorous verification system of the New START provision[51] and the publication of data on the US nuclear arsenal are the expression of the implementation of the principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification under the conditions of increasing complexity of verification.[52]

US hasn't conducted any nuclear tests for more than 23 years, supporting the ratification of the treaty prohibiting nuclear tests;[53] complying with voluntary moratorium, participating in monitoring nuclear explosions.[54]

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[45] *Nuclear Disarmament*, Working paper submitted by Egypt, New York, 27 April-22 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP. 39.

[46] The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; The 13 Practical Steps 2000 Review Conference; Action 5, 20 and 21 of the 2010 Plan of Action Review Conference.

[47] Oslo, Norway, conferences in March 2013, Nayarit, Mexico, in February 2014, and in Vienna, Austria, in December 2014.

[48] *Implementing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Disarmament*, Working paper submitted by the United States of America, New York, 27 April-25 May 2015 NPT/CONF. 2015/WP 44.

[49] The practice of open-ocean "unlikely case of unauthorized or accidental launch of missiles, directs them towards the ocean.

[50] The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).

[51] The United States and Russia have exchanged more than 8.300 notifications on the numbers, locations, movements, and eliminations of U.S. and Russian strategic forces covered by the Treaty.

[52] The Nuclear Threat Initiative as the International Partnership launched for Nuclear Disarmament Verification.

[53] Only will carry out safety and maintenance of nuclear arsenals through the *Stockpile Stewardship Program*.

For several years, the United States has not enriched uranium product (1964) or plutonium (1988) necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons; during 1993-2014, the US has bought from Russia enriched uranium which it processed into less enriched uranium using it in nuclear power plants; significant amounts of plutonium were withdrawn from military deposits.[55]

Sustained efforts to stop the production of necessary material for nuclear weapons require that the next step should be a multilateral verification of closure of production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons.[56]

USA renews its negative security guarantees for NPT member of NNWS, which comply with non-proliferation obligations, stating their openness to a legal document in this respect for a nuclear weapons free zone.[57]

Positive security guarantees are offered to the victims of states who use or threat of nuclear weapons in an aggression directed against them.[58]

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[54] The International Monitoring System, International Centre, the Date and the on-site Inspection (OSI), the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO).

[55] *The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation concerning the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation* (PMDA).

[56] *The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty* (FMCT). See also the consensus conclusion of a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT (established pursuant to UNGA A/RES/53/67) and the Shannon Report (CD/1299).

[57] *The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review*.

[58]"The United States intends to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the [NPT] that is the victim of an act of, or an object of a threat of, aggression in which nuclear weapons it has used." *The Security Council resolution S/1995/984*.

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THE HORN OF AFRICA AND ISMALIC RADICALISM

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ABSTRACT:
CUSTOMARY IDENTITY VS. ISLAM, RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM VS. ISLAMIC RADICALISM, DEMOCRACY VS. MILITANCY, WAR VS. INSURGENCY, AND DEMOCRACY VS. AUTHORITARIANISM – THE EAST AFRICAN SPACE IS CURRENTLY THE SCENE OF STRONG INTERACTIONS, VIOLENT CONFLICT, BOLD FOREIGN POLICIES, AND TENACIOUS ECONOMIC INTERESTS.
THE GROWTH OF THE RADICAL ISLAM IN EAST AFRICA IN THE LAST DECADES WAS MANIFESTED THROUGH THE SPREAD OF THE SALAFI AND WAHHABI CLERICS, WHICH HAVE PUT PRESSURE ON THE TRADITIONAL PRACTICES, AS WELL AS BY THE EMERGENCE OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM GROUPS INFLUENCED BY THESE IDEOLOGIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RADICAL ISLAM IS DUE TO THE CONFLUENCE OF A LARGE NUMBER OF FACTORS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL, SPECIFIC TO THE EAST AFRICA REGION.
MOTIVATED BY A RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE ISLAMIC LAW, THE JIHADIST IDEOLOGY WILL REPRESENT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT AND PERSISTENCE OF THE THREAT FOR THE CONSERVATIVE MUSLIM AS WELL AS THE WESTERN SOCIETIES AND GLOBALIZATION WILL ACCELERATE THE SPREAD OF THIS IDEOLOGY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.
THE MOST EFFECTIVE BARRIERS AGAINST THE INGRESS OF TERRORISTS AND RADICAL IDEOLOGIES IN THE REGION ARE NOT ONLY APPLICATIONS OF MILITARY FORCE, BUT ALSO CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE MUSLIMS FROM EAST AFRICA. AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION IN THE LONG TERM WOULD REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF CONDITIONS WHICH MAKE THIS REGION, A WELCOMING AREA FOR EXTREMIST GROUPS AND TERRORIST ATTACKS.

KEY WORDS: RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM, ISLAMIC RADICALISM, EAST AFRICA, SALAFI AND WAHHABI CLERICS, ISLAMIC LAW,

THE HORN OF AFRICA

An area of impressive and traumatizing contrasts, a beauty eloquent in opposition with the daily atrocities of the human survival, a wealth incontestable in opposition with exacerbated greed, a place which has endured over the age a peculiar combination of underutilization of resources and external support impossible to verbalized[3], often referred to as the place of immeasurable beauty, a veritable ocean, a separate planet, a huge and varied[4] cosmos overshadowed by brutal colonialism and by an absolutely chaotic division of the

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[3] Barbara Kingsolver, *The Poisonwood Bible*, (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2005), 7.
[4] Ryszard Kapuściński, *The Cobra's Heart*, (Penguin, UK, 2007), 5.

destines of some nations.[5] Furrowed by deep scars and remnants of contact with so many Africa civilizations seeks a path, a decent destiny that would lead to a long-awaited and desired balance.

Despite an UN arms embargo, according to the UN monitoring group concerning Somalia, the flows of weapons to Somalia have increased aggressive due to a growing number of member as well as the networks of trading of arms who were involved in this process. According to the report, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Iran, Libya, Lebanese Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia and Syria have supplied weapons and logistical support for ICU, while Ethiopia, Uganda and Yemen have offered military assistance to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).[6]

The arms trading networks in Yemen have sent the large consignments of weapons to all the parties' involved in the conflict in Somalia. The large quantities of weapons have passed through Bakaaraha, a network of arms markets interconnected financially in Somalia with Mogadishu highest market. After the victory of the CPE on the coalition ARPCT, networks in Yemen have begun carrying weapons exclusively to the ICU. However, according to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, military leaders have continued to buy an increasing number of weapons and to work through the relatives to ensure clandestine purchases of high caliber weapons.[7]

The arm trafficking on a large scale is not limited, of course only to Somalia. Suppliers of weapons also satisfy the needs of the various armed rebel groups in Sudan. Moreover, there is a market for weapons, undercover, in the area of eastern Nairobi, where many Somalis have settled. The illegal weapons are also brought and trafficked through airfields in the north-west of Kenya.

Customary identity vs. Islam, religious extremism vs. Islamic radicalism, democracy vs. militancy, war vs. insurgency, and democracy vs. authoritarianism – the East African space is currently the scene of strong interactions, violent conflict, bold foreign policies, and tenacious economic interests. It is a reality of chance in which any change takes place expeditiously, from the change of political regime to the change of the military strategy or the nation's economic.[8] Viewed from this perspective, East Africa seems to need the stability, even if one is offered under the auspices of radical Islam and Sharia. This scenario may become a reality in a short time as well as the radical changes whether political, economic, social or foreign policy. Based on these considerations it arises in this space deeply troubled a situation which in literature, after the Second World War became known under the generic name of "Catch 22"[9] or "22 Clenci".

East Africa, like any region, state, nation or organization tends towards stability, security and aspires to sustainable development which, within the framework of the socio-political guidelines is achieved through means of good governance, political liberalism and the national contribution. The problem is that the region of East Africa, to achieve these goals has at its disposal as solutions the radicalism itself, which wants to fight in the perspective of

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[5] Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o, *A Grain of Wheat*, (Heinemann Educational Books, 1994), 11-13.
[6] UN Security Council, 2/2007/436, "Letter dated 19 December 2007 from the Acting Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council."
[7] UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, „Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676."
[8] Mărcău Flavius Cristian, "Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area," *Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi" din Târgu - Jiu, nr.* 4/2015, Seria Litere şi Ştiinţe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuşi", 77-85.
[9] Joseph Heller (1961).

security and stability. The truth is that the East Africa needs this radicalism, regardless of its origin - Islamist, pro - Western nationalist or customary law.

The prevalence of an informal economy refers to the extent to which the informal economy overshadows the formal economy and which has escaped from the state control. Informal report to the total labor force is greater for women than for men and is predominantly in small business, such as retail trade and in the agricultural sector. This also involves a significant amount of cross-border trading.

In some cases, the informal sector institutionalized by the corrupted customs authorities, border guards and police, the terrorist networks offer the opportunity to launders money gives them the necessary funds for the transport or facilitates them to carry out financial transactions they need to operate. In Somalia, financial transactions are conducted through the "hawala", an informal system widely used throughout Africa, but also in the Middle East and South Asia. In the past, hawala transactions have not left any trace of the paper. The anonymity of these transactions has enabled the terrorists and their supporters' transfers of funds, without problems or prohibition of any kind. Since 11 September 2001, the national central banks of the countries of origin and international organizations have taken measures to increase the surveillance of the hawala transactions.

The presence of the authorities at the border areas it is vital to the entire territory of East Africa, reflecting a general incapacity of governments to maintain the foreign groups on the outside of their territories. For example, Kenya border with Somalia is very easy translucent -and at the same time, large part consists of the arid and sparsely populated by ethnic Somalis. Although there are many custom checkpoints Kenya, the rest of the border is rarely patrolled, and there are very many smuggling routes.[10]

The surveillance of the coastline and maritime is minimal. The waters in this area of Africa have become some of the most susceptible areas of the maritime piracy in the world. According to the annual report of the Office of the International Maritime, there have been 31 incidents of piracy and armed robbery reported against the ships from the coast of Somalia and 13 in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea in 2007 alone.[11]

With 20 countries[12] in composition and a population of approximately 400 million[13] inhabitants - The greatest of the regions of Africa, of which approximately 66 % Christians, 21% Muslims and 10 % ethno[14] religious and the prospect to balance this gap by the middle of the XXI century[15], East Africa is already shaping as being an important vector and the cradle of social struggle - political - economic - military between the precepts of democracy supported by the society as a whole and the radicalism of the Islamist, facing the denigration of any form of social or political development in the area.

The radicalism can be categorized in general as a set of "concepts and political attitudes which pursuits categorical and radical measure in solving the social life problems"[16], which emphasizes the fact that the radicalism is the one who changes invariably and perfected the political landscape, economic and social of the areas they come into contact.

The growth of the radical Islam in East Africa in the last decades was manifested through the spread of the Salafi and Wahhabi clerics, which have put pressure on the

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[10] Human Rights Watch, „Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya."

[11] International Maritime Bureau, „Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships - Annual Report 2007."

[12] *** *Composition of macro geographical (continental) regions, geographical sub-regions, and selected economic and other groupings*, United Nations Statistics Division scheme of geographic regions, 2013.

[13] *** *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision*, United Nations, Population Division, 2015.

[14] *** *Largest Religious Groups – Eastern Africa*, Association of Religious Data Archives, 2012.

[15] *** *The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050*, Pew Research Center, 2015.

[16] Florin Marcu, *Marele dicționar de neologisme*, (Saeculum, București, 2000), 7.

traditional practices, as well as by the emergence of extremism and terrorism groups influenced by these ideologies. The development of the radical Islam is due to the confluence of a large number of factors of socio-political, specific to the East Africa region. In external categories is part of the following: the effects of the Islamic renaissance at the global level of the past few decades, the influence of the international organizations as well as the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, the export of Saudi Arabia funds and ideologies, the impact of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the international spread of radical Islamist networks. The internal dynamics, which contribute to the rise of radical Islamism, has included the increase in the movements of the internal Islamist.

As regards to East Africa, it can be really being considered the cradle of the guidelines of the radical Islamist worldwide. During the Cold War black continent was under the domination of the colonial times, and if in the case of the latter the war was indeed one cold, it has generated many conflicts ignited in the geographical territory of the "South", where the countries have become desirous to assert national liberation from the tutelage domineering European empires.

In assessing terrorism in East Africa, a distinction must be made between Kenya and Tanzania, which provides a different type of environment for terrorist networks by virtue of their degree rather high bureaucratization, to Somalia, which has been in a statelessness status since the collapse of Siad Barre in 1991. The big urban areas in Kenya and Tanzania, together with their infrastructure somewhat functional and the companies arranged in a reasonable manner, offered these groups the opportunity to maintain the anonymity and to find the resources they need to build such networks.

In exchange, in statelessness Somalia, taking into account that the society is organized in the vast majority into clans, the authorities, to the extent that they are present, have a good capacity for monitoring these groupings. This makes Somalia difficult to penetrate to outsiders unless they have the protection of the local groups. Although those outsiders might be successful in bringing a local group, segmentation of social groups and the nature of the social relations would limit their ability to extend its influence on them. This makes the Tanzania and Kenya favorable areas for the development of the terrorist networks, even in the case in which Somalia becomes a refuge for some of them.

From Congo to the Horn of Africa and South Africa, the Cold War has created or facilitated the conflicts and destructive wars[17] of national emancipation national. It is the moment when, under the influence of US foreign strategy the African terrorist phenomenon has appeared in the form of the group RENAMO[18] in Mozambique financed by the Rhodesia racist and by South Africa who wanted the segregation, with the political support of the US[19]. The climax of this strategy has been reached in the Middle East, when the support given to the mujahedeen in their fights against the USSR forces has led to ideology of war and anchored in the religion through the creation of a global network of Islamism fighters, which now have returned to haunt the US into an Goardina equation which brings together the groupings of the Islamic radical of East Africa, Al Shabaab - acting under the tutelage of Al Qaeda, Hizbul Islami - Islamic Party which has brought together under the same management the four big insurgent Somalian groups ARS-A of Hassan Awey , Jabhatul Islamiya, Brigade Ras Kamboni and the Muaskar Anole grouping, police forces of the Harti tribe and ISIS located in the close proximity of East Africa in the village of Yemen and in areas north of

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[17] David Percox, *Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonization*, (New York, Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 18.
[18] RENAMO (1975) and FRELIMO.
[19] Mahmood Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War and the Roots of Terror, (*Harmony, 2005), 45.

the Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria and Libya[20], share their interests and to fight for domination.

Under the influence of a social environment unfavorable is developing these radical avatar precepts of ecclesiastical. Islam itself can be considered radical, because it has changed the perception of spirituality, of the tribes of nomads who had a polytheistic or even a non-religious perspective on existence. The nomadic origin of these social groups has made that their existence to invariably interact with numerous communities in search of a place to build a venue in which to develop into a national state governed by the rule of law. The interactions between these groups of nomadic Islamists have not always been the most favorable of their objectives; most people tend to marginalize or not to accept them. Moreover, the spectrum of the threats to the national security of the peoples made the ideological radicalism and terrorism the most vividly perceived threats to the social balance[21]. Motivated by a radical interpretation of the Islamic law, the jihadist ideology will represent the most significant and persistence of the threat for both the conservative Muslim as well as the Western societies and globalization will accelerate the spread of this ideology to the detriment of the national governments, the US and its allies as well as in those places deprived and degraded in terms of social values where the Islamist rhetoric will be received as the savior.

With regards to East Africa, it is envisaged that this to be part of the process of globalization of the Islamic radicalism, alongside the Urdu communities in Pakistan or India, Pashto in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Bengali from Bangladesh and India, Bahasa in Indonesia and Malaysia and Malay in Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The combination of these radical local actors with global players raised the level of the threat to a new record, the latter by giving them the logistic support and the support of the ideological they would need to continue the fight at the local level, in exchange to provide the necessary support in the global operations run by their sponsors[22]. Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Congo or Somalia are most often mentioned to in the media streams on the terrorist attacks, and we will see undoubtedly an extension of these territorial limits, the rest of Africa cannot remain immune of this scourge that will generate in time other cells, groups and the Islamist sects, more violent and more persevering in proselytizing acid.

In order to be able to reduce the threat coming from this scourge, the governments have approached a tactic of armed reprisals in order to destroy these deviant behaviors but have lost sight of the disadvantaged communities that formed the basis of which the Islamists choose their recruits. Any future strategy must focus not only on combating terrorism extremist groups but also on the extremism in the communities[23].

The religion will always be a central element of any nation, deeply rooted in the conscience and closely linked to very existence of that nation. Religious leaders have always had a huge influence on international politics a relevant example being the recognition of the Palestinian state by Pope Benedict XVI century in February 2013 and the signature of the

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[20] *** *ISIS's Regional Campaign: March 2016*, Institute for the Study of War, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%27s%20Regional%20Campaign%20MAR2016.pdf, (accessed in 26.05.2016).

[21] Rohan Gunaratna, *Understanding The Challenge Of Ideological Extremism*, (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2008), 9.

[22] Rohan Gunaratna, *Understanding The Challenge Of Ideological Extremism*, 227.

[23] Rohan Gunaratna, *Re-Assessing the Terrorist Threat: The Past, the Present, and the Future*, Inside on Terrorism, SITE Intelligence Group, http://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/about-us/21-jihad/44-reassess, (accessed in 30.03.2016).

Agreement the religious and spiritual in 2015 under the leadership of the Pope Francis[24]. It becomes obvious that religion has become so an instrument as a means of making international politics, to influence the governments or political leaders to direct or redirect foreign policy depending on the actions of the Church. Although precepts governing the church, any orientation would be, have existed and - in extreme conditions there will be a tendency of extremism, religion seeking the means to maintain its position as governess in front of the political orientations whether it is democratic or dictatorial. Islamism should be included in the category of extreme religious precepts, because it starts from the existing precepts and develop or interpret them in an extreme manner, marginal, exacerbating the importance of the conflict, the jihad in preserving and asserting that religious orientation. However the radicalism generates fundamental changes on the geographical scene of East Africa, starting with the change of population perspective, resizing the aspirations and hope for a stable and peacefully environment, favorable to the development, the involvement of international actors in the area by kinetic action or investments in the economy of the continent, the way in which the governments or state leaders are forced to address security issues, displacing an impressive number of immigrants to the adjacent areas or even to the neighboring continents, at the reconsideration of the options for young people for the future, generating situation of crisis by preventing access to humanitarian agencies in the area and to occupation of vast strips of the territory of the member of law, the fact is that the Islamic option is a radical one for Africa, and its choice will result in the lack of a peaceful conformation of the population, a total dismantling of the social space - economic - politically on the continent, before a settlement of its Islamist faults.

The region of the Horn of Africa is regarded as being made of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia, but other analysts have also included Kenya, while some have ruled out Sudan. [25]

It has become a common thing that the region of the Horn of Africa is almost confused with the notion of particularly dangerous, kind of a terrorist hotspot. Some analysts claim that this is due to the state of weakness of the states in the area, which makes them highly susceptible to terrorism, and are used as a waiting area or the hosting terrorist bases. Others bring forward the thesis that claims that Islamic extremists are tolerated and encouraged the violent acts carried out in the name of the "jihad".

The legitimacy of NATO intervention in the region does not only have a single point of departure but should be regarded as a response of the international community to a series of serious problems of political and social life but also the repeated infringements of human rights.[26]

The coasts of Africa, and in particular the shores of the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and those of the western part of the Indian Ocean, were susceptible to illegal fishing, traffic of goods and persons and piracy[27].

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[24] *** *Vatican signs treaty recognizing State of Palestine,* AFP, 2015, http://www.timesofisrael.com/vatican-signs-treaty-recognizing-state-of-palestine/, (accessed in 04.04.2016).
[25] Lyons, Terrence B.: "The Horn of Africa Regional Politics: A Hobbesian World," in Howard Wriggins (ed.): *Dynamics of Regional Politics. Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim,* New York: Columbia University Press, 1992, pp. 153-209. See also Selassie, Bereket Habte: *Conflict and Intervention in the Horn of Africa, (*New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), 9.
[26] Mărcău Flavius Cristian, Ina Raluca Tomescu**,** "Coordinates of NATO – EU cooperation", in proceedings "Strategic changes in Security and International Relations", 2014, 258-265.
[27] ICC International Maritime Bureau, *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships*, Annual Report 2013, January 2014, 27.

In the year 2005, is adopted the strategy of maritime safety, a strategy for identifying maritime safety, defense and facilitate the trade. This strategy also includes proving aid to African states to be able to secure the borders[28].

The representatives of the US Government, members of EUCOM (United States European Command), US Naval Forces Europe and ACSS (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies) together with the representatives of the African countries initiated a series of ministerial debates that have as a theme the maritime safety. These debates are aimed at increasing the capacity to monitor illegal activities and implementation of maritime laws[29].

In the waters of the eastern part of Africa forces in the framework of the CJTF- HOA Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa) operates in conjunction with the coalition forces CTF-150[30] (Coalition Task Force 150) for the provision of maritime safety on the routes in the vicinity of the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Oman, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

In 2004, the G8 launched a program to train 75000 soldiers, mostly Africans, called GPOI – Global Peace Operations Initiatives.

The political conflicts and instability present in some African states have caused human suffering on a large scale and has undermined the economic, social and political development[31].

The terrorist attacks on the US Embassies in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi in 1998, on the various objectives of the Mombassa, Kenya and the attacks in Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania have stressed the presence of the threat of terrorism in the region.

"Regional conflicts can arise from a wide variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competitive demands, and internal revolts, and tribal rivalries, ethnic or religious groups. (…) All these various causes have the same goals: the failure of the states, humanitarian disasters and safe areas for the propagation of terrorism"[32].

South Africa is the subject that brings forefront the issues of international maritime safety. The reason for these concerns at the international level may be because of the intentions manifested by China and India, in particular about the use of Africa natural resources which are located along the coastline.

Given the commercial interests of several states, the companies operating in the areas of the coastal areas must be protected. Another important requirement is international maritime security for commercial shipping. Other points of interest could be linked to the so-called "war on terrorism", of the mode of development and the granting of humanitarian aid, to limit the illegal migration and efforts to combat illegal waste shipments and poaching.

For more than three decades' peace and stability have not been found in the region in the Horn of Africa, a region which has been devastated by armed conflict.

Ethiopia was the victim of a civil war and involved in a conflict with Somalia and Eritrea (State, which has gained independence in 1993). Sudan has been involved in a bloody civil war, and Somalia has been devastated by the conflicts between gangs that demanded governance.

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[28] The White House, *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, September 20, 2013, p. 6.
[29] Congressional Research Service, *Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa,* March 2013, 11.
[30] CTF 150 – UK, France, Germany, Pakistan and US.
[31] Marjorie Ann Browne, Ellen Collier, and Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping Options: Considerations for U.S. Policymakers and the Congress*, (Washington D.C., 2015), 5.
[32] The White House, *The National Security Strategy of The United States*, September 2012, 13.

During the Cold War, the great powers pursued their own interests in the region, so that they become interdependent and the factions from different countries will to declare independence[33].

Somalia, having a strategic location in the Horn of Africa, is run without the support of a central government since 1991. The social system and way of life of the people of Somalia are extremely serious and steadily deteriorated, especially since the beginning of the year 2007. Over 1.5 million Somalians depend on the humanitarian aid, 80% is distributed by sea from Kenya. The ports and the shores of Somalia are usually unguarded, and this together with the deployment of various illegal activities has increased the uncertainty. For years, foreign warships patrolled the area and have occupied the inland waterway arteries, and the lack of maritime safety has a negative impact on the economic development, regional security, and stability throughout the region.

Somalia is involved in conflicts for two decades. The regime imposed by President Siad Barre was in an extremely repressive way generating from the year 1987 bloody internal conflicts. The central authorities have disintegrated rapidly, and in 1990; Somalia is a permanent battleground controlled by the chiefs of the tribes which dispute their power[34].

In January 1991, Barre he fled the country after his army was defeated by the Mogadishu militia led by General Muhammed Farah Aideed[35]. Somalia is today a country in a state of chaos and torn apart by a civil war.

The international interventions (UNOSOM I and UNITAF) have failed[36]. In accordance with the Security Council resolution, number 814, UNOSOM II took over the objective of establishing a new government, a new police and justice and the rebuild the economy. UNOSOM II was a multinational force composed of 20,000 soldiers from the peacekeeping forces ("Peacekeepers"), 8,000 people in the logistics department and 3,000 of civilians of 23 nations. Their mandate was intended to impose certain conditions of peace in the area and militias disarm. [37]

General Aideed has been perceived as being the main obstacle to achieve the objective of UNOSOM. The efforts the arrest or kill him have failed, but after the incident "Black Hawk Down", or "Day of the Rangers" according to the Somali references, (March 1994) the United States have withdrawn their forces from Somalia[38]. Shortly after some other international coalition and withdrew their troops.

A part of the territories of the Horn of Africa still benefit from foreign support (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti).

After 20 years of violence and anarchy, Somalia is still without a central government authority. Somalia has no national armed forces or the police forces, but there are still Militia groups and groups committed to provide protection[39].

The removal of barriers to the economic growth path - there is a general agreement in the political community on the need to promote economic opportunities, in particular, for young people in order to reduce the number of potential recruits' jihadist. However, given the extent of the barriers to economic growth in East Africa, it would be more realistic maybe a process of establishing a minimum order, security, and predictability in the behavior of the

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[33] Hans Seidel Foundation Kenya, *The maritime security quandary in the horn of Africa region: Causes, consequences and responses,* January 2015, 8.

[34] M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence,* (Johannesburg, 2015), 6.

[35] G. Arnold, *Africa. A Modern History,(* London, 2006), 16-23.

[36] A. Oyebade and A. Olao, *Africa after the Cold War. The Changing Perspectives on Security*, (London, 2015), 12.

[37] M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, 47.

[38] M. Meredith, *The State of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*, 48.

[39] http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Somalia/SecInfo.html (accessed in 20 May 2016).

governments, the attenuation of corruption, for the reduction of trade barriers, the debt relief were appropriated and to promote entrepreneurship, with an emphasis on small and medium-sized enterprises.

The most effective barriers against the ingress of terrorists and radical ideologies in the region are not only applications of military force, but also cultural and social aspects of the Muslims from East Africa. An effective solution in the long term would require the removal of conditions which make this region, a welcoming area for extremist groups and terrorist attacks. A strategic approach could include the following elements:

Strengthening state's institutions and the civil society - this could be accomplished by programs to improve the public administration and the government services, professionalism, as well as the support of the activities of the non-governmental organizations.

Supporting the regional governments to cooperate in obtaining a better control of borders, both land, and sea - this could be accomplished by the providing resources, training and surveillance systems suitable for the environment and the capabilities of the countries of the region. The improvement of the border control is particularly important in the case of the friendly countries bordering southern Somalia, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, to prevent the movement of terrorists across their borders.

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20. *** UNMIS (United Nations Mission in Sudan), „Dafur Peace Agreement", 5 Mai 2006, http://www.un.org/zh/focus/southernsudan/pdf/dpa.pdf

THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS

Ana-Simina SAVA[1]

ABSTRACT:
THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ASSESS THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS AND CERTAIN COMMUNITIES OF PEOPLE IN EUROPE. ALSO, IT ANALYSES THE PATTERNS AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF STATE-RELIGION RELATIONSHIPS IN THE EU COUNTRIES, FOCUSING ON THE MUSLIM COMMUNITIES NOT ONLY IN THE WESTERN EUROPE, BUT ALSO IN THE BALKANS. NOWADAYS, EUROPE FACES AN AMPLE AND COMPLEX PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION, WHICH IS GUIDED AND SUPPORTED BY THE EUROPEAN UNION. INITIATED ON ECONOMIC GROUNDS, IT HAS MANAGED TO SOLIDIFY ITSELF AND PRODUCE AN INTERCONNECTION OF A VERY EFFICIENT LEVEL, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND EVEN MILITARY FIELDS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WITHIN THE CULTURAL FIELD, MANY OF THE EFFORTS OF THE EU AUTHORITIES MOVING TOWARDS THIS AREA. IN TERMS OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE ETHNO-RELIGIOUS FACTOR, IT IS WIDELY BELIEVED THAT EUROPE IS CURRENTLY FACING TWO MAJOR CHALLENGES: FIRST OF ALL, THE PERSISTENCE OF VARIOUS ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS CRISES AND CONFLICTS, AND THE SECOND, THE PROBLEM OF ISLAM. THE TYPES OF RELATIONSHIPS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND THE STATE AND ALSO THE PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES WITHIN THE MODERN EUROPE, ARE ONLY A FEW OF THE SUBJECTS THAT ARE BEING ANALYZED.

KEY WORDS: ISLAM, BALKANS, EUROPE, IMMIGRANTS, SHARIA

INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, Europe faces an ample and complex process of construction, which is guided and supported by the European Union. Initiated on economic grounds, it has managed to solidify itself and produce an interconnection of a very efficient level, especially in the economic, political and even military fields, but at the same time within the cultural field as well, many of the efforts of the EU authorities moving towards this area.

The cultural problem seems to have a higher degree of complexity, because diversity is seen as one of the main strengths of the contemporary Europe. The European identity is becoming more complex, with its ability to tolerate the significance of cultural diversity. This fact proves the existence of certain values that Europeans cherish, with regard to their ideas about personality, democracy, justice and social equality, freedom and human rights, that are very well defined.[2]

For obvious reasons, sometimes reality contradicts this assertion, making the idea of a European cultural identity implausible, but what is sure is that there is a legacy of a continent based on historical experience, which is visible today in the European values. Perhaps there is no single integrated European culture, but what there is for sure, is a European heritage. Common experiences

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[2] See Flavius Cristian Mărcău, "Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area," *Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi" din Târgu - Jiu*, nr. 4/2015, Seria Litere şi Ştiinţe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuşi", 77-85.

of European history, even if they have not influenced Europeans in the same way, existed and were recognized by many of those located outside the European area. Even if linguistic, religious and political borders, divide Europe's countries at the same time, they are united by the common values and heritage that facilitated the creation and functionality of very efficient common institutions.

It is well known that the foundation of the EU started in the Western cultural area and later on, many countries from the South-Eastern Europe joined. The East versus West differentiation at a European level is not recent at all, actually it has been here since the Great Schism in 1054, also called the East-West Schism, that divided the Chalcedonian Christianity into the Western Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy. More recently, during the previous century's Cold War, there had been an even stronger differentiation on geopolitical and geostrategic grounds. The collapse of the communist system together with the USSR, led to a transfer of the disputes towards the cultural area. The Eastern Europe, former space of a soviet influence is characterized by a strong cultural diversity, both ethnic and religious, which leads to an increase in the complexity of the situation in Europe. It is more than obvious that the relationships between the East and West need to be redefined, so that Europe will not be facing a clash of civilizations.[3]

In the European context, religion and security as areas of interest represent a big concern for the European Union in building an area of freedom, security and justice. Thus, freedom of religion is a fundamental right for all Europeans and together with the other fundamental rights and freedoms, it is ensured by the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU, while the European security is addressing the individual and in particular, the rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual. Achieving an area of freedom, security and justice was and is one of the main objectives of the European Union, established in the Treaty of Amsterdam.

In terms of the influence of the ethno-religious factor, it is widely believed that Europe is currently facing two major challenges: first of all, the persistence of various ethnic or religious crises, conflicts, and the second, the problem of Islam. The types of relationships developed between the church and the state and the problems raised by the Islamic communities within the modern Europe are only a few of the subjects analyzed.

The state-church relationship in Europe evolved gradually since the beginning of the 19th century, when the church was financially supported as compensation to the fact that their assets were nationalized by the state. At that time, there was a high emphasis on the historical importance of churches, but later on, especially after the end of World War I, the efforts of the states were directed towards developing cooperative relationships with a multitude of actors of the social life. More than 50 years ago, when the Council of Europe elaborated the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, it included the freedom of religion, as a common basis instrument in terms of human rights for the member states and all of the candidate countries.

THE ISLAMIC ISSUE IN EUROPE

The predominant influence of Christianity in Europe is beyond doubt. Equally obvious are the trends towards pluralism in the EU history. While the first six countries that joined in 1957 belonged more or less to the Catholic branch of Christianity, the UK and Denmark in 1973 and Sweden and Finland in 1995 brought reformed elements. Adding Greece in 1981 broadened the branch of the Orthodox Christian church, segment that increased by the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. Pluralism trends do not occur only in the bosom of Christianity, but also more broadly. Islam, for example, has become a constant in the social reality of European societies. The aspects of the state-church relationships are perceived differently by the member states of the EU, in terms of guaranteeing fundamental rights – not only as a requirement of law in a national context, but also being covered by the EU as a supranational institution, exercising powers that can directly affect not only individuals, but associations as well.

Constitutions of the Western European countries, create some sort of a balance in the state-church and religion-law relations. For example, the Irish system of organizational and financial

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[3] See Flavius Cristian Mărcău, "Central and Eastern Europe – necessary stages of democracy construction," *Research and Science Today* 2(8)/2014, November 2014, 93-102.

separation of the church and state, compensates for the strong position of the church in the Irish society. In addition, financial relations in Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany go hand in hand with the organizational independence, guaranteeing the autonomy of the church. Finally, Spain and Italy are combining guarantees for minority churches with guarantees for the majority church, the Catholic Church being an expression of social reality.

Since the Iranian revolution in the late '70s, the issue of Islam and the challenges that the West is facing, have become of great interest to the international community. The unrecorded increase in the numbers of registered Muslim communities in the European space transformed Islam into the second religion in number of followers in Europe, after Christianity. The debate on the status of EU members added another important issue related to Islam, namely, whether a country with a Muslim majority of the total population could be part of the European identity. Moreover, the accession or willingness to accede to the European structures of many countries in South-Eastern Europe could bring within the EU countries with Muslim majority populations or with a significant percentage of Muslim population.

This raises the following question: is Islam an integrated part of an evolving cultural environment in Europe, or is it a threat to the European society? Representations of Islam have a strong influence on the political culture, national identities and on attitudes towards migration, security and multiculturalism. To answer this question, in this paper there will be analyzed both the challenges posed by the presence of Muslim communities existing in Europe and the phenomenon of immigration of the Muslim population.

For a start, in order to get a better understanding of the facts exposed, there is a distinction between Islam and Islamism. Islamism, also called political Islam in literature, is a political theology, an analysis and critique of political arrangements in a religious perspective.[4] It can be also defined as the interpretation and use of religion for political purposes, but regardless of the definition adopted, Islamism, although it has its connections with Islam, is different from it, the main difference being that Islamism is a political ideology and Islam is a religion. If Islamism can be characterized as issues centered on the social life, Islam consists mainly of transcendental religious teachings. However, any spiritual experience would be meaningless if it could not be exploited through actions, which obviously imply interactions with individuals or groups of people. From this point of view, each religion can be considered a critical reflection on politics.[5] Islamism is just a particular interpretation of Islam and it would be a major error to consider the religion as a problem per se, comparable to terrorism, for example. Islam is not terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic, not a religion but an ideology, or rather the result of it. Another difficult aspect is the diversity in the characteristics of ethnic, linguistic and cultural needs of Muslim communities in Europe, plus the multitude of nodal points of the network that links them to other significant regions and the strong or majority presence of the Islamic communities.

There is a big diversity of characteristics of Muslim communities in Europe and their relationships with host countries belonging to various European national contexts. Amiraux[6] pointed out while studying the cases of France and Germany, that there are remarkable differences regarding the academic and political attitudes towards the Muslim communities established on the territories of both of the states mentioned.

It is necessary to identify two distinct categories of Muslim populations, differentiated by a number of significant factors, such as socio-economic and cultural factors: Muslim communities in Western Europe, especially the EU member states and Muslim communities in the Balkans. Differences between the two types are based on their relation to the state of origin, for example, while in Western Europe, a significant number of members of Muslim communities are migrants in their second or third generation. Muslim populations in the Balkans are indigenous, a situation made possible by historical conditions, due to the former dominance of large parts of the Balkan area by the Ottoman Empire.

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[4] Cavannaugh, W. T. & Scott, P., *The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*, (Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Oxford and Carlton, 2004), 2.
[5] Cavannaugh, W. T. & Scott, P., *The Blackwell Companion to Political Theology*
[6] Amiraux, V., *Transnational political Islam: religion, ideology and power*, (Pluto Press, London, 2004), 28-57.

While most of the Muslims in Western Europe are located in urban areas or in the suburbs of urban areas, in the Balkans, Muslim communities are located mainly in rural areas. From a cultural standpoint, it can be observed that Balkan Muslims are, in most cases, native speakers of the language of the host state. It should also be considered that Muslims in the Balkans were and still are part of a political context mostly dominated by its distinctive ethnic and nationalist characteristics.

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE BALKANS

When referring to Muslim communities in the Balkans or the Balkan Islam, the diversity of these communities needs to be taken into consideration. Located in this region since the Ottoman presence that began, during the 14th century, after a process of Islamization that lasted until the beginning of the 20th century, these communities can be characterized as being far from homogeneous.

This cultural heterogeneity essentially has obvious ethnic and linguistic foundations. The dominant linguistic groups are the speakers of Slavic, Albanian, Turkish and Romani. These language groups are in turn divided ethnically and nationally, predominantly between Albanians, Bosnians, Turks and Pomaks.[7] In terms of the religious criterion, most of the Balkan Muslims are followers of the Sunni doctrine, derived from the Hanafi[8] school branch, including the Bektashi and Alevi minorities.

Most Balkan Muslim communities are living in rural environments and working in agriculture. Population movements in recent decades have reduced the Christian population in rural areas, because they preferred urban environments, which, along with the growth of the population in Muslim communities, resulted in an ethnic homogenization in certain regions such as Kosovo, Western Macedonia, the Sanjak region and the region of the Rhodope Mountains. The urban Muslim communities virtually disappeared from the Eastern Balkans, especially in Bulgaria and Greece, because of their migration to Istanbul and Anatolia. Romania could be an exception in this respect, because here the Muslim population is predominantly located in its urban areas.

In the Western Balkans, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Western Macedonia, the presence of Muslim communities in urban areas were noticeable since the Ottoman Empire, but there are significant differences, between Muslim communities living in urban areas alongside other secular communities and newly urbanized rural communities, that are still deeply attached to specific religious traditions and cultural practices.[9]

The geographical distribution of the Muslim communities in the Balkans is not a balanced one for sure. Before the beginning of the '90s, the only Balkan state with a majority of Muslim population was Albania. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, two other majority Muslim states appeared Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Moreover, important but not majority communities of Muslims are the ones located in Macedonia, Serbia and Bulgaria and significantly reduced ones in Greece and Romania.[10]

MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE WESTERN EUROPE

Except the Muslim communities from the Balkans and other East or South-East European countries, the majority of the Muslim population came to Europe starting with the '50s, most of them in the Western countries. There have been several ways in which Muslim communities were brought and developed themselves in the Western Europe:

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[7] Pomaks is the name given to the Bulgarian speaking Muslims (approximately 150-200,000), a smaller group of them (about 30,000) being located in the Greek region formerly called Thrace.

[8] Hanafi is one of the four law schools of the Sunni branch of Islam belonging. The school was founded in the 8th century by Abu Haneefah.

[9] Paul Duţă, ''Considerations on territorial integrity and unilateral separation'', *Research and Science Today* Supplement No. 2/2014, Academica Brâncuşi Publishing, Tîrgu Jiu, 2014, 143-151.

[10] Flavius Cristian Mărcău, „Some consideration about consolidation of democracy in postcommunist states", *Analele Universităţii „Constantin Brâncuşi"* din Târgu - Jiu, nr. 3/2014, Seria Litere şi Ştiinţe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuşi", 112-115.

- Recruiting workforce, especially through programs such as "guest workers", very common in Europe until the mid '70s;

- Afterwards, through family reunification programs, of those previously recruited for labor;

- Through the establishment of the descendants of those families in the host countries, as citizens of those countries;

- Because of the post-colonial immigration – this way, a very significant number of immigrants left India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean, moving to live and work in the United Kingdom; in France, there are mostly immigrants from Morocco, Algeria and other North-African states. Unlike those in the first three categories, they were not recruited through various programs to attract labor to Western Europe, but were rather attracted by the economic factor; the economic "boom" in the '60s coincided with a maximum rate of post-colonial immigration;

- Another category is the one of asylum seekers or refugees, who included a large number of people originating from countries such as Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea and Afghanistan;

- Even though, significantly smaller in numbers, another category is the one of students and professionals;

- The last category is a particular part of the Muslim population that did not come to Europe with any of the immigration waves. Most often they are native citizens of a European country that have chosen to convert to Islam as a result of marriage, or seeking some form of spiritual fulfillment.[11]

In terms of demographics, an increased birth rate was observed among Muslim immigrants in Europe, compared to the non-Muslim birth rate. A noteworthy aspect is that around 50%[12] of the Muslims in Western Europe were born in the countries of this region, which adds as an additional factor in increasing Muslim population in Europe.[13] As a result, the Muslim communities in Europe have a lower average age than the non-Muslim population.[14]

Another interesting aspect can be observed by comparing the political organization of Europe, having democratic institutions guaranteed by the constitution, to the organization of governance in the modern Islamic states where the Koran and Sharia Islamic law play a major role in legislation and its implementation. The current European system was able to separate their speech and religious institutions from the political and legal power, while keeping a thorough constitutional legitimacy, at a certain degree of ideological and educational power, even though, for many Muslims, the relationship between politics and religion remains a material fact, legal and constitutional in their view.

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[11] Holub, R., *Intellectuals and Euro-Islam*, in *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture & Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, edited by AlSayyad, N. & Castells, M., (Lexington Publishers, Oxford, 2002), 167-193.

[12] *How restive are Europe's Muslims?,* The Economist, 2001, 1.

[13] Caldwell, C., *The Crescent and the Tricolor*, Atlantic Monthly, 2000, 22.

[14] Mandaville, P., *Muslim Youth in Europe*, in *Islam, Europe's Second Religion*, edited by Hunter, T. S, Praeger, Westport, 2002, 219-230.

WESTERN EUROPE
Muslim Population c.2000

Muslims as Percentage of National Population

- 6% and greater
- 3% – 5%
- 1% – 2%
- Less than 1%
- • Cities with significant Muslim populations

Percentage of Muslims in European Nations

Country	%	Country	%
Austria	15%	Netherlands	3%
France	7%	U.K.	2.7%
Belgium	4%	Denmark	2%
Sweden	3.6%	Ireland	2%
Germany	3.4%	Poland	2%

Figure 1: Western Europe Muslim population[15]

Usually, the term "Muslim" is used to refer to a group or a person coming from an Islamic cultural background. The term does not necessarily indicate a practice of any form of religion or religious behavior, even though, the group members are perceived as Muslims in the religious sense of the word by the general public. In order to clarify this aspect of perception, people from Muslim majority countries can be classified in terms of religious involvement in four categories:

- confessional – a category that includes those faithful practitioners regarding Islam, not just as a mere religion but also as a social and cultural life;

- faithful – the category that supports the religious, ethical and social principles of Islam, without following specific religious obligations;

- liberal – the category that find the ethical and philosophical aspects of Islam very valuable, while being critical or rejecting religious issues pertaining to particular socio-political areas;

- agnostics – the category of those who do not believe in acts of faith of Islam and reject religion as the basis of social and cultural life in general.[16]

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[15] Source: islamproject.org

[16] Shadid, W.A.R. & van Koningsveld, P.S., *Religious Freedom and the Position of Islam in Western Europe*, (Peeters Publishers, Leuven, 1995), 60-76.

This classification is not only applicable to the Muslims in Europe, but to all of the Muslims, including those in their origin countries. According to William Montgomery Watt, an expert in medieval and early history of Islam, specializing in normative teachings of Islam as revealed in the Arabic writings, the Islamic contemporary major current is traditionally a conservative ideology. The expert mentioned above, identified five aspects:[17]

- it promotes the concept of a still unchanged world, both religiously and socially;
- Islam is perceived as a complete religion, which includes all necessary moral and religious truths of the human race until the end of time;
- it perpetuates the idea of inevitable conflict between the "dar al-Islam"[18] and "dar al-harb"[19], which will result in an Islamic takeover;
- assigns a high degree of self-sufficiency of Islam;
- idealization of Mohammed and early Islam.

For an effective integration of the Muslim communities, the policies adopted and implemented by policy makers must consider specific sensitive issues such as religion, law and education, to the extent that they can strongly influence the dimensions of national security, the socio-economic, the cultural and the political environments. When considering their integration, with regard to the compatibility or incompatibility of the values of Islam compared to the European values in many countries, the relationship between local people and immigrants was marked by cultural conflicts, including those highlighting the symbols of Islam. In most of the cases, the rituals, habits or traditions are undergoing a process of change, the main reason being that their performance should consider two legal systems that were not always compatible: the Islamic faith and the legal system of the host country.

A significant example for this matter is the hijab clothing and the debates on this issue, especially in countries like France, Germany and Turkey. Although regarded as a symbol of religiosity, the hijab clothing was perceived by some segments of the host countries societies, especially by the liberal feminists, as a sign of oppression of women. In this case and also when considering the building of mosques in Western societies, there must be some boundaries and a certain balance between individual and collective rights.

Legislation is an important factor of the integration of Muslim communities in the society of the host state. For this purpose, all of the aspects related to legal recognition practices associated with religion or religious tradition must be considered, especially the laws of Islamic origin. At a European level, there were voices who proposed the authorization and exploration of ways to harmonize the Sharia Islamic law and European legislation, where necessary. There is the case of the Archbishop of Canterbury, whose affirmation reveals that the adoption of some aspects of Islamic Sharia law seems an unavoidable solution for the future, in order to maintain a strong social cohesion.[20] This attitude, coming from a high church of the UK, represents a strong signal that the application of Islamic law is already present, informally, within Muslim communities. It must be a signal of the need for legislative harmonization in line with the realities of the European society, in order to avoid the appearance of a parallel legislative network.

From the educational point of view, the main aspect of this area is passing on the knowledge and values, including the religious ones. This covers the segment of preschool and school, as well as the one of adults, involving courses of theological and religious education, or extracurricular and informal education, through the media.

If nowadays, the Muslim exodus will carry on the same as in the previous couple of years, we may soon be calling our continent Eurabia instead of Europe. The European Union has allowed itself to succumb to the interests of the Arab world. The demand for oil, the predilection of the European citizens to host foreigners and the willingness to counterweight the US powers are coming from the

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[17] Watt, W.M., *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*, Routledge, London & New York, 1988, pp. 88-123.

[18] "dar al-harb", translated as the territory of war, is the name for the regions where Islam is not as dominant and therefore the divine will is not observed.

[19] By contrast, "dar al-Islam", translated as the territory of peace, represents those territories where Islam is dominant and where the submission to God is the most important thing.

[20] *Sharia Law in UK is 'unavoidable',* BBC News, 2008, 1.

roots of anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism and hatred against the US. There is a massive threat not only to Israel, but to the survival of Europe's Christian majority, as it is now. The exodus of refugees has reached unprecedented numbers in modern times. Countries like Macedonia, for example, came to be transited by thousands refugees, mainly Syrians and Iraqis, on their way to the countries of Northern Europe. And their number is expected to still increase in the future. The flow of emigrants via the Balkans increased significantly and the situation in Greece deteriorated rapidly after the avalanche arrivals from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.[21]

CONCLUSION

The differences between groups of European Muslims continue to play an important role in the mosques and associations in Europe. It is also important to admit that the presence of Muslims is an unfinished and unequal process. It is an ongoing process and it concerns all social realities. The integration of Islamic communities in Europe is unfinished, leaders are rare, the ruling class is about to be established and the population is still about to take possession of their rights in the European public areas, many of which are fragile because of the difficulty to entry into the labor market.

There is no single European model of the religion-state relationship. This type of relationship cannot be identified in a homogeneous form, because there are differences from state to state. The trends for religious freedom are common, but the mutual independence of religion and state must be combined with cooperation and support. There is no unified legal system regarding the religion-state relationship in Europe, although, due to the EU enlargement, the European law becomes increasingly more important to all member states.

However, Europe's future depends largely on how different cultures and religions will manage to coexist within the European Union and neighboring regions, particularly those of the Arab world and the Islamic world. This conclusion is supported by the historical lesson of the last decades, which proved that the religious dimension of human influence on the individual or groups behavior in varying degrees, was most often measured on the scale of bloody violence.

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[21] Paul Dănuţ Duţă, "Crisis analysis parameters", *Research and Science Today* No. 2/2014, Academica Brâncuşi Publishing, Tîrgu Jiu, 2014, 80-93.

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PROFILES OF SPECIALIZATION IN THE ROMANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION DURING COMMUNISM. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MECHANICAL PROFILE[1]

Valentin MAIER[2]

ABSTRACT
IN THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST REGIME THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSYEM WAS MODERNIZED AND DEVELOPED, ALTHOUGH ALL IT WAS MADE WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERS' CONCEPTIONS ABOUT PROGRESS OF SOCIETY AND ECONOMY. AN IMPORTANT MILESTONE IN THE HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IS THE CREATION OF PROFILES OF SPECIALIZATION IN 1974, PROCESS PREPARED PREVIOUSLY THROUGH DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS AND SUSTAINED WITH NEW MODIFICATIONS AFFECTING PROFILES AND SPECIALIZATIONS IN THE FOLLOWING YEARS. THEY ARE AS IMPORTANT AS THE PROJECTS FOR NEW PROFILES AND SPECIALIZATIONS PRESENTED AND ANALYZED IN THIS ARTICLE. IN ADDITION, THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE MECHANICAL PROFILE WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROFILE OF SPECIALIZATION, WILL BE INVESTIGATED WITH THE HELP OF NUMEROUS DOCUMENTS AND STATISTICS, PROVIDING US NEW INFORMATION ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION.

KEYWORDS: HIGHER EDUCATION, STATISTICS, PROFILE, SPECIALIZATION, STUDENTS.

After 1948 the Romanian higher education was confronted with the communist political pressure and influence in a negative, but also in a positive way. Among the bad influences we mention the purge of teachers that were not sharing the communist political views, the 'suffocating' political propaganda present in the educational act, the 1980s period with much emphasis on specializations with industrial application while at the same time other types of higher education were on a steep decrease trend, but among the positive influences we mention the increased number of students, of institutions and specializations, with an overall modernization of the higher education.

Starting from 1974, a new form of organization in higher education was adopted: profiles of specialization. In total, 36 such profiles were created, each amounting one or more specializations[3]. A drawback of the adoption of these profiles is that it aimed at a reduction of the number of specializations and in this way, an ease of the financial pressure over the state

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[3] State Council Decree (DCS) no. 147 from June 5, 1974 privind nomenclatorul profilelor și specializărilor din învățământul superior, precum și instituțiile și facultățile din sistemul Ministerului Educației și Învățământului.

budget. On the other hand, this measure can be seen as an attempt to organize better the further development and modernization of higher education.

No matter its effects, since this form of organization lasted 15 years in communism[4], by finding more about it we can find more about the higher education in this period. Therefore a presentation of the profiles from higher education will be done and also will try to find out which profile of specialization was the most important. For the first part will employ mostly archive sources, but for the second part, the statistics will play a major role.

Although it is worth to note that communist higher education is not such a well researched subject, we have to mention the works of Jan Sadlak[5] and Andrei Florin Sora[6] for their important focus on specializations, among different monographs or collection of documents for the higher education.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROFILES OF SPECIALIZATION IN ROMANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION

Chronologically, after the laws of education from 1948 and 1968, the next important moment was the creation of the profiles of specialization. It happened in 1974, when the following profiles of specialization were adopted: mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, geography, history, philosophy, psychology, pedagogy, philology, physical education, legal sciences, mechanical (construction of machinery), textiles, electrical, food industry, metallurgy, mining, oil, architecture and systematization, constructions, geodesy, forestry, agricultural, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, economic, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, theater arts, cinematography and television, music, fine and decorative arts, political sciences and journalism[7]. In total there were 36 profiles amounting for 124 specializations, from which 88 comprised 4 to 6 years of study.

When reading this list of profiles at least two questions arise: how did the legislator arrive at this list and is this list of profiles a reflection of the society's needs?

For an answer to the first question many more researches need to be done, but is not a real finding that the list of specializations was always in a process of changing, so the list of profiles, and in the end of specializations from 1974, was not an instant creation. If from the end of 1940s and the middle of 1950s we were witnesses of a process of increasing the specializations, after 1955 has started a slowly process of reduction of specializations, somehow diluted by the "assault" of pedagogical specializations[8]. Then, after 1970 a more

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[4] In 1977 the legislative act for adoption of profiles of specializations received some modifications DCS no. 209 din July 12, 1977 pentru modificarea anexelor nr. 1 și 2 la DCS nr. 147/1974. All specializations functioned under the subordination of the Ministry of Education and under other corresponding ministry/institution, depending on each specialization, as established since 1971 (Section of National Central Historical Archives-SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 105/1971, f. 103-114). The allocation of graduates was also done by different ministries and other institutions (Archive of Ministry of Education-AMed, 467/1975).

[5] Jan Sadlak, *Higher Education in Romania, 1860-1990: Between Academic Mission, Economic Demands and Political Control*, Buffalo, GSE Publications, 1990.

[6] Andrei Florin Sora, *Evoluția calificărilor din învățământul universitare românesc 1968-2011*, 2011. Available from:
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[7] DCS no. 147 from June 5, 1974 privind nomenclatorul profilelor și specializărilor din învățământul superior, precum și instituțiile și facultățile din sistemul Ministerului Educației și Învățământului.

[8] The first pedagogical institutes (three years of study) were established in 1959 in Bucharest, Craiova, Galați, Iași and Timișoara. At the same time, there were already two other similar named institutions, "Maxim Gorki" from Bucharest (later entered in the structure of University of Bucharest) and Pedagogical Institutes from Timișoara (with five years of study, transformed in 1962 in university), but with other characteristics. Between 1966 and 1968, numerous other discussions and documents (*Study regarding the Development of Education in Socialist Republic Romania*, December 1966) were done relating to, not only changing specializations, but also to the need of a new law of education (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 39/1967; SANIC, Fund

emphasized process of reduction/improvement (re)started, since from 1971 we found a clear proposal to make an act for detailing the list of specialization (especially for technical specializations), which materialized three years later, in 1974[9]:

"We propose that specialized sections to be settled by a law and directions of development by the Ministry of Education in collaboration with the beneficiary ministries"[10].

In 1977 the list suffered some changes, and then, in the context of severe economical problems that were present in the Romanian society more and more, the reduction was amplified in 1986 at the same time with a similar process regarding the structure of institutions of higher education[11]. Other projects from 1986 and 1989 would state even more drastic reductions.

Step by step in the development of the higher education system in the communist period, each measure was sustained by reasons to train specialized workforce for the different needs of the society.

Two periods for reform of the list of specializations are strongly related to the economical and especially industrial development, regarded as a main way for the development of the whole society: 1950s and the second half of the 1970s[12]. The first period was quicker and lasted approximately until the end of 1950s[13], while the latter lasted until the end of the communism.

At the time of 1989, industrial needs were still important in the process of establishing new specializations as the projected industrial robots and micro-electronics specializations prove[14]. Also, here we can add that even during 1980s many enterprises in the so called high-tech sciences were established[15] increasing the list of similar enterprises[16] and the political documents for the development of the country were also emphasizing this way of progress[17].

CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 103/1967; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 137/1967; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 52/1968, f. 185-191; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 110/1968, f. 204, 205, 215, 220-223; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 720/1968). An interesting situation is of specialization for sub-engineers going to studies in industrial enterprises (AMed, 330/1972; AMed, 424/1973; AMed, 229/1975).

[9] The structure of specializations from 1974 was prepared through several other documents (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 73/1970, f. 106-117; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 105/1971, f. 65-74, 143-147; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 33/1972; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 19/1973). Very interesting is the transcript of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the RCP from May 14, 1974, around the 1974's list of specializations (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 55/1974).

[10] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 11/1971, f. 69, 70.

[11] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 48/1984; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 39/1986; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 50/1986, f. 36, 36v, 46-52v. In 1989 another similar process was designed (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 164/1989).

[12] In July 1971 there were made interesting proposals for the improvement different types of higher education, with a focus on the technical higher education (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 11/1971).

[13] Examples of specializations that existed in 1950s and were later abolished: furnace, steel mills, foundries; electrification of industry and agriculture; welding; hydraulic and pneumatic machinery; electro-chemistry (Archive of Institutul Național de Statistică-AINS, *Analiza de sfârșit de an școlar 1953-1954. Învățământ superior*; AINS, *Situația învățământului superior la începutul anului școlar 1957/1958, cursuri de zi*). The development of specializations with 4 to 6 years of study divided in 5 periods of evolution (not on their exact establishing and abolishing years) can be found in SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 47/1986, f. 37-52.

[14] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 131/1989; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989.

[15] Enterprise for electro-pneumatic panels (DCS no. 129 May 13, 1981), Microelectronica (DCS no. 186 July 9, 1981), Enterprise for electro technical products (DCS no. 406 December 29, 1981).

Continuing with the development of profiles of specialization, three years later after their introduction, in 1977[18], their list was modified: mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, geology, geography, history, philosophy, philology, physical education, legal sciences, mechanical (construction of machinery), mechanical-chemistry, technology and chemistry of textiles, electrical, power, technology and chemistry of food products and fishing technique, metallurgy, mining, oil, architecture and systematization, constructions, geodesy, forestry, agricultural, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, economic, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, theater arts, cinematography and television, music, fine and decorative arts, political sciences and journalism[19].

The list remained at 36 profiles: psychology and pedagogy were out of the list, but two new profiles were introduced, mechanical-chemistry[20] and power profiles. Two profiles received a change in their name: from textiles to technology and chemistry of textile and from food industry to technology and chemistry of food products and fishing technique. Other two profiles, political sciences and journalism, were organized only at the Academy "Ștefan Gheorghiu" (for training of political staff). These names highlighted the orientation of the whole higher education starting from the second half of 1970s, focusing on the technical types of higher education. Also, other changes were made to the specializations that each profile comprised[21] and to the network of institutions of higher education[22].

PROJECTS FOR A NEW CLASSIFICATION OF PROFILES

The situation of profiles established in 1977 was not changed until the end of communism, but in 1986 and especially in 1989, projects were issued aiming the reduction of the profiles and specializations in the higher education[23].

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[16] Automatica, Electromagnetica, Electrotehnica, Electroaparataj, Electrocontact, IMSAT, Electroargeș, Tehnoton, IPRS, ELAROM, ICE and many others (DCS no. 273 September 8, 1981; DCS no. 225 July 8, 1985).

[17] "Art. 7 – In the industry of machinery construction the focus will be on using the whole capacity of machinery […], on development in a faster pace of electronics, microelectronics, of means of automation […]" (Law no. 2 July 1, 1981) ; "Art. 25 – Accelerated introduction of new and re-designed products […] in the conditions of increasing the technical level of production through the introduction of electronics and microelectronics, complex automation and using of robots" (DCS no. 318 October, 1, 1986 privind perfecționarea organizării și modernizarea proceselor de producție, creșterea eficienței economice în toate sectoarele de activitate).

[18] The new structure of specializations from 1977 was prepared through several documents (SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 64/1977; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 68/1977; SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Cancelarie, 71/1977, f. 35-42, 167-176).

[19] In 1977 the legislative act for adoption of profiles of specializations received some modifications DCS no. 209 din July 12, 1977 pentru modificarea anexelor nr. 1 și 2 la DCS nr. 147/1974.

[20] The profile was introduced with the specialization equipment and chemical engineering processes (from the Faculty of Engineering Machinery and Chemical Processes in the structure of the National Institute of Chemistry in Bucharest).

[21] For example for music profile, the 1974's list established the specializations instrumental music, canto, musical pedagogy and composition, musicology, while the 1977's list comprised instrumental music-music, canto-music, music and musical composition, musicology, changes made to names because the new specializations contained the pedagogy element (they also train teachers). See also Valentin Maier, *Evolution of the Artistic Higher Education in Communist Romania in the Years 1948-1989*, in "International Review of Social Research", nr. 4/2014, 131-148.

[22] For example the Institute of Chemistry (1974) was renamed National Institute of Chemistry from Bucharest, and had two faculties and many specializations from chemistry, biology (specialization: bio-chemistry) and mechanical-chemistry (specialization: machinery and engineering of chemical processes) profiles. A good source for information regarding the network of institutions remains, even today, *Admiterea în învățămîntul superior*, 1969-1989.

[23] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989.

The project from 1986 was presented on July 25 by Ion Teoreanu, Ministry of Education, to Elena Ceaușescu. The proposals made a serious reduction of the profiles, from 34 to 25, and of specializations, from 141 to 108[24]. The reason for this proposed changes were: the need to better organize the profiles for a rational way of utilising the specialists in the context of a raised rate of changing and modernization of production, the classification of specialization corresponding to the "real needs of economy and culture of our country and with the requirements of technical and scientific progress", establishing of a reduced number of new specializations "in high-end and priority domains of our economy". The proposed profiles were the following: mathematics; physics; chemistry; biology; metallurgy; exploration-extraction; mechanical; power; electro-mechanical; electronics and automation; architecture and systematization; constructions; agro-forestry; veterinary medicine; economic; medicine; pharmacy; legal and administrative sciences; philology; social sciences; geography; physical education and sport; theater arts, cinematography and television; music; fine and decorative arts[25].

In 1989 two similar projects were issued. If the communist regime would not have ended in 1989, it is for sure that the project to reduce the number of profiles would have been put into action, especially when reading the *Note regarding the classification of profiles and specializations for the higher education*[26] and the *Documentary for grounding the reduction of profiles and specializations in the higher education*, for one of these projects[27].

The project from 1989 not only stipulated the reduction of profiles from 34 to 30 and of specializations from 141 to 131, but also stated numerous other changes to be adopted. Regarding the profiles of specializations, there were several such modifications. First of all, there were some profiles abolished: technology and chemistry of food products and fishing technique, mechanical-chemistry, forestry, while agricultural and animal husbandry profiles were to be united into an agro-animal husbandry profile like medicine and dentistry in a new medicine profile. At the same time the electrical profile was to be substituted by electromechanical and electronics and automatics profiles[28]. Of course, many other changes regarded the specializations and the compositions of profiles. For example, the electrical profile and its ten specializations were to be divided among the two new profiles, that also would receive two newly established specializations: electromechanical profile (electrical engineering, electro-mechanics, traffic and the technology of transports, industrial robots-new specialization, electromechanical technology) and electronics and automatics profile (electronics and telecommunications, microelectronics-new specialization, computers, automatics, electronics, telephone-telegraphy, industrial automations)[29].

It is worth to note another document dated June 20, 1989: *Report regarding the progress in fulfillment the measures set by the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party with the occasion of the adoption at May 5, 1989 of the tuition plan and the number of scholarships for the year 1989/1990, for the whole education system*[30]. In its Annexes 14 and 15 we can read a different situation of profiles and specializations, in which only 26 profiles were left to function from 34 profiles[31].

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[24] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 47/1986.
[25] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 47/1986.
[26] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989.
[27] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 131/1989.
[28] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989.
[29] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 132/1989.
[30] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 55/1989.
[31] As in the last project presented, also from 1989, the political sciences and journalism were not taken into account due to their special status.

This second project from 1989 was indeed a harsh reduction of profiles, similar to that of 1986. The 26 profiles to continue to function were: mathematics; physics; chemistry; biology; metallurgy; mining, oil, geology; mechanical; textiles and leather; electro-power; electronics; architecture and systematization; constructions; forestry; agricultural; veterinary medicine; economic; medicine; pharmacy; legal and administrative sciences; philology; history-philosophy; geography; physical education and sport; theater arts, cinematography and television; music; fine and decorative arts[32].

Maybe other projects to alter the classification of profiles of specialization established in 1977 will be discovered in the future, as they are as important as the "in-use" profiles.

THE STATISTICS OF PROFILES OF SPECIALIZATION

For a general view of the development of profiles of specialization in the Romanian higher education we have prepared a series of statistics, starting from 1977 and ending in 1989.

The sources for the statistics were consulted at the Archive of National Statistics Institute[33] with the addition that the data for the beginning of the academic year 1989/1990, was taken from the National Central Historical Archives[34].

Table 1. Students (engineers and sub-engineers) enrolled in the profiles of specialization

Profile of specialization	1977	1980	1983	1986	1989
Mechanical	29445	41737	42810	40754	44211
Mechanical-chemistry	-	1078	1118	577	-
Technology and chemistry of textiles	1664	2213	2202	2182	2730
Electrical	17629	16704	17167	17406	21091
Power	-	3034	3060	3049	3154
Chemistry	8200	10301	7995	7968	9416
Food Industry/Technology and chemistry of food products and fishing technique	1002	1296	1265	1327	1702
Metallurgy	5281	7917	6324	5157	5661
Mining	1673	3061	3502	3164	2929
Oil	938	2169	2997	2890	2194
Geology-geophysical/Geology	1270	2367	2292	1270	706
Architecture and systematization	1561	1759	1245	880	667
Constructions	14285	18054	13672	11483	10705
Geodesy	410	598	469	334	323
Forestry	2022	2163	1905	1397	1296
Agricultural	6714	5520	3457	1739	2765
Animal husbandry	3437	2555	2002	1809	1551
Veterinary medicine	1324	1480	1607	1722	2064
Economic	22725	21919	19219	15641	15493
Medicine	16591	19620	17069	14115	13334
Dentistry	2416	2523	2973	2710	2685
Pharmacy	1852	1238	1051	772	664
Mathematics	6624	3598	3339	3623	3903
Physics	3193	2053	2305	2688	2917
Chemistry	1299	1172	785	1004	1556
Biology	2871	1315	726	693	854
Geography	1116	535	406	433	422
History	2206	1058	478	489	546

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[32] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 55/1989.

[33] AINS, *Situația învățământului superior la începutul anului școlar, cursuri de zi*, 1974/1975-1988/1989,.

[34] SANIC, Fund CC al PCR – Secția Propagandă și Agitație, 117/1989.

Philosophy-sociology/Philosophy	1132	541	412	380	311
Psychology	236	-	-	-	-
Philology	10828	5479	3231	2614	2973
Physical education	407	-	-	-	-
Legal sciences	7025	3863	2574	2392	2362
Theater arts, cinematography and television	289	202	162	166	170
Music	1789	962	513	373	367
Fine and decorative arts	814	1043	428	370	399

Regarding the data from the table, several notes have to be made: data appearing in table for 1977 is also for profiles that were no longer receiving freshmen; for the philosophy and philology profiles the data for 1983 is in fact from 1984, because data were not available for 1983; for biology in 1977 and 1980, physics, music, fine and decorative arts and mathematics in 1977, the data includes the number of students attending pedagogical education; all the data from the table is about clearly named profiles of specialization, not for specializations not included in a profile (for example, the specializations mathematics-physics, chemistry-physics, natural and agricultural sciences, physical education, had their data recorded under a simple category "university and pedagogical education with 3 years of study", but not under a named profile). Finally, another mention is about statistics in general, which of course represents an approximation of what really happened in the higher education, especially the statistics in communism.

As the data reveals us, the most important profile of specialization was the mechanical profile, followed by electrical, economic, medicine, constructions and chemistry profiles. On the other hand and in an expected way, the profiles of specialization from the artistic higher education, were attended by the fewest students among other profiles.

When looking at the data we can see a significant trend of increased number of students studying at mostly all technical profiles, with a severe and overall reduction in 1986, while mostly all non-technical profiles were having a steep decrease of number of students. If in 1977 there were 29445 students recorded at the mechanical profile, in 1989, there were 14766 more students, while the economic profile suffered a decrease of 7232 students in the same period, only surpassed by the reduction from philology, with 7855 students.

Studying statistics of higher education and using other sources we can find many interesting things about the development of higher education. For now, will have a closer look at the mechanical profile, the most important profile of specialization in the Romanian higher education.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MECHANICAL PROFILE OF SPECIALIZATION IN THE ROMANIAN HIGHER EDUCATION (1977-1989)

As the majority of profiles of specialization that functioned in communism, mechanical profile was established in 1974. The mechanical profile included then the following specializations: manufacturing engineering, machine tools, hydraulic and pneumatic machines, thermal machines, agricultural mechanics, fine mechanics, technological equipment, aircraft, motor vehicles and rolling stock of the railway. All of these were introduced for training engineers, but some of the mentioned specializations (11), along with other were specially designed for preparing sub-engineers: manufacturing engineering, technology welding, precision mechanics equipment, chemical and petrochemical, machinery and equipment for construction, equipment for building materials, equipment for the industry, automotive, rolling stock for railway construction hull, naval installations on board.

From the institutions of higher education that trained specialists before 1989 in the mechanical profile we mention the following: Polytechnic Institute "Gheorghe Gheorghiu-

Dej" Bucharest (Faculty of Engineering, Faculty of Aircraft, Faculty of Manufacturing Engineering, Faculty of Agricultural Engineering, Faculty of Transport), Polytechnic Institute of Cluj-Napoca (Faculty of Engineering), Polytechnic Institute "Gheorghe Asachi" University (Faculty of Engineering), Polytechnic Institute "Traian Vuia" Timişoara (Faculty of Mechanics, Faculty of Agricultural Mechanics), Institute of Sub-engineers Reşiţa (specializations technology engineering and technology of welding), Institute of Constructions Bucharest (Faculty of Technical Equipment), Institute of Mines Petroşani (Faculty of Technical Equipment), Institute of Oil and Gas in Ploieşti (Faculty of Technical Equipment), the Institute of Higher Education in Piteşti (Faculty of Sub-engineers), University of Braşov (Mechanics), Department of Manufacturing Engineering, Faculty of Wood Processing), University of Craiova (Faculty for Electrical Engineering) and the University of Galaţi (Faculty of Engineering)[35].

In 1977, as we have already seen, some changes were made in the system of profiles of specialization. As for the mechanical profile, it was composed of 12 specializations for training engineers after introducing of technology welding machine specialization. New institutions included specializations belonging to the mechanical profile: the institutes of higher education from Sibiu (Faculty of Engineering), Constanţa, Bacău, Oradea, Suceava, Târgu Mureş and University of Craiova (the specialization of equipment for the industry of building materials, this time not in the framework of Faculty of Electrical Engineering, but in the structure of the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering).

When looking at the statistics of students, without doubt the technical higher education was the most important type of higher education in Romania before 1989, although the system comprised artistic, legal, academic and pedagogical, medical and pharmaceutical, economic and agricultural types. The technical higher education was comprised after 1974 of many profiles of specializations each with many specializations. Among all the technical profiles we have to verify if the mechanical profile was the most important, employing statistical data retrieved from archive documents already mentioned.

Table 2. Percentage of students enrolled in the mechanical profile of specialization (engineers and sub-engineers) in the total number of students from the Romanian higher education (%)

Year	1	2	3
	Total students		Rate of 2 from 1 (%)
	Higher Education	Mechanical Profile	
1977	182.337	29.445	16.14
1978	190.560	34.274	17.98
1979	192.546	39.110	20.31
1980	192.769	41.737	21.65
1981	190.903	43.825	22.95
1982	181.081	43.316	23.92
1983	174.042	42.810	24.59
1984	166.328	41.710	25.07
1985	159.798	48.561	30.38
1986	157.174	40.754	25.92
1987	157.041	41.612	26.49
1988	159.465	42.147	26.43
1989	164.507	44.211	26.87
Average	174.504	41.039	23.75

The largest number of students in the Romanian higher education was recorded in 1980, 192769 students, while in the mechanical profile the peak was reached in 1985, 48561

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[35] *Admiterea în învăţămîntul superior*, 1969-1989.

students. Also, in the same year was achieved the highest proportion of students enrolled in the mechanical profile in the total number of students in the higher education: 30.38%. On average, 23.75% of students enrolled in higher education during 1977-1989 were enrolled in the mechanical profile (engineers and sub-engineers).

Table 3. Percentage of students enrolled in the mechanical profile of specialization (engineers and sub-engineers) in the total number of students from the technical higher education (%)

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Total students | | Rate 2 in 1 (%) |
	Technical H.E.	Mechanical Profile	
1977	85.380	29.445	34.48
1978	96.217	34.274	35.62
1979	106.170	39.110	36.83
1980	114.451	41.737	36.46
1981	116.156	43.825	37.72
1982	112.176	43.316	38.61
1983	108.023	42.810	39.63
1984	103.923	41.710	40.13
1985	100.480	48.561	48.32
1986	99.838	40.754	40.82
1987	101.588	41.612	40.96
1988	103.471	42.147	40.73
1989	106.805	44.211	41.39
Average	104.206	41.039	39.36

When looking at the previous data we can see that the largest number of students in higher technical education in Romanian was registered in 1981, 116156 students, a year after the maximum in the entire higher education. The highest proportion of students enrolled in the technical higher education from the total was achieved in 1989: 65% after other two years with similar proportions. Also, it should be noted that for the period 1977-1989, on average, 60% of the students attending the Romanian higher education were studying in the technical education. On average, 39.36% of the students enrolled in the technical higher education during 1977-1989 were part of the mechanical profile (engineers and sub-engineers).

Table 4. Percentage of students enrolled in the mechanical profile of specialization from the total number of students in the technical higher education - engineers - (%)

| Year | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| | Total students | | Rate 2 in 1 (%) |
	Technical Education	Mechanical Profile	
1977	54.244	18.451	34.01
1978	66.090	23.216	35.12
1979	77.888	28.182	36.18
1980	87.251	31.363	35.94
1981	91.378	34.075	37.29
1982	91.429	35.120	38.41
1983	90.559	35.681	39.40
1984	89.326	35.605	39.85
1985	86.917	34.998	40.26
1986	86.529	35.180	40.65
1987	68.281	36.155	52.95
1988	89.657	36.607	40.83
1989	92.051	38.342	41.65
Average	82.431	32.537	39.43

From the above table we see that 39.43% students from the technical higher education were enrolled in mechanical profile, ready to be trained as engineers (a similar 'weight' of the students in mechanical profile - engineers and sub-engineers – into the technical higher education). A clear fact is that 1989 saw the biggest number of students enrolled in the technical higher education, 92051 students, from which 38342 were studying in a specialization included in the mechanical profile. However, the largest rate of students enrolled in the mechanical profile from all the students in the technical higher education was reached in 1985, namely 52.95%.

Table 5. Percentage of students enrolled in the mechanical profile of specialization from the total number of students in the technical higher education – sub-engineers - (%)

Year	1	2	3
	Total students		
	Technical Education	Mechanical Profile	Rate 2 in 1 (%)
1977	31.136	10.994	35.30
1978	30.127	11.058	36.70
1979	28.282	10.928	38.63
1980	27.200	10.374	38.13
1981	24.778	9.750	39.34
1982	20.747	8.196	39.50
1983	17.464	7.129	40.82
1984	14.597	6.105	41.82
1985	13.563	5.785	42.65
1986	13.309	5.574	41.88
1987	13.307	5.457	41,00
1988	13.814	5.540	40.10
1989	14.754	5.869	39.77
Average	20.237	7.904	39.67

For the situation of sub-engineers we can see a similarity to the data for engineers: 39.67% students from the technical higher education (sub-engineers) were enrolled in the mechanical profile, ready to be trained as sub-engineers. One can easily see that if in the late 1970s and early 1980s there were more students trained to become sub-engineers, in the mid 1980s their number had a steep decline (in 1984 more than 50% compared to 1977, but the process was already beginning to take shape as early as 1981, with a rate of 3000 sub-engineers). Similarly, the number of students in mechanical profile followed the same trend. In terms of the proportion of students enrolled in mechanical profile in the total number of students in the technical higher education (sub-engineers), the most significant proportion was 42.65% and was reached in 1985. In 1989 as opposed to 1977, there were almost 5% more students in the rate of mechanical profile students in the whole technical higher education.

Another interesting perspective on the importance of the mechanical profile is revealed to us by the situation of 1989. From among all of the types of higher education, the technical type was the most important (106085 students enrolled), followed by medical and pharmaceutical education (16703), academic and pedagogical (15828), economic (15493), agriculture (6380), legal (2362) and artistic (936). When compared to other profiles of specializations, the mechanical profile was the leading profile and was followed by electrical profile with 18747 students enrolled, constructions profile with 8810 students and chemical profile with 8184 students. Notice how all of them are part of technical education. In terms of

the proportion of male and female students in the mechanical profile it must be noted, in a somehow predictable way, that the majority of students were male (in average 71%).

CONCLUSION

The profiles of specialization established in 1974 were an important step in the development of the Romanian higher education. The technical profiles and specialization were having the most attention from the political leaders, in the context of an economy based on industrial development. In this way not only they amounted the most number of students, but also they received many modifications, in 1977 and later, and also, by studying different projects from the end of communism we can see once more this care.

From the statistical data we can conclude that 40% of all enrolled students in the technical higher education were enlisted in the mechanical profile of specialization (engineers 39.43% and sub-engineers 39.67%). Even if in the mid-1980s the number of students to be trained as sub-engineers dropped, the situation was offset by increasing the number of students trained to become engineers. An interesting fact is that in 1989 there were almost twice as many students enrolled in the mechanical profile (engineers) compared to 1975 and within the same time boundaries, almost twice less students in the form of education for sub-engineers. All in all, 60% of the students enrolled in the Romanian higher education were attending the technical field of study and 23.75% of all students were enrolled in the mechanical profile, which means almost a quarter of all students.

All these data show us the importance of the mechanical profile of specialization for the entire Romanian higher education system, as well as the importance of policy makers who drew for education precise tasks on preservation, including for the last part of the communism, of a large proportion of specialists to be trained inside the technical field of education, so necessary for the industry, as it was considered the principal economic driver and the primary way to develop the country. The political decision to ensure the country's prosperity through industrial development, was consistent with the formation of a specialized workforce through the higher educational system.

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IULIU-MARIUS MORARIU, *RESTITUTIO GRIGORE PLETOSU* (CLUJ-NAPOCA: EIKON PRESS AND RENAŞTEREA PUBLISHING HOUSE, 2014).

Reviewed by Flavius Cristian MĂRCĂU[1]

The local history was always important for the research and it is today too. This is the reason for that, the work of Iuliu-Marius Morariu (today, the hieromonk Maxim), dedicated to the Archpriest Grigore Pletosu (1848-1934), the first literary critic of the poet George Coşbuc, the mentor of the first Romanian Orthodox Patriarch, Miron Cristea, and also of several important people from the Romanian culture in the interwar period and before, is important for the contemporary research.

The author, already known in the cultural space for his books[2], tries there a symbiosis between the historical research and theology. He presents the biography of Grigore Pletosu, but not in the classic way. Although he uses many historical documents, provided from the Bistriţa-Năsăud Service of the National Archives of Romania, the Sibiu one, the Archives of the Orthodox Metropoly from Sibiu and Cluj, from Jarda family and from his birth Parish, Chintelnic, he doesn't present in a positivist way the most important aspects from the life of the great priest, teacher and writer, but prefers to highlight the most important aspects of his spiritual portrait. He separates this portrait in two parts: the one as a teacher and the other as a professor.

For being easy for the lay reader to understand his approach, he also offers, in the introductory part information about his demarche. Also, in the chapters he realises a short incursion in the history of the church and shows what it meant the spiritual portrait of the professor and of the teacher for the Orthodox Theology. Then, he presents the way how there are valorified the main characteristics of the two ones in his life and activity. From time in time, he uses interesting examples to show how there where applied the prescripts of the Holy

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[2] See: Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Mystique and autobiography from Romanticism to nowadays - studies in Orthodox Spirituality,* (Saarbrucken: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2016); Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Stări, momente şi personalităţi din Ortodoxia transilvană – pasaje insuficient reliefate istoriografic (Dispositions, moments and personalities from the Transylvanian Orthodoxy),* (Târgu Jiu: "Academica Brâncuși" Publishing House, 2013); Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Saint Constantin Brâncoveanu – a model for today's youth,* translated in English by Romina Sopopian, Simona Răileanu, Raluca Ştefan, Anca Bivolariu, Roxana Maria Băiceanu, Andrei Mitrică, "Misisionary Colection for Youths", 3th volume, (Cluj-Napoca: Renaşterea Publishing House, 2015); Gavrilă-Tudor Zinveliu, Maxim Morariu, *Noi aspecte ale martiriului Sfinţilor năsăudeni (New aspects of the martyrdom of the Saints from Năsăud county),* (Cluj-Napoca, Renaşterea Publishing House, 2016); Iuliu-Marius Morariu, Ana Filip, *Istoria Mănăstirii „Izvorul Tămăduirii" Salva (History of the Monastery "The healing fountaine" Salva),* (Blaj, "Astra" Press, 2013).

Bible, canon law or the opinions of the Holy Fathers from the first centuries in his life and activity.

At the end, the author offers also a precious interview with the grand-son of the priest, Mr. Pavel Jarda, the son of the great composer and musician Tudor Jarda, who explains why his father was helped by the Archpriest and offers many interesting information about his family life (the sadness of losing his little daughter, Lucia[3], the way how Liviu Rebreanu talks about him and his daughters[4] and s. o.).

The book, which is forwarded by His Eminence Andrew, the Archbishop of Vad, Feleac and Cluj and Metropolite of Cluj, Maramureş and Sălaj[5], offers a reach bibliography (more than 400 sources) and it is an important historical restitution of the Great personality of Grigore Pletosu. Together with other articles and studies dedicated by the author to this subject[6], it is an important piece of a bigger puzzle, where he gets into the light his life and activity and shows his qualities as sacerdote, teacher at the Boundary Greek-Catholic Gymnasium from Năsăud (where there where formed more than 20 members of the Romanian Academy[7]), but also author of several books[8], articles, studies, reviews and translations.

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[3] For more information about her biography, see also: Teodor Tanco, *Un nume vestit de artist plastician ar fi fost Lucia Pletosu ("An important name of a painter would it be Lucia Pletosu)*, in *Virtus Romana Rediviva,* 8th volume - „Memoria Culturii (The memory of the Culture)", (Cluj-Napoca: Virtus Romana Rediviva Press, 1993), p. 301-305.

[4] See: Liviu Rebreanu, *Ion – novel* (Bucharest: Alcalay & Co Press, 1920).

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[6] Like: Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Activitatea pastoral-misionară şi catehetică a lui Grigore Pletosu la Gimnaziul Grăniceresc Năsăudean în perioada 1880-1900 (Pastoral-missionar and catechetic activity of Grigore Pletosu at the Boundary Gymnasium from Năsăud betwen 1880-1900),* in *Zilele Cercetării Ştiinţifice Studenţeşti din Universitatea „Constantin Brâncuşi"- Ediţia a VI-a (The Days of Students Scientific Research from "Constantin Brâncuşi" University, 4th edition),* (Târgu Jiu, "Academica Brâncuşi" Publishing House, 2013), p. 306-314; Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Protoiereul astrist Grigore Pletosu – cleric şi cărturar năsăudean (The astrist archpriest Grigore Pletosu – clergyman and scholar from Năsăud area,* in *Transilvania,* XLI (CXLV - 2013), No. 3, p. 28-32; Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Activitatea protoiereului şi profesorului Grigore Pletosu ca preşedinte al Secţiunii şcolare a „Astrei" (1902-1911) (The activity of the Archpriest and teacher Grigore Pletosu as President of the scholar section of "Astra" (1902-1911),* in Anamaria Macavei, Roxana Dorina Pop (coord.), *Consemnări despre trecut. Societate şi imagine de-a lungul timpului (Chronicles about the past. Society and image across the time,* (Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press, 2015), p. 187-198; Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Contribuţia protoiereului Grigore Pletosu la înfiinţarea Revistei Teologice (The contribution of the Archpriest Grigore Pletosu at the foundation of the Theologycal Review,* in Nicolae Dumbrăvescu (coord.), *Tinerii istorici şi cercetările lor (Young historians and his researches),* 2nd volume, (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut Press, 2015), p. 153-160; Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Activitatea naţional-bisericească a protoiereului Grigore Pletosu (National and Church activity of the Archpriest Grigore Pletosu),* in *Gaudeamus Alma Mater Crisiensis, Socio-Humanistic Series,* I (2013), no. 1, p. 261- 273; Iuliu-Marius Morariu, *Caracteristicile misiunii creştine în viziunea protopopului Grigore Pletosu (1848-1934) (The characterictiscs of the Christian mission in the vision of the Archpriest Grigore Pletosu),* in *Tabor,* X (2016), no. 1, p. 40-46.

[7] For more information about this subject, see: Mircea Prahae, coord., *Studii şi cercetări etnoculturale (Etnocultural studies and researches),*2nd volume, (Bistriţa: "George Coşbuc" Press, 2001); Ioan Seni, *Academicienii năsăudeni (The academicians from Năsăud),* (Cluj-Napoca: Napoca Star Press, 2016); Teodor Tanco, *Academicienii năsăudeni şi bistriţeni (The academicians from Năsăud and Bistriţa),* (Cluj-Napoca: Virtus Romana Rediviva Press, 1996).

[8] The titles of his books are: Grigore Pletosu, Ion Gheţie, *Retorica şi carte de cetire pentru clasa a VI-a gimnasială (Rethoric and reading book for the 4th Gymnasium class),*(Bistriţa: Carol Csallner Press, 1904); Gregoriu Pletosu, *Dogmatica Ortodoxă (Orthodox Dogmatics),* (Sibiu and Năsăud: Press of the Orthodox Archidiocese from Sibiu, 1893) – the book was reprinted in 2013. See: Grigore Pletosu, *Dogmatica ortodoxă (Orthodox Dogmatics),* eds. Ioan Pintea and Grigore Linul (Cluj-Naoca: Renaşterea Publishing House, 2013); Grigore Pletosu, *Propedeutica filosofică pentru învăţământul secundar (The Philosophical propedeutics for the Gymnasium teaching),*(Bistriţa and Năsăud: Carol Csallner Press, 1899).

We cannot forget to appreciate the prodigious activity of the author, which offer a complex perspective over the investigated subject and help the reader to discover the dynamic personality of the Archpriest Grigore Pletosu, a great father and professor from Năsăud area.

THE INCIDENCE OF ORAL AND MAXILLO-FACIAL PATHOLOGY IN A GROUP OF PATIENTS IN THE RADIOLOGY DEPARTMENT ASSOCIATED TO "PROF.DR.DAN THEODORESCU" HOSPITAL

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ABSTRACT
OBJECTIVE: THE EVALUATION OF THE ORAL MAXILLO-FACIAL HEALTH IS AN IMPORTANT TOPIC IN ALL COUNTRIES, SINCE THE INFORMATION IS USEFUL TO THE HEALTH DISTRICTS, HEALTH INSURANCE HOUSES, ACADEMIC SCHOLARS AND CLINICIANS. OUR STUDY REPRESENTS A SURVEY REGARDING THE TYPES OF PATHOLOGY IN THE POPULATION STARTING FROM THE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF RADIOLOGY ASSOCIATED TO "PROF. DR. DAN THEODORESCU" HOSPTAL IN BUCHAREST.
MATERIALS AND METHODS: SEVERAL PHYSICIANS ANALYZED THE X-RAYS AND/OR THE COMPUTER TOMOGRAPH SCANS FOR A GROUP OF PATIENTS WHO CAME TO THE DEPARTMENT IN A PERIOD OF 6 MONTHS (JUNE-DECEMBRE 2015).
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: THE RESULTS ALLOWED US TO DIVIDE THE PROBLEMS INTO 6 CATEGORIES, BASED ON: A) VERY HIGH PREVALENCE (OVER 150 OUT OF 200 CASES): CARIES AND EDENTATIONS; B) HIGH PREVALENCE (APPROX 90/200 CASES): PARODONTOPATHY AND PERIAPICAL COMPLICATIONS; C) AVERAGE PREVALENCE (APPROX 30/200 OUT OF CASES): BONE FRACTURES, CYSTS, SINUSITIS, DENTO-MAXILLARY ANOMALIES; D) LOW PREVALENCE (APPROX 10/200): DENTAL FRACTURES; E) VERY LOW PREVALENCE (APPROX. 5/200): TUMORS, DISCHARGE, TMJ AFFLICTIONS; F) LOWEST PREVALENCE (APPROX 2/200): EAGLE SYNDROME, OSTEONECROSIS, FOREIGN BODIES AND SIALOLITH.

KEY WORDS: ORAL HEALTH OF THE POPULATION, DIAGNOSIS, ORAL MAXILLO-FACIAL PATHOLOGY MANIFESTED RADIOLOGICALLY.

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INTRODUCTION

The present study springs from the intention to obtain a clear picture of the oral and maxillo-facial health in the population. Since in Romania the health system in this field is largely independent, comprising private dental surgeries, there are real difficulties at the level of the health districts and The Ministry of Health to set up a comprehensive accurate data base concerning the topic. The state of oral and maxillo-facial health of the population can be evaluated through surveys on population samples, as we will show in this study.

A search for this type of data available on the internet emphasizes that there are reports from various countries (USA, Great Britain, New Zeeland, Turkey, Benin, etc); even though the raports are not general, nor really systematic, they can be used as attempts to quantify this pathology. For instance, it is known that in the USA over 47% of the target group, which consists of 64.7 million adults, have a type of periodontal disease. The estimates were made on
a group of 3,742 adults over 30 years of age, in the general population, who have one or several teeth (1). Another study presents the percentage of untreated cavities in the USA (2) (see Tab. 1,2):

Age	Percentage of patients with untreated cavities in decidual dentition
From 2 to 5 years	27.90
From 6 to 11 years	51.17

Table 1. Percentage of patients with untreated cavities in decidual dentition, according to age.

Age	Percentage of patients with untreated cavities in the permanent dentition
From 12 to 15 years	50.67
From 16 to 19 years	67.49
From 20 to 34 years	27.88
From 35 to 49 years	25.56
From 50 to 64 years	22.14

Table 2. Percentage of patients with untreated cavities in the permanent dentition, according to age.

In Great Britain, the data in the literature show that the prevalence of caries decreased from 46% in 1998 to 28% in 2009, a reduction present in all age groups (3).

In New Zeeland, the prevalence of uni- or pluridental edentations in the patients over 18 is 61,8%. Also in New Zeeland, the prevalence of untreated coronal caries on one or multiple teeth, in patients over 18 years of age is 35.3%, 29.7% in women and 41.5% in men (4).

According to a study undertaken in Turkey, the incidence of the elongated stiloid process was estimated at 3.3%; 55% of the cases identified on the orthopantomographies were bilateral. The ratio men-women was 1/9 on the X-rays, and the mean age was 43.35.

A study made in a university hospital in Benin, over a 5-year period, reports a prevalence of maxillary sinusitis of 19.3%.

MATERIAL AND METHOD

The study analyzed a number of 200 patients who came to our department from June to Decembre 2015; the departaement of radiology associated to "Prof. Dr. Dan Theodorescu" Hospital houses also a department of the Faculty of Stomatology, which is part of the "Carol Davila" University of Medicine and Pharmacy in Bucharest. The patients came for various reasons, from trauma emergencies to post-operative check-ups. The patients were referred to the department of radiology both by the dentists working in the hospital, and in private practices. All the patients had at least one radiography taken (various angles) and/or CBCT. The radiographies were analyzed by several dentists who diagnosed and checked the lesions, and the findings were recorded in a table. The data were then statistically analyzed, the results were interpreted and the conclusions were drawn.

RESULTS AND DISCUTIONS

After the X-rays and the computer tomograph scans were analyzed, the information gathered was inserted in a table.

The statistical analysis of the data highlighted the following aspects: the patient distribution on gender was 55% women and 45% men, as it can be seen in **Chart 1**.

The patients are aged from 3 to 87 years, with a mean age of 42 years (see **Diagram 2**).

Chart 2

Chart 3 illustrates the distribution of the incidences used for this group of patients. According to this, most exposures are panoramic–type (OPG)(74%), followed by a roughly equal number of CBCT (≈10%) and retroalveolar Rx (≈12%). These findings support the general strategy of radiologic investigations.

Chart 3

Chart 4

Chart 4 shows the percentile distribution of the recommandation for computed-tomography.

Chart 5

CBCT
23%

Patients
without
CBCT
77%

Chart 6

CBCT
12%

No
CBCT
88%

Charts 5 and 6 show the distribution of the computed-tomography scans for the two sexes; the first one shows the situation for women, and the second for men. The greater need for CT scans in women is to be noted.

Chart 7 shows the number of OPG for each patient. Most patients have only one OPG, 28% have more than one (almost a quarter), 9% none. For more than a quarter of the patients, a second X-ray of the OPG type could also be studied, the second one being generally performed post-operative.

Chart 7

No Pano-
Rx
9%

More
than one
Pano-Rx
28%

One
Pano-Rx
63%

Chart 8 presents the distribution of the types of pathology. The graph allows us to divide the problems found into 6 categories, based on:
  a) very high prevalence (over 150 out of 200 cases): caries and edentulous gaps;
  b) high prevalence (approx 90/200 cases): periodontal diseases and periapical complications;
  c) c)average prevalence (approx 30/200 out of cases): bone fractures, cysts, sinusitis, dentomaxillary anomalies;
  d) low prevalence (approx 10/200): dental fractures;
  e) very low prevalence (approx. 5/200): tumors, discharge, TMJ disorders;
  f) lowest prevalence (approx 2/200): Eagle syndrome, osteonecrosis, foreign bodies and sialoliths.

Chart 8

Chart 9, **Chart 10** respectively, graphically present the numeric distribution of the type of pathology in women and men, respectively. The pathology is slightly different, with more fractures in men and more edentulous gaps in women.


Chart 9

Chart 11 shows the percentage of caries. It can be noticed that a significant percentage of patients have caries, but also that 1 in 4 patients is unharmed by caries.

Chart 12, **Chart 13** respectively, presents the graphic statistical distribution of caries in women and in men, respectively. According to these diagrams, the percentage of patients unharmed by caries do not show significant difference between the genders.

Chart 14 shows the presence of periodontal disease. Almost half of the patients have a form of periodontal disease.

Chart 10

Osseous fractures: 17
Dental fractures: 5
Chysts: 13
Tumours: 3
Supurations: 1
Salivary calculi: 0
Parodontopathy: 47
Caries: 67
TMJ affection: 3
Maxillary sinus affection: 16
Periapical pathoses: 43
Anomalies: 15
Edentations: 62
Foreign Body: 1
Osteoradionecrosis: 1
Eagle's syndrome: 2

Chart 11

No caries 25%
Have caries 75%

Chart 12. The presence of dental caries in women

No caries 25%
Have caries 75%

Chart 13. The presence of dental caries in men

No caries 26%
Have caries 74%

Chart 14

Periodontal disease present **49%**

Without periodontal disease **51%**

According to the two **Charts** (**15 and 16**), which show the presence of periodontal disease in the two genders, there is a slight difference (6 percent) in favor of men, compared to women.

Chart 15. The presence of periodontal disease (PD) in women

Have PD **46%**

No PD **54%**

Chart 16. The presence of periodontal disease (PD) in men

No PD **48%**

Have PD **52%**

Chart 17

All teeth present **23%**

Edentulous **77%**

Chart 17. Percentage of edentulous patients(red colour). According to this chart, approximately three quarters of the patients have at least one edentulous gap.(Blue=no edentulous gap).

Chart 18 and **Chart 19** graphically show the statistical distribution of edentulous gaps in women and in men, respectively. A statistically significant difference can be observed between the number of edentulous (blue colour) women (83%) and edentulous men (69%).

Chart 18. The presence of edentulous gaps in women

Chart 19. The presence of edentulous gaps in men

Chart 20

Chart 20 shows the presence of bone fractures in the group of patients in this study.

Chart 21, Chart 22, respectively, show graphically the numerical distribution of bone fractures in women and men. According to these diagrams, men present almost three times more bone fractures than women.

Chart 21. The presence of osseous fractures in women

Chart 22. The presence of osseous fractures in men

CONCLUSIONS

1. An approximately equal number of women and men came to the department of radiology, with a relatively balanced distribution: 110 women and 93 men. The

mean age is 42 years..

2. The most frequently required examinations were OPGs (74%), followed by an approximately equal number of CBCT and retroalveolar Rx (10%). These findings support the genral strategy of radiologic investigations.

3. Approximately 1/5 patients needed the computer tomograph scan.

4. In about half of the patients, a second X-ray, the OPG type, was performed, generally postoperative.

5. The problems identified can be divided into 6 categories, according to their frequency:
    - very high prevalence (over 150 out of 200 cases): caries and edentations;
    - high prevalence (approx 90/200 cases): parodontopathy and periapical complications;
    - average prevalence (approx 30/200 out of cases): bone fractures, cysts, sinusitis,   dento-maxillary anomalies;
    - low prevalence (approx 10/200): dental fractures;
    - very low prevalence (approx. 5/200): tumors, discharge, TMJ afflictions;
    - lowest prevalence (approx 2/200): Eagle syndrome, osteonecrosis, foreign bodies and   sialoliths.

6. The male patients with complete dentition (31%) are almost twice as many as women (17%).

7. One in four patients is unharmed by caries, irrespective of gender.

8. Jumatate din pacienti prezinta o forma de parodontopatie marginala, cu diferenta nesemnificativa pe sexe.

9. Approximately three quarters (77%) of the patients have at least one edentulous breech.

10. Approximately one in ten patients (12%) have at least one bone fracture.

11. Men have almost three times more bone fractures than women.

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BASOSQUAMOUS CARCINOMA: A RARE CASE OF EAR METASTATSIS IN A 13 YEARS-OLD

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ABSTRACT:
WE PRESENT THE CASE OF A 13-YEARS OLD FEMALE CHILD, WITH A NODULAR TUMOR ON THE EAR LOBE, RESECTED AND INVESTIGATED IN THE PEDIATRIC HOSPITAL OF PITEŞTI, ROMANIA. THE INITIAL CLINICAL DIAGNOSIS WAS OF A SEBACOUS CYST, BUT, AFTER CLOSER INSPECTION AT THE MICROSCOPE, WE DETECTED THE PRESENCE OF SQUAMOID PROLIFERATIONS, WITH KERATINISATION AND BASALOID FEATURES, CONCLUDING THE DIAGNOSIS AS A METASTASIS WITH BASOSQUAMOUS CARCINOMA ORIGIN. BASOSQUAMOUS CARCINOMA REMAINS A RARE FINDING IN CHILDREN AND, IS OFTEN, MISINTERPRETED AS A SUQAMOUS CARCINOMA. THEREFORE, THIS WORK IS INTENDED TO FOCUS THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS DISEASE FOR PATHOLOGISTS WHO INVESTIGATE CHILD DERMATOPATHOLOGY, REGARDING THIS MATTER.

INTRODUCTION

Basal cell carcinoma, clinically, may present on sun-exposed skin areas, particularly on face, being more frequent in white adults. Occurrence in young adults, other than in the context of nevus sebaceous, nevoid basal cell carcinoma syndrome, or Rombo syndrome remains exceptional. However, in children, Gorlin syndrome is characterized by basal cell carcinomas, with odontogenic jaw cysts, pitted depression of the hands and feet, osseous anomalies, a broad nasal root and hypertelorism. The indicence of all basosquamous carcinoma (BSQC) remains at 1-2% of all dermatological malignancy cases, having different synonyms: metatypical carcinoma, basaloid squamous carcinoma, or collision tumor, if both components (squamous and basal cell) are even. Futhermore, a BSQC metastasis presents itself as well delimited formation, although its incidence is lower than 5% in children younger than 20 years old[2]. Clinically, BSQC metastasis has no specific features, while the biopsy is the only way to figure out the final diagnosis. Thus, the histopathological diagnosis might be very problematic, because the growth is very slow. There might be encountered areas of basocellular and squamous carcinoma. The cells of basal component are larger, with

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pale cytoplasm, with areas of squamoid features that have abundant eosinophilic cytoplasm. Frequently, it might be visible another area of cells having transitional features intermingled in between both components. Not rarely, characteristic peripheral pallisading and stromal retraction remain inconspicuous. The diagnosis must well document the superposition of basal cell carcinoma with the squamous one[3].

CASE REPORT

The differential diagnosis encompassed lymphoepithelioma-like carcinoma, metastatic ameloblastic carcinoma and Ewing sarcoma. These possible situations were taken into account as the localization of metastasis was more frequent in head and neck regions. However, pathological and imagery criteria were not met for any of these tumors. The final diagnosis was that of a *metastatic bazosquamous carcinoma with local invasion of the left ear lobe.*

We present the case of a 13 years old female child, having a good health status, with no other complaints or symptoms, except for a mass on the left ear lobe, that enlarged within a 6 weeks duration to 1,5/0,7 cm. The rest of clinical examination and imagistics proved no obvious or worrisome lesions. Laboratory routine blood tests proved negative for all counts. The ear-nose-throat department in our hospital referred the case for resection within 2-4 mm margins for esthetical reasons. We received the tissue sample in our Pathology Department, fixed in 10% buffered formalin. It presented as a well delineated, nodular mass, with a gritty aspect, having intermingled white to brown areas and a general non-homogenous aspect (fig nr. 1).

Fig. 1. Resected nodule from left ear in a 13 years old girl. Gritty aspect with variable brown to white coloured areas is visible after sectioning (10% buffered formalin).

After tissue processing in successive alcohol concentrations (70, 80 and 96 degrees), paraffin embedding and sectioning with haematoxilin and eosin staining, we found definite squamous areas with ortho- and parakeratin forming pearls with basaloid features, without peripheral pallisading and with pseudo-stromal retraction (fig. nr. 2). These carcinomatous entities were detected inside dilated, ectatic blood vessels encircled by a desmoplastic, lymphoplasmocytic infiltrated fibrous strands, as the metastatic cells already invaded within the local perivascular connective tissues (fig. nr. 3). In transitional areas, more visible towards the basaloid areas, squamous morules were detected, thus proving the tendency for squamous differentiation. Atypical mitoses were found exclusively in basaloid areas of the BSQC, approximately 5 to 6 mitoses per field.

The case was reviewed interdisciplinary – pediatric surgeon, ear-nose-throat senior specialist, pathologist – for oncological treatment in a regional specialized department for similar pediatric cases.

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DISCUSSION

The differential diagnosis encompassed lymphoepithelioma-like carcinoma, metastatic ameloblastic carcinoma and Ewing sarcoma. These possible situations were taken into account as the localization of metastasis was more frequent in head and neck regions. However, pathological and imagery criteria were not met for any of these tumors. The final diagnosis was that of a *metastatic bazosquamous carcinoma with local invasion of the left ear lobe.* For definitive diagnosis, immunohistochemistry is necessary, although it has limited value. Representative paraffin embedded tissue samples should reserved for immunostaining with AE1/AE3, bcl-2, TGF-A, Ver-EP4, p53 molecular antibodies. With this kind of approach, it might be best visible the transitional area between the two components of the BSQC[4]. The optimal way to observe this kind of transitional cellular effect is

Fig. 2. Basaloid areas toegether with squamous differentiation in the resected tumor; metatypical morules are visible (center) with few mitotic figures

with Ber-EP4, who is detected in all basocellular tumors. This might indicate the presence of a pluipotential cell capable of differentiation trough a genetical mutation, causing frequent appearance of metastasis in such a young age[5].

Main therapy is represented by resectional surgery with security margins and chemotherapy, although this kind of tumor remains unresponsive, especially with oncological radiotherapy and pharmacological approach, in metastastic disease. In chemotherapy, we might use doxorubicin, cisplatin, fluorouracil in varying cycles, depending of CT volumetric response of the main tumor[6].

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
CONCLUSIONS

Fig. 3. Squamoid features are intermingled with basaloid ones. Perivascular invasion is visible toegether with squamou pearls and atypical mitoses (10x20, HE).

This collision tumor or BSQC remains with an overall low frequency among all cutaneous malignancies, in children; it has origins in basal cells of the epidermis, and a high potential for metastasing or invasion, especially because of the squamous features.

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CRUSHING INJURY WITH INFECTED FEMORAL FRACTURE - CASE PRESENTATION

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ABSTRACT

LIMB TRAUMA ARE OFTEN EVALUATED ONLY REGARDING THE BONE INJURY, THUS NEGLECTING THE IMPORTANCE OF SOFT TISSUE DAMAGE, WHICH MAY LEAD TO SEVERE COMPLICATIONS; ESPECIALLY IN CLOSED HIGH ENERGY TRAUMA, SUCH AS CRUSHING INJURIES LACK OF PROPER DEBRIDEMENT OF INJURED TISSUES RESULTS IN SEPTIC COMPLICATIONS, DUE TO BACTERIAL AFFINITY TO NECROTIC STRUCTURES. WE PRESENT A CASE OF AN INFECTED ISOLATED CRUSHING INJURY OF THE THIGH (TRAFFIC ACCIDENT), ASSOCIATING A COMMINUTED FEMORAL FRACTURE AND SEVERE SOFT TISSUE INJURIES, WITH EXTENSIVE MUSCULAR NECROSIS. COMPLEX SURGICAL TREATMENT INCLUDING REPEATED DEBRIDEMENTS WAS NECESSARY FOR HEALING THE INFECTION AND SEQUENTIAL METHOD WAS USED FOR STABILIZING THE FRACTURE. THE OUTCOME OF THE PATIENT WAS FAVORABLE BUT ONLY AFTER SERIAL DEBRIDEMENTS AND LAVAGES NEUTRALIZED THE INITIAL CONTAMINATION. THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THE IMMEDIATE AND SECONDARY COMPLICATIONS OF CRUSHING INJURIES WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION WHEN TREATING THIS TYPE OF TRAUMA.

KEYWORDS: HIGH ENERGY TRAUMA, FEMORAL FRACTURE, CRUSHING INJURY, SEQUENTIAL METHOD

CLINICAL CASE

INTRODUCTION: Crushing trauma of the extremities is characterized by a traumatic agent acting upon a certain segment of a limb which is situated on a tough surface, thus playing the role of a counteraction. So, the injuries are produced by the sum between: the energy of the traumatic agent and the counter-resistance, thus generating extensive muscular necrosis; this post-traumatic rhabdomyolysis which threatens not only the functional outcome

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[6], but also the vitality of the injured limb, is responsible for the systemic effects of crushing injuries, called "the crushing syndrome ", which threatens the life of the patient in most severe cases [7]. In order to avoid limb or life loss, early complete treatment in a multidisciplinary team is mandatory, including complete surgical debridement and fracture stabilization [8]. Due to the evolving character of the crushing injuries, the debridement must be repeated until all the necrotic tissue is excised, so as the oxygen provided by the vital muscles to ensure healing of the bone and soft tissues and avoid infection [9].

METHODS: We present a clinical case reflecting the difficulties in treating crushing trauma once septic complications have installed. The patient, male, 45 years old, without any other comorbidities, was admitted in the Orthopedics and Trauma Clinic of Clinical Emergency Hospital Bucharest 4 days after a traffic accident by transfer from a county hospital, with a crushing injury of the thigh and open femoral fracture. On admission, the patient presented with a tensioned suture on the thigh, blisters, areas of skin necrosis and a partially stable external fixator (ExFix), without proper reduction of the fracture.

Fig 1 - Radiologic view of the fracture and initial external fixation

Fig. 2 - Tension sutures, blisters, areas of skin necrosis

Initial aspect suggested increased tension of the subcutaneous structures, determining the blisters; the sutures were removed and the wound on the anterior aspect of the thigh became dehiscent, with a considerable residual skin defect; using an external incision,

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thorough debridement was performed, revealing large quantities of muscular debris, associated with soft tissue oedema , fascial oedema (aspect of fasciitis) and modified aspect of the hematoma, thus raising the suspicion of infection, later confirmed by cultures .

Fig. 3 - Initial debridement

The ExFix was converted to a proper one, with enough pins on each side of the fracture site; repeated lavages and necrectomies ("second look") were performed, because crushing injuries usually have an evolving aspect, and more soft tissues become necrotic from day to day. General antibiotic treatment was started with broad spectrum antibiotics and then performed according to the results from the culture. Careful interdisciplinary monitoring activity (due to the potential renal impairment produced by the products resulting from rhabdomyolysis) and supportive treatment were performed.


Fig. 4 - "Second look" – serial debridements, resulting in granulation tissue as a landmark of healing

RESULTS: As crushing has both local and systemic impact, the outcome must be evaluated from two points of view: from the general point of view, no systemic complications were registered; the renal and liver functions were not impaired, so we can conclude that the crushing syndrome did not appear as result of a thorough local treatment, combined with systemic supportive measures; considering the local outcome, the ExFix remained stable and after repeated lavages and necrectomies, granulation tissue invaded the injury site; the secretion diminished and then disappeared; skin graft was used in order to cover the defect.

Fig. 5- Clinical aspect after skin integration

When all signs of inflammation disappeared, the skin flaps were completely integrated, and the soft tissue injuries seemed to have healed, sequential method was considered to be suitable for the patient, external fixation being followed by intramedullary nail. No complications appeared after nailing and several years later, the nail was removed. Since no local complications appeared, it can be concluded that the local treatment was complete, providing healing conditions, despite the initial contamination.

Fig. 6 - Radiological aspect after intramedullary nail insertion

Fig. 7 - functional outcome 6 months follow up

CONCLUSION: Crushing trauma represent one of the most challenging type of modern traumatology, not only because they are increasingly frequent, but also because they associate complex injuries, affecting all the structures of a limb; although the bone injury is the most obvious one, the soft tissue damage is definitely the most important for the prognosis of the limb and of the patient, especially because necrotic muscles represent a very good environment for bacterial growth, thus considerably increasing the risk of early and severe infections. That is why infected fractures are frequent after complex high energy trauma; they require a prolonged and complicate treatment applied by a multidisciplinary team; the general measures- antibiotics and supportive treatment- are mandatory, but the most important is the local treatment which must create a clean environment. Complete debridement, always requiring several surgical interventions and optimal stabilization of the fracture are crucial not only for limb preservation, but also for patient's survival.

PERSISTENT INFLAMMATORY SYNDROME IN A POLYTRAUMA PATIENT- PREDICTIVE FACTOR FOR COMPLICATIONS- CASE PRESENTATION

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ABSTRACT
POLYTRAUMA REPRESENTS A MAJOR CAUSE OF MORBIDITY OF MORTALITY IN MODERN TRAUMATOLOGY. ALTHOUGH NO UNIFIED DEFINITION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED YET, THE MAIN PHYSIOPATHOLOGIC CHARACTERISTIC OF POLYTRAUMA HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED : THE SYSTEMIC INFLAMMATORY RESPONSE SYNDROME (SIRS), WHICH MAY HAVE A FAVORABLE OUTCOME, OR IT CAN EVOLVE UP TO MULTIPLE SYSTEM AND ORGAN FAILURE (MSOF) OR EVEN DEATH. THE INFLAMMATORY STATUS CAN BE DESCRIBED USING BIOCHEMICAL MARKERS AND ITS DURATION AND INTENSITY DEPENDS ON THE OUTCOME OF EACH OF THE ASSOCIATED INJURIES. THIS PAPER PRESENTS A CASE OF A POLYTRAUMA PATIENT WITH A PERSISTENT INFLAMMATORY SYNDROME WHO DEVELOPED MAJOR LOCAL COMPLICATIONS, INCLUDING SEPTIC ONES, THUS DEMONSTRATING THE VALUE OF PROPER MONITORING AND MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH OF POLYTRAUMA

KEY WORDS: POLYTRAUMA, BIOCHEMICAL MARKERS, DAMAGE CONTROL

CLINICAL CASE
INTRODUCTION

Several definitions have been proposed for polytrauma; in 2002, Trentz [6] introduced two major elements as crucial for a multiple injury to be considered a polytrauma:

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[4] Clinical Emergency Hospital Bucharest; Orthopaedics and Trauma Clinic
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- ISS >17, and
- The association of injuries determines a sequential systemic traumatic reactions that may lead to dysfunction (up to complete failure) of vital organs/ systems which had not been directly injured, meaning that this reaction affects target organs WITHOUT them having been primarily affected by trauma.

Pape [7],[8] and his team considered the following as relevant parameters for defining a polytrauma:

a. ISS > 15 and
b. Abbreviated Injury Score (AIS) > 3 in at least two body regions , and
c. at least one of the following: - hypotension (systolic blood pressure SBP <90 mm HB) OR   unconsciousness [GCS score ≤8], OR   acidosis [Base Excess BE ≤- 6.0], OR   coagulopathy [PTT ≥ 40 seconds or INR ≥ 1.4] OR age [>70 years]).

Regardless of the defining, the common thing for polytrauma is represented by the hyper-inflammatory status (SIRS), with duration and intensity depending on the balance between the initial trauma and the therapeutic intervention, and consistently determined by the pre-traumatic status of the patient[9],[10]

The elements defining SIRS are

1. Tachycardia , with HR> 90/ min
2. Tachypnea, with RR> 20 min, with decreased PaCO2< 32 mmHG
3. Body temperature >38 grd C or <35 grd C
4. Leucocytosis >12.000/mm3 or leucopenia< 4000/mm3, or immature granulocytes ≥10%[11]

The main goal of the treatment in initial stages of polytrauma is survival of the patient, so basic resuscitative interventions addressed to vital injuries are performed, then injuries requiring urgent treatment are approached, while the rest of the injuries are treated when the status of the patient is stable enough so as not to produce a reactivation of SIRS. This principle, called "damage control "ensures the patient stabilization with minimal systemic impact and avoids the "second hit" phenomenon

MATERIAL AND METHOD

The patient, 24 yrs old, sustained a traffic accident 10 days before arriving to our hospital; while riding a motorcycle he drove into a lighting pole. Severely injured, he was taken to the county hospital where he was immediately operated for ruptured subclavian artery (which was restored using a vascular prosthesis), ruptured spleen (splenectomy) and liver (hepatoraphy)

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Figure 1- Polytrauma patient with MSOF, 10 days after the accident

Afterwards, the status of the patient worsened, with progressive renal failure and pulmonary dysfunction (Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome), evolving to Multiple System Organ Failure (MSOF).

Due to the extreme severity of the injuries and their negative outcome, the patient was sent to a Level 1 Trauma Center.

When arriving to our hospital, the patient (Figure 1) was haemodinamically unstable, intubated and anuric; multidisciplinary clinical evaluation was performed, followed by blood and urinary analysis , X rays and CT scan, revealing :
- Severe cerebral trauma with cerebral hemorrhage
- Bilateral rib fractures with bilateral haemo-pneumothorax and bilateral pleurostomy
- Right femoral fracture temporarily stabilized with cast (Figure 2 a,b), with a pre-patellar contaminated wound

a   b   c

Figure 2 – Right femoral fracture (a) with contaminated pre-patellar wound (b)

Left humeral fracture temporarily stabilized with cast (Figure 3 a, b) with the subclavian artery permeable (Figure 3 c)

a   b   c

Figure 3- Left humeral fracture – X ray (a) and clinical aspect (b); incision for subclavian graft (c)

Blood analysis revealed severe inflammation- leucocytes 19.400x1000/μL, trombocytopenia (69000/mm3), hiperkalemia (6.71 mmol/l), anaemia (7.2g% Hb), acute renal failure (creatinine 4.21 mg/dl, urea 84 mg/dl, CK > 20000U/l, ESR 60mm/h

Due to the severity of the injuries, immediate treatment was started, with the following primary, urgent goals:
- Compensate hypoxia and anemia- blood transfusion was immediately administered
- Restore renal function- dialysis was indicated and started
- Sustain pulmonary function
- Stabilize the femoral fracture, since this is unanimously considered a resuscitative procedure. Because the patient was considered a borderline type, Damage Control procedure was chosen, so closed reduction and stabilization with ExFix was the method of choice (Figure 4 a)


a   b

Figure 4 – Fracture stabilization using the Damage Control method- ExFix: femoral fracture (a), humeral fracture (b)

Post-operative outcome was favorable, with a slow improvement of inflammatory tests. Figure 5 shows the variations of leucocytes, and creatinine, not using the absolute values, but the percentages compared to the average normal ones (leucocytes 4-9x1000/μL, AST 14-50U/L, creatinine=0.7-1.4 mg/dl)

Figure 5 - Variations of anemia, creatinine and urinary flow

The humeral fracture was operated 3 days after the femoral one also following the Damage Control principles and an ExFix was inserted (Figure 4 b). The general status slowly improved; dialysis was continued for 10 days and, 14 days after admittance, the patient was extubated; reevaluation revealed left hemiparesis , as a consequence of the initial severe trauma with cerebral hemorrhage. He remained in the ICU 3 weeks after extubationg and was transferred to a Medical Rehabilitation service.

After 3 weeks in this service, the patient developed an acute septic syndrome, due to pericarditis with tamponade; he was urgently transferred from recovery to cardio-vascular surgery, where pericardiotomy was performed; due to persistent fever (up 39 grd) associated with respiratory dysfunction, he was transferred back to our hospital.

Clinical and CT evaluation revealed bilateral pleural fluid, pericarditis with infected hemopericard and mediastinitis; a Methiclino Resistant St. Aureus (MRSA) was isolated in the hemoculture, as well as in the pleural effusion. Due to the respiratory insufficiency, surgery was urgently performed, with left pleural excision and right pleurostomy , followed by sustained general treatment (including antibio-therapy)

The outcome was slow and difficult , with progressive pulmonary improvement. As for the fractures, definitive stabilization of the femoral fracture was delayed up to 10 months. An acute respiratory infection (considered as communitarian) appeared 4 months after definitive fixation and 2 weeks after that , acute infection with St.aureus appeared in the femoral fracture site, which had no other signs of infection or inflammation so far (at almost 1 year after trauma).

Considering this complicated evolution of this patient, a retrospective analysis was performed in his medical records in order to identify any potential biochemical elements which could be correlated with this long term complications.

Due to the fact that the key element of polytrauma is hyper-inflammation, the authors analyzed the inflammatory tests: leucocytes, ESR, fibrinogen, C Reactive Protein (CRP), available in the medical records of the patient in our hospital for the first admittance period. Figure 6 shows the graphic evolution of these tests (not in absolute values, but in percentages referring to the mean normal values of the laboratory in our hospital)

Figure 6- Inflammatory tests of the patient

RESULTS- DISCUSSION

The dynamics of the inflammatory tests showed a certain pattern: the initial values were extremely high compared to normal, revealing the severity of the inflammatory syndrome, consistent with the status of the patient. The fact that 10 days had already passed form trauma, this aspect suggests that the outcome of the injuries was in no way a favorable one; on the contrary, the patients status get worse within this time, with the final onset of MSOF, when he was sent to our hospital

The dynamics of the patient demonstrates that choosing the Damage Control procedure was beneficial for the patient, who did not perceive operations as a supplementary trauma, thus avoiding the " second hit" phenomenon.

After surgery the inflammatory tests continue to decrease, but they did not return to normal a long time; there was no other increase on this curve, but the fact that up to 3 weeks there were still abnormal values may suggest that the inflammation was persistent, despite all the therapeutic efforts. This can be explained by the fact that the possibilities of the organism to develop the counteractive system- CARS (*Compensatory Anti-inflammatory Response Syndrome*) were exhausted due to the long term between trauma and complete treatment.

The dynamics of the inflammatory markers showed a slow, but favorable tendency, reflecting the efficacy of the therapeutic measures, but the persistency of increased values for up to 3-4 weeks can definitely be correlated with the later complications

Inflammatory response in polytrauma has multiple components, the most important being: leucocytes (especially neutrophils, then macrophages), IL-1, IL-6, TNF-α, IL-10, IL-18, C3 and C5 (stimulating neutrophils), thromboxane, prostacycline (PG I2), CRP, Procalcitonine.[12],[13],[14]

The biochemical markers commonly used to evaluate this complex phenomenon are : leucocytes, fibrinogen, ESR and especially CRP- its' normal values are 0.3-1.7 mg/dl; although it does not give specific information, it is considered a consistent inflammatory marker. In our study, it showed the more accurate concordance between the inflammatory syndrome and the outcome of the patient.

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CONCLUSIONS

Polytrauma is characterized by severe injuries with increased morbidity and mortality; its' primary pathogenic mechanism is inflammation , which is responsible for activating other secondary damages in non-primarily traumatized systems and organs, thus leading to MSOF. Due to this fact, the inflammation tests are used in clinical practice in monitoring these patients and make therapeutic decisions. This case illustrates a potential connection between persistent inflammation and secondary complications, especially that the patient was protected by using the Damage Control procedures, which avoid the " second hit" phenomenon . Persistent inflammatory changes can be, in this case, related to the occurrence of secondary complications and the hypothesis of their predictive value worths validation through prospective randomized studies.

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