

# **RESEARCH AND SCIENCE TODAY**

**~Scientific Review~**

**No. 2(8)/2014**

**November 2014**

**ISSN: 2247 – 4455**  
**ISSN: 2285 – 9632**  
**ISSN-L: 2247 – 4455**

**Târgu Jiu 2014**

**Cover:** Batcu Alexandru

**Editing:** Mărcău Flavius-Cristian

**Director:** Mărcău Flavius-Cristian

Contact:

Mail: [flaviusmarcau@yahoo.com](mailto:flaviusmarcau@yahoo.com)

Tel: +40766665670

**ACADEMICA BRÂNCUȘI PUBLISHING**  
**ADDRESS: REPUBLICII AVENUE, NO. 1**  
**Târgu Jiu, Gorj**  
**Tel: 0253/218222**

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## THE FAILURE OF LIBERALISM IN NADINE GORDIMER'S OCCASION FOR LOVING

Cătălin TECUCIANU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

BY THE BEGINNING OF THE 1960S THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE WAS UNDERGOING MAJOR CHANGES WHICH AIMED AT ENFORCING FURTHER RESTRICTIONS ON THE BLACK, COLOURED AND INDIAN POPULATION. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF CRUCIAL DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN THE MID-1950S AND EARLY 1960S – OUT OF WHICH TWO STAND OUT AS BEING THE MOST IMPORTANT - THAT HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE RESPONSES OF GORDIMER'S NOVELS FROM THE 1960S. THUS, THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO ANALYZE THE NOVELIST'S FICTIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVENTS AFFECTING SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1960S AND THE WAY IN WHICH SPACE/PLACE IS NOW SEEN AND REPRESENTED IN *OCCASION FOR LOVING* (1963).

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**KEYWORDS:** LIBERALISM, IDENTITY, APARTHEID, SOUTH AFRICA, SPACE.

### INTRODUCTION

The dominant ideology of multi-racialism proposed and used by the broad opposition to apartheid in the 1950s was in the new decade far less assured than it had been earlier. With the secession of the Africanist segment of the ANC and the founding of the Pan-Africanist Congress in April 1959, the assumptions of multi-racialism were now put to question. The PAC were fierce adversaries of this ideology which they believed served as a means to multiply racialism; as far as they were concerned oppression in South Africa was in fact a national oppression of the black indigenous majority by a white settler minority. As a result, resistance should also be national, by Africans for themselves, against the white.

*Occasion for Loving* responds in an interesting fashion to the realities of this challenge by acknowledging a basic legitimacy to the PAC claims. "What's the good of our friendship or her love [to him]?"<sup>2</sup>, says the novel's white protagonist after a love affair between a black friend and a white Englishwoman has proved disastrous for the former. Gideon's fate at the end of the novel makes it clear that, not only are whites incapable of providing any real support for blacks, but they can also make the situation worse. In this respect, *Occasion for Loving* represents "a moment of profound transition as a dominant

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<sup>1</sup> PhD Candidate, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iași. catalin.tecucianu@gmail.com.

<sup>2</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 313.

oppositional philosophy broke under the strains of its own assumptions”<sup>3</sup>, and as it prepared to take up the next. This novel marks the decisive end, for Gordimer, of the success (if there ever was any) of multi-racialism and denounces the liberal’s ‘fence-sitting position’. At last, the answer to her 1959 essay, “Where do Whites Fit In?” was bitterly confirmed: “nowhere”.

The second and more important event that occurred during the writing of the novel was the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 which made quite clear the futility of peaceful resistance to the apartheid regime and marked the transition to a climate in which opposition could only be expressed through acts of violence. On March 21<sup>st</sup>, 1960 at one of the townships near Johannesburg called Sharpeville, 67 PAC demonstrators were killed and 186 were wounded after the police started shooting at the peaceful mob gathered in front of the police station. This event, more than any other, marked the transition from one world to another. The transition from peaceful resistance to violent confrontation had been made and the old assumptions of a moral struggle and inter-racial solidarity, no longer appeared to have much validity.

Gordimer had moved in circles of intellectual opposition in the 1950s, particularly the circle surrounding the Johannesburg magazine *Drum*; she had been involved in the activities of the 1950s which created a hopeful climate of multi-racial cooperation. In the new climate, however, the notion of multi-racial opposition appeared naïve: racially motivated state violence drew a stark line which necessitates the pursuit of black freedom by blacks for blacks. Cultural oppression was an intrinsic part of this attack; all the writers associated with *Drum* found themselves in one way or another being driven to exile. To Gordimer, this was “an incredible time when ... almost everyone I knew was in jail or fleeing.”<sup>4</sup> which brought about a deep solitude.

## ARGUMENTATION

Gordimer’s third novel came to life in a world entirely unrecognizable from that of the earlier work, and the series of dramatic political and social changes at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s means that the assumptions of the previous decade could no longer remain unquestioned. Almost four years after the publication of *A World of Strangers*, in May 1962 Gordimer’s publishers received her latest manuscript for a new novel which would be entitled *Occasion for Loving*; she would later call it “a piece of work with which I began to be a real novelist”<sup>5</sup>.

Gordimer’s third novel voices her discontent with liberal strategies of opposing apartheid, and for achieving black liberation. As Gordimer herself declares in one interview:

It’s about liberals and (...) the attempt of people to apply a personal standard of values, to oppose it to the social set-up within which they live: in this case, liberals who have no color feeling and who don’t really mind the color-bar, who decide that within their private lives they will live the way they want to live, the decent way. I’ve tried to show how this works out in conflict with the situation here, and whether, indeed, it can be successful (...) As it works out in the novel, it’s a failure.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 89.

<sup>4</sup> Nadine Gordimer, quoted in Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside*, 75.

<sup>5</sup> Ronald Suresh Roberts, *No Cold Kitchen: A Biography of Nadine Gordimer* (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2005), 256.

<sup>6</sup> Nancy Topping Bazin & Marilyn Dallman Seymour (eds), *Conversations with Nadine Gordimer* (Mississippi: Mississippi University Press, 1990), 26.

The novel also conveys, as Dominic Head argues, “a burgeoning sense of the positive potential of black African roots in South Africa, and this amounts to a preliminary sketch of how a black political mobilization – based on a shared history – might be brought about.”<sup>7</sup>

The story revolves around a white South-African family, the Stilwells, and their relationship with an English couple that comes to live with them, Boaz and Ann Davis. The Stilwells are convinced liberals who do not agree with South African apartheid and live their life as though the color barrier did not exist. In some ways they convince themselves they exist outside the system – their home is open to anyone, they travel freely to the townships and work within the political parties that are actively fighting against the apartheid system – and this is their way of believing they have kept their own integrity intact. Through the Stilwells, Ann Davis meets Gideon Shibalo, a black painter and a friend of the family. The two start a cross-racial affair which will call into question the Stilwell’s commitment to the black cause and expose the absurdity of apartheid laws which have the power to bring to a halt friendships and even love.

As we have seen so far, there was a new mood flowing in the social and political air of South Africa at the end of the 1950s. In stark contrast to the optimism and defiance that characterized the mid-1950s, there was now an increasing awareness that the spirit of Nkosi’s “fabulous decade” was departing clearing the ground for something new. Ironically, Lewis Nkosi is also the one who characterized the end of the era, particularly by referring to the future of mixed love affairs, which represented the true embodiments of multi-racialism and its success. In the new light of the age, these affairs now became only “nightmares of worry and effort to have some privacy”:

English or European girls who had no clear conception of the legal restraints and the risk such affairs entailed, arrived in the country, made impossible demands, assuming, for the most commendable reasons, that if you liked one another that was all that counted.<sup>8</sup>

Referring directly to the liberal socializing that had been a trademark of the 1950s, Verwoerd, the ‘architect’ of apartheid, had declared that he would use an ‘iron hand’ to do away with this subversion of state policy. Generally speaking, the inter-racial world of Johannesburg found itself watched very closely, undermined and at times even hunted, as pieces of legislation continued to separate the races in various social fields. Thus, the Native Laws Amendment Act and the Group Areas Amendment Act, both passed in 1957, were specifically designed to target multi-racial contact in white areas in the fields of religion, education, health, recreation and entertainment.

The already few liberals who were able to keep their seats in Parliament under the fatally illiberal terms did so without ever successfully challenging the core of apartheid, which was the denial of universal adult voting rights. They accepted it as a working reality. These parliamentary liberals, vapidly talking of “opportunity” while actively denying blacks the vote, were only polishing the chains of the oppressed, argued the liberation movements. Gordimer describes them:

Nothing more than a sort of ‘parliamentary’ sincerity, if you know what I mean – no real, deeply felt indignation, but only the raise-finger gestures that stand for it, no flow of any sort of strength from these people promising to fight, and fight again, and still fight (...) What added the final touch was that, as usual, even when someone on the platform was thundering about freedom

<sup>7</sup> Dominic Head, *Nadine Gordimer* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 62.

<sup>8</sup> Nadine Gordimer, quoted in Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 76.



for 'non-whites', and we were all applauding our little hands off, and the Nat hooligans were yelling abuse, there wasn't a black man in the place to see his life being arranged for him, to receive championship or abuse ... The inevitable unreality about everything we whites do in this country. There's something ghostly about it.<sup>9</sup>

As a result, liberalism became "a dirty word in Africa"<sup>10</sup> and its almost inexistent power to change the life of the people they claimed to represent was exposed. This is the event that gave Gordimer a new theme – "the decline of liberalism, black and white, that has proved itself hopelessly inadequate to an historical situation"<sup>11</sup>. It is this historic juncture that gave rise to the preoccupations in *Occasion for Loving*, the mood of which is mostly elegiac.

Using this both personal and collective trauma as the starting point, Gordimer turns it into a political metaphor and investigates the liberals' commitment to their creed and the relation between love and power. She sketches the white protagonist, Jessie Stilwell, around her own childhood experience; thus the novel offers a stunning similarity between Gordimer's years of adolescence and Jessie's. Tom and Jessie Stilwell are a happily-married liberal couple who keep an open house and are entirely dedicated to maintain the integrity of personal relations against the distortions of law and society. Their condition is that of most white liberals: they are kind hearted and willing to help anyone if the situation arises.

For the most part of the novel, Jessie goes through a process of introspection, renegotiating the terms of her existence by reevaluating the past; to put it differently, she is facing an identity crisis and, as a result, is in search of a new identity:

Like many people, Jessie had known a number of different, clearly defined, immediate presents, and as each of these phases of her life had closed by being replaced with another, it had lost reality for her; she no longer had it with her. The ribbon of her identity was always that which was being played out between her fingers; there was no coil of it continuing from the past. I was; I am: these were not two different tenses, but two different people.<sup>12</sup>

Like Gordimer, young Jessie was home-schooled, on the alleged reason of an inexistent heart illness, deprived of any physical activity and sheltered in a state of dependence by her unhappily married mother, against the latter's European husband, Bruno Fuecht. Jessie left her mother's house only to marry a young soldier who died during the war, not before leaving her pregnant. As a result, "she lived on her own – with the baby, of course – for the first time in her life, and worked and travelled for a few years before she met, and finally married, Tom Stilwell."<sup>13</sup>

Driven by her strange and difficult relation to her son from a previous marriage, Morgan, Jessie attempts to reconstruct her past, a process which runs parallel with her husband Tom's attempts to write a history of Africa, from the "black point of view"<sup>14</sup> or from the "historical point of view"<sup>15</sup> as he considers it, which will present the African people as a

<sup>9</sup> Nadine Gordimer, quoted in Ronald Suresh Roberts, *No Cold Kitchen: A Biography of Nadine Gordimer* (Johannesburg: STE Publishers, 2005), 163

<sup>10</sup> Nadine Gordimer, quoted in Nancy Topping Bazin & Marilyn Dallman Seymour (eds), *Conversations with Nadine Gordimer* (Mississippi: Mississippi University Press, 1990), 93.

<sup>11</sup> Nadine Gordimer, quoted in Ronald Suresh Roberts, *No Cold Kitchen: A Biography of Nadine Gordimer*, 358.

<sup>12</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 20.

<sup>13</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 22.

<sup>14</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 10.

<sup>15</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 10.

historical subject in their own right, rather than as a subset of a Eurocentric history.

He had been at work for two years, collecting notes for a history he hoped to write – a history of the African subcontinent that would present the Africans as people invaded by the white West, rather than as another kind of fauna dealt with by the white man in his exploration of the world.<sup>16</sup>

Tom's intention relies on the belief that a disinterested perspective, which will formulate an objective rendering of history to record black experience in Africa, can be achieved. But the fact is that a white person, who has been a tool of oppression, writing the history, makes the notion of objectivity uncertain. What is significant about Tom is that through him Gordimer reveals that her conception of South African history has changed. Although in her previous novels she had included, to varying degrees, a black component, history there was dominantly portrayed as being white. In *Occasion for Loving*, however, Gordimer acknowledges for the first time that "the ultimate current of history in South African past, present and future is black, and not white: that the latter is a subset of the former"<sup>17</sup>. This change in national identity and space – South Africa is a country of blacks, not of whites anymore – brings along new types of identity that are ready to surface.

The most important features of the novel's interest in liberalism and humanism are presented through the love affair that also forms the core of the novel: an intimate relationship between the black artist, Gideon Shibalo, and a white English woman, Ann Davis, who has arrived with her husband, David Boaz, to stay with the Stillwells in Johannesburg. This love affair ultimately fails from the inside and the reason why it fails is even more important than the fact that it does so. No external sanctions are needed to destroy Ann and Gideon's relationship; on the contrary, these sanctions have become internalized. As an outsider who arrives to South Africa with no understanding of its human complications, Ann absorbs the obsessions and fears into the matrix of her own personality. Having fled into the countryside once with Gideon, the two lovers make plans to leave the country. But Ann cannot cope with the implications of loving a black man. In a moment of panic she suddenly leaves with her husband instead, while Gideon is left to become wreckage.

The break in communication between the white and the black characters is a theme that is taken rather frequently in Gordimer's early fiction. From the beginning in *Occasion for Loving*, Jessie is aware of the power of apartheid to break and pull people apart from each other. Hence, when Boaz talks to her about his ambition to work freely in Africa, Jessie questions him to clarify whether he wishes to work with the Africans "without hurting them" or "without being hurt by them" or "without responsibility"<sup>18</sup>. Jessie knows that the fascination of the white community with the African world is short-lived: "Ah, Tom, don't ask me to postulate it. We don't see black and white so we all think we behave as decently to one colour face as another. But how can that ever be, so long that there's the possibility that you can escape back into your filthy damn whiteness? How do you know you'll always play fair?"<sup>19</sup>

The life for the black and his white liberal friend in South Africa has reached a crisis. In 1959 there was a great debate going on in white liberal circles over the Extension of Universities Bill, which was being promulgated to exclude blacks from white universities and send them off to various tribal colleges. As an academic and a convinced liberal, Tom is very

<sup>16</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 9-10.

<sup>17</sup> Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 78.

<sup>18</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 12.

<sup>19</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 312.

interested in this matter but the thoughts and impressions he collects from the blacks around him make him realize that there is a deep mistrust in the goodwill of the whites' actions. On his way to a meeting to discuss the Universities Bill, a black man tells him he can "fight over this business" if he wants "but don't think that anything you do really matters. Some of you make laws, and some of you try to change them. And you don't ask us". This is some distance from the general image of blacks presented in Gordimer's previous novels which shows that a significant change of tone has been registered; liberalism is on the wane.

Without the power to change anything on the public scene, the white liberal exercises his politics in personal relations, which leads to absurd effects and ridiculous situations. Thus, the liberal Jew and cheated husband, David Boaz, responds with staggering tolerance, even friendliness, towards the man who is having an affair with his wife, for the simple reason that the latter is black. Even in his jealousy, Ann's husband is unable to intervene in the affair between his wife and Gideon because "inbred patterns of guilt and consequent overcompensation have the effect of reducing him to paralysis"<sup>20</sup>. Ironically, however, Boaz ends up taking advantage of Gideon's skin by refusing to treat him "like any other man" because "Gideon isn't a man, won't be, can't be, until he's free."<sup>21</sup> And the worst part is that "Gideon knows it"<sup>22</sup>, as Jessie points out. Just as Jessie's shaking hands with Jason at the end of her holiday leaves the poor black servant confused, Ann and Boaz's goodwill treatment of Gideon takes him nowhere but to a secluded life away from the white world. Thus the novel explores the political power of intimate relations and shows how the state political powers define the limits of personal desire by such acts as a law against miscegenation:

A line in a statute book has more authority than the claims of one man's love or another's. All claims of natural feeling are over-ridden alike by a line in a statute book that takes no account of humanness, that recognizes neither love nor respect nor jealousy nor rivalry nor compassion nor hate - nor any human attitude where there are black and white together. What Boaz felt towards Ann; what Gideon felt towards Ann, what Ann felt about Boaz, what she felt for Gideon - all this that was real and rooted in life was void before the clumsy words that reduced the delicacy and towering complexity of living to a race theory . . .<sup>23</sup>

The love relation between Ann and Gideon is doomed from the start not because of some external reason, but because the repressions of apartheid have become psychologically inscribed. In this regard, as Clingman observes, "it is the prestructuring effects of apartheid that count"<sup>24</sup>. Apartheid has the power to penetrate to the most intimate of human relationships and even Tom and Jessie who were witnesses to this love affair and in their liberal humanistic attitude had promoted it, are forced to acknowledge its inherent failure:

They believed in the integrity of personal relations against the distortion of law and society. What stronger and more proudly personal bond was there than love? Yet between lovers they had seen blackness count, the personal return inevitably to the social, the private to the political. There was no recess of being, no emotion so private that white privilege did not single you out there; it was a silver spoon clamped between your jaws and you might choke

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 83.

<sup>21</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 312.

<sup>22</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 271.

<sup>23</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 246.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Clingman, *The Novels of Nadine Gordimer: History from the Inside* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), 82.

on it for all the chance there was dislodging it. So long as the law remained unchanged, nothing could bring integrity to personal relationships.<sup>25</sup>

As far as they are concerned, this is also a failure of their liberal beliefs:

The Stilwell's code of behaviour towards people was definitive, like their marriage; they could not change it. But they saw that it was a failure, in danger of humbug. Tom began to think there would be more sense in blowing up a power station; but it would be Jessie who would help someone to do it, perhaps, in time.<sup>26</sup>

The humanist autonomy that had been a success in 'a world of strangers' is found to be obsolete and lacking in an 'occasion for loving'. This discovery is a shattering one: in so far as liberal humanism is rooted in a belief in the incorruptibility and infinite social premise of authentic human relationships, in a contrary realization such as this, the premises of its existence are swept away.

It is painful for Jessie to see Gideon drunk with the impression after his "experience of the disastrous love affair" with Ann that every white woman is "a bitch". In his state of drunkenness Gideon only perceives the Jessie's skin colour and not her identity. One white is substitutable for another, and the point is that relations between Gideon and Jessie have become totally impersonal. Jessie loses Gideon's company as a family friend, thus revealing the failure of personal relations against the distortion of laws and society in which people live in South Africa:

When Jessie saw Gideon again, he clearly had no memory of what he had said to her. They continued to meet in a friendly fashion, sometimes in the Lucky Star, occasionally at the houses of friends, but the sense of his place in the Stilwells' life and theirs in his that she felt that night never came again. So long as Gideon did not remember, Jessie could not forget.<sup>27</sup>

This attitude leads to the creation of a wall, a barrier that separates Jessie and Gideon in their relationships with each other. For Jessie, now, to be anti-social is a failure, but to be socially engaged is impossible. This enforces, once again, the idea that there can be no triumphs of consciousness in South Africa, no victory of personal relationships.

It is for the first time that one of Gordimer's novels ends in paralyzing irony. It is also for the first time that one of her novels expresses the acute alienation of an incapacitated white consciousness. Much of this can be put on the extraordinary force with which historical events struck at the end of the 1950s. Dismantled from the body of opposition that had disappeared both socially and politically, this paralysis and irony is the most powerful inner illumination of the destruction of the common assumptions of the previous decade. And ideologically, the most significant thing about the novel is by consequence a question of absence. For if the failure of the love affair marks the end of liberal humanism, Gordimer has been unable to put anything else in its place.

All in all, *Occasion for Loving* represents a moment of profound transition as a dominant oppositional philosophy broke under the strains of its own assumptions. In this way, the novel brings to a close the inner history of liberal humanism in the 1950s and early 1960s. Gordimer has finally exhausted humanism as a discourse: all the hopes of it were centered in Jessie Stilwell, and what she records is their futility in the face of apartheid.

<sup>25</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 321.

<sup>26</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 321.

<sup>27</sup> Nadine Gordimer, *Occasion for Loving* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), 332.

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## THE COST OF LIFE IN ROMANIA DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD<sup>1</sup>

Crucița-Loredana BACIU<sup>2</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*THE TOP ONE PRIORITY FOR EVERY HOUSEHOLD IN EVERY TIME WAS TO ACHIEVE AS MANY RESOURCES AS NEEDED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FOOD IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A CERTAIN LEVEL OF COMFORT FOR ITS MEMBERS. THIS LEVEL OF COMFORT WASN'T THE SAME THROUGH HISTORY. IT WAS INFLUENCED BY THE ECONOMY AND BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA. IN ROMANIA, IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD, AN INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS TOOK PLACE. THIS PROCESS NEEDED WORKERS; MOST OF THEM RECENTLY ARRIVED INTO THE CITY, FROM THE NEAREST VILLAGES. THIS PHENOMENON AFFECTED THE NATURAL ECONOMY. THE WAGES WERE LOW; THE PRICES WERE HIGH, ESPECIALLY INSIDE BIG CITIES.*

*WHAT WAS THE COST OF DAILY LIFE IN ROMANIAN'S CITIES? WERE THE SALARIES HIGH ENOUGH TO ASSURE THE RESOURCES NECESSARIES TO FAMILIES' SURVIVAL? WHAT FOODSTUFFS WERE CONSIDERED ESSENTIALS? THOSE ARE THE CORE QUESTIONS THAT WE INTEND TO ANSWER DURING THE STUDY USING PRESS AS MAIN SOURCE.*

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**KEY WORDS:** *ECONOMY, ALIMENTATION, PRICES, FOODSTUFF, WAGES.*

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### INTRODUCTION

Primary human needs, those that bind tightly to his survival are those related to food. This was the main concern of all times. The famous frescoes of Lascaux, depicting the act of hunting, illustrates perhaps the most eloquent this aspiration towards food security. During late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, man has adapted by finding new and different food resources, but neither of them failed to ensure survival during times of famine. The triumph of the latter may be considered that it took place in the twentieth century, despite the two great periods of shortages during the First and the Second World War. The triumph as we defined it, not necessarily depends on the harvest collected and reared, but rather to the capacity to produce money, the object of the exchange on the world's market. The end of the 19th century brought with it a wide development of transport and food preservation methods, which determined the use of foodstuff even if they have been obtained on other continents.

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<sup>1</sup> The research is financed by European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013, Contract: 159/1.5/S/137832, "Minerva – Cooperation for elite carriers in doctoral and post-doctoral research".

<sup>2</sup> PHD student at Babeș-Bolyai University, Doctoral School „History, Culture, Civilization”, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, e-mail address: loredanabaciu26@yahoo.com.

This unprecedented development, industrialization and alongside the development of cities has led to rethinking the idea of famine, due to a lack of financial resources.

In exchange for daily bread, the man of the twentieth century, living in a town, didn't sow or harvest, but worked in the factory, in public institutions or private ones, being properly remunerated for its work. This remuneration ensured him a minimum of comfort, allowing him to sustain his family, assuring them food and clothing.

In Romania, in the interwar period, due to the low rate of industrialization, natural surplus and excessive migration into the city, to achieve the ideal of comfort becomes an aspiration more than an accomplishment. An employee's salary only reached to ensure monthly family's food, other needs being often ignored.

In this study we aim to follow the indicators of economic life that have an immediate impact on living standards in urban society in the interwar period in Romania (food prices of essentials and the relationship between the latter and the wages paid by employers, the quality of food, the link between quality and price and speculation with food). We considered relevant the journalistic usage; in this case, the newspapers "Gazeta Transilvaniei", "Telegraful Roman", "Clujul" and „Buletinul Camerei de Comert si Industrie Cluj” were the favorite sources. The choice of these four papers out of over 1 000 registered in the interwar period is not coincidental. Each of them represents one of the great cities of Transylvania, Braşov, Sibiu and Cluj, they had a tradition of decades and within their pages relevant information to our research were find.

## MAIN TEXT

### I. SALARIES DURING THE INTERWAR PERIOD

In 1920, the Ministry of Labor has set up employment Offices in every town-center of each County. These offices became necessary due to the demand for personnel of the new factories and the requests for jobs coming from those leaving their native village in favor of industrialized city. Due to the natural surplus, work force throughout the period has exceeded the number of jobs available. The figures provided by the national statistics are telling in this regard (Scurtu, I, 2003). Wages offered, viewed in relation to the prices of food essentials, are quite small.<sup>3</sup> This holds in particular for poor productivity of the newly established industry, but also on hand surplus in relation to the offer. Thus, in 1923 it varied between 300 and 1350 lei. At the base of the hierarchy were guard agents, housekeepers, day laborers and caregivers, midwives, and at the top of the hierarchy- pharmacists, physicians and heads of Office.<sup>4</sup> Because the meat price varied between 16 and 38 lei and the bread's between 5 and 10 lei, 300 lei, the lowest salary, wasn't enough to assure family nutrition not even for a week. It should be noted, however, that the timetable was still not covered, and the work of women, a novelty from the social point of view, was significantly undervalued.

A few years later, in 1927, wages seem to have increased remarkably, ranging between 2 500 and 4 000 lei.

An investigation of Veturia Manuila, held in December 1927 shows us what it meant in terms of food, a modest budget and a richer one. If modest income allowed the hostess to acquire 2 liters of milk daily and monthly 30 kg of flour, 4 kg of fat, 2 kg of butter, 2 kilograms of rice, two kilograms of lentils, 70 eggs, 4 kg of meat, various vegetables and oranges, rich income allowed the purchase, in addition, of a quantity of 6 kg of sugar,  $\frac{3}{4}$  kg

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<sup>3</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome LXXXVI, 1922, no. 125 and 152, 2 showed that the price of meat was 16 to 38 lei and the price of bread was 5 to 10 lei. A 300 lei wage could only cover the bread expenses for a month.

<sup>4</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome LXXXVI, 1922, no 23, 4.

coffee, 4 kg of Frank (coffee substitute), a double quantity of rice and lentils. These purchases were worth 2 610, respectively 3 136 lei.<sup>5</sup>

Distributing the quantities given in 30 days of consumption we observed that a usual diet was composed of an average of: a 1 kg of bread daily, 133, 3 gr of lard, 66, 6 gr of butter, 2,3 eggs, 133,3 g of meat, 200 g of sugar, 25 g of coffee and 133,3 of Frank. A menu not too rich, as we can tell today, but these were the conditions in which the workers and officials lived in the years of economic development's peak of Romania and represents a true breakthrough in relation to the figures set out above for the year 1923.

During the great depression those wage values have dropped significantly. Civil servants have seen their salaries reduced by 25%, and those working in the private sector were just happy that they haven't lost their job. Accepting that the maximum salary for a civil servant was up to the amount of 3 500 lei, after applying wage decreases of it, remained with a remuneration of 2,600 lei, which they only received when the money entered in the budget of the State, this meant even a delay of three months.

After 1933, the salaries reached and exceeded the amounts before 1930, allowing a certain comfort to workers and officials.

## II. PRICES OF FOOD ESSENTIALS

The price of a foodstuff in relation to the salary or other foodstuff prices, reflect the status enjoyed by it on its market outlets, its degree of use and measures taken by the authorities to adjust the price/quality ratio.

Given that the sources taken into account by us do not reflect the entire outlet in the country and that it had in the viewfinder only than foodstuff whose price is relevant for society as a whole, we refer in this study only at the prices of basic foodstuffs, such as perceived then. Thus, the foodstuffs whose prices were reported in the pages of the newspapers were: bread, meat, milk and sugar. The inclusion of sugar in this category is not accidental. Its popularization and its cheapening in, along with some social measures have led to its takeover of especially poor strata of society who saw in it the ideal food, offering a great deal of energy in relation to its quantity.

### THE BREAD

Country with an extensive grain crop, Romania founded its diet on carbohydrates obtained from cereals: bread was the foundation of the city's food and polenta in the villages. Thus, of all the foods mentioned in the newspapers, bread stands out, being frequently mentioned in terms of its price, its variations due to the conditions of the free market, or to regulations of local authorities, etc.

Following its price, we can see that it varies according to the grain harvest of the previous year and the year to which we relate. Immediately after harvesting, the price dropped until it gradual climbed in winter, reaching a peak in the summer of the next year. High prices of bread were determined also by the massive grain exports to Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Thus, the bread could be purchased with rates ranging between 5 and 18 lei. Purchase variants were: white bread, wholemeal and brown. The difference between the purchase price of the white and brown bread was always up to 2 lei, with a few exceptions when the difference dropped to a leu or increased at 4-6 lei.

The prices curve, as we described it above, with a low price in the autumn and a high toward summer, it can be observed in 1925 (the maximum price for bread was originally set

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<sup>5</sup> Veturia Manuilă, „O anchetă socială”, in *Buletin Eugenic și Biopolitic*, tome. I, 1927, no 12, 370-374.



to be 9 lei brown bread, 11 wholemeal bread and 18 lei white bread, the price dropped after evaluating the new harvest at 9 lei brown bread, 11 lei wholemeal bread and 13 lei white bread), 1935 (initial maximum prices were between 7,5-9,5 lei and they dropped to 7 or 9 lei) and 1937 (initial maximum price were between 8.5 and 10.5 lei, they decreases to 7.5 and 9.5 lei).

This curve of prices has not always taken this form. Bad harvests caused by floods, frost and hail have overturned it. Year 1924 is eloquent in this matter; it begins with rates starting at 5 lei for brown bread, 9 lei for wholemeal bread and 10 lei for the white one. A few months later, prices rise slightly to 11 lei wholemeal bread and to 13 lei for white bread. Later on, the wholemeal bread could be bought for 13.5 lei and the white one for 14.5 lei. The peak was reached in the autumn. Then, the prices were 15 lei for wholemeal bread and 16 lei for white bread.

In the third decade the average price of brown bread was 8.18 lei, the wholemeal one of 11.11 lei, while the white bread rate was 12.57. The next decade brought a substantial change: cheapening off and removing the wholemeal bread. The average prices recorded were 7.42 lei for brown bread and 9.57 lei for white bread. What should be noted is that throughout the crisis, prices for bread were not published, but only the changes that they were suffering.

With regard to the bread's regulation, we note that at the beginning of the third decade, we had to deal with three kinds of wares covered by the maximum prices: brown bread, wholemeal bread and white. In 1925, white bread was replaced by loaf for which there wasn't a recommended maximum price, and in 1932, to ease the life of Romanian citizens the Government has decided to allow the mills to extract no more than two types of flour from wheat: bread flour and pastry flour, each being used according to the technique of extraction. Therefore, from the bread flour only bread could be obtained, when from the bakery, croissants, rolls and baguette could be baked.<sup>6</sup>

Returning to the price problem, we must note that these were imposed by municipalities, without interference of the central authorities. This way it could be explained the price differences between the various cities of the country. The only intervention of the government in the issue of price of bread was materialized in the Law for the Suppression, the Supplement and the Amendment of some articles of the Law for the Recovery of Agricultural Production. Through this law, the Government imposed a tax stamp for bread: values in excess of 200 g for white bread, 250 g for loaf, 700 g for whole meal bread, 500 g loaf of special recipe (graham, rye), and 500 -1000 g brown bread).<sup>7</sup> The role of this stamp duty was to ensure the funds needed for the aids designed by the Government to be granted to farmers to facilitate exports of cereals. Its amount was ranged between 0.5 and 1.5 lei depending on the type of bread and it had to be paid by bakeries, not by the final consumer. The price's development, however, show us that this tax was reflected in the trading price of the most important staple food.<sup>8</sup> Exception to this tax was imposed only for those who prepared the dough for bread at home and just baked into bakeries. Stamp duty was maintained also in 1932, but its amount was changed.<sup>9</sup> Thus, for wheat bread a fee of 1 lei stamp was charged, for the others 0, 50 lei.<sup>10</sup> Neither the press nor economic history studies consulted do not mention this fee after 1932, therefore we cannot determine exactly when it

<sup>6</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCV, 1932, no. 90, 4.

<sup>7</sup> *Buletinul Camerei de Comerț și Industrie Cluj*, tome X, 1931, no 1, 12.

<sup>8</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCIV, 1931, no. 76, 4.

<sup>9</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCIX, 1931, no. 112, 6.

<sup>10</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCX, 1932, no. 90, 4.

was taken out, it is certain that the price of bread has undergone substantial declines in the years immediately following the economic crisis of 1929-1933.

Regarding to the manufacture of this foodstuff during the crisis, "Gazeta Transilvaniei" published in the issue 102 of 1931 some complaints of the consumers. They were coming from the unemployed persons who benefit of the state's aid consisting of bread, meat, lard, soap, sugar, wood and others. The bread that they offered was the worst quality, because the very next day it caught mold and got sour.<sup>11</sup>

White wheat bread, recently baked is considered to be the symbol of the opposition between rural and urban space. Taking into account the price of bread in line with the salary level of the time, we can find that white wheat bread was to be the preserve for a luxury dinner or celebrations. The ordinary worker couldn't afford it every day.<sup>12</sup>

### THE MEAT

Another symbol of the otherness from rural to urban space is the meat, in particular fresh meat. This foodstuff was to be found very rarely on the tables on rural environment. In urban areas, due to the variety existing on the market and its prices steadily dropping to adjustment to a new era, the consumption of this foodstuff was much more popular. With regard to its outlet on the market, one could find it as: first class beef (muscle coming from the lower limbs of the calves) and class II (muscles coming from the upper limbs of the calves), roast beef, beef, mutton, pork (with or without bone and fat), lard and bacon.

Fixing prices for meat and sausage was the prerogative of an Association of butchers, consisting of all the butchers who worked in a town. Although prices were settled in the plenary, there have been rare cases in which its members have violated the provisions of the set and have marketed the products at higher prices. These cases were brought to the attention of the public by the gazettes and punished both by the Association and the City Hall.<sup>13</sup>

None of the sources cited treat the problem of poultry. It is recalled how poultry was sold on the market and its price, but the butchers weren't selling this assortment of meat. As regards to fish, this sort of meat is remembered occasionally, especially during the Christian abstinence when, due to the increasing market demand, we've recorded a more or less pronounced price increase. A superficial analysis of meat's prices reveals that animal fat was much appreciated. Pork meat with fat has long been the most appreciated meat, being rated as a peak value. Also, bacon and lard were marketed with a three-fold price asked for a kilo of beef.

Beef, both with regard to its trading price, and that popularity in its time, was to be found in the wealthy menus and in the weekly ration of workers. The price for beef of second quality has varied between 11 and 36 lei; the minimum price was reached in 1935, and the peak in 1927 and 1940. With regard to beef of high quality, its price has seen important changes too, enrolling for a maximum of 16 and 42 lei recorded in 1935 and 1940. The average price per kilogram for low quality meat was 22, 09 lei, and for the superior quality - 30 lei.

The price of veal is much higher than that of beef, and let us understands that it was enjoying a high prestige. Thus, the price of a kilo of calf ranged between 26 and 46 lei, while the average price per kilogram was 32 lei, with 2 lei more expensive than a kilo of high-quality beef. Mutton has not enjoyed a great popularity among the townspeople, was considered to be of lower quality meat. In rural areas, it was consumed during the autumn

<sup>11</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCIX, 1931, no. 102, 1.

<sup>12</sup> Alina Șuta-Bogățean, „Habitat și alimentație în societatea rurală românească din Transilvania de la Revoluția Pașoptistă la Marea Unire din 1918”, (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut, 2012), 263.

<sup>13</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome LXXXV, 1922, no. 74, 4

when the barren sheep and rams were cut off, being preserved only by transforming into pemmican. Its trading price is consistent with the prestige it enjoyed. Thus, in Braşov, Sibiu and Cluj, a kilo of mutton cost between 16 and 28 lei. The minimum was reached in 1923 and in 1927 the peak. The average price per kilogram was 19, 42 lei.

As regards pork meat, we can strongly affirm that has been the most appreciated variety until late, in the 20th century. The appreciation is due to the fat contained, capable of supporting body substance in heavy working conditions. The price of it reflects those set out above. Thus, a kilo of pork cost between 26 and 56 lei, the maximum prices was attained in 1935 and 1927. A differentiation can be made: pork is marketed in two versions: the quality I and II. The average price achieved per kilogram for the first quality pork meat was 46 lei, and for the quality second of 39, 33 lei.

Bacon sold in the butcher's shops in the inter-war period was also classified into raw bacon and smoked bacon. The price for raw bacon was generally lower than that for the smoked bacon. Thus, the raw bacon was market with a price range between 46 and 50 lei per kilogram, and the smoked with a price of 52-54 lei per kilogram. Lard was marketed with a price ranging between 48-58 lei, and fat with 70-74 lei.

Ham's price was 130 lei per kilogram in 1931 according to the report of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Cluj, and sausages could be purchased at the price of 60 lei per kilo according to the same source.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the low pay and harsh conditions of existence, workers, whatever was their profession, they bought monthly a variable quantity of meat, if not for their own consumption, at least for meals that felt compelled to organize or for a particularly menu on Sundays. Slowly, the meat started to be considered an ordinary food and not a luxury. In support of this claim we bring the list of foodstuff provided as aids for the unemployed during the crisis. The menu had invariably contained a quantity of meat. The food offered at the unemployed canteen contained 250 grams of fat and 500 grams of meat.<sup>15</sup>

## THE MILK

G. Constantinescu appreciated that the average consumption of milk in the 1930s on the whole territory of Romania was 120 ml of milk per capita, unevenly spread. The area in which was consumed a higher quantity of milk was, according to the author, the Western cities of Timisoara and Oradea-Mare, and areas with a low consumption of milk were the southern and eastern slopes. The lowest milk consumption values have been registered in the city of Constanţa.<sup>16</sup> Prof. Dr. Constatinescu went further and presented in his article the average consumption, in 1940, in the main cities of the country. Thus, the highest milk consumption is recorded at Oradea (350 g/capita), Timişoara and Cernauti (300 g/capita), while the lowest values were recorded in Bucharest and Iaşi (100 g/capita). Cluj occupied a median position with an average consumption of 260 g/capita.

The figures offered, broadly sketch the popularity of milk during that period. If at the country side this foodstuff is considered to be a staple food, especially for children, in the cities, the figures show us a completely different situation. Experts recommend a daily intake of 500 ml of milk for adults, which was rarely purchased and consumed. This situation is caused by its price, as reflected in the press.

The price of this staple food was constant throughout the period, between 5 and 8 lei for cow's milk and 8-9 lei for the buffaloes, although in rural areas, the direct producers sold milk with a price of up to 3 lei per litter. Price increase is somewhat motivated by the costs of

<sup>14</sup> *Buletinul Camerei de Comerţ şi Industrie Cluj*, tome X, 1931, no. 1, 27.

<sup>15</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XCIII, 1930, no. 10, 3.

<sup>16</sup> G. Constantinescu, „Săptămâna Laptelui”, in *Revista de Igienă Socială*, tome II, 1932, mai, no 5, 380.

milk's pasteurization, especially in the conditions under which all medical studies, even the press insisted not to consume raw milk due to bacteria and dirt that might be contained in it.<sup>17</sup>

### THE SUGAR

The sugar, although it was not one of the staples of daily meal, didn't miss from the pages of newspapers. Its use was widespread in Europe and the Americas, barely at the beginning of the 18th century<sup>18</sup>. In Romania, it was considered until towards the end of the 19th century as a luxury food, being found only in shopping lists of the most prosperous. Its trading price was considered high, and its use was not so widespread as to be considered essential in a household. Veturia Manuila's survey completed in 1927, recalled sugar on shopping list only of those with a relatively high budget. His ascent may be made in connection with the intensive cultivation of sugar beet, but another of his propeller was its ability to sweeten foods without having to change the taste, which is why it has been used to sweeten drinks, coffee, tea and chocolate. Since the 1930s it was included in the list of aid offered to the unemployed and other persons in financial difficulty, and in 1934 the *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, discussing the increasing price of it, pities the poor who used this foodstuff combined with bread to feed their children, we consider it appropriate to include in the list of basic foods. In terms of price, we can consider it a relatively high, and remained so throughout the period, and his presence on the market is problematic.

In 1920, "*Gazeta Transilvaniei*" signaled a price of 16 lei for a kilo, although mentioning that the food had suffered a considerable increase from the 9.5 lei practiced until then<sup>19</sup>.

Four years later, the same newspaper indicated a price of 24-26 lei per kilogram, mentioning that his price leveled off with State interference in this issue.

The quantities produced in Romania, obtained from sugar beet crops were not enough, which is why towards the end of the third decade of the last century there were further increases up to the threshold of 38-41 lei. In 1931, the Chamber of Commerce and industry Cluj mentioned among the reference prices in the city the one for sugar that rises to 43 lei for a kilogram sold as cubes and 39 lei as granulated.<sup>20</sup>

The prices weren't maintained at these values though. During and immediately after the crisis, meanwhile the economic recovery one can notice a cheapening of this foodstuff up to threshold achieved in 1924.<sup>21</sup>

The importance of this foodstuff and the appreciation awarded to it by the society may be interpreted in the light of the state of nutrition of the population. One of the speeches held in the Chamber of Deputies on 19 March 1932 aims to convince that sugar is an important source of carbohydrates needed by the human body. Under the terms of the malnutrition, obvious at the majority of the citizens of Romania, the Deputy asked the Chamber to take action to reduce the price of sugar and to encourage the production or the import of a quantity sufficient to raise the nutritional level of the population.<sup>22</sup>

The speech of Deputy preoccupied with the state of nutrition of the people is not without merit. Sugar is a quick source of glucose, but one not exactly cheap and quite hard to find on the food market in the interwar period. Testimony in this regard is the letter received

<sup>17</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome C, 1937, no. 47, 2.

<sup>18</sup> 3.4. Kiple, K and Ornelas K C, „The Cambridge World History of Food”, [Online] Available at: <http://www.cambridge.org/us/books/kiple/sugar.htm>. (June, 29, 2014).

<sup>19</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome XXXIV, 1920, no. 83, 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Buletinul Camerei de Comerț și Industrie Cluj*, tome IX, 1931, 27.

<sup>21</sup> Sabin Manuila, „Statistica prețurilor. 1937”, (București: Institutului Central de Statistică, 1939), 158.

<sup>22</sup> Dr. S. Irimescu, „Probleme de igienă publică și de politică sanitară”, (București: Imprimeria Centrală, 1932), 19-21.

by Coriolan Suciu from his parents living in Ciugudul de Jos, in which they demand that "if you find some sugar in Blaj, send us at once".<sup>23</sup> The newspapers from different cities of the country also announced that there was no sugar on the market because it's produced and imported in an insufficient quantity and that the traders hide it to sell it more expensive.

"Gazeta Transilvaniei" deplores the situation of Temeswar in 1923. The city has come without resources of sugar, and the amount they wanted to import was stocked because a delay in transport occurred. It seemed that the city had a sufficient amount of sugar, but that wasn't offered for sale by the operators in order to raise prices. The city of Brasov hadn't had a better situation. Sugar resources here weren't sufficient, but the State decided to get involved in this issue, ordering substantial requisitions at the Bod factory. The amount requested was to be distributed to the townspeople in order to reduced prices.<sup>24</sup>

The number 52 of the same newspapers announced that from Netherlands were to be imported an amount of 450 carriages of refined sugar, incomplete, to be accomplished in Transylvania. Because the State has ordered substantial requisitions, Transylvanian factories decided not to process the sugar imported because they did not have security for their investment.<sup>25</sup>

To resolve the issue of sugar, both in terms of quantity and in terms of prices, the State has encouraged the cultivation of sugar beet. The authorities call to farmers has been played in the media and reiterated the years of the line, promising that the price will fall, and the food stuff will be purchased by representatives of all social classes.<sup>26</sup>

Officials, State workers with low wages, paid late and with low scores, benefit of certain measures taken to ease the way. Thus, for them, a provision was introduced, whereby paying in advance, immediately after sugar refining of it, it would be issued for the applicant, but at a reduced price. This measure facilitated not only the lives of officials, but also of the factory that benefit from the money for raw material processing. However, "Gazeta Transilvaniei" announced that a portion of the amount paid in advance by officials has disappeared, and that the factory refuses to issue the sugar for the ones who paid.<sup>27</sup>

In an attempt to reduce the price of a food that became more and more appreciated, researchers have made considerable efforts to develop new methods of extraction using other raw materials. One of these tests was published in "Cultura Poporului". Here, D Calugăreanu exhibits a much more efficient process for obtaining a large quantity of sugar using the sap of a Palm tree from the Philippines. The technique is similar to that of sugar cane production, using the juice made from the sap of the tree. (Călugăreanu, D, 1924)

"Telegraful Român" published an article alike, discussing of sugar wood. As set forth in article quoted, a doctor in London obtained 37 kg of sugar using 50 kg wooden bran. These two articles identified by us translate the acute need for cheapening of a first need food, considered a luxury due to its extremely high price.<sup>28</sup>

Used as a sweetener for beverages such as tea, coffee and chocolate, sweet food, but also for jams and compotes, we can consider that its status has evolved during this period, enjoying a great popularity depict its high price.

<sup>23</sup> Colecția de manuscrise în limba română a Bibliotecii Centrale Universitare Cluj-Napoca, *Fond Coriolan Suciu*, dosar *Correspondența cu părinții*, fila 1 recto.

<sup>24</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome LXXXVI, 1923, no. 24, 2.

<sup>25</sup> *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, tome LXXXVI, 1923, no. 51, 3.

<sup>26</sup> *Clujul*, tome I, 1923, no 11, 3

<sup>27</sup> D. Călugăreanu, „Zahăr din palmieri”, in *Cultura Poporului*, tome II, 1924, no. 53-54, 3.

<sup>28</sup> *Telegraful Român*, tome LXXIV, 1926, no 66, 3.

## CONCLUSIONS

Veturia Manuila's investigation along with the of analysis of prices in comparison with the wages of reference stated that workers and most of the officials of the State of Romania used the wages offered to provide daily nutrition. Grigore Benetato, Romanian hygienist who worked during the same period at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Cluj, in a field study he found that besides the costs of heating and lighting, food is the one that occupies a position of priority in the concerns of Romanian workers. However, reporting the quantities offered by the investigation of Veturia Manuila to a number average of 4 family members, we've noted that the body's needs were not complemented by it. The bread occupied the first place in the shopping list, alongside vegetables purchased in the market. The meat, 4 kilograms referred to in the inquiry, weren't included in the daily menu; the lent was respected, along with an abstinence caused by food shortage. Beef is the most popular meat for consumption; the pork was served especially in Christmas time. The milk enters into the children's menu, but adults rarely used it. They served it especially in combination with coffee for breakfast. Sugar, in his dual capacity of foodstuff and spice, although intense newspaper noted, it was used in a few households, its use was generalized only in the last years of the period considered.

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## ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS DURING 1916-1918

Elena-Steluța DINU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT:

THE ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS ONE OF ACTUALITY AND INTEREST FOR EUROPEAN HISTORIOGRAPHY. INTEREST IS BASED ON THE NEED TO KNOW THE LINKS BETWEEN STATES. THROUGH THE FOLLOWING SYNTHESIS WE INTEND TO CONVEY A MORE OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC VIEW ON MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND RUSSIA DURING THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF ROMANIA IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR DURING 1916-1918, WHEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE THEORETICALLY ALLIED AND WERE PART OF THE SAME POLITICAL-MILITARY GROUP, NAMELY THE ENTENTE. IN THIS TIME INTERVAL ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS WERE MAINTAINED AT A LEVEL OF MUTUAL DISTRUST, WHICH DAMAGED MILITARY COOPERATION, CULMINATING IN THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND SEIZURES OF ROMANIAN TREASURES FROM MOSCOW.

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**KEYWORDS:** ROMANIA, RUSSIA, WORLD WAR I, THE ENTENTE, CENTRAL POWERS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

On 4/17 August 1916, King Ferdinand convened at Cotroceni, a Crown Council<sup>2</sup> attended by Crown Prince Carol and twenty-one statesmen, among them Ion I.C. Brătianu. This Council had been convened not to take a decision that had already been taken, but to get the support of all politicians in favor of Romania entered the war alongside the Allies. Most of those present supported the point of view of the king. Exception made Titu Maiorescu and Alexandru Marghiloman who were in favor of maintaining neutrality so as Petre P. Carp who argued again that Romania would have to participate in the war alongside the Central Powers and, implicitly, against Russia.

Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary on the evening of 14/27 August 1916, immediately after the debate of the Crown Council at Cotroceni.

The reason that Romania entered the war is clear from the Proclamation of King Ferdinand I of 15/28 August 1916, on the occasion of the declaration of war to complete the nation: "our ancestors were able to establish the Romanian State through the Union of Romanian principalities, through the War of Independence, ... today it is given to us to complete their work ...: the union of Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians ... an undivided and free Romania from Tisa to the Sea<sup>3</sup>".

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<sup>1</sup> PhD in History, "Babeș-Bolyai" University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, mail: elena.dinu@ubbcluj.ro

<sup>2</sup> Ion Mamina, *Consilii de Coroană* (Bucharest, 1997), 58-53.

<sup>3</sup> Marta Bibescu, *Un sacrificiu regal: Ferdinand al României* (Bucharest, 2000), 59-61.



Respecting the treaty of alliance with the Entente, Romania engaged all the human and available material against Austria-Hungary. According to the plan of campaign for 1916<sup>4</sup>, two fronts had to be opened: north and north-west or south Transylvanian front or front of Dobrogea. The general front opened on the Carpathians and along its southern border had a length of about 1500 km.

On the other hand, shortly after the outbreak of Romanian offensive across the mountains, Germany (August 28), Turkey (30 August) and Bulgaria (September 1) declared war on Romania. So, in addition to considerable length, Romanian front had, as well, a disadvantageous form<sup>5</sup>.

Since early days appeared some deficiencies due mostly to the attitude of allies who did not complied with their obligations under the agreements which had been concluded with Romania. Such a deficiency was represented by slowness with which the Allies supplied the Eastern front with materials, weapons and ammunition, as a hindrance to the successful implementation of the Romanian army's war plan. By November 1917 supplies arrived on a detour, via Russian ports of Arkhangelsk on the White Sea and Vladivostok from the Pacific<sup>6</sup>. Thus, the Romanian army was not insured in sources of supply.

From a military perspective, the period Romania entered the war was not favorable. Romanian intervention occurred at a time when theaters of military actions in Europe, in general offensive efforts from the Allies ceased: Russian military offensive in Galicia, commanded by General Brussilov, Franco-British offensive on the River Somme, as also the German offensive in Verdun had been stopped. Central Powers forces were not heavily engaged, having a certain freedom of action by which they could achieve overwhelming superiority on the Romanian front<sup>7</sup>.

In this context, obligations that had been assumed by the Romanian allies were not fulfilled: the offensive from Thessaloniki against the Bulgarian troops ten days before Romania entered the war was not carried as planned; the offensive against the Germans in the west was not resumed or Brusilov's offensive in Galicia against the Austro-Hungarian army did not occur.

Therefore, we can say that the time Romania entered the war was not favorable to Romanian army, but rather favored the allied armies. Romanian intervention released Verdun, facilitated the victory of the Italians in Corso, decreased pressure on the Russian front and even facilitated occupation of Monastir by Sarraïl.

In their view, the Romanian army military action should integrate Allied coordinated effort especially since, entering the war, the Romanian army was placed in direct extension of the Russian front.

Filling initial positions on the battlefield and overcoming bad time of Romania's entry into war did not pave the way for a fruitful collaboration between Romania and Russia as the Russian front headquarters avoided to engage with all the forces promised, thus contributing to increased difficulties of Romanian army to face the enemy<sup>8</sup>.

Romanian Army was not supported by any of the two fronts. Romanian General Staff had to transfer on the southern front a third of the number of troops, weakening the power of combat troops in Transylvania. In the Carpathians, the Russians did not send suitable forces through the gorges of Moldova, to strengthen the advance of Romanian Army in

<sup>4</sup> *Istoria militară a poporului român*, vol. V, *Evoluția organismului militar românesc de la cucerirea independenței de stat până la înfăptuirea Marii Uniri din 1918* (Bucharest: Ed. Militară, 1988), 363-368.

<sup>5</sup> *Istoria militară*, 498.

<sup>6</sup> Keith Hitchins, *România 1866-1947*, translated by George Potra and Delia Răzdolescu (Bucharest: Ed. Humanitas, 1996), 284.

<sup>7</sup> Ion Cupșa, *Armata română în campaniile din anii 1916-1917* (Bucharest: Ed. Militară, 1967), 178.

<sup>8</sup> Ion M. Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, vol. I (1900-1924) (Bucharest: Ed. Albatros, 1998), 101-102.

Transylvania. The four Russian divisions stood inactive in Bessarabia. The inaction of Russian troops on the front was also felt in Dobrogea<sup>9</sup>.

Russian military command avoided to engage with all the forces they had promised, adding to the difficulties of the Romanian army and then to its withdrawal on shorter lines than the initial.

Since the end of September, instead of granting the promised aid, General Mihail V. Alexeev – Chief of Staff Czarist – proposed abandoning Oltenia and west Muntenia and suggested withdrawal on a defensive line from Dorna to Brasov to Bucharest and beyond, along the Danube to Constanta. The concept of General Alexeev to spare Russian army and shorten the front line was assumed also by the next commander of the Russian army, General Gurko<sup>10</sup>. To this is added the fact that the French and English war material for Romanian army very late from Russia.

The existence of Romanian state was always an obstacle to traditional Russian policy trends. Romanian-Russian divergences were apparent past in the background. Only the common interest, the defeat of Austria-Hungary, made possible an alliance between Romania and Russia. But this alliance was "the black dot of our policy of war."<sup>11</sup> Length of the front, the lack of technical equipment of the Romanian Army, inefficiency of Romanian-Russian collaboration, failure to fulfill commitments by other allies, contributed to the outcome of Romanian campaign of 1916. After several months of confrontation, at the end of 1916, the front line was stabilized along the Carpathians, Lower Siret and Danube.

More than two-thirds of the Romanian territory was occupied by troops of the Central Powers, including Oltenia, Muntenia and Dobrogea. Within the Romanian territory occupied by the troops of the Central Powers was imposed military administration whose primary goal was the requisition of oil, grains, and provisions.

Although an important part of Romanian territory was occupied, including the capital, the enemy's plan was not fulfilled, the Romanian government and army continued to exist as a belligerent power<sup>12</sup>. Since the 12/15 November 1916, the king, the royal family and authorities went to Iași, which became the temporary capital of a much reduced Romanian state<sup>13</sup>.

Resistance in Moldova still lasted over a year, the Central Powers troops failed even to the last moment to get full and decisive military victory decisive. The Romanian army was not destroyed as planned.

Romanian army reorganization took about five months; meanwhile the Command and Romanian troops had the support of the French mission, led by General Henry M. Berthelot.

Under the new conditions following the first campaign, the Romanian government tried to update the commitments made by the Allies to Romania to convince on the importance of this theater of war in Romania. In this respect, Brătianu urged to participate in Petrograd Conference of January 19 / 1 February 1917. Brătianu received assurances from the British and French representatives that financial problems and the supply of arms remained fixed under the previous agreements<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>9</sup> Constantin Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului pentru întregirea României 1916-1919*, vol. I (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1989), 573-575.

<sup>10</sup> Leonid Boicu, Vasile Cristian, Gheorghe Platon, eds., *România în relațiile internaționale 1699-1939* (Iași: Ed. Politică, 1980), 404.

<sup>11</sup> Kirițescu, *Istoria războiului*, 576.

<sup>12</sup> *Istoria militară*, 497.

<sup>13</sup> Gheorghe Platon, ed. *Istoria Românilor*, vol. VII, tom II *De la independență la Marea Unire (1878-1918)* (Bucharest: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003), 436.

<sup>14</sup> Dumitru Preda, *România și Antanta. Avatururile unei mici puteri într-un război de coaliție, 1916-1917* (Iași: Institutul European, 1998), 191-192.

Plans to coordinate military efforts on both fronts, settled at conferences in Chantilly, Rome, Petrograd, were not implemented because of military and political failures<sup>15</sup>.

Shortly after the conference in Petrograd, the Russian Revolution occurred in February 1917, resulting in regime change: in 3/16 March 1917 Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in favor of his brother Grand Duke Michail, who next day gave up the throne. Russia was proclaimed a republic. Thus, Romanov dynasty came to an end<sup>16</sup>.

Russian provisional Cabinet gave in 14/27 March, a statement that the Russian authorities will respect the obligations made to their partners. However, the regime change and confusion in the management of the power occurred in the country, had important consequences for subsequent situation on the Eastern front.

In the context of the fall of tsarist, hoping to improve relations with the Russian Provisional Government Lvov, Kerensky, the head of the Romanian government together with General Prezan paid a visit to Petrograd in late April 1917. Though, significantly improved after the visit, the Romanian-Russian relations were maintained at a level of mutual distrust, which damaged the military cooperation<sup>17</sup>. Romanian government was worried about the disintegration of the Russian units, especially, since there were many Russian soldiers on the front in Moldova and on its territory. "Revolutionary" agitation of Russian troops on the Romanian territory led to moments of tension between the two, yet partners.

Those events determined the Western allies: France, Britain, seconded by Italy, to intensify efforts in order to strengthen and maintain political and military combat capability of the whole eastern front, especially since the Romanian army reorganization was successful. For this purpose a general Romanian-Russian combat plan was developed<sup>18</sup>.

When the great offensive in this area of the front was prepared, the Russian army had to defend the alignment which was intended for switching to offensive battle, a section four times higher than the Romanian army. But to low combative capacity of the Russian army was added also its collapse that quickly deepened in the months May-June 1917, on the eve of the Battle of Mărăști, Mărășești and Oituz (July-August).

Even in the early days of implementation of the plan of battle, Russian divisional commander, General Scerbacev received an order from the head of the Provisional Government, Kerensky, to cease all offensive whereas the situation in Russia, suddenly worsened, no longer allowed Russian troops to take large-scale operations.

At Mărăști, Russian units, being disorganized, attended only sporadically and only at the beginning of the fight. Consequently, Romanian divisions had to face almost themselves pressure from the troops of the Central Powers. Moreover, during resistance in Mărășești and Oituz disorganized Russian troops were engaged only in certain battles. In these circumstances, the Romanian army had to replace the Russian units – who refused to fight and retreated to defend areas of the front left uncovered – even during the fighting that lasted until the end of August 1917<sup>19</sup>.

Despite flaws of large Russian units in the summer of 1917, the Romanian Army demonstrated its ability to struggle and resistance, preventing the Central Powers plan to take Romania out of battle and take their share of the Romanian state.

Romanian victories in the summer of 1917 did not improve the overall situation on the Romanian front and behind the front. The situation was critical: general results on both

<sup>15</sup> Preda, *România și Antanta*, 193.

<sup>16</sup> Pierre Milza, Serge Berstein, *Istoria secolului XX. Sfârșitul „lumii europene” (1900-1945)*, vol. I (Bucharest, 1998), 85.

<sup>17</sup> Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 116.

<sup>18</sup> Preda, *România și Antanta*, 196-199.

<sup>19</sup> Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 440-445.

fronts of the Entente, the lack of connection between them, the distrust by Russian troops, military disorganization in Thessaloniki, isolation of Romania from Italy<sup>20</sup>. Using the difficulties of the Triple Entente, military headquarters of the Central Powers army unleashed a powerful offensive which allowed at the end of 1917 and in early 1918 to bring victory on all fronts.

To this was added evolution of events in Russia, where after the coup of 25 October / November 7, 1917, "October Revolution", the Bolsheviks took power, the new government called "Council of People's Commissars" with Lenin as chairman, seconded by Trotsky and Stalin. The next day was given "Decree on Peace", through which the Bolsheviks proposed to all belligerent states to start negotiations immediately for the conclusion of peace, a peace without annexations. They linked, using this formula, obtaining peace to solving territorial problems and the right of nations to self-determination<sup>21</sup>.

In these circumstances, hostilities ceased on the eastern front at December 1, 1917, four days later was signed the armistice with the Central Powers and peace talks were started. Russian exit from the war also involved Romania exiting from battles. With no other alternative, the Romanian government accepted the proposal of the Russian general D.S. Scerbacev made to representatives of the Central Powers for an armistice with the Romanian-Russian troops on Moldavian Romanian front. The armistice was signed in Focșani on the 26 November / December 9, 1917, despite opposition of Western allies<sup>22</sup>.

Due to the thorny issue of Bessarabia relations between Romania and Russia became worse, culminating in the severance of diplomatic relations.

Following the Revolution of February 1917, the fall of the Tsar and of proclaiming the Russian provisional government of the right of peoples of the Russian Empire to "have their own" national movement of the Romanians in Bessarabia intensified, following a series of political training for separation of Bessarabia from the Russian Empire.

These preparations led to the proclamation by Congress of Moldavian soldiers in Chisinau that opened proceedings on 20 October / November 2, 1917, of territorial and political autonomy of Bessarabia in the Russian Federative Republic. The Congress also decided to convene the Country's Council, which met for the first time on 21 November / December 4, 1917, when Ion Inculeț was elected president of the national Supreme Court. On 2/15 December, the Council of State proclaimed the Moldavian Democratic Republic tied with Russia as a federative state. The Board Director General was elected as executive organ<sup>23</sup>. On 24 January 1918, the Country's Council proclaimed Bessarabia an independent republic, and on 27 March / April 9, 1918, adopted the decision of union of Moldavian Republic with Romania<sup>24</sup>.

Between the proclamation of the republic and independence occurred a series of events (Bolshevik occupation, arrest of some of the leaders of the national movement of Bessarabia). After the armistice with the Central Powers, disorganization of the Russian army became total on the Romanian front. On their way of withdrawal Bolshevik soldiers went through Bessarabia, where they indulged in robbery actions, causing a state of disarray and uncertainty. Towards the end of December 1917, Chief of Staff of the Red Army in Bessarabia, after occupying Chisinau, put pressure on legal authorities to call Russian military to establish order in Bessarabia. Without getting those demands, detachments of repression were sent in order to install Bolshevik control in Bessarabia. The situation became

<sup>20</sup> Pierre Renouvin, *Primul război mondial*, translated by Lucia Popa (Bucharest: Ed. Corint, 2001), 104.

<sup>21</sup> Renouvin, *Primul război mondial*, 105-107.

<sup>22</sup> Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 448.

<sup>23</sup> Alexandru Boldur, *Istoria Basarabiei*, 2nd edition (Bucharest: Ed. Albatros, 1992), 499.

<sup>24</sup> Ion Nistor, *Istoria Basarabiei* (Chișinău, 1991), 282.

serious in early January 1918, when gangs of Russian soldiers caused great unrest, leading to even open attacks against the legal authorities in Chisinau<sup>25</sup>.

In these circumstances, the Council of State requested the Romanian government to send troops to maintain security. Starting with 10/23 January 1918, the Romanian army entered Bessarabia, in order to ensure order and security of the Republic, then had to withdraw. With the support of the Moldavian National Guard, military units led by Ernest Broșteanu failed to fulfill its mission: Bolshevik troops withdrew across the Dniester River<sup>26</sup>.

Bolshevik government response resulted in breaking diplomatic ties with Romania and Romania's Thesaurus in Moscow was seized. On 15/28 January 1918, by the order of the Council of People's Commissars the Romanian diplomatic mission was asked to leave Russia. So, severance of diplomatic relations between Russia and Romanian occurred from the Bolshevik government initiative<sup>27</sup>.

On 27 January / February 9, 1918, Soviet Russia and the Central Powers signed at Brest-Litovsk peace. After that followed peace with Ukraine and the occupation of Russian and Ukrainian territories by the Austro-Hungarian armies. Thus, Romania had no possibility to receive foreign aid, or, in case of defeat, to withdraw the army. Under these conditions, at 5/18 March 1918, the preliminaries of peace were signed at Buftea and on 24 April / May 7, 1918 Peace Treaty of Bucharest<sup>28</sup>.

The Peace Treaty and its additional provisions brought Romania in a state of economic and political dependence to the Central Powers. State of war was replaced with state of occupation; the country was divided in two: occupied territory and Moldova to Mărăști where Romanian government continued to exercise administration and authority.

King Ferdinand refused to sanction the peace of 7 May, although the legislature voted it. Treaty of Bucharest conditions were not implemented, developments in the second half of 1918 and going war favored canceling the treaty.

The events of the battle fronts were held in favor of the Entente, while the Central Powers began defense. General Foch, supreme commander of the Allied armies in France responded the failed German offensive at Champagne with counteroffensive "second battle of the Marne" in July-August 1918 representing the signal defeat of the Central Powers<sup>29</sup>.

After German defeat on the battle of the Somme in the summer of 1918, German troops followed the Siegfried line so that in September began the German offensive of Allied troops<sup>30</sup>. On 12/25 September 1918 Balkan Entente armies pierced the Bulgarian front. In these circumstances, on 29 September Bulgaria capitulated and signed an armistice in Thessaloniki. Also Turkey, on Oct. 30 signed the armistice of Mudros, and on November 3, 1918 Austria-Hungary surrendered and signed an armistice with the Entente powers at Villa Giusti<sup>31</sup>.

After resuming the Entente offensive in the Balkans, the Romanian government led by General Constantin Coandă ordered the mobilization of Romanian Army to rejoin the battle with the Allies on 28 October / November 10, 1918, considering null the regime established by the Peace of Bucharest. Having declared war on Germany, Romanian troops entered simultaneously in the occupied territories.

<sup>25</sup> Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 174-176.

<sup>26</sup> Gheorghe Platon, *Istoria modernă a României* (Bucharest: Ed. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1985), 174-176.

<sup>27</sup> Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 194-195.

<sup>28</sup> Mircea N. Popa, *Primul război mondial. 1914-1918* (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979), 420.

<sup>29</sup> Renouvin, *Primul război mondial*, 120-121.

<sup>30</sup> Renouvin, *Primul război mondial*, 123-125.

<sup>31</sup> Renouvin, *Primul război mondial*, 126-128.

We conclude that at the date of signing the armistice between the Allies and Germany at Compiègne (October 29 / November 11, 1918) as well as with the independent Hungary in Belgrade (October 31 / November 13, 1918), Romania was in the camp of the victors<sup>32</sup>.

At the end of World War I, national unity was accomplished by the Unification plebiscitary decisions of 27 March / 9 April (Bessarabia), 15/28 November (Bucovina), 18 November / 1 December 1918 (Transylvania). Without diplomatic support obtained during neutrality – the treaty of alliance and military convention signed with the Entente powers, coupled with participation in the war, Romania's representatives would not have been able at the Paris Peace Conference that ended the First World War, to obtain international legal consecration union of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Transylvania with Romania.

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<sup>32</sup> Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 452-453.

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## THE MYTH OF DEMOCRACY IN A FAILING ECONOMY

Teodora DOBRE<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*THE LONGEVITY OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS, TRIGGERED IN 2007 AND EMPHASIZED IN 2008 BY THE CRASH OF THE STOCK MARKET RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MANAGEMENT DURING A PERIOD OF CRISIS. THE FINANCIAL BOOM SPREAD THROUGH A DOMINO EFFECT, INFLUENCING THE GLOBAL MARKET. THIS PAPER FOCUSES ON ANALYZING WHETHER SUSPENDING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AND APPOINTING A GOVERNMENT OF EXPERTS, OR SWITCHING FROM DEMOCRACY TO AUTOCRACY WILL INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY AND SOLVE THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WHICH TODAY'S SOCIETY IS FACING. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CRISIS IN A CONTROLLED POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT MIGHT REVEAL SURPRISING RESULTS – IN THE LONG TERM, AN AUTHORITARIAN REGIME OFFERS (WITHIN LIMITED LIBERTIES) A MORE EFFICIENT CRISIS SOLUTION.*

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**KEYWORDS:** *ECONOMIC CRISIS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION, KEYNESIANISM, DEMOCRACY, DICTATORSHIP, EFFICIENCY, SOLUTION*

The political evolutions in the last decades, the death of bipolarism in the international system and the shift of the security paradigm created a relative state of instability of the global arena, which is in a constant process of acclimation to the new parameters of security. The technological progress and the fast evolution of the telecommunication systems and Internet generated a series of parameters, within the development of modern wars takes place and which increased significantly the degree of interdependence between the state actors and the non-state ones.

Pursuant to the current globalization tendencies, the military traditional threats transformed gradually in asymmetric transnational threats, the focus shifted from the military area to the economic one. Tanks and cannon shots have been replaced by marketing strategies and public campaigns. The center of a functional society became obtaining strategic competitive advantages, speculations and fighting for market segments. A society without money is a powerless one, regardless the resources it disposes. Placed in the impossibility to exploit the available resources, it rapidly becomes exploited.

Nonetheless, history proves that the desire to obtain economic power exists from ancient times and brings as arguments the economic crises. This paper addresses the main global economic crises, discussing the causes that triggered them and the solutions identified.

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<sup>1</sup> MSc. Student at the National School of Political Science and Public Administration, The National Institute for Intelligence Studies, teodora.dobre@rocketmail.com



In the context of globalization, shifting from traditional war to economic war, an economic crisis raises concerns regarding the stability and continuity of a powerful state. In this situation, which political regime becomes the most efficient: democracy, dictatorship or technocracy?

For a better understanding of the phenomenon, we will briefly discuss the main theories regarding the causes of the crisis. The liberal doctrines promote the political and economic freedom of the individual unto the state. Any intervention of the state is rejected, as the market is considered a self-regulator organism. The sole cause of bankruptcy is the inefficiency of the institution, its lack of performance and competitiveness. As a consequence, the financial collapse is perceived as progress, a factor that reduces and eliminates unproductive elements.

Major economic crises with global effects brought into attention the necessity of the state's intervention in economy, arguing that it is a necessary evil. The market is the expression of the society. Having that in mind, we can say the democratic state is, ideally, the political reflection of the population it governs and its purpose is generating social welfare. Even if the free-market is a mechanism that promotes competence, it does not guarantee economic prosperity and welfare. So, if the crisis has a significant impact upon a large part of the population, the state decides to intervene in the economy and implements a series of measures in order to limit the damaging effects. The problems that derive from this are numerous: the state will determine an uneven distribution of resources (different from the way it would have been in a free market), affecting in this way competitiveness; mass-nationalization could lead to the end of capitalism and there is no limit defined for when should the state stop its intervention in the economy.<sup>2</sup>

The nature of economic crises varies. On one hand, the keynesianist vision<sup>3</sup> claims that the main cause of the crisis is the human behavior – the individual acts accordingly to his animal instincts, making spontaneous decisions, based on an amplified optimism and not a rational calculus. On the other hand, the Austrians<sup>4</sup> identify as the root cause of the crisis the variation of the monetary mass. Although these explanations are well founded, they fail to explain completely the triggering-mechanism. The Keynesianism does not justify why the crisis is not perpetual (considering that the animal spirit is a constant), while the Austrians do not illustrate the reasons why the crisis was not triggered in situations defined by significant increase in the monetary mass. The speculative bubble reunites these two visions, creating a unique framework that fosters the depression.

## CRISES IN HISTORY

The first major economic crisis in history was the tulip and bulb craze back in 1637 and was triggered by a speculative bubble. The tulips began to rise in price, reaching unimagined values, which were not an accurate reflection of the merit of a tulip bulb.<sup>5</sup> The lack of demand and the impossibility to find buyers determined the burst of the speculative bubble and the beginning of the crisis. The identified solution was annulling contracts, on the condition that a payment of 10% from the initial value will be made. The measures did not ameliorate the situation and the negative effects of the crisis persisted a few years.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Hazlitt, Henry, *Economics in one lesson*, 1946

<sup>3</sup> Keynes, John Maynard, *The general theory of employment, interest and money*, 1936

<sup>4</sup> Piroșcă, Grigore Ioan, *Individualism și opinie publică*, Comunicare în doctrine economice, (București: ed. ASE, 2003)

<sup>5</sup> In Charles Mackay's book (*Extraordinary popular delusions*) the following transaction is mentioned: for a Viceroy tulip bulb, the price was 48 barrels of wheat, 96 barrels of rye, 8 pigs, 12 sheep, 2 barrels of wine, 1000 liters of beer, 2 tons of butter.

<sup>6</sup> Lybeck, Johan, *Istoria globală a crizei financiare*, (București ed. Polirom, 2012),

In 1929 began what was about to be called the Great Depression – the longest and the most severe crisis in history, which affected the global economy and determined significant changes in macroeconomic politics and in the structure of financial institutions.

Among the causes of the decline, the economists identified consumption reduction (aggregated demand), and implicitly production downfall, while the merchants and the producers observed an unplanned increase of goods in the stock.

The catalyst of the crisis was the sudden lack of confidence of the population in the American economic system. The stock market prices were almost 4 times higher than in the last 8 years. The Federal Reserve increased the interest rates, in the attempt to slow down the accelerated increase of stock holdings. This led to expenses deadness in domains in which the interest fluctuation was vital (e.g. construction, auto industry). In October 1929, after a series of events that led to gradual decrease of the prices, the creditors lost their trust, and the speculative bubble burst. 24<sup>th</sup> October remains in history as the Black Thursday – the beginning of a 10-year crisis. In this amount of time, the industrial production of the United States decreased with 47%, and the GDP with 30%.

The solutions identified by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the American president at the time, were structured in a series of economic programs known as New Deal and sought to determine relief, recovery and reform. In the first two months of the year 1933, 4004 financial institutions declared bankruptcy and the unemployment rate reached 25%.

Reforestation Relief Act offered 250 000 jobs to the American youth, within the Civilian Conservation Corps and by the end of the program, in 1941, 2 million citizens brought their contribution to the American society. The Agricultural Adjustment Act established ceiling prices for agrarian products and offered subsidies for farmers. Bridges and energetic pipelines were constructed. In other words, the solution identified by Roosevelt for the economic crisis was the major investment in infrastructure and in national producers. Encouraging the economy and reviving some economic agents rendered the population's trust in the financial system, the decrease of the unemployment rate determined a higher purchasing power and thus, favoring the overhaul of the crisis.<sup>7</sup>

Historians still debate the success of the New Deal. Those who sustain the efficiency of the Roosevelt-measures underline on one hand the economic indicators, who never came back to the values recorded during the Great Depression, and on the other hand perceive the investments made in infrastructure as long term advantages for the US economy. On the contrary, critics considered that although the unemployment rate was reduced, it still remained high. New Deal, from their perspective, was not a viable solution, the real factor that determined the end of the crisis being, in fact, the Second World War. Also, the changes that Roosevelt made regarding the executive did not bring benefits to the American nation.

In 2008 the sudden decrease of liquidity in the credit global market and in the banking system determined a new economic crisis. Starting with 2005, the banks began to lower their mortgage loan conditions, granting advantageous initial terms. Considering the long term tendency to rise in price in the real-estate market, a significant percent of the population took more than one mortgage loan, in the hope that it will be able to refinance them later with more advantageous rates. A remarkable number of Americans had real estate properties that did not afford in reality. The mortgage loan with a high degree of risk increased from 5% to 20% in 1944-2006. Granting loans on easy conditions and betaking to Ninja Credits (a stable working place, income and guaranty on assets were not necessary) amplified the economic bubble. The mortgages were transformed into public effects. Based on high degree of trust accorded by rating agencies, the investment banks took risks and although they obtained huge

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<sup>7</sup> Cole, Harold; Ohanian, Lee, *New Deal policies and the persistence of the Great Depression: a general equilibrium analysis*, 2001

profits, their degree of risk and debt also increased. In 2007, the collective debt of Lehman Brothers, Bear Sterns, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley reached 4000 billion, which represented approximately 30% of the US economy.

The burst of the economic bubble was caused by the rising interest rates and impossibility of the citizens to refinance their mortgage loans. Shortly after, millions of houses ended up being even (1,3 million only in 2007). The alternatives at that time were not too encouraging: the banks ought to choose between keeping the real estate properties, in order to sell them later, on stable market (but a significant amount of money was needed for maintenance) and selling them at considerably lower price than their actual value.

7<sup>th</sup> September represented the start of the economic crisis: powerful companies like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG collapsed and with them, through domino effect, companies that had equity stakes. The complex mechanisms that govern finances globally determined negative evolutions in numerous states, both in Europe and in the Arab World. In Europe numerous financial institutions declared bankruptcy. One of the most affected states was Island, which was highly dependent on the financial sector. Its long recovery was successful mainly due to IMF loans. The annual rate of decreasing GDP was in the first trimester in 2009 of 14, 4% in Germany, 15, 2% in Japan, 7, 4% in UK and 9, 8% in the Euro zone. The Arab World signaled loss in value of 3 trillion USD, the “explosion” of the unemployment rate being just a matter of time. In May 2009 UK reported a decrease of foreign investments in the Middle East, because of the low demand on the oil market. The Arab banks declared, after only 3 months of crisis, losses of approximately 4 billion USD.<sup>8</sup>

The solution identified by the American government was simple: capital injection. In the absence of other creditors, the billions needed for saving the state from economic collapse came from the Federal Reserve. Can the state intervene in the economy and if so, how much can it do? Does the nationalization of the companies represent the end of capitalism? Are the citizens really benefiting? The debate about the legitimacy of the state’s intervention in economy revolves around the idea that this is a crisis solution. The Government will re-sale the institution, once it becomes functional and efficient. However, when talking about a phenomenon that is as severe and complex as the one in 2008, when institutions like AIG – the 18<sup>th</sup> company in the world – are declared bankrupt, we ask ourselves which company will be in the lucky position to be able to buy such an institution? Furthermore, the entire balance of the market will change: once nationalized and compliant to favorable policies, the institution will increase its capital of image and gain the trust of the population. In this way, the state does not encourage competitiveness and efficiency on the market.

### COMING BACK TO RATIONALITY

Although the 2008 crisis left behind bankrupt companies and high unemployment rate, it seems to have had a positive effect also – it determined the population to come back to rationality. In the United States, a significant percent of the population owned real estate properties they did not afford. Implementing harsh measures, stricter fiscal policies and imposing more conditions when it comes to according loans were the first steps to be taken in order to increase the efficiency of the financial system. Although the measures seemed austere at the beginning, on the long term their sole purpose is increasing production, reviving the economy and ensuring national security.

Josh Gerzema<sup>9</sup> pointed the change made upon the regular consumer. The decision-making process envisaged interest rates shifts, capital injections, creating crisis funds and despite all that, the economy continued its descendent trajectory, until the individual changed

<sup>8</sup> Abrudan, Mirela, *Criza economică și reflectarea ei în mass-media*, (București ed. Tritonic, 2010)

<sup>9</sup> *The Brand Bubble*, 2008

its behavior. Unfortunately, the contemporary American society is a projection of the irrational behavior of the consumer, which is based on the false premise that what he owns is what defines him. The American culture is the culture of the consumer, in which the quality of life is defined quantitatively.

The economic crisis in 2008 was an opportunity for the regular consumer to take control over the economy's trajectory and eliminate or reduce the degree of self-risk through daily rational decisions. In 2008, approximately 70%<sup>10</sup> of the United States' GDP was assured by internal consumption. The statistical data collected 11 months later proved that the rate of personal savings increased considerably, which proves the fact that the population became more responsible and forehanded, when it comes to expenses. Gerzema emphasizes the fact that the American citizens still have cash, but they no longer choose to spend them on unnecessary items. The amount of money spent on medical care and groceries proves that they started spending money they have, without resorting to credit cards and loans. Leading from Hobbes'<sup>11</sup> idea that the individual is placed in the center of the society, a new philosophy emerged – economic behaviorism – which emphasizes the importance of the human behavior rather than sterile market forces. The state's intervention in the economy and the measures implemented are based on the classical principles of the economy, approaching crisis in a traditional manner. The economic progress so far, analyzed in comparison with the causes previously mentioned, underlines the fact that behind faulty monetary policies stands the human behavior, as a catalyst of the economic crisis.

Leading from this premise, we have to ask ourselves: which solution is the best for maintaining the crisis under control – state's intervention in the economy or let the market function as a self-regulator organism? Creating a technocrat government, that will manage the crisis from the perspective of an expert, was one of the first solutions implemented in Japan during the 1992-2002 crisis. In 1997 Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, a bank considered too big to fail, was declared bankrupt. Until 1998, the measures imposed by the government did not managed to change the status quo. In 1999 the first real solutions were proposed: creating an independent authority for financial supervision. Thus, Resolution and Collection Bank Corporation appeared on the market and bought the toxic assets. The banks with a faulty management were let to go bankrupt, and the first 20 banks merged into 5 banking groups. The Japanese crisis was even worse than the one in 2008, and it only amplified as the government failed to make a decision<sup>12</sup>.

In today's society, major economic decisions are similar to the intelligence process. Collecting information and creating scenarios in order to predict future events is one of the main tasks of the economists. They disseminate their conclusions to political beneficiary. Nonetheless, the system proved to be inefficient, as the 2008 economic crisis was not anticipated and prevented.

Rogoff and Reinhart<sup>13</sup> identified two elements common to all 138 financial crises that took place after the Second World War – an increase in the speculative capital and extremely high prices for real-estate properties located in a residential area or destined to the commercial sector – managing to elaborate a predictability formula for the economic crisis. From their perspective, the 2008-financial boom could have been prevented easily, if the

<sup>10</sup> Mathews, Rick, *US GDP is 70 percent personal consumption: inside the numbers*, 2012, last accessed 04.09.2014 <http://www.policymic.com/articles/15097/us-gdp-is-70-percent-personal-consumption-inside-the-numbers>

<sup>11</sup> *Philosophical rudiments concerning government and society*, 1651

<sup>12</sup> Lybeck, Johan, *Istoria globală a crizei financiare*

<sup>13</sup> Reinhart, Carmen, Rogoff, Kenneth, *This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly*, (Princeton Press, 2011)

indicators of the system crisis would have been taken into account (all visible and known). The 2008 crisis was the result of the free market, as it allowed for under regulated or poorly regulated financial entities to play a major part in the financial system. In the context of a political beneficiary who ignores the alarm signals, whose decisions are not made on a rational calculus, the economic crisis diffused in a relatively short time. Imposing a technocrat government could solve these problems, but I prefer revealing a more interesting scenario – how a crisis develops in a controlled market.

Let's take for instance China. After Deng Xiaoping's reforms in the 80s, China had a spectacular economic evolution. The decisions taken by Chinese government apply beyond the law: evacuating millions of citizens, rationalizing food, and other measures, all with the purpose of increased consumption on the long term. This measures and the strict control of the state upon consumption are impossible to implement in a country with a democratic regime, as it exists the constraints of the public opinion. The Chinese state represents an unique mixture of capitalism and communism, promoting a particular economic policy, being open to the global market – elements that favored implementing measures in order to reduce the negative impact of the crisis. "Although the prognoses elaborated by international organisms indicate a compression of the economic development, the appreciation still remains optimistic, (...) it is based on a modification of the market position's roots, from sustained growing rates, as a consequence of cheap and consistent labor force; respectively direct investments into infrastructure, education and technology, to the pressure induced by increasing salary and decreasing demography."<sup>14</sup>

Yasheng Huang<sup>15</sup> analyses India's economic evolution in comparison with China. Although in the last 5 years they had similar economic developments, in the last 30 years, China's progress was incomparably higher. If someone argues that this is the result of infrastructure investments (for instance, like in the case of Roosevelt's New Deal), a quantitative comparative analyses between China and USSR might offer a surprising result. Even if USSR had in 1989 more telecommunication networks and a better infrastructure than China, the Iron Curtain fell and China is now one of the greatest economic superpowers in the world, if not the greatest<sup>16</sup>. The causality link is inversed: economic growth leads to obtaining more financial resources and investment opportunities (infrastructure, education, technology) and not the other way around.

In what concerns the relationship between democracy and economic growth, Lipset<sup>17</sup> considers democracy a product of financial development more than a catalyst for it – China, although an authoritarian form of government, became in the last decades more democratic and open. There is the belief that economic growth is necessary for democracy and not backwards and that a certain level of economic growth is required for the regime to be sustainable, reducing the intensity of conflicts. This conclusion was drawn based on a simple ratiocination: investing in education and communication helps creating and consolidating a security and a democratic culture, efficient business environments, elements that sustain the

<sup>14</sup> Drăghici, Mihai, *O perspectivă asupra relațiilor economice globale*, Revista Sinteză, nr. 5, iunie 2014, 83

<sup>15</sup> International Program Professor in Chinese Economy and Business, Profesor of Global Economics and Management, MIT Sloan Management

<sup>16</sup> China was on the verge of an economic crisis in 2013. The opinions regarding the causes of this event are diverse: on one hand, the ruling of Bo Xilai lead to a series of decisions whose long-term evolution might determine stagnation; on the other hand, that is China's natural evolutionary rhythm. China's economic growth is remarkable, but not unprecedented. Japan, North Korean, Taiwan had anual growths of 9% for two decades, then the progress was slightly slowed down. The Asian Tigers knew flourishing periods, followed closely by crises. The cause? It is difficult for them to develop rapidly in the conditions of a large economy, sustained mainly by middle class individuals.

<sup>17</sup> *Political man: the social bases of politics*, 1960

democratic path of governmental institutions. Based on Asian countries' evolution, economists consider democracy, as a political regime, an impediment in economic growth. The process of economic development requires massive investments in human and material resources. This type of investment implies reducing consumption, which can be painful for certain social segments. Governments must apply harsh measures<sup>18</sup>, through which the amount of money necessary can be obtained. For a dictatorial regime, implementing this measure is favored by the lack of real power of the population and by the political uncomplainingness of the masses. In democracy, on the other hand, the power lies in the hand of the people, and through the electoral levers available the implementation of certain measures can be suspended. The welfare of a state is perceived by the regular individual in terms of own welfare. He is preoccupied of his own workplace, his economic advantages and self-security rather than respecting the democratic principles in organizing elections, state's structure or statistics regarding the unemployment rate. In the moment when decisions that affect his comfort (social, financial) are taken, he will demand the change of the status quo. The major difference between the individual in a democratic state and the one in an authoritarian state derives both from the expectancy regarding individual benefits, and from the degree of power the individual exerts upon the regime.

### CONCLUSIONS

It is hard to analyze the impact the political regime has upon economic growth, as the comparison between the evolutions of a democratic state, let's call it X and of the same state X but with an authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, Przeworski and Limogi observed that between 1946 and 1988 the democracies in South America knew an economic growth of 1,31% , compared with non-democratic states 2,15%.

In order to establish the economic trajectory of a state, more than simple statistical data must be taken into account. Elements like historical and social background influence significantly the evolution of the state. A dictatorship which exceeds in infringing human rights and fundamental freedom is continuously threatened by the possibility of a social riot. On the other hand, historical precedents have proven the stability of an authoritarian regime in situations of economic crisis. The statistics coming from a closed regime are almost never precise (for instance, Romania during its communist period was illustrated as a prosperous country, contrary with the disturbing reality of food rationalization and crisis).

For economic success, a country does not require a democratic government, as the state is invested with power (legitimately or not) and takes decisions regarding the allocation of resources for the welfare of its citizens. This function can be performed effectively by a government elected democratically, or, as the studies have shown, by an authoritarian ruler. The efficiency of the measure is actually higher in strictly controlled environments, as the individuals, who only seek self-benefits, lose their ability to change the regime and stop the implementation of harsh policies. The resilience of an authoritarian regime in case of economic crisis is undoubtedly higher than of democracies and proves to be more efficient in applying fiscal policies in order to reduce and limit the negative effects of the crisis.

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<sup>18</sup> Vaman Rao (1984) apud Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limogi, *Political regimes and economic growth*

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## **POLITICAL ELITES AND REGIME CHANGE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

**Emilia - Elena CLUCERESCU (TĂNASE)<sup>1</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

*WITHIN A REGIME CHANGE, AMONG THE ELEMENTS TO BE ANALYZED FOR ACKNOWLEDGING HOW IT IS CONDUCTED THE ROAD FROM COMMUNISM TO DEMOCRACY, A PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS TO BE GIVEN TO THE POLITICAL ELITES, TOGETHER WITH THE INSTITUTIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS. FOR THE ELITE PLAYING IN THIS SITUATION THE ROLE OF DEMOCRATIZATION AGENT, TRANSFORMATION CAN TAKE SEVERAL MEANINGS: REPLACEMENT OF THE FORMER ELITE WITH A NEW ONE, PRESERVATION OF SOME MEMBERS IN KEY POSITIONS AS WELL AS ADAPTATION TO THE NEW CONTEXT AND CONTINUITY. THIS STUDY IS TRYING TO DECRYPT WHAT ARE THE POLITICAL ELITES AND TO WHAT EXTENT POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCHERS CAN INTRODUCE THE CONCEPT OF (POST)COMMUNIST ELITE FOLLOWING THE EVENTS FROM 1989 – 1990 IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE CONCERNING THE REPRODUCTION AND CIRCULATION OF ELITES, WITH AN EMPHASIS OVER THE ROMANIAN CASE WILL BE ENVISAGED.*

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**KEY WORDS:** POLITICAL ELITES, CONTINUITY, REGIME CHANGE, POSTCOMMUNISM.

### **INTRODUCTION**

"Les élites jouent un rôle décisif dans l'histoire"<sup>2</sup>, dans le sens où l'évolution générale de la société se réalise grâce à l'adoption de certaines décisions et cette capacité décisionnelle revient toujours aux élites. L'étude des élites représente donc "un prisme fertile pour la compréhension des systèmes sociaux et politiques de domination"<sup>3</sup>.

Le terme "élite" est utilisé avec une grande fréquence dans le vocabulaire des sciences sociales, "dans un sens large et descriptif, faisant référence à des catégories ou des groupes qui semblent se situer "au sommet" [...] d'une structure d'autorité ou de partage des

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<sup>1</sup> Doctorante Université de Bucarest – Faculté de Sciences Politiques; email:emilia.clucerescu@yahoo.com

\* Ce travail a bénéficié du soutien financier accordé par le biais du projet " Routes d'excellence académique dans la recherche doctorale et post-doctorale - READ" co-financé par le Fonds Social Européen par le Programme Opérationnel Sectoriel le Développement des Ressources Humaines 2007-2013, contrat n°. POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926.

<sup>2</sup> Ezra Suleiman, Henri Mendras, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, (Timișoara : Amarcord, 2001), 291;

<sup>3</sup> Nicolas Bauquet, François Bocholier, *Le communisme et les élites en Europe Centrale*, (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2006), 24 ;



ressources”<sup>4</sup>, maintenant ainsi une ambiguïté accentuée et une certaine imprécision sur son sens.

La signification proprement dite du terme “élite” ne doit pas se perdre dans des définitions compliquées ou ayant des prétentions exhaustives ; une explication minimale est celle qui présente l’élite comme un groupe capable de prendre des décisions ayant des conséquences majeures ; ses membres “occupent des positions pivotales”<sup>5</sup>, importante étant donc leur capacité décisionnelle, quels qu’en soient les effets.

Les études consacrées aux élites étendent leurs origines jusqu’à la fin du XIXe siècle - début du XXe siècle, donnant naissance à l’approche classique du phénomène. Les deux représentants de marque du courant classique sont Gaetano Mosca<sup>6</sup> et Vilfredo Pareto<sup>7</sup>. Dans les travaux de Mosca, “l’idée d’élite a servi comme une alternative politiquement acceptable pour le concept marxiste de classe dirigeante”<sup>8</sup>, en proposant ainsi une autre dénomination pour cette couche de la société. D’autre part, Pareto propose une modalité simple de commencer une étude sur les élites, à savoir l’identification descriptive ou formelle des celles-ci.

Les moments ultérieurs trouvent la formalisation d’une dialectique entre une approche élitiste et une approche pluraliste<sup>9</sup> au sein de la recherche consacrée à ce sujet. L’approche élitiste attribue à cette classe sociale une capacité de domination et d’infiltration intrinsèques tandis que l’approche pluraliste est centrée sur les relations qui s’établissent entre les élites concurrentes, étant donné que le pouvoir dont jouit une élite est fluctuant et doit être considérée dans le contexte dans lequel il se déroule. Dans les recherches plus récentes, la problématique des élites se traduit “plus proche de son essence, dans une nouvelle construction théorique, celle du leadership”<sup>10</sup>.

## LES ÉLITES POLITIQUES DANS LE CONTEXTE DU CHANGEMENT DE RÉGIME POLITIQUE

Les élites politiques peuvent être décrites en termes de relations que celles-ci établissent avec le pouvoir politique, des relations directes. Pour les études concernant le changement de régime, l’approche de la dimension des élites se révèle être un instrument utile ; par exemple, les arrangements démocratiques postrévolutionnaires en Roumanie et en Europe centrale et orientale tournent autour de la problématique du rôle et de l’implication des élites tant dans l’épisode révolutionnaire que par la suite, dans la construction de nouveaux régimes démocratiques dans ces pays.

La transformation des élites communistes trouve ses racines dans un processus qui se déroule dans les années 1980 et qui envisage des changements successifs dans leurs structures. Il s’agit du phénomène d’autonomisation des élites<sup>11</sup> dans chaque pays communiste, de rupture de l’élite communiste unique, ce qui conduit à la fragilisation, à la perméabilité et finalement à la désintégration de la *nomenklatura*<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Ezra, Henri, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, 9 ;

<sup>5</sup> Charles Wright Mills, *The power elite*, (Oxford University Press, 1956), 4;

<sup>6</sup> Gaetano Mosca, *The ruling class*, (Michigan: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1939);

<sup>7</sup> Vilfredo Pareto, *Traité de sociologie générale*, (Paris : Payot, 1932);

<sup>8</sup> Ezra, Henri, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, 10 ;

<sup>9</sup> Les deux approches sont analysées de manière plus détaillée par Ezra, Henri, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, 12-13 ;

<sup>10</sup> Mihai Milca, *Geneza teoriei elitelor, Provocarea Neo-Machaivellenilor*, (București: Editura Economică, 2001), 21;

<sup>11</sup> Richard Lachman, “Catalizatorii revoluției. Mobilizarea maselor și conflictele între elite de la familia Medici la Elțin”, in: *Teoretizarea revoluțiilor*, John Foran (éd.), (Iași: Polirom, 2004), 87 ;

<sup>12</sup> Terme employé généralement par la littérature scientifique pour définir l’élite politique de l’Ancien Régime;

La ligne de démarcation élite communiste – élite postcommuniste reste subtile, vu la continuité de certains personnages dans différentes positions et fonctions. En ce qui concerne le cas roumain, Raluca Grosescu réalise une étude de type quantitatif sur le reclassement politique de la nomenklatura après 1989<sup>13</sup> : représentatif dans cette direction est le Front du Salut National (qui inclut des noms de premier rang de l'ancienne élite), étant aussi forgé comme acteur politique par des personnalités-clés du régime communiste. D'autres partis politiques joignent la liste : le Parti de la Grande Roumanie, le Parti de l'Union Nationale de Roumanie, le Parti Agraire Démocratique de Roumanie, le Parti Socialiste du Travail ou bien l'Union Démocratique des Hongrois de Roumanie.

L'auteur met l'accent sur les chiffres de l'apparition des figures de l'ancien nomenklatura dans la structure des Parlements postcommunistes - il s'agit d'une proportion d'environ 20% des membres de la nomenklatura qui s'est perpétuée au pouvoir en 1990 et 1992, 28% en 1996, suivis d'une réduction considérable en 2000, jusqu'à 14%. En ce qui concerne les premières élections depuis 1989, à partir d'un point de vue quantitatif, plus de la moitié des postes ministériels sont occupés par la nomenklatura communiste. Dans le cadre du troisième gouvernement, il y a une légère baisse jusqu'à 47% et dans le gouvernement de 2000, le taux se diminue à 18%<sup>14</sup>.

Pensant l'année 1989 en termes d'une simultanée rupture et continuité par ailleurs visible dans le cas de la Roumanie, il est essentiel de souligner que toute tentative visant à analyser l'émergence, la formation et le fonctionnement des élites postcommunistes implique un retour aux origines de cette élite soudainement entrée dans scène publique, parce que "l'élite d'aujourd'hui trouve sa racine, sa compétence, son succès, sa puissance dans les élites d'hier"<sup>15</sup>. La réapparition des personnalités de premier rang du régime communiste dans les nouvelles structures démocratiques en cours de constitution conduit à la formation d'une classe politique spécifique, appelée *post-nomenklatura*<sup>16</sup>.

Par ailleurs, la perpétuation des élites n'est pas surprenante, mais apparaît comme naturelle : "en absence d'une élite professionnalisée de remplacement, la continuité s'impose"<sup>17</sup>. Dans ces circonstances, il est important à noter comment le maintien du pouvoir à l'intérieur d'un même cercle dirigeant pèse sur la qualité de l'instauration d'un régime démocratique et quelles en sont les prémisses de la continuité outre l'évident caractère professionnel. Une telle recherche sur l'histoire des élites politiques s'avère avoir un enjeu scientifique, mais aussi politique<sup>18</sup>, la connaissance de l'évolution de la classe qui prend les décisions étant vitale pour l'étude du postcommunisme. L'absence de la structuration d'une contre-élite, qui prenne en charge la résistance anticommuniste favorise l'implication des partis historiques revitalisés sur la scène politique d'après 1989 en Roumanie plus que dans

<sup>13</sup> Raluca Grosescu, "Traectorii de conversie politică a nomenclaturii din România. Spre o economie a partidelor create de fostele elite", in: *Elite comuniste înainte și după 1989, Anuarul IICCR*, (Iași: Polirom, 2007), 199-231 ;

<sup>14</sup> Les chiffres se retrouvent dans l'étude de Grosescu, *Traectorii de conversie politică a nomenclaturii din România...*, 201-205 ;

<sup>15</sup> Georges Mink, Jean-Charles Szurek, "De la nomenklatura poloneză la elitele economice postcomuniste", in : Ezra, Henri, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, 251 ;

<sup>16</sup> Le terme est utilisé par Daniel Barbu pour argumenter le fait que la scène politique en cours de se constituer est dominée par une classe dirigeante capable à s'adapter idéologiquement à un changement de régime, dérivant de cette manière un groupement politique de néo ou cryptocomunistes, qui s'articule dans un courant d'action politique cohérente ; Daniel Barbu, *Republica absentă*, (București : Nemira, 2004), 30 ;

<sup>17</sup> Ezra, Henri, *Recrutarea elitelor în Europa*, 293 ;

<sup>18</sup> Les deux enjeux de la réflexion sur l'histoire des élites en Europe central sont identifiées par Nicolas Bauquet, François Bocholier (éds.), *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale*, (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2006), 22-23 ;

des pays comme la Pologne, l’Hongrie, la République Tchèque<sup>19</sup>, le Parti National Paysan Chrétien Démocrate, ou le Parti National Liberal arrivant ainsi à y occuper des positions-clé dans le nouvel échafaudage institutionnel.

Le besoin d'une d'étude plus approfondie sur la problématique des élites en Europe centrale et de l'Est est pleinement justifiée étant donné le fait que ce thème soulève un débat politique porté après l'installation de régimes démocratiques dans la région, étant apportée en discussion "l'ampleur, réelle ou présumée de la "grande conversion" de la nomenklatura"<sup>20</sup> dans le contexte de profonds changements au début des années 1990.

Pour ce qui tient à la rupture et à la discontinuité, "une culture du changement consiste dans une grande rapidité et non-linéarité d'une part et dans le potentiel aussi grand pour des manifestations créatives de l'autre côté"<sup>21</sup>. Le processus de changement, afin d'atteindre des résultats favorables, exige "une capacité d'innovation (inovativeness)"<sup>22</sup>. En quel pourcentage l'univers de l'élite après 1990 représente changement et innovation ou bien une visible continuité reste un vif débat.

La disparition de l'Ancien Régime apporte avec soi un changement radical parmi ceux qui coagulaient le pouvoir politique, dans les fonctions et les rôles joués par ceux qui ont partagé l'autorité, entraînant une restructuration fondamentale du pouvoir lui-même : "Elle reflète un processus de scissiparité et de redistribution des privilèges, des marques, des rôles et de la reconnaissance sociale"<sup>23</sup>.

La mise en place d'un nouveau régime doit être visualisée dans l'ensemble de ses conséquences ; le réarrangement institutionnel et l'organisation de nouveaux acteurs sont confrontés à des difficultés majeures, partant de l'exercice de la capacité décisionnelle jusqu'à la faible articulation des partis politiques et l'incapacité de ceux-ci à éduquer le corpus électoral. Cette dernière dimension a deux effets majeurs: le vote se déroule en l'absence de culture politique démocratique des citoyens et les élites politiques se trouvent devant le défi de gouverner tout en construisant le régime démocratique.

Dans les changements de régime survenus en Europe centrale et orientale, les élites politiques ont eu et continuent d'avoir un rôle fondamental. Ainsi, la littérature politique a estimé "qu'en mettant l'accent sur les caractéristiques des élites politiques (origines, valeurs et comportements) peuvent être compris les processus complexes de transformation et leurs résultats"<sup>24</sup>.

Parmi les élites qui peuplent le paysage politique roumain après 1989, on peut identifier trois catégories différentes, appelées de manière informelle comme "les survivants", "les ressuscités" et "les nouveau venus"<sup>25</sup>.

La justification de la participation au pouvoir politique est différente pour chacune de ces trois catégories : les survivants indiquent l'expertise dans la direction des affaires de l'État; les ressuscités se basent sur les luttes politiques historiques qu'ils ont menées lors de l'instauration du communisme, sur les longues périodes de détention et sur l'attachement pour les véritables principes et symboles démocratiques. Enfin, les nouveau arrivées argumentent le manque de l'implication dans le champs politique antérieur, indépendamment de la période, et la spécificité d'être des gens dédiés à la construction du présent.

<sup>19</sup> L'observation de ce phénomène est fait par Stelian Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, (București : Humanitas, 2006), 45 ;

<sup>20</sup> Bauquet, Bocholier, *Le communisme et les élites en Europe Centrale*, 23 ;

<sup>21</sup> Michael Fullan, *Leading in a culture of change*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001), 31;

<sup>22</sup> Fullan, *Leading in a culture of change*;

<sup>23</sup> Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, 12;

<sup>24</sup> Laurențiu Ștefan, *Patterns of political elite recruitment in post-communist Romania*, (București: Editura Ziua, 2004), 9;

<sup>25</sup> Les trois dénominations appartiennent à Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, 49 ;

Lors des élections du début des années 1990, il y a une apparente rupture des élites communistes dans les structures de gestion, mais un retour ultérieur massif de celles-ci s'opère, dans des postes-clés de l'exercice du pouvoir politique, exprimant une plus grande confiance dans l'expérience prouvée des élites communistes et l'incapacité des gouvernements révolutionnaires à répondre positivement au défi posé par l'ouverture d'un arrangement institutionnel démocratique.

La logique dichotomique de rupture et continuité présente au niveau des élites politiques dans les pays postcommunistes tend s'imprégner hautement dans les processus de constitution et consolidation des classes dirigeantes après 1989.

Durant la période communiste, le contrôle exercé par le Parti Communiste dans le recrutement des cadres se manifestait de haut en bas, partant du centre et se reproduisant au niveau régional et local<sup>26</sup>. L'institution du pluralisme politique ainsi que la validation des représentants politiques à travers les élections démocratiques régulières change profondément le mode de recrutement des dirigeants politiques, sans pour autant constituer un piège dans la reproduction d'une partie de l'ancienne nomenklatura.

Au niveau primaire – le niveau local, lors du moment de la rupture et donc pendant les premiers élections (variant entre 1989 et 1992 dans les pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale), tenant compte de l'ampleur des transformations, au moins en apparence, l'ancienne élite communiste n'a pas le temps pour se replier et semble être remplacée par une nouvelle couche ; cependant, au fur et à mesure que le temps passe prend lieu, "le retour au pouvoir des ex-communistes et de leurs alliés paysans"<sup>27</sup>. Ce premier moment de rupture est donc petit à petit remplacé par la reprise de la scène politique par les anciennes élites communistes, grâce à leur expérience et à la gestion défectueuse assumée par les gouvernements révolutionnaires<sup>28</sup>.

## CONCLUSIONS

Quelle a été le sort de la nomenklatura après la chute des régimes communistes ?

Trois considérations sont à analyser pour ce qui tient de la nomenklatura et de son destin lors des événements de 1989 – 1990 : 1) le pouvoir effectif se retrouve dans les mains d'une partie de la nomenklatura ; 2) le régime laisse naître graduellement une contre-élite qui jouera sa carte en 1989 ; 3) une partie de l'ex-élite garde la capacité de faire mettre en place son capital symbolique ou culturel pour se réinsérer dans le nouveau paysage politique<sup>29</sup>.

La dernière considération semble plus adéquate si on pense à la définition canonique des élites : "plus que par un rapport direct au pouvoir, on caractérisera donc les membres des élites par la possession d'un capital économique, culturel, politique, social ou symbolique, susceptible de les faire accéder à des situations de pouvoir"<sup>30</sup>.

La chute irréversible de l'Ancien Régime, surtout par une révolution sanglante, qui entraîne la transformation de la nature même du pouvoir<sup>31</sup> pose fortement la question de la validité de la continuité des élites politiques ; "les changements de régimes se sont incontestablement traduits par une mutation accélérée des structures et des voies d'accès aux élites"<sup>32</sup>. Il nous paraît donc optimal de considérer l'utilité future des analyses partant d'un positionnement de *via media*, qui soutient que : "La nomenklatura est disparue comme corps homogène,

<sup>26</sup> Mink, Szurek, *De la nomenklatura poloneză la elitele economice postcomuniste*, 256 ;

<sup>27</sup> Mink, Szurek, *De la nomenklatura poloneză la elitele economice postcomuniste*, 258 ;

<sup>28</sup> Bauquet, Bocholier, *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale....*, 52 ;

<sup>29</sup> Ces trois dimensions sont analysées par Nicolas Bauquet, François Bocholier (éds.), *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale....*, 24 ;

<sup>30</sup> Bauquet, Bocholier, *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale....*, 24 ;

<sup>31</sup> Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, 12 ;

<sup>32</sup> Bauquet, Bocholier, *Le communisme et les élites en Europe centrale....*, 51 ;

structuré. Mais nombreux de ses éléments participent à titre individuel ou de group aux différents niveaux des structures de pouvoir<sup>33</sup>. De plus, pour la pertinence des recherches, il est important

Pour ce qui est de la continuité, la possession du capital a joué sa carte ; cet instrument a conduit à la préservation des membres de l'ancienne élite dans des postes dirigeants aussi dans la période postcommuniste. Toutefois, une nouvelle élite naît. Elle semble trouver ses ressorts dans deux sources principales : dans une tradition politique qui remonte à la période ante et post-guerre et une autre formée de l'intellectualité humaniste, managériale et technique<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, 12;

<sup>34</sup> Tănase, *Revoluția ca eșec*, 71.

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## **POLISH STRATEGY: EFFORTS TO BUILD UP AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE THEM? - ABOUT NATIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC "TURN" AND WHAT IS BEHIND IT**

**Filip NALASKOWSKI<sup>1</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

*WHAT IS THE BIGGEST SOCIAL PROBLEM IN POLAND? IN A NEAR FUTURE POLAND WILL BECOME A POOR LAND OF OLD PEOPLE. IT'S THE DEMOGRAPHICAL DOWNHILL. PAPER SHOWS POSSIBLE STRATEGIES AND IMPOSSIBLE EFFORTS.*

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**KEY WORDS:** SOCIETY; DEMOGRAPHY; EDUCATION, POLAND; SOCIAL PROBLEMS; STRATEGIES;

### **INTRODUCTION**

Country are the people, and if this statement is trivial it happens that we do not fully realize. Tradition and patriotism are in living people. People are the creators of culture. For them exists and creates a law, and about them is the history. Moreover, not only the people, the nation, is the sense of the existence of the state, but also the community is the sine qua non of its existence. According to the classical definition, country: land, power and people <sup>2</sup>. It is therefore worth, even very briefly, to look at the strength and potential of modern Polish state.

As perhaps never in the history of the Polish state is safe territory. The country borders remained virtually<sup>3</sup> unchanged since the end of World War II. Today, the active involvement of Poland in NATO, but also in other structures, seems to calm about Polish borders only confirm. Poland has a place on the map of Europe, and no one in their right mind does not attempt to challenge it.

For almost 25 years, Poland is fully democratic. What does it mean? Poles themselves choose their government. The nation took over full responsibility for governance in its own grounds. This is due to international standards. However, once again turning toward the clichés, the democratic system is not a perfect solution<sup>4</sup>, so we do not know a better

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<sup>1</sup> PhD, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland, filipn@umk.pl

<sup>2</sup>The simplification of the definition of G. Hegla, for: Mariusz, Gulczyński; *Nauka o polityce*, Warsaw: AlmaMer, 2007;

<sup>3</sup> An exception was here "correction of border" of the Soviet Union in 1951, covering more than 480 km<sup>2</sup> territory of the People's Republic.

<sup>4</sup> For W. Churchill, namely: "Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time. " - House of Commons Speech, November 11, 1947.

alternative. Just as it did in relation to border security, so here we will not find legitimate votes undermine the autonomy of Poland.

The third condition is the nation. Ethnic community, political and cultural identifies the with the concept of Polish. Contrary to what is often shown, the Poles are still a strong nation. Historical experience, but also contemporary problems seem still to work in favor of social cohesion in the country. Invariably an important role, although slightly decreasing, has a church. Community tradition, history and customs prevalent among the majority of citizens, constantly distinguished Poles in Europe, which seems as specific monolith<sup>5</sup>. One might say that the Poles are a nation of "quality" quite strong, and nothing in this situation will not change anything in the near future.

The real, main problem is disclosed in respect to the "quantitative" dimension of the Polish population. Here appears real, reasonable concerns and anxieties. Polish society is melting, but also getting older and the projections do not predict imminent improvement.

In short summary, it is clear that unless there is no reason for serious concern about the shape of the Polish border and autonomous authority, whereas the greatest threat to the existence of the Polish state, are demographic threats. Shrinking in number and aging nation will not be able stand on guard of borders and autonomy. Contemporary concern for Polishness is a concern about the size and structure of the nation.

## MAIN TEXT

### DEMOGRAPHIC DOWNHILL

With regard to the demographics of Poland and challenges associated with it, stands out today a few problematic areas. Perhaps the most important two of them have already been mentioned: change of structure of the population and declining birth rates. Behind them are mentioned as well dimensional changes in family structures, labor market problems, impacts of globalization<sup>6</sup>.

It is worth briefly describe the situation and demographic projections for the Poland. According to the data in 2011 registered more than 390 thousand live births<sup>7</sup>, a decrease of more than 23 thousand compared to 2010, but also it is about 30% less than in 1990 and more than 55% less than in 1983, which was the peak year of the last baby boomers (nearly 724 thousand births). In 2011, the birth rate (number of births per 1000 inhabitants) was 10.1% (up 0.7 points less than in the previous year, but more than 4 points less than in 1990 and more than 9 points less than in 1983 respectively)<sup>8</sup>.

Especially unfavorable period of 1984-2003 were the years when it was recorded steady decline in the birth rate - up to 351 thousand in 2003, which was the worst in the demographic development of the country. The year 2009 was the sixth consecutive year in which was recorded greater number of them, but unfortunately the last. Since the year 2010, the number of births is falls again.

Optimal demographic situation - simple replacement of generations - determines total fertility rate shaping at the level of 2,1-2,15 (if in a given year per woman aged 15-49 years falls on average 2 children). Nowadays the number of birth rate recorded - the level of reproduction - does not guarantee the replacement of generations, not to mention the growth of population. Still remains observed since 1989, a period of depression at birth. In 2011, the

<sup>5</sup> Stefan, Wolff; *Ethnic Minorities in Europe: The Basic Facts*, (Nottingham: UoN Press, 2008), 2.

<sup>6</sup> Bożena, Balcerzak-Paradowska; *Ogólne kierunki zmian w polityce rodzinnej krajów Unii Europejskiej* [in:] *Polityka rodzinna w krajach Unii Europejskiej – wnioski dla Polski*, (Warsaw: RPO, 2009); 19-21.

<sup>7</sup> *Rocznik statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, (Warsaw: The Central Statistical Office, 2012); 148-216.

<sup>8</sup> *Population Prognosis for Poland 2008-2035*; (Warsaw: The Central Statistical Office, 2008); 147-187.



total fertility rate reached only 1.30<sup>9</sup>. From 24 years in Poland there was not a single year in which the number of births will guarantee the replacement of generations.

Thus, these data indicate that this sub-title downhill (mountain bike competition involving fast descending a route, with very steep slopes of the mountains), it is not an exaggerated metaphor for the Polish situation in which the number of citizens is rapidly declining. Results of long-term predictions of the Polish population by 2035 - CSO - leave no illusions: in the coming years, the number of Polish population will steadily decrease, the rate of decline will be getting better with time. It was expected that in 2010 the Polish population has reached almost 38 092 thousand people (actually 38 200 thousand), in 2020 - about 37 830 thousand, and in 2035 - about 35 993 thousand. A similar state of population growth occurred in the years 1981-1982, when it was seen last peak of birth. In the next 20 years, will diminish more than 2 million Poles, with just over 38.5 million<sup>10</sup> to almost 36.5 million.

### **OLD AND POOR AS A POLE**

From the decline of the population has the right to further alarmed the age structure of the population. In the simplest terms, it could be characterized as a proportion of the size of different age groups. As before, so it is worth relay on hard data from the Central Statistical Office.

The age structure of the population will change rapidly throughout the prediction period - that is, until 2035. For these changes are responsible changes occurring in the highs and demographic lows, the effects of which overlap with different strength in different periods. The result of this "wave" are visible changes in the processes of fertility and mortality. What is important, migrations affects less on the age proportion of population<sup>11</sup>.

Number of people of working age (18-59/64 [male / female]) throughout the prediction period will systematically decrease from 24570 thousand in 2010 to 20739 thousand. In 2035, thus more than 3,8 million with the biggest decrease will take place in the five years from 2015 to 2020 (about 1,2 million people). These changes will result in a rapid shrinking and aging labor force and consequently deterioration of the labor supply in the Polish labor market. To make matters worse, the process of melting of the population of working age, will accompany the process of increasing the population of retirement age, with 6413 thousand in 2010 to 9621 thousand in 2035.

A preventive measure already used here was to extend working time between men and women with 60 years in the case of women and 65 years in case of men up to 67 for both sexes. By definition, this is a solution to some extent unfair and reducing the feeling of safety and comfort of citizens. Moreover, used strategy does not solve the problem, it moves only slightly over time.

What is meant by the changes in the structure of the population? Now the burden of maintaining all other citizens (under 18 and above 59/64) in 2035 will rest on the shoulders of a group of about 18% less numerous than now. To make matters worse, the number of retirees and pensioners 'dependent' of working people will increase by as much as 34 percent. These risks can be expressed in a different way: while in 2010 the one person of retirement age there were nearly 4 (3,83) in production age, then in 2035, will fall a little over two (2,15) - that is, while maintaining the same indicators and social regulation, the money will be about half as much<sup>12</sup>. A further consequence of this dramatic trend, must be either a reduction of benefits and expenses for all (children, pensioners), or increase charges towards employees

<sup>9</sup> *Rocznik statystyczny Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, 189.

<sup>10</sup> Data from the census of 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Data from the census of 2011, s. 161.

<sup>12</sup> Own estimation.

(taxes, fees, labor costs) - both "solutions" are however, impoverishment of society and serious economic problems of Poland.

### **HELP-ROBBERY**

About demographic problems characteristic for Poland, scientists and politicians are debating for years. Like many other issues, so here, you can try to counteract the causes or effects. Also, as in other areas, counteracting only the effects do not solve the problem actually, at most mitigates their effects.

This group of solutions include earlier presented ideas extending of working time (working age), which governs decided to introduce in Poland. Similarly, the robbery effect of lowering expenditures will bear the expense of all citizens of the state. The younger ones - through cuts in: social benefits, education sector, health care, sport. Similarly, it would be in the strategy of the oldest - saving would be performed at the expense of health care, but primarily through diminution the amount of pensions. In a word, it would be acting not only ineffective, but simply unethical towards weakest sections of society.

Similarly, short-sighted solutions will be attempts to retain the amount of state expenditures by further increasing the commitment of citizens: taxes - including VAT, excise, duties and, of course, income tax and labor costs - even insurance premiums. From the point of view of social unrest Once again, we would have to deal with the unethical and potentially dangerous action.

Like the previous "solutions" such ideas and increasing public debt should be considered as wasteful and ineffective strategy. Without a clear, certain perspective of repayment (to such, and not other demographic and economic indicators there is no perspective) such a move would be interpreted as acting against Polish society and posterity.

### **(IM)POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS**

A contemporary Europe, which was struggling (and still is struggling) with demographic challenges similar to Polish, has developed many strategy for the recovery of indicators of population. One of them is a family policy.

Theoreticians in relation to family policy on our continent distinguish several models: liberal, conservative, social democratic, south European<sup>13</sup>. It seems, however, that determine of the effectiveness of the model is not only difficult but sometimes impossible, due to the important role of other factors that are superimposed on the dynamics of demographic processes. It is difficult, for example, determine with certainty whether Ireland's success is the result of demographic well growing economy and increasing wealth of society, a strong Christian tradition, effective family policy, or influx of people from other countries. While analyzing examples of various European countries, a try to eliminate individual factors, allows to draw a certain very cautious conclusions.

It seems that the overall wealth of the society, which often is combined with priority of careers, as well as the inclusion of women in the labor market is not conducive to (indirectly) the development of the population. This is evidenced by data of Germany. Germany as one of the the richest countries of the old continent for decades struggling with declining birth rates, especially in families of native German, and more recently with the decline of the population. Most clearly about this also provide worldwide data, where the list of society with the "highest number of births" open societies of poorest countries (mainly in Africa), and closes very rich countries like Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Austria<sup>14</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Bożena, *Ogólne kierunki zmian w polityce rodzinnej krajów Unii Europejskiej*, 15.

<sup>14</sup> Index Mundi – [www.indexmundi.com](http://www.indexmundi.com) – 8.05.2013r.

Thus, one can even indicate an inverse proportion - the richer the country, the lower the birth rate .

What impact has the tradition and culture of demographic change? As it turns out, probably limited. On the one hand is an example of traditionally Catholic Ireland, which for many years was noted down for a high demographic indicators. On the other hand, there are examples of societies traditionally of family like Italy (also traditionally Catholic) and Greece, which for years stuck in stagnation. In order to more accurately demonstrate the limited influence of culture, we can give the example of Sweden, which is not associated with a strong family tradition, but the population steadily increases.

With the high degree of certainty can be established that on demographic development has affected family policy, but this policy must be intensive. This is well illustrated by the examples of Scandinavian countries and France. These are countries with very extensive package of support for families. Free kindergartens and nursery schools, generous benefits for the child (for progressive), long and well-paid parental leave, favorable conditions for families in tax systems. This strategy is effective, but it also has its weaknesses. The first is associated with enormous costs, and hence the fiscal burden to the citizens. The second most on such impulses react poorer sections of the society, for which the proposed amounts are measurable, significant profit and encouragement. It should be noted that to a large extent in these poorer sections of the "fit" the immigrant community<sup>15</sup>.

To complete this thesis can be indicated countries that implement family policy "not-intensive" and the effects of these activities are very limited. Among the group of those countries include the countries of Eastern Europe, including Poland. "Baby bonus" (ie, a one-time grant for the birth of a child), parental leave, subsidies for kindergartens and some relief in the tax system appear to be insufficient incentive to have children.

### DEMOGRAPHIC TIGERS OF EUROPE

With some caution, but also with documentary evidence in hard data<sup>16</sup>, you can accept the idea that the most important element in the fight for the preservation and development of the population is the impact of immigrants. Today's "demographic tigers of Europe", are countries wide open to immigrants, and what's involved, the countries in which the population of new immigrants provides a relatively large percentage. The phenomenon of this process lies in the fact that the population of the country is increasing not only because of the flow of immigrants, but most of all a very high fertility of these, after settling.

Classic examples of this are the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Spain and Italy. Listed here countries share, to a lesser or greater extent, a few features. All, from the rest of Europe, have high rates of population growth. All of them are clearly upstream indicators of net immigration - it means that a lot more people settle there, than to leave - which shows the strong liberal immigration policy. After all, not full, but the available data indicate that in most of these countries fertility rates among the native population is quite low - on average per woman can fall from 1,40 child (Italy) to 1,73 (Finland)<sup>17</sup>.

What is not to be missed is the fact that economists often associated countries' economic success with increased influx of immigrants<sup>18</sup> – as classic examples are here, the

<sup>15</sup> B. Kołaczek, *Uwarunkowania demograficzne, społeczno-gospodarcze i kulturowe polityki rodzinnej w krajach Unii Europejskiej* [in:] *Polityka rodzinna w krajach Unii Europejskiej – wnioski dla Polski*, 31-54.

<sup>16</sup> Index Mundi

<sup>17</sup> Index Mundi

<sup>18</sup> George J., Borjas; *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001);

United States, Canada and Australia. This can sometimes be translated as immigrant initiative and determination in making work. It is also said about the feedback, it means that the more people flows, the more developed the economy and the country becomes more attractive to newcomers.

There is also the other side of the medal, and in fact a number of potential problems. First, the influx of people of widely varying ethnic and cultural roots often cause serious conflicts in the background. In Europe, especially the "bad name" have immigrants from Muslim countries - as evidenced by the "friction" in France, but also in the Netherlands, Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. What is interesting, these problems do not have a large scale in Ireland, which together accounted for most of the people from other European countries (mainly Poland) - so not so distant ethnically and culturally.

The emergence of foreign nations, may cause unrest and discontent among the indigenous population. In contrast to the cultural conflicts they may have some other ground - this will often be the economic base. Then, too often repeated arguments, passwords will be "picking up jobs" or "squeeze rates". But again, as economists suggest, these are wrong statement, because it often indicates a positive impact of immigration on the economy<sup>19</sup>.

The last issue worth discussing is only temporary activity of immigrant population. As indicated in the research of sociologists and demographers<sup>20</sup>, high fertility rates especially characterized by immigrants in the first and second generation, then it expires. Thus, the procedure of opening of borders can solve demographic problems, but only in the scale of 1-2 generations.

## CONCLUSION

### ROAD TO POLAND - NEW FAMILY POLICY AND IMMIGRATION

As has been show up, there are two effective strategies to improve the demographic situation.

In the situation of Poland extremely difficult to implement family policy will be high expenditure. In view of the difficult economic situation, high unemployment and public debt, it seems impossible to save up so high measures that could become an incentive to create numerous families. It is worth to mention that the introduction of so called "Baby bonus" was great effort and problem and it was only a one-time expenditure of about 1000 zł<sup>21</sup> for every newborn Pole. Family policy is even systematic high expenditure, monthly allowances for children, fees for kindergartens and nurseries, wages for parents on parental leave, but the reduction in revenues from higher tax rebate. It seems that such measures are beyond the reach of Poland.

The second strategy is opening up to immigration. This direction is also not easy to implement, but probably only actually possible. Here we can even talk about a new family and immigration policy. The first condition for the success of such a strategy is ... to find potentially interested in settling in the country. For economic, cultural and even climatic reasons Poland is not frequent, attractive destination for people looking for a new country. However, there are community groups interested in settling in Poland. These are often citizens of former Soviet republics but also Asian countries. What is interesting, and particularly important, some of these people are descendants of Polish exiles and displaced persons. This group should be a natural first "tranche" of immigration. People identify with

<sup>19</sup> Borjas, *Heaven's Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy*

<sup>20</sup> Blau, Francine D.; *The Fertility of Immigrant Women: Evidence from High-Fertility Source Countries* [in] Immigration and the Workforce: Economic Consequences for the United States and Source Areas; Chicago: Borjas and Freeman, 1992;

<sup>21</sup> That is about 250€.

Poland, sometimes dreaming of moving (back) to the country of their ancestors. The existing limitations very often prevent from the arrival.

Another strategic recommendation is the lead of immigration policy to restrict the cultural - ethnic – social conflicts. So, of course, a wide opening and preferences should apply to communities that do not deviate too much from native culture and willing to assimilate in Poland. In this regard, it would be necessary to use the experience of Western Europe, which has been measuring for a long time the problem of the immigrant population.

Finally, the last recommendation would be to implement, to the extent possible of economic, the family policy to further assist families in establishing "new Poles", not forgetting the "old" citizens. The combination of good family policy with openness to newcomers was as it seems, a recipe for demographic success In UK and Ireland.

The rate of such strategies, in addition to demonstrated improvement of (in fact salvation) demographic situation can be economic success. As was mentioned earlier, it was often involving countries involved to open and thoughtful immigration and family policy.

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## THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE AND NUCLEAR COORDINATES OF REGIONAL SECURITY

Andreea Emilia DUȚĂ<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

THE CENTERPIECE OF MAINTAINING PEACE AND SECURITY IS THE DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION, PLUS THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM.<sup>2</sup> A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION IS MORE THAN NECESSARY, BUT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS HAVE TOUCHED ONLY THE POLITICAL DECLARATION, A SMALL STEP BUT IT MUST BE DEVELOPED.<sup>3</sup> NOTE THAT MEMBER'S RESPONSIBILITY MUST BE CORRELATED WITH INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.<sup>4</sup>

"THE NUCLEAR SUBSYSTEM" AS PART OF THE OVERALL POLITICAL SYSTEM COULD INCLUDE NEW ACTORS CHARACTERIZED BY FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS DIFFERENT FROM TRADITIONAL STATE ACTORS, BUT CAN BECOME VIRTUAL COORDINATES FOR THE IMPLEMENTED POLICIES. POTENTIAL REGIONAL OUTBREAKS THAT CAN SUPPORT OPEN CONFLICT WITH NUCLEAR SIZE, INDIA-PAKISTAN, ISRAEL, IRAN, NORTH KOREA'S AMBITIONS RAISED ON THE AGENDA, THE NEED FOR REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AS A WAY OF MODELING DEVELOPMENTS NEGOTIATED AS THE GLOBAL DIPLOMATIC POORLY REGULATED.

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**KEYWORDS:** DISARMAMENT, NON-PROLIFERATION, SECOND NUCLEAR AGE, REGIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY

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<sup>1</sup> Andreea Emilia DUȚĂ attends the Bucharest University and actually is engaged a study program within "A.S. Puskin" Institute, Moscow. Email: deea.emilia@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Recall the statement in UN General Assembly Resolution 67/44 on *Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction* "Emphasizing that progress is urgently needed in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation in order to maintain international peace and security and to contribute to global efforts against terrorism", and recognize that there is a need to make further progress in this regard. The Ministerial Declaration from the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, 1 July 2013 (Annex of document GOV/INF/2013/9-GC(57)/INF/6), Preamble and Para. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Invite States that have not yet done so to make a political commitment to implement the non-legally-binding *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources* and supplementary *Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*, and encourage all States to implement these instruments and to maintain effective security of radioactive sources throughout their life cycle. The Ministerial Declaration from the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts, 1 July 2013 (Annex of document GOV/INF/2013/9-GC(57)/INF/6), Preamble and Para. 4.

<sup>4</sup> The objective of the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 is to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective security wherever nuclear and other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to meet their national responsibilities and international obligations, to reduce risks and to respond appropriately to threats. Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017, GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19, 2 August 2013.

## TWO IMPERFECT ATTEMPTS: DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

In the sixth decade of the last century, the strategic approach to the issue of disarmament failed to change the international effort towards non-proliferation and limiting risks. US-Soviet discussions on the reduction and limitation of strategic weapons, offensive and defensive,<sup>5</sup> concluded that the damage caused by a nuclear war are huge and continuous improvement of these weapons worse consequences.

In the seventh decade of the last century, disarmament is replaced by the international nuclear non-proliferation agenda, the nuclear powers maintain nuclear strategic advantages and privileges protects its active position in addressing the nuclear issue.

The parallel development of strategic missile and missile defense systems, including the effects of the disaster revealed destruction of nuclear warheads by defense interceptors defensive systems - project Grushin,<sup>6</sup> system components Taran medium range and long-range<sup>7</sup>, project Avrora,<sup>8</sup> the project system of A-135 accompanied by the development of operational-tactical scale missile defense of Moscow. A new stage begins with the development of the concept of missile defense, including a spatial dimension having responsibilities.<sup>9</sup>

In the period 1950-1970, from a position of unique nuclear superpower USA finds catching the USSR<sup>10</sup> and world formula promotes five nuclear powers.<sup>11</sup> "The threat polygonal" - if the Cold War nuclear games were controlled by the two major powers in the second nuclear age, each member of the nuclear club threatens many countries, an unprecedented challenge.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>5</sup> The Treaty banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, 1968). Article VI of NPT committed the nuclear powers "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." ABM treaty (1972).

<sup>6</sup> Grushin's Experimental Design Bureau. V-1000 interceptor missile, ground-based system of missile defense codenamed "A". See I. D. Yevtiev, "Iz istorii sozdania zenitnoraketnogo shchita Rossii – o sozdanii zenitnykh upravlyayemykh raket i zenitno-raketnykh kompleksov v Rossii i stranakh NATO" ("From the History of the Development of the Missile Defense Shield of Moscow: On the Development of Guided Missiles for Air Defense Systems in Russia and NATO countries"), (Moscow: Vyzovskaya kniga, 2000), 75.

<sup>7</sup> The long- and medium-range components of the Taran system with multi-channel radar stations of the TsSO-S type. See M. Pervov, "Sistemy raketno-kosmicheskoi oboroni sozdavalis tak" ("This is How the Space and Missile Defense Systems of the Country were Created"), 2nd ed., AVIARIUS-XXI, 2004, 161.

<sup>8</sup> The project would take place in three phases: first shield around Moscow, the European part of the USSR, the Asian part of the USSR supported by two rounds of radio stations to intercept and impact with interceptors. Huge costs have blocked full deployment of the project. See M. Pervov, "Sistemy raketno-kosmicheskoi oboroni sozdavalis tak" ("This is How the Space and Missile Defense Systems of the Country were Created"), 2nd ed., AVIARIUS-XXI, 2004, 173.

<sup>9</sup> concepts of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems.

<sup>10</sup> Halperin group's report, "we came to an inevitable conclusion that none of the existing American strategic programs could give us the predominance that we had in the 1950s."

<sup>11</sup> The Five Polar Power World formula (U.S., USSR, China, Western Europe and Japan). In 1974, The ABM Treaty is signed together with an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

<sup>12</sup> The author presents the geopolitical area Middle East: as if Iran will have nuclear weapons at their disposal, then Egypt and Saudi Arabia will try to procure such weapons also followed automatically by Syria; in the second phase, the United States and Israel will be threatened and possibly a third phase - after a race of having irrational nuclear weapons - triggering a regional nuclear war. Andrei Kokoshin, *Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, (Harvard Kennedy School, 2011), 2.



ABMT becomes the text model of many international agreements based on the principle of equality and equal security by limiting and prohibitions. The provisions regarding limitations of each signatory state from MD system - include maximum 100 interceptors and 100 launchers arranged in only two areas, each with a radius of 150 km - reflected nuclear balance, the main component of the strategic military balance at the time, later called official "strategic stability".<sup>13</sup> It is recognized by both superpowers that provision of strategic missile submarines raise uncertainty in the forecast of a potential nuclear conflict.

In the next period it followed a new spiral of potential nuclear confrontation with the Soviet deployment of SS-20<sup>14</sup> and Pershing II<sup>15</sup> by the United States and the launch of the SDI program with the threat of withdrawal of ABMT.

Scientific and technological auspices of a new spiral, this time in space, enabling the production of anti-satellite weapons systems for the annihilation of adversary satellites - orbit flying already known - virtually ensuring protection of nuclear warheads. New anti-satellite weapons spiral brings new threats, reconnaissance satellites, the missile warning system and satellite systems infrastructure. Without being based on a bilateral moratorium on conducting mutually and testing anti-satellite weapons, respected by the USSR and the USA, between 1985<sup>16</sup> - 2008.<sup>17</sup>

US strategic orientation is based on the "preemptive military action"<sup>18</sup> and it raises some ambiguity regarding the materialization option proactive defense and efficiency of its space vehicles.<sup>19</sup>

Anti-satellite technology is of great diversity - depending on the location (on land, water, air, space), the energy used (kinetic, energetic), tactics (to malfunction, blindness), vector - MiG-31 and F-15 and space mines.

After the Cold War, US and USSR in a joint statement commits to strengthen strategic stability.<sup>20</sup>

The deterioration of US-Russian relations, participation trends blocked multilateral nuclear issues, returning to Cold War superpowers binomial but much changed coordinated with development potential unpredictable.

Currently, there is an unanimous need for a regulated framework for nuclear safety.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> The term "strategic stability" was used in the U.S.-USSR Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty] as of 1987, and the START I Treaty as of 1991.

<sup>14</sup> SS-20 - Pioneer medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), which carried three MIRV warheads.

<sup>15</sup> Pershing II (MRBM) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), with stronger capability to hit hard targets (including underground command posts).

<sup>16</sup> The United States conducted a test of its anti-satellite weapons, hitting a low-orbit satellite with an experimental air-deployed ballistic missile called the SRAM-Altair.

<sup>17</sup> When sea-launched missiles hit a U.S. reconnaissance satellite. Before that, China conducted an anti-satellite missile test using a German interceptor missile.

<sup>18</sup> The principle of taking preemptive military action against any threat to the U.S. national security, which was defined in the *U.S. 2002 National Security Strategy*.

<sup>19</sup> See Marc Kaufman, Dafna Linzer, "China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test," *Washington Post*, 19 January 2007. Available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007011801029.html>.

<sup>20</sup> The statement said that future negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms should be aimed at "further reduction of the risk of war, especially nuclear war, enhancement of strategic stability, transparency and predictability by way of further stabilizing reductions of the strategic arsenals of both countries. This shall be achieved through the pursuit of arrangements that increase survivability, eliminate incentives for the first nuclear strike, and embody the relevant interrelation between the strategic offensive and defensive means."

<sup>21</sup> The Agency supports the international legal framework for nuclear security through the promotion of the relevant legally binding and non-binding instruments under Agency auspices and the development of comprehensive guidance in the Nuclear Security Series in accordance with the publications plan agreed by the

## DIRECTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE

Nuclear governance includes a series of measures that states adhere even if against their interests. An important role is played by specific regions interstate- relations crises, conflicts - regional balance of conventional forces, alliances etc.<sup>22</sup>

Arms control and governance are built on mutual basis, on matters of strategic significance serious point but usually not used through legal instruments. Under these arrangements, which have delicate granted both the international dimension and the national sovereignty, the center pivot is the risk that nuclear weapons are drawn.

There is a major distinction to disarmament and non-proliferation even if they are correlated, because if its interests are ignored governance and the other are promoted.

A direction of development of the nuclear age is the nuclear fuel cycle control; although steps in developing a multilateral management known variants since the Cold War, but no progress is made.<sup>23</sup>

Currently, institutions, arrangements and practice do not operate as a coherent complex, unable to speak the universal legitimacy, especially since the legal instruments are flexible and allow the nuances of official positions and they are subject to a perfect diet do not necessarily mean progress, even they are inserted in the instruments of international law.<sup>24</sup> The relationship between the United Nations and IAEA closes all Security Council resolutions, according to international instruments, a trend to these data primarily involving international unlikely law changes.<sup>25</sup>

Non-proliferation is dependent on nuclear technology which currently does not offer a viable solution to restrict the production of nuclear weapons but also to allow the use of nuclear energy for civilian purposes on a large scale.<sup>26</sup> Duality of nuclear technology, the spread of knowledge and capabilities seriously limits controlled by technology and the option of using nuclear fuel cycle.

Although the NPT is opened for signature for over 45 years, it is signed by 189 countries of which 40 are estimated to be able to produce and develop nuclear weapons, an alternative to this agreement was made with although the NPT should be strengthened and developed. For the new nuclear era, NWS and NNWS philosophy are the pillars for non-

NSGC. The importance of strengthening the framework was indicated in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 17, and 20 of the Ministerial Declaration. See *Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017*, GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19, 2 August 2013.

<sup>22</sup>See *Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017*, GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19, 2 August 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Electricity from nuclear reactors is particularly important to parts of the industrialized world. Currently, only six countries have enrichment facilities supplying the commercial world market: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Thus the international community is thinking hard about how to manage the nuclear fuel market and is looking to different forms of fuel assurances to dissuade additional countries from launching their own enrichment capacity. See Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan and Debra K. Decker, „Insure to Assure. A New Paradigm for Nuclear Nonproliferation and International Security”, *Innovations* / spring 2009, 142-143.

<sup>24</sup> Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament. See *the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, had entered into force on 5 March 1970.

<sup>25</sup> ARTICLE I – Principles. 1. The United Nations recognizes the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the Agency) as the agency, under the aegis of the United Nations as specified in this Agreement, responsible for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy in accordance with its Statute, without prejudice to the rights and responsibilities of the United Nations in this field under the Charter. See *Agreement Governing the Relationship Between the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency*, 19th day of June 1959.

<sup>26</sup> “The biggest risk to the nonproliferation regime today comes from the spread of fissile material production capability.” See Anatoly Dyakov, “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Security,” in *Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties*, ed. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2009), 39.

proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear technology, which was built on NPT and might become obsolete.<sup>27</sup>

Relationship disarmament – non-proliferation in the NPT frame is regarded differently in the NWS to NNWS, namely disarmament, including nuclear is the final object of this treaty.<sup>28</sup> Regarding nuclear disarmament, it concerns both NWS and NNWS as ways to block the proliferation of nuclear weapons not only market in the current reform agenda and the NPT.<sup>29</sup>

Spectacular developments in technology make changes even over substance risks, imposing periodic evaluations. Need verification mechanisms on nuclear material is particularly acute.

Nuclear governance develops a multi-purpose structure formed with the corollary consensus on a wide range of issues in economic trends and conditions that involve a number of states technologic increasingly larger, including non-state actors. A global nuclear order is dependent on regulations, policies and international relations, military-political paradigms, the intensity of promoting the interests of states and international organizations.<sup>30</sup> Obsolescence agreement on conventional arms in Europe and NATO option for extended nuclear threat and maintaining tactical nuclear weapons are major determinants of nuclear safety.

Adapting the current system at the second nuclear age, although it has supported nuclear power policy statements, it is conducted in an imperceptible pace; nuclear summits have not solved any of the major issues in the field and the NPT review conferences may be the new proposals. NPT Review Conference (2015)<sup>31</sup> will be a setback in achieving strategic disarmament obligations if cuts are not continued by Russia and the United States are negotiating strategic issues, although accused of nuclear preserve their privileged role.<sup>32</sup>

Maintaining nuclear doctrine which promotes the principle of reducing the importance of nuclear factor gives a boost to NWS to avoid proliferation even exacerbate inequity treaty parties.<sup>33</sup> NNWS will continue to seek NWS to honor its obligations under the NPT.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> “The NPT is designed, first and foremost, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The other two elements of the treaty are not really pillars at all; they are subordinate clauses under the central purpose of nuclear nonproliferation.” See Baker Spring, *The Misleading Messages from the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference*, Heritage Foundation Web Memo No. 2924, June 3, 2010, 1.

<sup>28</sup> “Broadly speaking, the Movement remains united in the conviction that the ultimate goal of the NPT is nuclear disarmament. . . . Unlike nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation was never a central tenet of the Non-Aligned Movement.” See William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, *Principles vs. Pragmatism: The Non-Aligned Movement and Nuclear Politics* (London: Routledge, 2012), 41–42.

<sup>29</sup> See Scott D. Sagan et al., *Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate*, (Cambridge, Mass.: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010).

<sup>30</sup> See Andrei Kokoshin, *Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School 2011.

<sup>31</sup> The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

<sup>32</sup> Brazil’s perspective on the NPT system, for example, the regime is seen as a “politically driven tool in the hands of the United States to lay down the law” and reflects an effort by great powers to use international norms “to impose their will on weaker nations.” See Trita Parsi, *A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2012), 177.

<sup>33</sup> “The most fundamental problem with the nuclear nonproliferation regime is, in itself, a double standard: the inherent asymmetry, or inequality, between the nuclear haves and have-nots.” See Mohamed ElBaradei, *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2011), 236.

<sup>34</sup> For the foreseeable future, the NWS are not prepared to do what the majority of NPT member states wish them to do and believe they are legally obligated to do. See Sverre Lodgaard, *Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World?* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

Reducing nuclear arsenals under current levels through substantial revision of the situation in the subject of complex multilateral program.<sup>35</sup>

It should be emphasized that the basic building an edifice of nuclear governance consists of conventional, nuclear-strategic relationship (precision strike, counter of it). One solution is to reach agreement between the parties with some nuclear purposes.

The nuclear landscape is a collection of correlation between political and military structures on the escalating levels of nuclear confrontation, fighting variants crisis, assessing the consequences of nuclear conflict outbreak. Status quantitative and qualitative symmetry of the two nuclear superpowers, is affected when one of the parties achieve superiority and the other party does not take countermeasures in response defining the strategic situation as stable or unstable.<sup>36</sup> An unstable strategic situation entails a risk of nuclear conflict.

Overcoming a level of arsenals of nuclear weapons ("safe limit" or "stability limit")<sup>37</sup> with a huge destructive capacity, reporting to the state renders the symmetry of the two nuclear superpowers because their destructive power draw unimaginable consequences. Considered as the starting point of calibration consequences, the breakthrough of the arsenals is indispenabil for negotiations various arrangements in the field - to reduce and limit their strategic forces composition.

Technical and operational uncertainties of executing a massive preemptive strike, synchronized and at some point the trajectories of struggle, other than testing on hundreds of targets are sufficiently strong so as to strengthen strategic nuclear symmetry. Destruction guaranteed a certain target is questioned by "fratricidal effect of warheads" and the fact that the first shot will mask the location of the target by the dust that lifted into the air; consequences of this effect are impossible to estimate when launching a rocket volleys 1000.<sup>38</sup>

Strategic stability is defined by the "stability margins" which relates to external and internal factors - including scientific research and technological developments that negatively influence the results of certain weapons systems - the impact on strategic nuclear defense.<sup>39</sup>

Nuclear deterrence is dependent on the requirements set by the potential need: nuclear ammunition to cause unacceptable losses opponent, protecting forces will execute counter coup, the ratio of forces and missile defense systems opponent.

The opposing party decides that the losses are unacceptable and by developing crisis, the degree of damage to the national potential options available; scenario with 300 shots, each with 0.5 MT, executed on several hundred industrial centers.<sup>40</sup>

Regarding response kicks can choose between: kick ball response, counter coup and counter attack.

In the literature, it is observed that although the USSR had a huge arsenal of missiles and warheads placed in silos, a small proportion of these were designed to counter because

<sup>35</sup> See *First Report of the Deep Cuts Commission, Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security*, April 2014. The Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), the Washington-based Arms Control Association (ACA) and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO, RAN).

<sup>36</sup> This situation has existed for a long period of time: the United States had more warheads missiles while the Soviet Union had to make serious efforts to pass the multiple warhead missiles equipped with MIRVs.

<sup>37</sup> "safety margin" or "stability margin."

<sup>38</sup> See Andrei Kokoshin, *Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School 2011, 22.

<sup>39</sup> See V. Z. Dvorkin, "K voprosu o formirovani politiki natsionalnoi bezopasnosti" ("On the Formation of National Security Policy"), *World Economy and Foreign Affairs*, 2004, No. 13, 52-56.

<sup>40</sup> See Y. A. Trutnev, "Na blago Rossii: K 75-letiu akademiki RAN Yu. A. Trutneva" ("For the Benefit of Russia: Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Y. A. Trutnev"), *Sarov, Saransk: Krasnyi Oktyabr*, 2002, 334.

they were not insured against the effects of massive hits. The vulnerability was fixed by ensuring mobility and improved performance of shot response.<sup>41</sup>

Running counter strike depends on the warning systems<sup>42</sup> - two levels of satellites and radar systems - which offer only a few minutes to a political decision on what kind of reaction must be adopted.

Unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons could trigger a nuclear war: technical errors, deficiencies in information analysis and decision making, strategic evaluations superficial, a highly stressful environment that tainted the institutional framework. A tactical decision to launch missiles with nuclear warheads without the leader of the state agreement is possible with very serious consequences. Preventing accidental triggering nuclear war is a main direction in the organization of the command and control of strategic forces.

Besides prevention and control required escalation to a profound political-military crisis may turn to nuclear war.<sup>43</sup>

A development that exacerbated the distinction between conventional war and nuclear war is the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons and tactical operational concept limited nuclear war as artillery shells. Initially limited nuclear war option was developed by the United States in response to the conventional balance of forces favorable to the opponent, but at present, although they were substantially reduced and withdrawn deposits constitute the foundation of Russia's national security.<sup>44</sup>

Nuclear deterrence is the concept that summed up two opposing sides; on the one hand, the need to deter any adversary risk of being destroyed from the first shot, on the other hand, your opponent must show its

The belief that the opponent can not execute a preemptive strike but has the ability to support strikes are in response to vulnerability (damage you may suffer) and mutual invulnerability (kicks opponent response will produce losses).

SDI<sup>45</sup> Strategic Defense Initiative - a program conducted in space defense costs higher than the "Manhattan Project" - and the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, they obliged the USSR to develop a response strategy but with a symmetrical profile in fact a new level of Soviet arms race that it did not allow for financial reasons. The Soviet response strategies at asymmetric-symmetrical replace principle, divided into three areas: increasing invulnerability strategic forces, offensive and improving measures to neutralize the space stations with high power lasers. Approach on the basis of asymmetric threat, although usually the reaction is built on the principle of symmetry, introducing new parameters for assessing the balance of determined opponents of power-capability ratio.

Asymmetric reaction to SDI - an expanded missile defense system - based on three types of response, organized by type of impact during activation, vital and vulnerable targets of SDI, revealed the importance of reducing non-selectivity. Development of nuclear weapons for destruction without collateral damage, on which the doctrine formulated various

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<sup>41</sup> See V. Z. Dvorkin "K voprosu o formirovanii politiki natsionalnoi bezopasnosti" ("On the Formation of National Security Policy"), *World Economy and Foreign Affairs*, no. 13, 2004.

<sup>42</sup> early warning systems (EWS).

<sup>43</sup> The non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945 certainly remains the single most important phenomenon of the nuclear age. See Tannenwald, Nina (2007). *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, No. 87. New York: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>44</sup> See "Yadernoye oruzhie posle 'kholodnoi voyny'" (A. G. Arbatov and V. Z. Dvorkin, "Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War"), Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2006, 34.

<sup>45</sup> Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

concepts of limited nuclear war and multiple perspectives on controlled nuclear conflict contributed to the post-nuclear revolution in military art.

Joined the proliferation of nuclear security must solve an issue in the agenda of international politics,<sup>46</sup> the relationship between nuclear and terrorist intentions with consequences difficult to predict in the future. Attention to define nuclear installations to be protected<sup>47</sup> and the need to regulate the system of criminal breach of this agreement<sup>48</sup> signifies the seriousness of the situation.

## **REGIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA-US BALANCE**

In terms of regional security, the status of nuclear power by a state reconfigures regional and global relations of power; status of nuclear power itself, minimizing uncertainty - France and Japan distrustful of protection US - offset imbalance conventional balance.

Having the status of nuclear power in Iran<sup>49</sup> exchange ratios in the south-west Asia from nuclear pentagon - China, India,<sup>50</sup> Pakistan, Russia and Israel - to the hexagon, heptagon possible - entering Saudi Arabia supported by Pakistan in the system - which will interact with the nuclear balance Russia-US. In East Asia, the status of nuclear power by the North Korean nuclear complex will generate a polygon, without excluding the entry of Japan into the nuclear spiral.

Regional nuclear security relationship balance Russia-US required that states should detect the pentagon, hexagon, etc., inside and balance directly in a process of transition from a structure to another.

Russia-US nuclear balance in terms of nuclear security is higher than in the past, though there are still dangerous aspects - US withdrawal from ABMT (2002), development of an American missile defense combat power to annihilate Russia, if not a huge expense for a higher level of invulnerability. USA permanently maintained efficiency and upgrade strategic nuclear forces, improved by pre-emptive strikes against potential nuclear forces of other states and ensuring supremacy for major international crisis.

Given that China, France, Great Britain, India continued their efforts to modernize their nuclear forces and means for future commitments related to limiting and reducing nuclear arsenals could be achieved by joining the US-Soviet INF agreement.<sup>51</sup> Adhering to the principle of not using nuclear power nuclear weapons and the principle non-threatening to use nuclear weapons against NNWS or against nuclear weapons free zones.

Missile warning system - MWS<sup>52</sup> have got only the USA and Russia, possibly in the distant future and China, while France and Britain (developing only naval component) gave

<sup>46</sup> The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

<sup>47</sup> See pp. 1-2 of Article 1, The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

<sup>48</sup> See pp. 1a, b of Article 2, The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

<sup>49</sup> Iran has been treated harshly and deprived of access to international nuclear markets though it is an original member of the NPT, though its nuclear facilities have been heavily inspected, though it allowed implementation of the Additional Protocol for several years, though it has never been (in the eyes of many observers) proven to have nuclear weapons or even a weapons program. See Martha Williams, „On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security”, *CISSM Working Paper*, February 2014, 13.

<sup>50</sup> How is it that India, outside the regime, uninspected, and unambiguously in possession of nuclear weapons, is treated better than Iran, inside the regime and heavily inspected? How it is that nuclear-armed non-member India gains access to benefits of membership that are meant for members in good standing? See Martha Williams, „On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security”, *CISSM Working Paper*, February 2014, 13.

<sup>51</sup> The U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).

<sup>52</sup> missile warning system (MWS).

up such a system. It is estimated that China will have the option to develop nuclear offensive strategic forces than the establishment of a missile defense system (BMD). India is backing US civil nuclear field, even if it violates its own principles of non-proliferation.<sup>53</sup>

An important dimension of safety is the work of submarine forces, particularly anti-submarines and collision strategic submarines<sup>54</sup> on patrol could be climbing a major security incident light to nuclear conflict. Although there are certain regulations regarding collisions between ships and between planes,<sup>55</sup> there are no provisions to prevent collision submarines, but only in situations of exercises that can be seen on the other side, although there are enough regulations in international practice for such situations.<sup>56</sup>

Russia has reduced the number of strategic missile submarines and patrol the area proposed to limit strategic missile submarines on patrol while fighting anti-submarine activities in these areas through a US-Russian agreement containing procedures for verifying the compliance with its provisions.

The international treaties on non-proliferation focus on the limitation and reduction, focusing on qualitative developments significant nuclear arsenal especially precision strikes. In negotiating the NPT, has accepted the existence of American nuclear weapons on their territory and expanding NATO "nuclear umbrella" essence of coalition strategies of which the United States and NATO Strategic Concept have no justification.<sup>57</sup> It speaks more than double standard NPT - powers and its allies can benefit from nuclear weapons and others can not.

Detection of nuclear safety trend is uncertain because of reductions<sup>58</sup> negotiated by the United States and Russia will not be changed at least for medium term, even if there is a proposal to reduce by one third the strategic nuclear forces, negotiations have not started. NATO invoked as obstacles intention to conduct missile defense systems and strategic and tactical technologies for placing nuclear weapons in space and satellites threat. Regarding the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons<sup>59</sup> (TNWs) Condition of American TNWs in Europe withdrawal.

A new level of nuclear reductions under New START, might establish around 500 deployed strategic delivery vehicles<sup>60</sup> and 1,000 nuclear warheads deployed missile

<sup>53</sup> See "Armaments, Disarmament and International Security," *SIPRI Yearbook* 2007.

<sup>54</sup> Two missile-carrying nuclear submarines—French (Triomphant-class) and British (Vanguard-class)—collided in the Atlantic on 3 February 2009. See Andrei Kokoshin, *Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions*, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School 2011, 55.

<sup>55</sup> The U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement (signed on 25 May 1972, was modified and amended in 1979 and 1986 by mutual agreement of the parties). Available at:

<http://www.armscontrol.ru/start/Rus/docs/incsea.htm>

<sup>56</sup> The U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement prohibits the simulation of attacks against ships and aircraft, and obliges commanders of aircraft of the parties (Article 4) "to use the greatest caution and prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other Party operating on and over the high seas." The same wording would be very useful for commanders of submarines as well.

<sup>57</sup> Within NATO, for example, twenty-eight member states enjoy the security benefits provided by nuclear weapons—benefits that are denied all other NNWS members of the regime. But, In Article I of the NPT, the NWS pledge that they will not provide nuclear assistance of any sort "to any recipient whatsoever," whether "directly or indirectly." Similarly, in Article II, NNWS pledge not to receive any such assistance, including "control over such weapons ... directly or indirectly." See Martha Williams, „On the Importance of MC&A to Nuclear Security”, *CISSM Working Paper*, February 2014, 19.

<sup>58</sup> See New START.

<sup>59</sup> tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs).

<sup>60</sup> deployed strategic delivery vehicles.

defenses<sup>61</sup> and increase confidence, TNWs, high-precision conventional weapons and weapons location in space.

The level of nuclear safety is dependent nuclear negotiations and remove fears of further strategic If the US wants the start as soon as possible while the conclusion of Russia postpones the New START (2021) although descended from two of the three limits of agreement, and that the life of American missile systems to the Russian is high and the high potential for improvement in deposit missiles against Russian possibilities. On the other hand, USA may postpone until 2018, at least to the limits imposed by the treaty, and not to the bottom.

Bilateral negotiation mechanism suggested Russia should look on technological developments impact and on nuclear security of both countries and the international community<sup>62</sup> may be further materialized through New START agreement in order to demonstrate efforts towards non-proliferation, and for a predictivitate mutual agreement.

The term tactical nuclear weapons - TNWs<sup>63</sup> can be defined by a joint US-Russian effort as the foundation of systems analysis, control and procedures to be negotiated, followed by clarification of the NATO nuclear policy on such weapons. Legislation for the TNWs regime - as non-strategic weapons remain in storage - can be done through bilateral agreements or as part of broader treaties to include strategic weapons system, carried or stored in warehouses. Without the establishment of non-intrusive checking procedures will not check on weapons in warehouses. A possible development could be setting an overall limit for all nuclear warheads, deployed and in storage, supplemented by a limit of the deposits, and the strategic and tactical compensation systems eliminate any limits to vehicles.

Both nuclear doctrine of the United States and Russia's nuclear strike option are silent, but development of nuclear safety issues through deterrence of any attack; changing doctrines, following negotiations to understand each other's intentions make consequential structural changes (alert nuclear preemptive strike, declarations of intent, mutual declarations, political mutual fighting alert, multilateralisation dialogue, non-use of nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack).

Balancing TNWs USA (500) - Russia (2000) and not having verification measures<sup>64</sup> in view of Americans need to be balanced, while Russians favor a consolidation of the balance with other relationships in the field - withdrawal TNWs in Europe and the dissolution of adjacent infrastructure, including upgrading of the withdraw of B-61 bombers - divisions within NATO to preserve or revocation.<sup>65</sup> In addition, it is unlikely that such negotiation TNWs regime may begin before negotiations continue New START.

Monitoring the space<sup>66</sup> between Norway and Russia, Poland, Russia, Turkey and Russia by two coordination centers - in Warsaw and Moscow - may also include operation BMD, promoting transparency, a NATO-Russia Center for the supervision and monitoring of missile threats or objects space, an initiative of NATO-Russia space cooperation.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> deployed strategic warheads.

<sup>62</sup> Establishing a transparent verification regime under New START, a consultative mechanism for bilateral discussions with the present - the New START Bilateral Consultative Commission and the "Working Group on Arms Control and International Security at the US-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission" – having China, France and Britain in a mechanism similar to US-Russia bilateral consultative mechanism.

<sup>63</sup> tactical nuclear weapon.

<sup>64</sup> See *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives* (PNIs -1991 and 1992), which led to independent but reciprocal steps, resulting in the dismantlement or withdrawal of thousands of TNWs from forward or surface naval deployment to non-deployed status in centralized storage facilities.

<sup>65</sup> See *NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review*.

<sup>66</sup> See NATO-Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI).

<sup>67</sup> See The NATO-Russia Cooperative Airspace Initiative.



## CONCLUSIONS

In the medium and long term, the United States and Russia are expected to kick prompt global software development with suitable precision<sup>68</sup> conventional weapons arms control procedures and favorable reductions of nuclear weapons in the future. Such weapons with "non-prompt" weapons could be the subject of measures to increase mutual trust binding and China.

Concerns regarding their threats: missiles carried on submarines American cruise missiles<sup>69</sup> increasing capabilities of Russia.

Measures to increase confidence in the conventional strategic weapons: informing Russia about nuclear strategic movement of all vehicles, not only B-1B bomber; annual declaration of the maximum number of conventional and nuclear missiles deployed on different classes of ships and submarines.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> See The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program.

<sup>69</sup> Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM).

<sup>70</sup> See *First Report of the Deep Cuts Commission, Preparing for Deep Cuts: Options for Enhancing Euro-Atlantic and International Security*, April 2014, 24.

## ACRONIME

ABMT	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty	Tratatul privind Rachetele Anti-Balistice
DV	Delivery Vehicles	Vectorii de transport
GZ	Global Zero	Conceptul Nuclear Zero
HB	Heavy Bomber	Bombardier greu
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile	Rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile	Rachetă Balistică Intercontinentală
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty	Tratatul privind Forțele Nucleare de Rază Medie
MAD	Mutual Assured Destruction	Distrugerea Reciprocă Asigurată
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missiles	Rachete cu rază medie de acțiune
MIRVs	Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles	Rachete Purtătoare de Multiple Focoase Nucleare Independente
NSNW	Non Strategic Nuclear Weapon	Armamentul nuclear non-strategic
SALT I	Arms Limitation Talks	Discuțiile privind Limitarea Armamentelor
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles	Rachete balistice lansate de submarine
SORT	Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Capabilitățile Ofensive
START I	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Tratatul de Reducere a Armelor Strategice
New START	The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	Noul Tratat de Reducere a Armelor Strategice

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## THE COMPLEX NATURE OF HUMANITARIAN CRISES: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

Ion PANAIT<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT:

*A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF LITERATURE CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, HAS RECENTLY EMERGED IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BUT THESE STUDIES HAVE NOT EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AND VERY SELDOM EXAMINES THE ROLE OF ENFRAMING IN SHAPING PUBLIC OPINION.*

*THE CONFLICTS MOBILIZE A PLURALITY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ACTORS, SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS THAT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO THE GOVERNMENT-REBEL RELATIONSHIP OR THE BINOMIAL ECONOMIC INTEREST OF BUSINESSES - THE OFFICIAL OR COLLATERAL CHECKOUT METHOD OF RESOURCES BY THE GOVERNMENT, POLITICAL POWERS OR MILITARY FORCES. THE OIL AND MINING COMPANIES HAVE THEIR OWN STRATEGIC GAMES THAT SEEK TO MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION AGAINST COMPETITORS, OFFERING IN RETURN FOR THEIR BENEFITS, FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO LEADERS OR REBELS THAT ARE LIKELY TO TAKE OVER.*

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**KEY WORDS:** HUMANITARIAN CRISES, ACTORS OF THE CONFLICT, INTERSTATE CRISES

The regulations and the ongoing practice of the United Nations' agencies in the humanitarian crises have a valuable share but at the same time have also disclosed its limited share part towards the catastrophic situation on the ground, especially since, in most cases, the local population' expectations were way too high compared to the potential of the donors.

On the other hand, the literature devoted to humanitarian activities, highlights the voluntariness and the detached character subordinated to some highly altruistic purposes which exonerate any suspicion of hidden intentions to take advantage of the affected population or even more, to seize control of both the general public and of the involved political power. For this reason, the unlimited participation of of the military outside the civilian control is particularly controversial, even though, in certain circumstances it represents the only possible solution.

The generalized effect of the human security theories and its corollary, and the responsibility to protect tug in the status and the role of both the United Nations and the international non-governmental humanitarian agencies in humanitarian crises which objectifies into a flood of pro and con arguments.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lecturer, "Lucian Blaga" University, Sibiu. nelutu.panait@yahoo.com.

<sup>2</sup> In our opinion, the system of the principles of operations developed under the UN aegis is constituted by: the existence of the consent and cooperation of the warring parties; keeping an impartial attitude towards the

One view defines the humanitarian intervention as “injecting military power — or the threat of such actions undertaken by one or more states from the outside in the affairs of another state, action which is intended (or at least one of its main goals) to alleviate serious human suffering.”<sup>3</sup> The cause of human suffering may involve “systematic abuse of human rights by a cruel and repressive regime” or simply “a general breach of the authority of the central government, leading to a state of anarchy which itself threatens these rights.”

Thus, the humanitarian intervention usually involves the use (or threatening to use) of military force to impose a sense of stability in what may seem to be a chaotic situation. No military forces are expected to provide humanitarian assistance themselves (although in some cases they offer initial help: medical and nutritional), but rather to restore some legal rules so that aid agencies can reach to populations that are in danger.<sup>4</sup> Obviously, some humanitarian interventions will be more difficult than others. Whenever an intervention in a “failed state” takes place, in which the central authority has been damaged, the outside military forces will be facing a divided opposition having various military capabilities.

Whenever it takes place an intervention a humanitarian crisis, caused by a repressive regime, the intervention force may face the opposition of a modern and well trained army.<sup>5</sup>

The humanitarian interventions will clearly be viewed as “risky” by the policy makers and by the public in the states which take the intervention into account. The benefits of the intervention may be unclear and/or widely distributed among “free-riders” and the costs of the intervention both financial and human, can be substantial.<sup>6</sup>

When the public support for the humanitarian intervention decreases or when the public openly begins to ask questions about the operation (as it happened in the United States after the events in Somalia in October 1993), the democratic governments will have a hard time continuing its humanitarian activities.

A significant amount of literature concerning foreign policy frameworks and the use of military force, has recently emerged in the field of international relations, but these studies have not exclusively focused on humanitarian interventions and very seldom examines the role of enframing in shaping public opinion.

warring parties throughout the operation; the release the operation is performed the Security Council at the proposal of the Secretary-General; The Security Council has the power to adopt resolutions to open the operation, setting the limits of its mandate, its modification, whenever necessary; The Secretary-General shall inform the Security Council of the progress of the mission, the Security Council has as its competence to make the decisions; The Secretary General shall be responsible for its activity in front of the Security Council; The Secretary-General proposes, and the Security Council decides on the financial support of operation: by voluntary contributions (the most common), or out of the Organization funds in accordance with the stipulations of the Charter (the General Assembly determines how these costs will be shared between the member states). See, Duță Paul, *Instituții de securitate. Partea generală*, București, Centrul Tipografic Editorial al Armatei, 2006, 32-38.

<sup>3</sup> This definition includes, but does not specifically mention military alliances interventions (such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]) and intergovernmental organizations (e.g. United Nations). It also includes interventions made by private military corporations when they are run and funded by a sovereign state. See Garrett, S. A. 1999, *Doing good and doing well: An examination of humanitarian intervention*, Westport, CT, Praeger.

<sup>4</sup> For our purposes, the military units called in a foreign country to handle natural disasters do not constitute an “intervention.” Garrett, S. A., *op.cit.* p. 23. See also, Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Reciprocal Vulnerability*, Ottawa, International Development Research Center, 2002; United Nations Development Program, *An Account for Human Development*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

<sup>5</sup> The difficulty of every type of intervention can vary significantly. A Russia in “decline” in the midst of a civil war would involve greater risks than an intervention against an oppressive regime in Haiti. See Nina M. Serafino, *Peacekeeping/Stabilization and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on the Civilian Response/Reserve Corps and other Civilian Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 12 2012, available on [www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf](http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> See Lepgold, J. 1998, “Problema actiunii collective a NATO,” *International Security* 23, 78-106.

## TYPES OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS

Humanitarian crises can initially be divided into two types: those caused by a "systematic abuse of the most basic human rights by a cruel and repressive regime" and those caused by "the general collapse of the central overnmental authority, which leads to a state of anarchy which threatens those rights."<sup>7</sup> Unfortunately, many of the humanitarian crises of recent years have been the direct result of a misconduct intentionally committed by repressive governments.<sup>8</sup>

Within the classic experiments, there are three hypothetical scenarios involving a repressive regime and one that describes a virtual anarchy caused by warring clans. The issue A was built loosely on the situation in Rwanda, in 1994, but with the roles reversed. It describes an ethnic conflict in which a minority-led army demands vengeance on a rebellious majority that is trying to obtain political power.<sup>9</sup> Issue B is based on the situation in Indonesia since 2000, but it enhances the religious violence between the Muslims and the Christians. In this case, the leader of the country has lost control over an army dominated by the Muslims. The issue closely follows the situation in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998. In this case, the paramilitary force quells an independence riot in a rejected province. Issue D offers a scenario similar to the one in Somalia in December 1992. In this case, the adverse effects of a 5-year drought are exacerbated by a civil conflict, which prevents the humanitarian agencies from reaching the endangered population.

One factor that affects the military intervention for public support in a humanitarian crisis is the ratio of lives saved\lost and foreign lives saved\lost.

The humanitarian assistance would impede the flow of refugees that otherwise would have fled over the borders in Western Europe, and would subdue the increasing wave of accusations of genocide and "ethnic cleansing" by the media: as a conclusion it was a course of action that a disabled and disparate group states could approve of.

"The isolation through charity" is the comment reported by an official of the United Nations; and as Reiff concludes, the UN deeply rooted institutional culture has turned it into the "perfect application partner" ... for the great powers since they needed an excuse for not intervening militarily".<sup>10</sup>

The humanitarian assistance has been increasingly used more as alternative to political solutions regarding the complex political issues, as it has been tragically proved in the past five years in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In this respect, the humanitarian

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7 In these cases, it might be easier to be generated public support for a humanitarian intervention, if an offensive government can be easily discredited-the Clinton Administration's attempt to associate Slobodan Milosevic with Hitler's atrocities was somewhat effective in generating public support for U.S. policy on Kosovo. The ability to clearly identify a guilty villain, will undoubtedly increase the likelihood of public support, but it can also create a more difficult post intervention situation if the villain is allowed to hold the power. Of course, even in anarchic situations, we will try to publicly identify the persons responsible for worsening the situation. (ex. Farrah Aidid in Somalia). See Garrett, S. A., *op.cit.*, 54.

8 See Scott Wilson and Jon Cohen, *Poll Finds Broad Support for Obama's Counterterrorism Policies*, in „Washington Post“, February 8 2012, available on [www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/gIQAfrSEyQ\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-finds-broad-support-for-obamas-counterterrorism-policies/2012/02/07/gIQAfrSEyQ_story.html).

9 This reversal of roles enables the comparison between the issue A (violence led by the minority against the majority) and the issues B and C (violence led by the majority against the minority) See, Dorman, A. M., and T. G. Otte, eds. 1995, *Military intervention: From gunboat diplomacy to humanitarian intervention*, Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company.

10 See David Reiff, *A bed for the night: humanitarianism in crisis*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002, 131. See also Michael Ignatieff, in *The warrior's honor*, he addresses the possibility that in fact the humanitarian operations to have extended the wars in former Yugoslavia. (pp. 102-3). This is how he comments over the humanitarian assistance in Sarajevo: "In fact, the West policy consisted in addressing the following: we will not fight against the chieftain of the aggressors and we will not support their victims to resist, but we will try to prevent the victims' extermination." (102)

assistance increasingly reflects the nature which is determined by the sovereignty itself, in which the UN supports more and more international actors that could violate this support of international order only where it existed just the grounds — for example, the need for humanitarian intervention.<sup>11</sup> This was demonstrated by the position that the UN Security Council had in the crisis in Darfur, Sudan.

A humanitarian crisis involves a series of value dimensions, and some of these dimensions will force the negotiations of this particular value. Thus, the decision whether to intervene with military force in a humanitarian crisis will involve not only the lives of the population in peril saved/lost, but also the lives saved/lost of the troops that intervened. The support for the military intervention in the humanitarian crises depends on the political elites, on the location and on the race/religion of the endangered population.

The humanitarian assistance has the following features: non-coercive operations, but the use of force authorized by the additional mandates; the deployed troops are considered "Blue Helmets"; and they were not statutory in the Charter: *Chapter VI and a half*; The belligerent agreement is not necessary, but the UN considers itself to be neutral; the UN flag and the UN Headquarters; the civilian and the military personnel is deployed during the conflict.

The military humanitarian assistance has the following features: coercive operations; the troops deployed are not considered "Blue Helmets". They belong to an international coalition or to some regional bodies; that are not statutory in the Charter since it represents an intrusion in the internal affairs, but it has Chapter VII, article 42 as a support; the belligerent agreement is not necessary; it does not take place under the UN flag and command; the civilian and the military personnel is deployed during the conflict. At the level of humanitarian assistance operations, some military failures were obvious.<sup>12</sup>

The disarmament operations had been precipitated by the awakening of some primordial animosities that had been rather suppressed than resolved, during the call-off of the cold war that led to conflicts that were traced by the most unspeakable abuses regarding human rights, during anarchic conditions.<sup>13</sup>

The operations were not launched where there is no peace to be maintained, but where there is a strong international desire to bolster humanitarian assistance efforts while attempts are made to find political solutions to a conflict. The efforts of such peacekeeping missions have increasingly focused on the limited objective of providing humanitarian assistance rather than to impose a comprehensive agreement. What is more, the consent may be missing because the authority has fallen or it does not possess the essential attributes, due to the proliferation of some groups which require authority. The peace agreements are inexistent or unregarded and the international law and the conventions are openly ignored or despised.<sup>14</sup>

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11 See for example Christopher Clapham, *Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

12 Within the type I operations, in Yugoslavia, the FORPRONU forces have been taken as hostages, and the Serbian forces occupied the security areas. The armed humanitarian aid granted in Somalia was a success, but the size of political UNOSOM II was a failure. In Rwanda, MINVAR I was a failure, as "the blue helmets" were unable to adapt to the overturning of the situation into violence and genocide. These failures are also due to the attitude of the member states, which are less likely to be willing to involve themselves in such conflicts, unlike the mindset of cooperation that characterized the start-up period of the „cold war“.

13 See Micha Zenko and Michael A. Cohen, "A Clear and Present Safety", in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2012.

14 See Gettleman Jeffrey, *Forever Wars, Africa*, Foreign Policy, March-April 2010, available on [www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas\\_forever\\_wars](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/22/africas_forever_wars).

Two of the most typical examples of this type of operations are those conducted in Somalia<sup>15</sup> and in the former Yugoslavia, while the Rwandan mission is recognised as being the most obvious failure.

Apparently ineffective nature of the third generation of peacekeeping had led to a number of attempts to reinvent the United Nations' concept of peacekeeping.<sup>16</sup> Similarly there has been a modest hope that "the continuous process of reflection and analysis on this matter would lead to a consensus among the UN members on what peacekeeping means and what it doesn't." However, it is unlikely that a consensus will arise in the near future. Under certain circumstances, it appears that the UN will be doomed to failure if it acts, and condemned if it doesn't. This apparent contradiction is represented by the dilemmas of putting forward for both political and humanitarian reasons in a single mission.

Every time when the countries are hit by war, famine or natural disaster, the United Nations assist in the provision of humanitarian aid through their agencies.<sup>17</sup> In addition, some non-governmental organizations fell in beside the United Nations agencies that have become increasingly important players in the humanitarian sphere and human rights.<sup>18</sup> While this wide variety of participants who take part in the issue of uncoordination in UN peace missions, the humanitarian activities were considered to be a substitute for the UN peacekeeping, when the conditions are not perceived to be fair for the deployment of the troops. However, the international humanitarian assistance agencies and the non-governmental organizations do not have the power and the organizational structure needed to carry out operations in situations of imminent conflict. Furthermore, the help they bring that

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15 The intervention which took 3 years in Somalia (1993-1995) proposes to change the way people perceived maintaining peace. Here, UNITAF, a multinational force under the leadership of the Security Council and empowered to have a wide power, extended resources and a short term in office, passed the operational responsibility to UNOSOM II, which has been granted a far less authority but on a much longer term. "The seminar on lessons learned" from UNOSOM concluded that the mandate of operation was vague, frequently changed during the process and that it was open to billions of interpretations. In August 1993, a commando force of 400 American army officers arrived in Mogadishu chasing Aidid. In September, 3 American soldiers were killed when Aidid's militia officers took down an American helicopter. In October 1993, 18 American soldiers were killed, and more than 70 wounded in a battle that lasted for 15 hours in Mogadishu. In a few days, President Clinton sent reinforcements and established a pullback date for the American troops. "There isn't a single event that influenced so much maintaining peace in the post-Cold War period that the Somali intervention." Five years later since the humanitarian mission had been dissolved in conflict; Somalia had a strong influence on the security American-like policies. See, Duță Paul, *Instituții de securitate. Operațiuni vol. I*, București, Centrul Tipografic Editorial al Armatei, 2007, 52 and the next.

16 There has been identified a need to establish ways of "transformation of an operation of maintaining peace into one of strengthening the peace; to develop a concept for the UN operations which are distinct from those for maintaining peace and strengthening against aggression; and, more generally, to produce policies with a certain intellectual, strategic and moral coherence" See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, United States Institute of Peace, 2011, 24-8.

17 A part of this help is also the assistance provided by the UN agencies and operational programs, such as: UN Development Programme (UNDP); UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA); World Health Organization (WHO); UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO); World Food Programme (WFP). See Nina M. Serafino, Catherine Dale, and Pat Towells, *Building Civilian Interagency Capacity for Missions Abroad: Key Proposals and Issues for Congress*, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 23 2012, available on [fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/183725.pdf](http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/183725.pdf).

18 Major organizations such as: CARE, Save the Children, Services of Catholic liberation, Doctors without frontiers, World Vision, as well as other less-known organizations, were situated in the first rows in relieving human suffering in armed conflict monitoring. In fact, in countries such as Burundi and Sudan, much of their work is carried out in unsafe conditions, without the presence of the peace keepers.



to maintain the areas often becomes a resource that will further serve as fuel, rather than to resolve an armed conflict.<sup>19</sup>

The negative impact of the humanitarian assistance (where warlike forces had gained control over the humanitarian resources), drew a significant indirect impact. The food and the money, in the absence of troops and diplomatic pressure, become important components in belligerent local tactics, as UN and other agencies operating in a political, military and diplomatic suction fan were diverted from their humanitarian goals.<sup>20</sup>

Nevertheless, the future of peacekeeping will be decisively determined by the collective desire of the member states, rather than humanitarian reasons. The proliferation of the participants in the current interventions depends on the national governments; they are the ones who distribute the military forces and the money-the essential sources in all operations which aim at easing the effects of conflict or its end. And, left to the collective wisdom of the member states (some of which are more equal than the others), it is unlikely that the new generation of peace operations must have a similarity with the noble but less lucky (struck by fate) efforts in the early and mid '90s.

### **HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

The East-West conflict has found its way in wars - first in Greece, then in Korea, Vietnam, South Africa, Central America, Afghanistan and other places, but, except Korea and Vietnam, these wars were generally limited regarding size and scope. As the inconclusive result of periodic conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbors showed, according to many people, managing these conflicts generally meant secrecy and preventing the expansion, a matter which was best achieved by the power states. While it allegedly showed a commitment to the role of the international organizations in operating/managing conflicts, like the United Nations, it was clear that the ability to cease or manage conflicts belonged to the power states, not to the international or regional organizations.

The UN potential of managing conflicts was limited to those cases in which there were East-West allowance measures or consensus, and its actions consist mainly in the intervention, in the electoral support, in the process of decolonization, and traditional peacekeeping operations such as Cyprus, Israel, Egypt (Sinai Desert), or Israel-Syria (Golan Heights).

Since 1989 the security perceptions have changed, due to a strong growth of sectarian violence and a similar increase in conflict management in the broadest sense, unlike the objective of increasing the national security of state against direct foreign threats.<sup>21</sup>

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19 In March 1997, in Zaire, for example, Kabila's rebel forces obtained the fuel they needed to raise the troops for an attack on the southern town of Lubumbashi from a UNHCR warehouse from Goma. More than 15,000 gallons of fuel have been repurchased for 300 rebels who successfully assaulted Lubumbashi, in April 1997. In addition to the fuel stolen, Kabila's army also relied on the stolen trucks to transport the stolen food. Moreover, the Mobutu army also hijacked UN Charter planes to carry weapons for the useless struggle against the rebels. The planes have entered a refugee camp and the weapons were distributed later to the Rwandan Hutu refugees who had become the first line of defense for Mobutu.

20 When the international agencies and the NGOs are trying to help the civilian population, their warlike governments and the opposition forces take them and use them as resources in order to keep the war going. The inter-group tensions are also raising when the NGOs provide external resources to certain groups and not to others or where workers from certain groups are employed thus excluding others. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incident of Civil War in Africa," *Centre of Development Research*, ZEF Bonn, Facing Ethnic Conflicts, December 2000.

21 In the immediate post-Cold War era, the world's attention has shifted from the pursuit of superpower rivalry, from the counting of nuclear warheads and from the "Star Wars" (as it was called in the press the Strategic Defense Initiative of President Ronald Reagan) to the assistance of the outbreak of the civil war on almost every

The internal geopolitical games, many of them taking place in the African territories, are related to the international environment, both for the cause and the consequences, as well as for their prevention and resolution. Africa is the continent where the number of victims of armed conflicts is the highest in the world. With a number of 13 million displaced people and 3.5 million refugees, it twice exceeds Asia, which has five times as many people.<sup>22</sup> The conflicts are vast, they differ in intensity, duration and territorial expansion; they can be intern, international or regional, civil or insurrectional, armed conflicts or terror tactics, conflicts between forces or terrorism.

The type of internal conflicts (civil wars, rebellions) differs from the traditional external conflicts (international); this distinction has changed since the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>23</sup> While the conflicts between states have visibly decreased, the domestic ones have increased enormously. In these wars, the civilians suffer casualties at an alarming growth rate, falling prey to either government forces, or armies that fight against each other, or even the state fighting for control and power. The civilian population, who has no guilt, is caught in the middle and pays the price. Meanwhile, the international community, to her great shame, often sits on the sidelines and debates on how, why, when and where the intervention should take place. The power states are fighting for their own interests and vote for or against, and in the meantime people die.

As shown by the events in Rwanda from April to July, 1994, no government has been willing to take action to prevent the genocide planned by the Hutu regime, and within four months, an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and Hutu were killed.<sup>24</sup> Instead, during and after the genocide, Rwanda has become a major target for bilateral and multilateral humanitarian operations.<sup>25</sup> Inland, internally, the displaced persons, and those who survived the genocide

continent-wars that normally spread over the state boundaries covering entire regions. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2012.

22 Armed colonial and precolonial conflicts subordinate themselves to conquests, raids or slave seizures; the wars of independence represented national liberation movements during the Cold War and took place in Biafra, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola and Mozambique. See Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *L'Afrique face à l'Islam. Les enjeux africains de la lutte contre le terrorisme*, ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 2003.

23 African internal conflicts are directed by regional and international networks, which are incompatible with the analysis of algorithm of the realistic theory within the terms of nation states which pursue goals of power, it can be observed a change of form and intensity. Cold war conflicts are characterized by an ideological opposition and the support of major blocks against intrafricane multiforme guerrillas that have a partial support from the great powers. See, Mary Kaldor, *Transnational civil society*, in „Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas J, (eds.) Human rights in global politics”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.

24 At this time there is not determined the exact number of Tutsis and Hutus who were killed during the genocide, which lasted for four months, but the figures vary between 750,000 and 1 million. Instead of responding to the acts of genocide, the most countries have avoided these obligations under the stipulations of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide since 1951, referring to massacres as being similar to those belonging to the genocide, and they are incidents of genocide. France, Belgium and Italy sent troops into the area several times to recover their citizens. Furthermore, the action of France to set up the Turquoise Zone in June 1994 with a manpower of 2,500 troops can be seen as an effort to stop the genocide, but most of the analysts agree with Samantha Power in *A problem from hell: America and the age of genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), p. 380, on the matter that, on the one hand “The French troops have been deployed extremely fast ... which illustrates the state of peace towards any state aims at ”, but on the other hand the French did not do much to prevent the Hutus’ tools for genocide, for example the racist radio station and the so-called “cleansing” exercises performed by the Hutu extremists.

25 In July 1994, while the genocide was acting destructively on all levels, 1 million Rwandans crossed the borders of what was Zaire at that time to seek shelter from the Patriotic Army of Rwanda, dominated by the Tutsis which had been found in Uganda. This exodus of refugees has drawn support operations in refugee camps along the borders between Zaire and Rwanda and Tanzania and Rwanda. Rwandan support operations were slower, but, nevertheless, many requests for support and recovery have been made since August 1994 to the present. See Mark Malan, *AFRICOM: A wolf in sheep's clothing?*, Washington, DC: International refugee

were the beneficiaries of the humanitarian assistance. Also, there were nearly a million refugees who had found refuge in the neighboring countries in July 1994, after the takeover by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army. If the humanitarian assistance has served as a kind of excuse for the failure of the international community to take action in order to prevent mass killings in Rwanda, it has similarly been used as an alternative to a political action to tackle serious crimes against humanity that occurred in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. The humanitarian support was a trigger used to connect the policy gaps caused by the inability of major powers to agree on political solutions regarding a profound political issue.<sup>26</sup> In these circumstances a new concept was, that of "responsibility to protect," or R2P defined as the responsibility of the state to protect its citizens from certain specific crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and war crimes.<sup>27</sup>

At the end of 2001, in Afghanistan, the assistance was given, with a little hesitation, from the same aircraft that, only one or two days before had launched bombs; and two years later in Iraq, the leading powers considered the providing of humanitarian assistance as a means of reconciliation between them and the Iraqi people. In both cases, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the provided amount of humanitarian assistance, went beyond the identified needs and it largely reflected more of an incentive to support the perceived foreign intervention.<sup>28</sup> Both cases also showed a clear distortion of the principles of international humanitarian law and were facilitated by the support of the United Nations humanitarian system.

It would be an illusion to believe that the functioning of the economy reduces the risk of violence, and trade would ensure peace. If not all conflicts have an economic motivation, they all need funding. War economies can be closed, financed from local resources, open and guerrilla war economies, externally funded as well as by political, military and humanitarian sanctuaries.<sup>29</sup>

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testimony before the Subcommittee on South African Issues, August 1, 2007, available on [foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Malan Testimony070801.pdf](http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Malan%20Testimony070801.pdf)

26 Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Russia could not agree over a course of action. Moreover, France and Germany pursued some goals that have proved to be mutually destructive. For nearly three years, the United States of America was reserved in getting involved in these policies, in part, to focus on the agenda of the Clinton Administration. See Abel J. Esterhuysen, *Iraqization of Africa?*, in „Strategic Studies Quarterly”, Vol. 2, No. 1, spring, 2008, 119.

27 The doctrine also includes aspects on prevention by any means. The polemics are based on issues such as the apparent subjugation of the sovereignty of the state, authorization, who can intervene and when it will occur and the aim of humanitarian interventions. This does not diminish the importance of the issues, but on the contrary they are the crucial issues that should not be overlooked. However, they refer to the proceeding, not to the purpose. The period in which we live and the existing conflicts make the R2P to be fundamental to the international community. See Alex Bellamy, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention," *International Affairs* 84, no. 4 (2008).

28 The main factors of the African wars are the raw materials which enable the financing of conflicts; there can be distinguished several types of wars depending on the nature of the raw materials: for oil (Angola, Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan), for diamonds (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, The Democratic Republic of Congo) for precious metals (Bunia, The Democratic Republic of Congo), for drug dollars and land games (Burundi, The Ivory Coast, Darfur, Rwanda) and for the control of water (Nile residents) or for forest resources. See for example Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, *Shifting sands: the search for "coherence" between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies*, Humanitarian Policy Group Report no. 8, London, Overseas Development Institute, August 2000, 55 and the next.

29 It is important to know the role played by the economic factors as opposed to other factors. The African states have military expenditures that represent 7% of the world's expenditure (7.1 billion U.S. dollars out of a total of 975 billion dollars) for a quarter of major conflicts (5 of 19). Poverty, underdevelopment and the lack of security are the cause and the effect of the conflicts, all creating a vicious circle. Beyond this vicious circle, according to some authors, the old ideological conflicts were based on the desire to obtain the advantages of annuity; this thesis may be specific to the current armed conflicts in which the role of the economic factors is

Conflicts occur in weak states; there are rarely interstate conflicts, Eritrea-Ethiopia being an exception. Within the states, the opposition parties are regional (North-South: Ivory Coast, Uganda, Sudan), are particular for disintegrated states or resulted from implosion (The Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia).<sup>30</sup>

The conflicts mobilize a plurality of private and public actors, soldiers and civilians that cannot be reduced to the government-rebel relationship or the binomial economic interest of businesses - the official or collateral checkout method of resources by the government, political powers or military forces. The oil and mining companies have their own strategic games that seek to maintain their position against competitors, offering in return for their benefits, financial support to leaders or rebels that are likely to take over.

There was a search for diversification of risks related to maintaining the power of the government or the rebels' access to power; thus in Angola was supported by the French company ELF both in Dos Santos and in Savimbi, and in Congo both by Nguesso and Lissouba.

The conflicts are the result of the conjunction of several factors, each with its own development; ancient conflicts that were not fully extinguished are updated, even tooled by their own potential through the eruption of economic, social and political crises (Arab-Berber population vs. Black-African animism and Islam vs. Christianity, nomadic vs. sedentary farmers).

They are intranational, but with a regional dimension in that the militia involved in conflict is redeployed in the neighboring countries; this cause triggers an identity crisis accompanied by an institutional crisis and a territorial fragmentation. The conflicts can turn from violent into uncontrollable actions, engaging poverty, and even excluding the absence of the institutions that supports them.

The cultural and civilization factors play their well defined role over the African territory. Wars are very likely to happen when they appeal to religion and politics; the religious fundamentalism replaces the nationalist and socialist visions about society.<sup>31</sup> The "black" Islam has flourished in the realm of poverty, exclusion and frustration.<sup>32</sup>

Beyond the crisis, the ethnic or religious issues have become the main goals of political rhetoric and the complexity of the situation is reduced by framing the identities or the combatants among the forces of 'good' or 'evil'.

The conflicts are more present inside the systems where leaders struggle to monopolize wealth, and political adversaries for the redistribution, control and endorsement of those leaders. War can have a political purpose: the accession to power by force; it may

controversial, and there are enough arguments for a perspective of historical continuity. See, Jean-Christophe Rufin and François Jean (eds.), *Economie des guerres civiles*, Paris: Hachette, 1996, 23-31.

<sup>30</sup> The victory can not be clearly in favor of one party; consequently each party shall approach certain annuity. The wars allow the legitimacy of some actions of which, in peacetime, are considered crimes. The participants' economic advantages in civil wars are the hold-ups, protection fees, weapons, food and drug dollars' trade, the exploitation through forced labor, land control, the theft of foreign aid, etc. See Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, "On the Incident of Civil War in Africa," in *Centre of Development Research* (ZEF Bonn: Facing Ethnic Conflicts, December 2000).

<sup>31</sup> Africa was not too interested in treating the differences between civilizations, even though domestic violence in Sudan or Eritrea and Ethiopia may be regarded as expressions of conflict between Christians and Muslims. There are Islamic networks, more or less nebulous than Al-Qaida, implanted in the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Sudan, Sahara. See Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *op.cit.*, 56.

<sup>32</sup> In the Ivory Coast, as well as in other African societies, the Pentecostal movements are a proof of the confusion between morality, religion and politics, a politics of opposing religious phenomena by the Northern Iman of this state. The political factors are essential, determining the degree of legitimacy to the power, the disappearance of the socio-political compromise, the fight the rulers to accede to power, the desire to set up territories, the decomposition of the citizenship. See, Jean-Paul Ngoupande, *op.cit.*, 82.

take the form of an ethnic battle as far as the ethnicity becomes a game power. 33

The military aspects are various; the armed conflicts are closely linked to the government's military expenditure. The only conflict with the characteristics of a conventional war between states is that of Ethiopia-Eritrea.<sup>34</sup>

The conflicts are fueled by the development of small weapon trafficking, present in Eastern Europe; it is estimated that, currently there are over 100 million weapons in the African continent.

The gun dealers are simultaneously involved in the vicious circle of drug dollars, diamonds, oil, money laundering. The cost of weapons has seriously fallen; in some states, an AK-47 costs less than \$ 10. The mercenaries, militias and child -soldiers play a crucial role in the African wars.

A cease-conflict in one area leads, sooner or later, to a conflict in the neighboring area - the case of Liberia and Sierra Leone to the Ivory Coast, the Rwandan Hutu displacement in The Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo and the southern Djandjawid militias to western Sudan.

Children who are in precarious situations enroll as a means of survival, being violently re-socialized; the military activities, especially for child-soldiers, encourage unemployment, de-socialization and lack of education for the youth.<sup>35</sup>

A geopolitical dimension is particularly present. After the Cold War, the hegemonic powers began a withdrawal from this area. But, there are some exceptions: the UK in Sierra Leone, France in The Ivory Coast, the European Union in The Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis) and the presence of the United States (the military base in Djibouti present in Sahel and Sahara).

The end of the Cold War and of the bipolarity aspect is translated by means of a dynamic and territorial splitting.

A new hegemonic game about oil and the fight against terrorism is given birth.<sup>36</sup> Many African conflicts<sup>37</sup> generate the dissociation of the national territories uncontrolled by

33 Unequal access to the positions of responsibility and the competition for power and control of resources, create tension between groups on based on identity issues-ethnic or religious. Diaspora, regional powers or conglomerates are masses of maneuver for the political actor. There are many states which no longer control the territories, the respect for the law and the rules imposed by the monopoly of legitimate violence. See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding United States Institute of Peace, 2011.

34 According to official data, Africa, in 1985, represents 10% of the imports of weapons; in 1995, the percentage dropped to 2%; military expenditures fell from 10 billion, in 1985, to 8,1 billion in 1989. See, SIPRI yearbook, <http://www.sipri.org/>, accessed on 25.01.2014.

35 The regular armies and forces to maintain law and order are often without a minimum discipline. The phenomenon "solreb" has gained momentum (soldier during the day, rebel during the night.), mercenary-like status, cleavage between the clans, the private armies that affect a weakening of national armies and the mobilization of soldier-children. See Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Reciprocal Vulnerability*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002; United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Issue*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

36 The conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Angola were fueled by China by providing weapons, while exploiting its position as a permanent member of the Security Council, thus allowing some countries to bypass the sanctions of the international community. In Somalia, a state that in fact was undergoing a secession phase, after more than 18 years of war and more than 450,000 people dead, the Islamists supported by Eritrea and perhaps by an Al-Qaida faction oppose the senior war supported by Ethiopia and the United States. In June 2006, they took power in Mogadishu. See Elke Krahmann, *Security: Collective Good or Commodity?* in „European Journal of International Relations”, Vol. 14, No. 3/2008, September 2008.

37 In 2005, Zimbabwe was involved in the conflict in The Democratic Republic of Congo to counter the tendencies of leader of South Africa. Burkina Faso was involved in the conflict in the Ivory Coast, with Robert Taylor in Liberia. Some conflicts focused on conquests and on getting control over some territories, such as gaining access to sea for Eritrea and Ethiopia. See Paul Duță, *op.cit.*, 156.

a power state but by transnational associations (diaspora, conglomerate, regional powers) with alliances or occult support coming out of the control of that particular state and the international system.<sup>38</sup>

The armed conflict areas in Africa are caused by the rebirth of ethnic, religious or national ambitions, the weakness of constitutional states and their sovereignty, by the interference of regional and international powers as well as the growing power of the international criminal organizations.

In the above mentioned conflicts the humanitarian crises are inherent, their treatment is postulated to solve the political and military matters in accordance with the United Nations regulations.

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<sup>38</sup> In 2006, in Chad, the Zaghawa clan that ruled in that period, was threatened by the rebels who arrived in Sudan, respectively in the province of Darfur. The case of the conflict in Sudan has as a bias the clash of China's and the USA's interests related to oil, while France struggles to retain its positions defending francophonia by realizing a balance between the Arab-Muslim world and the black and Christian world in order to avoid the domino effect in the region. See Paul Duță, *op.cit.*, 159.

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## CRISIS ANALYSIS PARAMETERS

Paul DUȚĂ<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT:

*THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A "COMMON CAUSE" OF THE GREAT POWERS IN THE FACE OF THE GROWING UNREST WAS DIFFICULT TO IDENTIFY - WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE INVASION OF KUWAIT BY IRAQ IN 1991. ON THE CONTRARY, IN MANY CASES, SUCH AS THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, SOMALIA, AFGHANISTAN, RWANDA, IRAN THERE ARE RECORDED FRICTIONS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS, WITH CONTROVERSIAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE BALANCE OF POWER AND, IN THE CASE OF RWANDA, A "COMMUNITY INDIFFERENCE" SEEMS TO HAVE REPLACED THE BIPOLAR ORDER. DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE DISAPPOINTMENT BEGAN TO REPLACE THE EUPHORIA, A GROWING TREND OF THE MAJOR POWERS TO AVOID THE COMPLEXITIES AND CHALLENGES OF EMERGING POST WESTPHALIAN ORDER BEGINS TO EMERGE.*

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**KEY WORDS:** INTERNATIONAL CRISES, INTRASTATE CRISES, INTERSTATE CRISE

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### PRELIMINARY SPECIFICATIONS

The excessively various literatures about the crisis, and also the computer-assisted research projects in the analysis and predictability of the breaking-out, the escalation and the extinction of crisis enable comparisons particularly useful for the understanding of their processuality. It is necessary to make some clarifications before revealing the similarities and differences between intrastate international crises and interstate international crises.

Firstly, the crises differ from conflicts and war; the criteria of making a difference are various, but for this study we will take into account the intensity of violence, the polemological criterion of the victims and the finality (extinction). Thus, after 1945 a series of non-violent crisis is recorded: Iran-Oil Concession (September 26, 1944 - December 9, 1944); Iran-Economic Development (September 26, 1944 - December 9, 1944); Kars-Ardahan - The Territory (June 7, 1945-April 5, 1946); Turkey-The Territory (June 7, 1945 - April 5, 1946); Communism in Poland (June 30, 1946-January 19, 1947); USSR-The Influence (June 30, 1946 - January 19, 1947); Turkey-Financial Hardships (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946); Turkey-The Territory (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946); USA- The Influence (August 7, 1946 - October 26, 1946).

Secondly, the difference between intrastate and interstate crises is based on the criterion of the number of participating states; in the case of the intrastate crisis it is about a single state while in the case of the interstate it is about at least two if not more states. Crises that degenerate into war: the Civil War 2 in Greece-Yugoslavia (November 13, 1946 -

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<sup>1</sup> Romanian Diplomatic Institute, ppduta@yahoo.com.



February 28, 1947); Greece-The Political Regime (November 13, 1946 - February 28, 1947); The First War in Korea-North Korea (June 25, 1950 - September 30, 1950).

Thirdly, the comparison is fitted on the criteria and on the indicators of operation in a computer-assisted analysis, where we intervened if we considered that there are some corrections to be made. Thus, the political regime is the triggering point of some crises: Truman Doctrine - The Political Regime of the USSR (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); Greece-The Political Regime (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); The U.S. Marshall Plan-The Political Regime (July 3, 1947 - July 11, 1947); Turkey-The Political Regime (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); Czechoslovakia-The Political Regime (July 9, 1947 - July 11, 1947); Cuba-the Dominican Republic-The Political Regime (July 26, 1947 - September 28, 1947); the Dominican Republic-The Political Regime (July 26, 1947 - September 28, 1947); Soviet Note-Finland-The Political Regime (February 22, 1948 - April 6, 1948); Finland-The Political Regime (February 22, 1948 - April, 6 1948).

Fourthly, the comparison reveals the psychosocial aspects of the decision-making act, less analyzed in the Romanian field literature through case studies, fully relevant to famous crisis but also suspected of personal interpretation. Crises due to the getting of influence without violence: U.S. (February 21, 1947 - May 22, 1947); The Soviet Union (July 3, 1947 - July 11, 1947); US (June 25, 1950 - September 1950); The Baghdad Pact (February 24, 1955 - October, 1955); Egypt (February 24, 1955 - October 1955). Political regime oriented crises, accompanied by minor clashes: Costa Rica (December 11, 1948 - February 21, 1949); Cuba Luperon (June 19, 1949 - June 21, 1949); Dominican Republic (June 19, 1949 - June 21, 1949); Tunisia (May 31, 1957 - June 17, 1958); Central America-Cuba I (April 25, 1959 - December 8, 1959).

Fifthly, although we pay some attention to humanitarian crises as a subspecies of the intrastate crises, they do not represent the object of the study below. For such crises there should be a separate analysis.

After 1989, the wrong evaluations of the ratio of forces and especially the medium and long-term consequences have produced more serious events (more difficult to explain in rational terms) such as the fact that Saddam Hussein began a unwinnable war in 1991 and caused a devastating military incursion on his territory in 2003, resulting in the end of his regime and his own death. Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader in the Angolan conflict, began the crisis by ignoring the agreements concluded and the protection of the Nations, Slobodan Milosevic who started another unwinnable war in 1999, or the end of the regime of Mohammed Gaddafi in Libya.

The humanitarian crises, generally as a species of intrastate crises, have not been perceived as events with major political consequences, respectively the national and international public-including government leaders in service - do not any empathize with the critical situation of those affected by disaster and they do not really try to respond to these situations. The sufferings from remote places such as Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Guatemala have applied for considerable public support and empathy.<sup>2</sup> The food shortage plaguing the countries in Africa have made the donor governments as well as the international

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<sup>2</sup> Many argue that the response of the humanitarian aid system began as a consequence of the battle of Solferino in 1859, when Henri Dunant began formulating the concept of support-assistance that led to the founding of the International Movement of the Red Cross in 1863. This movement has generated a series of international humanitarian legal obligations-the Geneva Convention - which established the obligations of combatants with regard to the civilians and of 'non-combatant' parties. We can also say that, at the operational level, the Commission Hoover took the initiative of support in the period of famine in Europe at the end of World War I, which marked the „beginning” in the sense that the lives of hundreds of thousands of people devastated by the war depended on foreign aid.

organizations and the private humanitarian agencies aware of the consequences of political indifference towards human suffering-an aspect that mass-media presented "live"<sup>3</sup>

Humanitarian assistance is an activity distinctly different from development assistance. While humanitarian assistance is intended for a short period of time, as a response to the needs created by the emergency state, development aid is designed for a long-term economic and social support. Even if those actions are designed separately, we may encounter cases where the two are interwoven. An example of this genre is the post-conflict status, an extremely complex condition in which both actions are required and in order to effectively function it requires coordination and a highly rigorous management.

In an ideal world, the humanitarian assistance granted by emergency, will be quickly followed by an effective peace process (and vice-versa), and then followed by a new government helped by international rehabilitation programs. In this scenario, the humanitarian organizations would no longer be necessary. In reality, a humanitarian crisis can last for a very long time, thus even during conflict opportunities for rehabilitation and reconstruction of that state can be created. Choosing to resuscitate a particular sector of the health care system or choosing to support the efforts of local authorities to call in service the elementary education system, humanitarian organizations can assume responsibility for some tasks that have a long-term impact.

However, humanitarian crises are seen as collateral problems to the real political concerns.<sup>4</sup> According to some opinions, there is a stress on the characters of humanitarian assistance-the offered support should be neutral, impartial and independent, although international support is deemed to be too small, too sparse and having an insignificant impact in order to be considered an important weapon in any political arsenal. The variety of benefices promoted by variants of human security theories, generally "forget" to mention not only the financial resources but also the ideal vector of humanitarian operations.<sup>5</sup>

### THE GREAT POWERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRISES

The year 1989 paved the way for some optimistic scenarios more rational than sentimental; a similar sense of common cause and universal optimism had no longer been known from the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818, with the reintroduction of post-Napoleonic France in The Great Alliance.<sup>6</sup> But just as in that remote period, the 1990s began to reveal new or reborn outbreaks of conflicts and crises that have quickly stifled global aspirations in the bud. The ex-participating states in the Cold War have increasingly faced more grievances, with the prospect of civil conflicts, disintegration and even collapse. Military minor damage crises and minor clashes: Nicaragua Contras IV (September 9, 1989 -

<sup>3</sup> The UN Secretary-General was Juan Perez Cuellar at the onset of famine in Ethiopia in 1984. Jim Grant, who was at that time head of UNICEF and Jim Ingram, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme informed, in clear terms, Juan Perez Cuellar that if the United Nations did not respond to crisis in Ethiopia, the media reaction will have a devastating effect on the UN and its agencies or its programmes.

<sup>4</sup> See William Shawcross in *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979, the fact that the US were willing to sacrifice the people of Cambodia to bring home the war in Viet Nam.

<sup>5</sup> A sense of harmony or euphoria in the world seemed to precede the Fall of the Berlin Wall. As Michael Ignatieff noted the prospects for global context which preceded the Cold War, „it was not idealistic to expect a new method of robust but pragmatic collaboration between the superpowers designed to alleviate the proximity wars that impoverished many regions of Africa, Latin America and Asia.” View Michael Ignatieff F, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997), 89. Ignatieff goes further by suggesting the fact that „the possibility getting a glimpse of sustained growth for the support and development of the budgets of the Third World, in the context of the peace dividend of the Cold War, is not beyond the bounds.”

<sup>6</sup> Ignatieff F, *The Warrior's Honor*, 85.

November 7, 1989; Honduras (September 9, 1989 - November 7, 1989); Ghana/Togo Border II (April 11, 1991 - October 5, 1991); Ghana (April 11, 1991 - October 5, 1991). Crisis for territory with minor clashes: Iraq Bubiyan (August 28, 1991 - August 1991); Kuwait (August 28, 1991 - August 1991).

The establishment of a “common cause” of the great powers in the face of the growing unrest was difficult to identify - with the exception of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1991. On the contrary, in many cases, such as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Iran there are recorded frictions among the great powers, with controversial alignments in the balance of power and, in the case of Rwanda, a “community indifference” seems to have replaced the bipolar order. Due to the fact that the disappointment began to replace the euphoria, a growing trend of the major powers to avoid the complexities and challenges of emerging post Westphalian order begins to emerge. Crises with serious clashes and minor military damage: Rwanda/Uganda (October 1, 1990- February 17, 1991); Rwanda (October 1, 1990 - February 17, 1991); Georgia/Abkhazia (September 25, 1992 - October 8, 1993); Georgia (September 25, 1992 - October 8, 1993).

In some cases, such as the recognition of Croatia by Germany in 1992, unilateralism has replaced the consultative processes, bypassing consensus among multilateral institutions, such as the EU or the UN. In many cases, when a high-powered task force intervened to promote peace and save hundreds of thousands of lives, the governments of other major powers have chosen to refrain or even to oppose to such intervention. Initially, this could be viewed as indifference towards the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as towards those crises in the former Yugoslavia. Later it becomes extremely obvious in the case of Rwanda.

“Humanitarian disasters in Srebrenica and Rwanda ended a brief period of hope which had caught a glimpse in 1989.”<sup>7</sup> Indeed, the situation in Srebrenica reflected disengagement and lack of harmony that, in a significant extent, symbolized the emerging reality in the period prior to the Cold War. However, the fate of Rwanda was largely linked to the events in Mogadishu, the capital of the collapsed state of Somalia, which occurred seven months before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. While the U.S. refused to get involved in the Bosnian conflict, which had resulted in flows of refugees at a large scale, “ethnic cleansing” and concentration camps, the Bush Administration felt obliged to respond, in the final stage in January 1992, to the prospect of mass famine that threatened a number of up to 500,000 Somalis.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. military have been involved in Operation Restore Hope to provide logistical support and security for aid agencies in attempting to provide assistance in the midst of chaos and civil unrest that were propagating almost all over the country.<sup>9</sup> When the U.S. began to take actions to restore stability and governance in Somalia, one of the most powerful warriors of the despots of Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aideed, opposed to it. Thus, in a battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, 19 U.S. soldiers were killed, reality which showed not only the limits of United Nations rules and regulations, but also the hard to control effects of peace-enforcement operations.

<sup>7</sup> Ignatieff F, *The Warrior's Honor*, 93.

<sup>8</sup> It is worth noting that, while the agreement on population figures in Somalia has always been an ambiguous topic, the estimates of 1991 ranged from 6.5 million to 8.8 million. In this context, half a million people clearly indicates the dimension of threat. See Jorge Nef, *Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability*, Ottawa: International Development Research Center, 2002.

<sup>9</sup> See David Halberstam, in his work *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals*, New York: Simon Schuster &, 2001, p. 251, refers to the senior officials of the National Security Council, suggesting that „the U.S. intervention in Somalia was Powell's way of making a humanitarian thing, but just as importantly, of not sending troops into Bosnia.”

Intrastate and international violence continued in many corners of the globe - Darfur, Somalia, Congo, situations in which the international community has shown a limited appetite to intervene. The reality was that the procedure to obtain a consensus has made difficult any direct intervention in a conflict which is extended beyond the point of no return.<sup>10</sup>

The efforts of the international community for the disengagement have pointed out, on the one hand, a general aversion to invest in so-called “peace dividend” of narrow interests, mostly internal. On the other hand, the disengagement has also shown a lack of interest in engaging in a complex diplomacy, which could threaten the false sense of harmony that reigned between powers. Discordant shades have been hidden; until, of course, unilateral actions have served the best interests of individual power. The political crises without violence were: The No-Fly Zone-Iraq (August 18, 1992 - September 8, 1992); Iraq (August 18, 1992 - September 8 1992).

The humanitarianism -in the perspective of UN rules and procedures-has become a decelerator, sometimes even antagonistic, for the stability of operations and state reconstruction as well as a reason for the end of hope in a “common cause” of the great powers.

### INTRASTATE CRISES AND INTERSTATE CRISES

In the complex and contradictory context of international relations in which crises are developing, a computer-assisted analysis research<sup>11</sup>, starting with the cases in which the nations see themselves as being in foreign policy crisis, while their opponents are not, can reveal the characteristics of the concept of crisis related to the types and intensity of international reactions. A crisis usually involves at least two parties on antagonistic positions, determined by a variety of reasons.

The RCI project is based on a combination of sources to determine a particular state-nation as an actor of a crisis.<sup>12</sup> Under this project, it is determined whether the leaders of state-nations involved in a particular crisis are or are not crisis actors.<sup>13</sup>

**The definition of crisis condition.** According to the perception of the concerned states which are part of a crisis, the respective situation is considered as unilateral crisis. It is to be noted that “unilateral crises” differ from the normal ones or from “bilateral” crises in many ways, especially with regard to the risk of an emergence of a violent crisis. Crises for the political regime without violence: Libya - The Expulsion of the Tunisians (August 21, 1985 - September 26, 1985); Tunisia (August 21, 1985 - September 26, 1985).

The absence of a common vision regarding the likelihood of future hostilities at the onset of the crisis is posited as the basis, in respect of the differences between the two types of crises. In the field literature, a series of assumptions about these differences are offered and they provide a basis for empirical analysis. A detailed analysis shows that the chances of an intrastate crisis to degenerate into acts of violence are small, even when obvious effects of the crisis are presented.

<sup>10</sup> See, Madeline K. Albright and William S. Cohen, *Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for Policymakers* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009).

<sup>11</sup> See, *The Program Of The International Crisis Reactions (RCI). The project of the International Crisis Reactions (RCI)* includes data relating to 412 international crises and 895 actors of crisis for the period 1918-1994.

<sup>12</sup> Including diplomatic memoirs, government documents, historical sources (The New York Times and Keesings The Contemporary Archives), scientific articles and historical narratives. See Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

<sup>13</sup> For a complete description of the processes of data assembly from RCI project, see Brecher, Michael & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

The analysis of several international crises reveals that one-third of these have a unique feature, namely, the period of time during which an actor in the crisis is considered to be in crisis, due to a verbal or physical act of an opponent who does not consider himself as being in crisis. This means that, while some perceive “a threat to one or more fundamental values, they realize at the same time the reaction time to that threat and the increased likelihood of escalation of military hostilities”, and the opponent has a different position, based on a set of antagonistic assessments.<sup>14</sup>

Crises for the political regime without violence: Costa Rica-Nicaragua I - The Political Regime (December 11, 1948 - February 21, 1949); The Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia (August 19, 1949 - November, 1951); Yugoslavia (August 19, 1949 - November 1951); Iraq (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Panama (April 25, 1959 - May 4, 1959); USSR Soviet Note-Finland II (October 30, 1961 - November 24, 1961); Finland (October 30, 1961 - November 24, 1961); Cuba-Venezuela (November 1, 1963 -December 1, 1963); Venezuela (November 1, 1963 - December 1, 1963); The Iraqi Threat (June 9, 1976 - June 17, 1976); Syria (June 9, 1976 - June 17, 1976); Intervention in Libya-Gambia (October 27, 1980 - November 7, 1980); Gambia (October 27, 1980 - November 7, 1980); Jordan-Confrontation in Syria (November 25, 1980 - December 14, 1980); Jordan (November 25, 1980 - December 14, 1980); Iran, the Attempted Coup-Bahrain (December 13, 1981 – January 8, 1982); Bahrain (December 13, 1981 - January 8, 1982); Ethiopia-Tension in Sudan (November 20, 1983 - February 20, 1984); Sudan (November 20, 1983 - February 20, 1984).

Crises for the political regime with minor clashes: North Vietnam The Vietcong Attack (September 18, 1961 - November 15, 1961); South Vietnam (September 18, 1961 - November 15, 1961); The Critical Situation in Taiwan HI (April 22, 1962 - June 27, 1962); China (PRC) (April 22, 1962 - June 27, 1962); Beirut Airport (December 28, 1968); Lebanon (December 28, 1968 - January 1969); The Attempted Coup d'état in Sudan (July 2, 1976 - July 15, 1976); Sudan (July 2, 1976 - July 15, 1976); The Attack of South Africa on Lesotho (December 20, 1985 - January 25, 1986); Lesotho (December 20, 1985-January 25, 1986); The Rebel Attack on Sudan-Uganda (August 19, 1986-September 20, 1986); Uganda (August 19, 1986 - September 20, 1986); The attempted Coup d'état Ghana-Togo (September 23, 1986 - February 5, 1987); Togo (September 23, 1986 - February 5, 1987).

Crises for political regime with serious clashes: Cuba Che Guevara/Bolivia (March 23, 1967 -October 10, 1967); Bolivia (March 23, 1967 - October 10, 1967); Portugal the Conakry Raid (November 22, 1970 - December 11, 1970); Guinea (November 22, 1970 - December 11, 1970).

In these cases, it is about “intrastate crisis”. While most of them are cases with a single actor, such as Israel in “the crisis of the 1976 Syrian militarization” or Iraq in the context of the “crisis of No-Fly Zone of 1992”, others, such as the “crisis of the remilitarization of the Rhineland of 1936” for Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, France and England, involved several actors, but not their main crisis opponent (in this case, Germany).

**The part as an actor of the crisis.** The analysis of the intrastate crisis starts from the idea that one of the parties involved in the crisis meets all three conditions required for membership crisis actor (risk perception, time perception, and perception of a likelihood of military hostility escalation). Thus, while a state-nation would trigger a crisis of another state

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<sup>14</sup> See Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1997 'Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior'. *International Studies Quarterly* 21: 39-74.

through an action,<sup>15</sup> it may not be included as a crisis actor if the requirements for crisis actor are not met.

Of the three conditions that are generally associated with perception of crisis, the perception of a likelihood of military hostility escalation represents the fundamentals for the definition of the term. For example, Snyder and Diesing include this component in their own definition of crisis: "An international crisis is a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in a severe conflict, except for the current war, which involves the perception of a dangerously high likelihood of the outbreak of the war."<sup>16</sup> The centerpiece of the definition is the "perception of a dangerously high likelihood of the outbreak of the war," of the governments involved. "The perception of an increased likelihood of hostilities is also fundamental for the conceptualization of RCI research of foreign policy crises." While the presence of the three perceptions is needed, dangerously high likelihood of outburst of the war is the pivotal condition for the start of a military crisis, concerning the foreign policy security for a state ...<sup>17</sup>

This definition of international crisis is the grounds for the differences between the two types of crisis regarding the risk of intensifying the violent acts. Out of the 412 international crises, 76 of intrastate crises triggered in the midst of a widespread war are excluded if they are focused on violence. In 120 crises, one of the actors is not included as a real actor of crisis. Eleven of these cases are excluded, because the non-crisis actor adversary is, in fact, a non-state actor. Thus, from 325 cases, 109 are unilateral crises and 216 are bilateral crises.

**The risk of the emergence of violence.** The main difference between intrastate and interstate crises stems from the perceptions of actors with regard to the risk of violence emergence in any type of crisis. A fundamental condition for a nation that considers itself as being in crisis is that it should estimate a higher likelihood of military hostilities in confrontation with an opponent. Where a nation operates a crisis for another nation with a foreign policy action, but it does not perceive itself to be in crisis, we might reasonably infer that there are no clear and immediate intentions to engage in a violent military conflict with another nation. Although its action has led another nation to believe that the likelihood of future hostilities is higher, however, the triggering nation perceives the situation differently.<sup>18</sup> Crises for the territory with minor clashes: Botswana (June 14, 1985 - June 21, 1985); Qatar the Incident in Al-Dibal (April 26, 1986 - June 15, 1986); Bahrain South Africa (April 26, 1986 - June 15, 1986).

It is to be noted that there is provided no explanation for what kind of differences in perception with regard to the likelihood of future hostilities are in these cases, but it is simply suggested that this difference involves a reasonable assumption about the likelihood of violent acts by the crisis in these cases. In other words, because the perception of an increased risk of military hostilities is not shared by the main opponents of the crisis, the risk of a higher level of violence is lower than in crisis situations in which this perception is shared by

<sup>15</sup> For example, Germany through "the crisis of the remilitarization of the Rhineland of 1936" or Syria through "the crisis of the 1976 Syrian militarization."

<sup>16</sup> See Snyder, Glenn H. & Paul Diesing, 1977, *Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises*. Princeton, (NJ: Princeton University Press), 6.

<sup>17</sup> See Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, 1991, 'Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1), 143-169.

<sup>18</sup> See Dan Snodderly, ed., *Peace Terms: Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peace building*, Washington, DC: Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace building, United States Institute of Peace, 2011.

all the nations (e.g. bilateral crises).<sup>19</sup> The absence of such common perceptions in the intrastate crises offers an opportunity to explore the extent to which this particular crisis has an impact on the possibility of escalation. It is necessary to have a more substantial theoretical approach on the role of such perceptions of the crisis. It is to be noted that there is a number of other expectations, resulting from the taking into account of the essential differences between intrastate and interstate crisis. Considering that the triggering entity of the intrastate crisis does not expect an evolution of violent acts as a result of its action, it is expected that crisis management technique adopted in the context of the crisis may be nonviolent.<sup>20</sup>

Intrastate crises can be managed by negotiation, mediation, or other non-violent measure in order to reach a settlement of the dispute. The gravity of the values at risk in intrastate crisis situations is relatively low, because of the unilateral nature of the crisis. The intrastate crisis occurs when the triggering entity does not consider itself to be in a crisis. However, through a specific action, the triggering nation caused the crisis of another nation. Despite this fact, the triggering nation continues to believe that the likelihood of hostilities did not exceed the average. In this scenario, the gravity of values at risk is relatively low and it would be inconsistent to expect that the nation could be triggering a high-level threat (for example, a threat of serious injury, or a threat to the existence of another state) without a reaction from the target nation which, in its turn, could cause crisis for the triggering nation.<sup>21</sup>

The low level threats are less likely to provoke a crisis for the triggering entity and the degree of danger in the unilateral statements of crisis is generally low. Similarly, it is expected that the level of stress faced by decision-makers on issues of crisis should be different in intrastate and interstate crises. In general, the levels of stress increase when threats become more severe and when the differences in status and power are getting bigger. The levels of stress in the intrastate crisis is expected to be lower due to the less stringent nature of the threats expected in these cases.<sup>22</sup>

The differences of the characteristics of intrastate and interstate crises are particularized depending on the degree of general violence that took place during the crisis (after the initial outbreak of the crisis), regardless of whether the violence was adopted as a technique for crisis management or not. Any crisis involving serious clashes or war at a large scale is known to be violent. Crises without any violence or minor clashes are referred to as non-violent. In intrastate crisis situations, the likelihood of crisis violence is lower than in the cases of interstate crisis. The crisis-management technique used during the crisis includes a series of tools of influence, including negotiation, other non-violent measures and violent military use of force. In this case it is important whether the fundamental technique of crisis management has been violent or non-violent. In intrastate crises, the likelihood that an actor of the crisis should use a violent crisis-management technique is less than in the situations of interstate crisis.<sup>23</sup>

The gravity of values at risk measures the degree to which basic values are in danger in case of a crisis. A low value threat implies political or economic threat. A big danger would include territorial, serious damage or life threats. Having in view the assumption that

<sup>19</sup> See Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 2000. *A study of crisis*. 2nd Edition (CD-ROM included). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

<sup>20</sup> See SIPRI yearbook, <http://www.sipri.org/>

<sup>21</sup> See Crocker, Chester, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds. 1999. *Herding cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*. Washington, DC: U.S Institute of Peace.

<sup>22</sup> See Leng, Russell, 1993. 'Reciprocating Influence Strategies and Success in Interstate Crisis Bargaining', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1), 3-41.

<sup>23</sup> See Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, 1991. 'Trigger-Response Transitions in Foreign Policy Crises', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(1). 143-169.

the triggering entity estimates a limited likelihood of violence escalation in unilateral cases, it is expected that this perception should be associated with a low level of threat in the context of the crisis. In intrastate crisis situations, the level of threat to the fundamental values is far more likely to be lower than in interstate crisis situations.<sup>24</sup> Crisis for existence without violence: South Korea (June 25, 1950 - September 29, 1950); Taiwan (June 28, 1950 - September 30, 1950); Egypt, Syria The Formation (RAU) (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Jordan (February 1, 1958 - February 14, 1958); Zambia (November 5, 1965 - April 27, 1966); U.S. Able Archer 83 (November 2, 1983 - November 11, 1983); Soviet Union (November 2, 1983 - November 11, 1983).

The level of stress experienced by the decision-makers during crisis; the nature of the threat is fundamental, with a separation of power between the actor and the main opponent of crisis. In intrastate crises, the level of stress experienced by decision-makers is smaller than in situations of interstate crisis.

In order to determine the likelihood of violence in a crisis, it is important to determine the moment when the military hostilities broke out, after or before the outbreak of the crisis, regardless whether it was considered the basic technique in crisis management. Crises with military damage or minor clashes: South Africa The Cross-border Attack (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Botswana (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Zambia (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Zimbabwe (May 19, 1986 - May 1986); Mozambique Ultimatum (September 11, 1986 - December 18, 1986); Malawi (September 11, 1986 - December 18, 1986).

It is to be noted that there is a twice higher frequency of violence in intrastate crises. Deviant intrastate crisis analysis in which violence took place shows that most of these crises have had violent crisis triggers. In contrast, only one-third of the non-violent intrastate crises have triggered the violence. The hypothesis of "violence breeds violence," in the field literature of crisis behavior would lead to the idea that responses to violent triggers are also violent.<sup>25</sup>

Initiation-response is partly responsible for the rare occurrence of violence (after the initial outbreak) in intrastate crisis situations. The violence is more likely to be adopted as a fundamental technique of crisis management in bilateral crisis situations than in unilateral situations. Comparing the gravity of values at risk in intrastate and interstate cases, we notice that the level of threat in cases of intrastate crisis is slightly lower than in the case of interstate crises.<sup>26</sup> Intrastate crises are different from interstate crises in several different ways. The likelihood of violence in intrastate crisis situations is significantly less. The likelihood of adopting drastic measures as essential technical management of the crisis is less than in intrastate crisis situations. Although the differences are less substantial, the gravity of values at risk and stress levels are slightly lower in the case of intrastate crises. The possibility that the fundamental factors in cases of intrastate crisis could be associated with a lower likelihood of occurrence of crisis violence that could be caused by a number of other factors that are simply related to this type of crisis is of great interest. The above noticed differences between intrastate and interstate crisis, with regard to the possibility of violence, could be the result of a set of other factors which are considered to be important predictors of violence during the crisis. These factors include the geographic proximity of the actors of

<sup>24</sup> See Hopmann, P. Terrence. 1996. *The Negotiation Process and the Resolution of International Conflicts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.

<sup>25</sup> See Leng, Russell, 1993. 'Reciprocating Influence Strategies and Success in Interstate Crisis Bargaining', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(1), 3-41.

<sup>26</sup> See Bremer, Stuart A., 1992. 'Dangerous Dyads: Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Inter-state Violence, 1816-1965', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(2), 309-341.



crisis, the power differences between the opponents of the crisis, whether the crisis was violently triggered, the gravity of values at risk and the type of regime of crisis actors.<sup>27</sup>

**Specific factors of the crisis.** The contiguity indicates whether the crisis opponents are geographically neighbors or not. Crises can degenerate between the neighboring nations into acts of violence as opposed to the crises between the nations that are not neighbors. Geographical proximity can create more opportunities for conflict and for reducing the cost of mobilizing the army for long distances.

Crises with minor clashes: Sweden (June 16, 1952 - July, 1952); USSR Catalina Incident (June 16, 1952 - July 1952).

Crises with serious clashes with great injury: Ethiopia-Somalia (December 26, 1960 - 1961); Ethiopia (December 26, 1960 - 1961).

The power distribution indicates whether a balance of power existed between the opponents of the crisis or not.

The outbreak of crisis indicates whether a crisis was violently triggered or not. Violence in the crisis trigger proved to be a very strong predictor of whether a crisis would develop violently or not. Crises with minor clashes: the Jordan Regime (April 4, 1957 - May 3, 1957); Jordan (April 4, 1957 - May 3, 1957); France-Tunisia (May 31, 1957 - June 17, 1958); Nicaragua (June 1, 1959 - June 14, 1959); Dominican Republic (June 14, 1959 - December, 1959); Haiti (August 13, 1959 - September 5, 1959); Central America/Cuba II (November 9, 1960 - December 7, 1960); Nicaragua (November 9, 1960 - December 7, 1960); Guatemala (November 13, 1960 - December 7, 1960).

The nature of the threat measures the gravity of threat during the crisis. There are expected increases of crisis violence.

The crisis for the territory without violence: Venezuela Essequibo (July 9, 1968 - August, 1968); Guyana (July 9, 1968 - August 1968); Uganda Rights (February 15, 1976 - February 24, 1976); Kenya (February 15, 1976 - February 24, 1976).

Crisis for the territory with minor clashes: Goa India I (August 10, 1955 - September 6, 1955); Portugal (August 10, 1955 - September 6, 1955); Goa India II (December 11, 1961 - December 19, 1961); Portugal (December 11, 1961 - December 19, 1961); Mali-Mauritania (March 29, 1962 - February 18, 1963); Mauritania (March 29, 1962 - February 18, 1963); Kenya-Somalia (November 20, 1963 - March 4, 1964); Kenya (November 20, 1963 - March 4, 1964); South Africa The Critical Situation in Caprivi (October 5, 1971 - October 12, 1971); Zambia (October 5, 1971 - October 12, 1971); South Africa Zambia Raid (January 19, 1973 - February 3, 1973); Zambia (January 19, 1973 - February 3, 1973); The Invasion of Iraq-Kuwait (March 20, 1973 - June 8, 1973); Kuwait (March 20, 1973 - June 8, 1973); South Africa Mozambique Attacks (January 30, 1981 - March 1981); Mozambique (January 30, 1981 - March, 1981); US Gulf of Syrte I (August 12, 1981 - September 1, 1981); Libya (August 12, 1981 - September 1, 1981); Lesotho (December 9, 1982 - December 15, 1982); South Africa Botswana Attack (June 14, 1985 - June 21, 1985).

Crisis for the territory with serious clashes: Oman-South Yemen (November 18, 1973 - March 11, 1976); Oman (November 18, 1973 - March 11, 1976); Litani Israel Operation (March 14, 1978 - June 13, 1978); Lebanon (March 14, 1978 - June 13, 1978).

Democracy is a proportionate measure of the number of democracies involved in a crisis. The increases are associated with declines in terms of likelihood of violence during the crisis.<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> See Rousseau, David L.; Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter & Paul K. Huth, 1996. 'Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88', *American Political Science Review* 90(3), 512-533.

<sup>28</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

The type of crisis indicates whether a crisis is intrastate and interstate. The likelihood of violence during crisis decreases in intrastate crisis situations, no matter the effects of the geographical contiguity of crisis actors, the power differences between the crisis opponents, the triggering factors of crisis, the level of threat of the values, as well as the regime's opponents.

Apart from geographical contiguity, the differences of power, the violence of the outbreak of the crisis, the severity of threat, and the regime of the crisis factors, the fact that a crisis is an intrastate one remains an important factor in explaining the fact whether the violence breaks out during the crisis or not. This thing suggests that regardless of the factors that lead a nation to believe that it is or is not in crisis mode (regardless of the factors that have led to the development of a unilateral crisis), these factors serve as an important component with regard to the phenomenon of violence during the crisis. Crisis for territory: Ethiopia the Incident in Todghere (February 12, 1987 - April, 1987); Somalia (February 12, 1987 - April, 1987); Cameroon-Nigeria (May 2, 1987 - September 26, 1987); Cameroon-Nigeria (May 2, 1987 - September 26, 1987). Crisis for the territory without violence: China (PRC) (June 27, 1950 - July 1950); Sudan (February 9, 1958 - February 25, 1958); Egypt-Sudan Border I (February 9, 1958 - February 25, 1958); Ghana (March 1960 - April 1, 1960); Ghana-Togo Border I (March 1960 - April 1, 1960).

In the studies that examine the factors of sudden surge of international crisis, there should be given attention to the potential impact of intrastate crises.

The variable of intrastate crisis, of the type of crisis, has a significant contribution in terms of statistics for explaining the differences in violence crisis. In brief, the statistical patterns that assess the relationship between the different types of independent variables and the violence in times of crisis by using the RCI data set may indicate a weaker relationship of variables than the patterns that include the control of intrastate crises.<sup>29</sup>

The definition of foreign policy crisis focuses on the point of view of the leaders of a nation-state with regard to future military hostilities, to the threat of fundamental values and to the moment when they should take decisions. The first of these attributes, the perception of a higher likelihood of military hostilities, is the central element of the definition. Considering the fact that the definition is perceptual, it is possible that a state-nation should be in crisis, while its main opponent is not in crisis. These crises, considered to be intrastate ones, have an important similarity.<sup>30</sup>

Unlike interstate crises, the nation states in intrastate crisis do not share the perception of the likelihood of escalation of future military hostilities. This fact constitutes the fundamentals for a number of assumptions about how patterns of intrastate and interstate crisis should differ. Data on international crises provide support for these assumptions.

There is a possibility of less intensification of violence during times of intrastate crisis than in interstate crises. In a multidimensional analysis, the fact that a crisis was an intrastate one has remained a significant predictor of violence (or the lack of it), despite the presence of other control variables. Multiple analyses suggest that there is an additional attribute of the intrastate crises, beyond the geographical contiguity, the sharing of power, the outbreak of the crisis, the severity of threats, or the regime of the contestants, which helps to explain the inclination of such crises towards nonviolence.

<sup>29</sup> It is also worth noting that there may be cases when it is necessary that the unilateral crisis should be excluded entirely from the analysis. For example, in their study on the democratic peace theory, Rousseau et al. (1996: 532) exclude many of the unilateral crises from the analysis because there is "no strong evidence for the existence of the opponent who uses strength". See David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*, 512-533.

<sup>30</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

An evaluation of the theoretical significance of this additional attribute cannot be determined until the attribute itself is appropriately identified. This additional attribute represents the absence of common perceptions about the likelihood of military hostilities between opponents in crisis. The rules for inclusion of a state-nation as an actor of crisis facilitates the identification of actors who do not share the same perception of the risk of triggering hostilities military the same as other countries that are in a dispute.

It is to be noted that the fact that the theoretical attribute of one of intrastate crises is not the fact that they are unilateral, but the fact that the actors do not share the same perception about the risk of violence outbreak. This particular attribute is common for intrastate crises, but could also characterize a part of interstate crises. By applying this measure to all crises, a more thorough assessment of the impact of this factor on the intensification of the crisis might be possible. Although the variable of perception with regard to the type of crisis is only a representation of common perceptions, it strongly supports the idea that the congruent perceptions on future military hostilities could play an important role in explaining the violence of a crisis.

It seems that the common perceptions about the risk of military hostilities are a critical component in the network of factors that contribute to the intensification of violence. When one party in a dispute notices an increase of the risk of violence, the crisis is much less likely to intensify, even when we have control over other important predictors of crisis escalation.<sup>31</sup> Crises for the political regime with serious clashes: Libya Israel (October 14, 1953 - October 1953); Jordan (October 14, 1953 - October 1953); Taiwan the Infiltration in Burma (February 8, 1953 - October 15, 1954).

From the synthetic presentation of the parameters for the analysis of crises-the definition of a crisis, the quality of a crisis actor, the risk of the outbreak of violence, specific factors of crisis-we may notice that there is a coherent algorithm but the quantifying of parameters so that one can work with formulas is accompanied by inherent risks with vitiation consequences of the crisis diagnoses.

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<sup>31</sup> David; Gelpi, Reiter & Huth, *Assessing the Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace...*

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## CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE - NECESSARY STAGES OF DEMOCRACY CONSTRUCTION\*

Flavius-Cristian MĂRCĂU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT:

THE FALL OF COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, IN 1989, IS PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT FROM THE SECOND WORLD WAR. DISAPPEARANCE OF TOTALITARIAN COMMUNIST REGIME MARKED THE BEGINNING OF A NEW PHASE A PARTICULAR CONSTRUCTION AND DEMOCRACY IN THAT STATE FOR MORE THAN FOUR DECADES KNEW ONLY BASED CONTROL SYSTEM OF EXCESSIVE AND SUPPRESSION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. WESTERN EUROPE THE MODEL FOR THE GRADIENT DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE ENTRANTS STATES BUT THEY PROVE TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE STEPS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO BE FOLLOWED FOR OBTAIN FINAL RESULT: DEMOCRACY. IN THIS ARTICLE WE PRESENT STAGES OF MANDATORY MET FOR A STATE THROUGH DEMOCRATIZATION, TO REACH DEMOCRACY.

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**KEYWORDS:** COMMUNISM, TOTALITARIANISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION, DEMOCRACY

The collapse of the Soviet Empire marked the beginning of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe and was seen as a politically and economically triumph of the West. A famous interpretation of this event was attributed by Francis Fukuyama, as an *end of history*. Extrapolating, we can state that democratization was a *new chapter of history*, marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, *and not an end*, as Fukuyama argues. A *chapter* for Westerners proasserting the possibility of a viable alternative to capitalism or democracy was virtually non-existent .

Recent history shows us that all states of decommunized in Central and Eastern Europe have turned inevitably to democracy, following certain steps. We mention that the mandatory steps to go due to the configuration of the previous political regime given the intention (and succeeding) to make it in society *Tabula Rasa*: Association destroyed every trace of social point of view and prevented the establishment of new associations<sup>2</sup>. The mandatory steps that we have identified the democratization are: 1) Establishing membership and training; 2) compromise; 3) habituation; 4) The alignment of the international system; 5)

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\*This article was presented at the conference "Social Development, Administration and Justice", 14<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> November 2014 at "Constantin Brancusi" University of Targu-Jiu, and published (in Romanian language) in conference proceedings "Dezvoltare Sociala, Administratie si Justitie", editia a III-a, (Targu-Jiu: Academica Brancusi Publisher, 2014), 144-154

<sup>1</sup> Research Assis, Research Institute of Development, University "Constantin Brancuși" of Târgu-Jiu, Romania; Phd. C., Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, flaviusmarcau@yahoo.com

<sup>2</sup> Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, (Iasi European Institute, 2002), 313

The development and market capitalism; 6) The development of parliamentary institutions and political. These six steps together towards a single result: *democracy*<sup>3</sup>. Continuing our study we describe in the end will decide their order and their classification in one of the three phases of democratization: *initial, partial and full*.

## 1) ESTABLISHING MEMBERSHIP AND TRAINING

Pasquino believes that *membership and preparation* are found one after the other and not side by side. After their conceptual delimitation, we explain why we believe it is better for them to work together.

When we talk about community belonging referring to, specifically membership in the political community. This concern them directly on participants regime change in, they must be included in a political community. Although this phase of democratization has not received due consideration should be borne in mind that its importance is reflected in the strong distrust of minority political community that wants to be democratic. Specifically if a united and concentrated minority is not in the political community that wants to produce the restoration of democracy, in this case two unfavorable situations arise transition to democracy: 1) the minority that refuses to submit to the new political class reform decisions; 2) or reaching civil war. As an example for the latter case is Ukraine in 2014: civil battle between pro-Russian and pro Westerners .

Thus for the transition to democracy is smooth or blockage, it is imperative that most people find themselves in the same political community.

Inevitably, after the problem was solved ownership, the system prepares the formation of a democratic regime. We note that this is where *preparation* stage start but, as previously mentioned, we can not talk about education without clarifying ownership or affiliation without clarifying something to follow (preparing for something). In this case we are talking about preparing the formation of a democratic regime<sup>4</sup>.

## 2) COMPROMISE

If before talking about the population belonging to a political community, now we will discuss the problem of elites that are found in different political communities.

As in the first case (of ownership) can create democratization various unfavorable situations when the elites refuse cohabitation (living together), entering the competition for political power and everything they want is to fight for power. Please note that the difference between fighting and competition is that the competition is respected democratic principles and the rule of law is violated<sup>5</sup> in battle.

In any event competition is preferred but not be overlooked one thing: competition can turn into a fight. This would be when the democratization process stops and the only option is that o to reach agreement on compromise.

Once compromise has been made shall be submitted to the decision phase "*compromise reached consists of not only the conscious decision to recognize equally their differences, but also to create structures and procedures to protect these differences, to put value and guide them towards democratic competition by accepting the existence and legitimacy of opposition*"<sup>6</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Adrian Gorun, *Introduction in Political Science*, (Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press, 2003)

<sup>4</sup> See Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 314

<sup>5</sup> Gorun, *Introduction in Political Science*

<sup>6</sup> Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 314-315

Please note that this compromise does not fully solve the political conflict but maintain stability<sup>7</sup>. The point you can name, as did Rustow, *habituation*.

### 3) HABITUATION

This stage, which can have a fairly large temporal scope, comprising *the step of knowledge*. The latter is necessary since this *political cohabitation* requires prior knowledge between subjects, followed by the query. As in the steps above, no one can not be considered stable. She may suffer blockages or obstructions welcome at any time, either in the first stage (the knowledge) be undergoing common. If knowledge can be considered inevitable (and necessary) and unfavorable situations may develop transition phase commonly found in some instability which can degenerate into a conflict between the power elite, so unfavorable since such a situation would *compromise* relegation stage.

This phase aims, in part, strengthening compromise on the premise that its artisans have *"need to convince the professional politicians, activists and citizens of the importance and effectiveness principles of conciliation and reconciliation"*.<sup>8</sup> Once this has been achieved, democracy increases due to the smooth functioning of its principles (checked over time).

### 4) ALIGNMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

In the case of the states in Central and Eastern Europe, the international system has proved to be a mold concerning the establishment of a democratic regime and a guide when states were still under the influence of communist regimes. Pasquino says that *"it can not, by itself, or to establish or destroy political regimes, except war and invasion. In general, the international system acts as a facilitating or weakens democratic trends background"*.<sup>9</sup> Thinking about the role of former communist and totalitarian regimes changing international system, we conclude that Pasquino is wrong when it claims that it can produce changes than by war and invasion. If in the 80s, for example, the international system does not intervene to support the trade union Solidarity in Poland in particular and the general regime change, communism certainly acted in a particularly aggressive. The role of the West has been understood as one of conciliator, largely, but understanding its true role, we can say, 25 years after the fall of communism, it was the manipulator.

The alignment of the international system proves to be necessary for democratic principles to become effective. I said earlier that it is able to facilitate or weakening of democratic tendencies. Nothing really. Certainly in the middle of the USSR could not develop a democratic state with regional influence international system.

### 5) THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET AND CAPITALISM

The survival of a democratic regime is inevitably linked to socio-economic context in which it is desired to strengthen the regime. Przeworski argues that *"democracies arise independently of the level of development, but die in the poorer countries and in the richer countries survive."*<sup>10</sup> We believe that in poor countries democracies may occur only in exceptional cases, not only did not survive. As an example we can take from the poor African countries. Every trace of democracy has disappeared due to poverty encountered in the region. Another situation where the political destabilization in a democratic state poorest is

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<sup>7</sup> See Adrian Gorun., *Politics and power*, (Bucharest: Ed. Expert, 2006)

<sup>8</sup> Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 315

<sup>9</sup> Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 316

<sup>10</sup> Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limongi , *Modernization: theories and facts*, in World Politics, January 1997, 159

created when attempting a forced economic development in a short period of time. In this case the regime tends to devolve into authoritarian or totalitarian. However, we stress that an authoritarian or totalitarian favors higher growth in a poor state, than democracy. This was demonstrated by Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Fernando Limongi Cheibub and study *"What determines the durability of democracies?"*. When preparing the study, they observed trajectory of a number of 135 countries on the survival and collapse of political regimes in the period 1950-1990.

We previously established that the poorest states tiny democracy is likely to arise, and if you try a forced growth in a very short period, the system tends to be authoritarian or totalitarian, and in this case it is imperative to answer the following question: where totalitarian regimes produce higher economic growth in poor countries than democratic regime, and democracy can arise only in the developed countries in economic terms, we are entitled to say that it is necessary to support regimes totalitarian because the only way a democracy may arise in a poor country? We address this question because the answer that we will offer to provide an explanation which leaves no room for interpretation. First democracy dictatorships are not the product development. If this would be possible, *"the speed with which dictatorships make the transition to democracy would increase with the level of development: however, the survival prospects of dictatorships analyzes indicate that not happen. Indeed, transitions to democracy are random in terms of level of development: no transition can not be predicted only by the level of development "*.<sup>11</sup>

By the answer I understood very clearly that the birth of a democracy is not random and linked to the level of development and, once created, democracy is more likely to survive in more developed countries than in poor ones but, according to Lipset, maintain welfare of a nation democratic regime. Basically, how is good condition is bigger democratic regime is more likely in terms of survival and consolidation.<sup>12</sup>

## 6) THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL

Since we are talking about the party leader (Communist Party in our case) and the fact that he lost his leadership role should be underlined that in the first stage of the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, was dropped any mention constitutional target *leading role* of the Communist Party in the state and around this stage, other political parties were granted the right to exist and to carry out. The newly *deported* from party leadership and outlawed in some states<sup>13</sup> had to *redefine*<sup>14</sup> (on the surface). But in many countries, redefining consisted of changing the name to give the vague impression of abandonment of Marxism-Leninism but there were also cases where former party members were unable to

<sup>11</sup> Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *What determine the durability of democracies ?* in Larry Diamond, Yun-han Chu, Marc F. Plattner, Hung-mao Tien (eds.), *How to consolidates democracy*, (Iasi: Polirom, 2004), 308

<sup>12</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset, *Some Social Requisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*, in American Oilitical Science Rewiev 53 (1959), 56

<sup>13</sup> See the case of Romania when after the bloody events of 1989, the Communist Party was outlawed and dissolved by decree-law.

<sup>14</sup> Continuity of successor parties of the former communist party is a strange paradox of democratic politics in Central-Eastern Europe. Eventually, the 1989 revolution sought to remove the communist parties in power to end the monopoly sis their political and economic discretion But all these partied, even the most despised, have suprevietuit and some of their successors have won popular support pofesionalism considerable political and reputation. Some have returned to government, free elections this time. (Anna Grzymala-Busse, pointing past: ex-communist parties after 1989, Grzegorz Ekiert, Stephen E. Hanson, Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, p 197)



find a middle ground in terms of the so-called transformation party, at which the party split in two<sup>15</sup>.

From this point we can discuss the states decommunized multiparty<sup>16</sup> system and parliamentary institution and political<sup>17</sup> formation. We consider that democracies differ from state to state, and *"systems for the separation of representation and oversight powers and methods of organization of interests and legal doctrines associated rights and duties of citizenship may vary and even vary significantly between regimes that are generally recognized as democratic."*<sup>18</sup> John Hallowell argues that democracy should be understood as a complex of institutions essential for the survival of the regime and can not be isolated or treated as a distinctive feature, which is *"designated, individually and collectively, to apply the principle that government should support the consent of the governed"*.<sup>19</sup>

Although democracy differs from state to state, it presupposes drawing constitutional limitations in setting power of political leaders<sup>20</sup> and establish mechanisms for the election of new leaders. Looking at history, we understand that parliaments arose only when it was raised the issue of limiting the power of the king. These limitations aimed largely the power to spend because parliament, at the time, represent the interests of the nobility, being composed of them, and they come to support much of the costs and fees imposed king. This kind of control can be seen as a pioneer of parliament in achieving democratic<sup>21</sup> regimes.

Next we discuss the institutional characteristics that may be incurred in the new democratic regimes or presidentialism and parliamentarism ie we answer the following question: *which of the two systems support democracy a longer life?*

Trying to give a reasoned answer, we call on the study of Juan Linz *"The perils of presidentialism"* as it is launched assumption that parliamentary democracies are more durable than presidential ones. The argument behind this statement is that the presidential race can come only one winner and the loser will not receive any formal role in policy and it may not even be a member of parliament. When a parliamentary system, defeated candidate for the premiership will be leader of the opposition<sup>22</sup>. Adam Przeworski believes that a presidential regime, Chief Executive fulfilling the role of head of state and undermine the legitimacy of opposition because it *"can partisan interests of the President that the national interests"*.<sup>23</sup>

Another argument concerning trends in a system bottleneck and decrease the life of the democratic regime is that such blockages can occur in both systems that frequently appear only in presidential democracies legislative bottlenecks.

We previously presented various arguments in favor of the parliamentary system, drawing on various theories launched by Linz, Stepan, Przeworski, Lemongi, etc. and we considered most important, underlying this statement is that of Preworski and Lemongi namely *economic growth of a state "parliamentary systems in poor countries, although you*

<sup>15</sup> Leslie Holmes, *Post-communism*, (Iasi: European Institute, 2004), 206

<sup>16</sup> See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure. Birth and Death of Communism in the XX century*, (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia Publishing House, 1993), 120-129

<sup>17</sup> Adrian Gorun, *Introduction in Political Science*, (Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press, 2003), 149

<sup>18</sup> Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, *What determine the durability of democracies...*, 308

<sup>19</sup> John H. Hallowell, *Moral basis of democracy*, (Bucharest: Ed. Paideia, 1999), 44

<sup>20</sup> Jean Gurgel, *Democratization*, (Iasi: Polirom, 2008), 83

<sup>21</sup> See Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 181-182

<sup>22</sup> See Juan Linz, *The perils of presidentialism*, *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1990), pp. 51-69; Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, *What determine the durability of democracies ?* in Larry Diamond, Yun-han Chu, Marc F. Plattner, Hung-mao Tien (eds.), *How to consolidates democracy*, (Iasi: Polirom, 2004), 311-312

<sup>23</sup> Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, *What determine the durability of democracies?...*, 312

*are very fragile, have almost double the chance of survival presidential democracies and they are increased fourfold when there is economic growth "*<sup>24</sup>

Regarding the political institutions of democratic governance, Robert Dahl, presents in the book about democracy, six institutions considered mandatory in a democratic regime, namely: a) elected officials; b) free, fair and frequent, c) freedom of expression; d) access to alternative sources of information; e) associational autonomy and f) inclusive citizenship<sup>25</sup>.

Why do we need these political institutions? The answer is quite simple: without them, the democratic regime becomes unstable and tends toward authoritarianism. We'll do a brief description to explain their necessity in a democratic<sup>26</sup> system.

a) *officials elected through vote*

Government decisions return to leaders elected through the vote by citizens but we want to highlight the fact that electoral democracy is not a guarantor of freedom, than if they are added various safeguards<sup>27</sup>.

b) *Free elections, fair and frequent*

What does this mean? First of all citizens must enjoy equal vote: all votes must be considered as equal to each other. In the second place, all citizens who go to vote shall not be liable to reprisals from third parties.

*The frequency of elections mean time of electoral rounds. It is not enough that the elections are free and fair if the frequency is low. Basically, if the representatives are elected for a period of 15 years, for example, when citizens are diminished right of final control over the agenda. For us to limit this right, it is imperative that the elections are held regularly and the distances between them not. According to Dahl, elections "annual representatives as a little too frequent, and any period longer than five years would be too long "*<sup>28</sup>

c) *Freedom of expression*

What we mean by freedom of expression in a democratic regime? I'll try to define this freedom by comparison with totalitarian and authoritarian regime. In such a system, the people are subjected to total censorship on free speech. Not supported discussions on politics, economics, defense. The only accepted by one party talks are strictly related to everyday life and not defame party in any way. For example, during the communist regime censorship was applied in such a way that the early years of democracy, political discussions on it were mostly in private. Thus, anyone who talks about politics or leaders in terms which contravened the communist ideology and it is, come to be investigated by the Security and depending on the seriousness of the (propaganda against the regime) be condemned.

Democracy provides citizens the right to express openly, without undergoing repercussions own opinion on state policy, its leaders, defense<sup>29</sup> and others.

d) *Access to alternative sources of information*

Given the necessary information, understand that democracy makes this possible. But a totalitarian regime prohibits informing the public? No. No regime, whether totalitarian or authoritarian, does not prohibit information of a control by manipulating the media, publishers and printers control so that people could not get to the information (books, magazines, newspapers, informed audio or video) unless they were under the single party

<sup>24</sup> Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, *What determine the durability of democracies?...*, 318

<sup>25</sup> See Robert Dahl, *About democracy*, (Iasi: European Institute, 2003), 83-84

<sup>26</sup> See extensively analysis made by Adrian Gorun in the book *Stasiology and Electoral Systems*, (Targu-Jiu : Ed. Academica Brancusi, 2008)

<sup>27</sup> See Jean-Francois Revel, *Revival of democracy*, (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1995), 45

<sup>28</sup> See Dahl, *About democracy*, 92-93

<sup>29</sup> See Michael Saward, *Democratic theory an indices of democratization*, in David Beetham (Ed.), *Defining and Measuring Democracy*, Sage Modern Politics (36), London, UK: Sage, 16-18

visions. Specifically, the materials were inspected and if they are found to contravene the communist ideology, are totally or partially enforce censorship.

In a democracy, citizens enjoy the right to seek any alternative information sources (magazines, books, newspapers, Internet, etc.) without them find themselves under the control of any political party or government but there are cases in all democratic states in which a part of the media is subservient to politics and is used mostly for influencing political attitudes of citizens.


e) *Associational autonomy*

In a state with democratic regime, citizens enjoy the right of association, and democracy is strengthened by the existence of independent associations of all kinds: economic, cultural, political, to Most important for a political status are political associations. This last category includes political parties, public interest action groups, lobbyists, etc. Bo Rothstein gives us a great example that need Association argues. It shows a group of people who live either working or living in the same place in the same area. These people find that their interests are not only individual but collective when it is considered that need the same things, be they natural resources, laws governing conflicts over property, to *"In order to achieve common interests, improve wages and working conditions, reveals the need to establish or regulate the use of natural resources to avoid the tragedy of the commons. So they come together and form a trade union organization or a cooperative economic type whatsoever"*<sup>30</sup>

f) *The comprehensive Citizenship*

This latter institution encompasses all five institutions described above. Specifically, a citizen of a democratic state benefit simultaneously from the right to choose to be elected to free speech, to inform and to be associated.

**In conclusion**, we say that these six steps described above depend on each other and avoiding one of them is not possible, otherwise leading to inevitable sudden stopping of the process of democratization. Why support this? We will try to illustrate briefly to remove any doubt about whether we are going through one or more stages of the six above. Looking at each step we concluded that they are closely related in sequence and only works one another, the model developed below:



<sup>30</sup> Bo Rothstein, *Political Institutions: an overview*, Robert E. Goodin in Hans-Dieter Klingemann, *Manual of Political Science*, (Iasi: Polirom, 2005), 127

We believe that this model can be followed by a fresh out of state under a totalitarian or authoritarian regime if it wants to implement a democratic regime.

The six steps are mandatory and, as I said, we can not overlook any: a state can not reach a *compromise* if *membership* is not determined or can not get to the stage to *get used to* if you did not obtain a *compromise* between elites on the final outcome of the procedure (democratic) because this step was omitted. Thus, the logic of their walking, we understand that omission, deliberate or not, inevitably lead to a stage stop the process of democratization.

There may be situations, very rarely, in which a State may make an exception to the foregoing.

The best example is the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that after the fall of the Berlin Wall was unified with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). In the present case we can talk about *assimilation*. What does it mean? Germany was a democracy and benefit both functional structures and a culture of democracy. In this case the GDR had to go through just the first four stages. He realized establishing membership and prepare for unification elites and the general public. According to a survey of Radio Free Europe, "*87% of East Germans and 81% of West Germans wanted unification*"<sup>31</sup>. The compromise was the fact that there were no elite who will want a separate from the Federal Democratic Germany. Weights were however encountered in the fourth stage since there were countries that felt that the unification of the two German cause instability in terms of European<sup>32</sup> security. Once these first four steps have been completed, the last two were getting done automatically, finding functional in Germany.

Note that in connection with the sixth stage should not be considered only parliamentary or presidential regimes. We have made reference to the two going on the assumption that history gives us enough data about democratic states who use or have used parliamentary or presidential regimes compared with countries using a different type of regime and did not exclude the possibility that it may not be whether the regime is democratic semi-presidential or are in a constitutional monarchy. Also, the failure of one of the political institutions of the six contained in the last step can lead to a significant slowdown or even cease its democratization. For example, the democratization process can be stopped if officials are not elected or if there is only formal elections, which are not free and fair In both cases, officials would not arrive in power will of the people and therefore we can not discuss in the State concerned of a democratic regime.

We were talking previously about the importance of voting and noticed that it does not represent a guarantee of freedom unless other conditions are met and essential to the functioning of democracy. For example, an elected government "*may well be oppressive invader, vindictive and arbitrary, as a government we can give people choice, regions, cities, as well as a wide range of arts and literature.*"<sup>33</sup> The difference between the two situations is noticeable, as in the first case, citizens are able to produce changes among representatives, given that they are in control: periodic elections, referenda, etc. The second situation can not be considered representative democracy due to the inability of control, the government decision, the population.

We want to mention and to argue that post-totalitarian regimes, Linz and Stepan described are applicable to post-communist world. We base this remark with the sudden end of the totalitarian communist regime. In this situation post-totalitarian regimes can not find applicability for various reasons: 1) the leader is not found as a product of the Communist

<sup>31</sup> Adrian Pop, *Origins and Patterns of eastern european revolutions*, (Bucharest: Encyclopedic Publishing, 2010), 265

<sup>32</sup> Pop, *Origins and Patterns of eastern european revolutions*, 262

<sup>33</sup> Revel, *Revival of democracy*, 37

Party; 2) ideology regime is no longer applied after the time of its collapse; 3) inability to return to the communist regime; 4) encouraging the existence of political pluralism after the disappearance of the totalitarian regime.

	Post - totalitarianism		
	<i>Initial</i>	<i>Frozen</i>	<i>Mature</i>
<b>Pluralism</b>	Absent	Emergent	Tolerated
<b>Ideology</b>	Ossified	Emptied	With technocratic elements
<b>Mobilization</b>	Sporadic, ritualistic	Abandoned	Terminated
<b>Leadership</b>	Bureaucracy - collegial	Bureaucratic-collegial	Of party

Table 1<sup>34</sup>

Linz and Stepan, through their study found that post-totalitarian<sup>35</sup> regimes can be found in the transition process. This is true only if the transition is smooth and starts from a totalitarian regime to a democratic regime goes. In the present regime suffered a fall forced Central and Eastern Europe and the post-totalitarian regimes are described as follows:

*initial post-totalitarianism*: the two authors consider that this regime is at the beginning of the transition process. Political pluralism is lacking in this case; Type ossified ideology; mobilization is sporadic and ritual; founder leader is not but a product of the party regime.

*post-totalitarianism frozen*: In this regime, political pluralism is an early form alpha; ideology is the same but confidence in it begins to disappear; mobilization is abandoned; leader of the party is the same product.

*mature post-totalitarianism*: in this phase of post-totalitarian regime, pluralism is tolerated; party leader are the same but are beginning to be put into question; mobilization is completed.<sup>36</sup>

In our case, first, that we can not discuss about a product leader of the Communist Party because it has become non-existent or has undergone structural changes, abandoning their own ideology, in some countries may be inappropriate and multi-party system was felt immediately after the fall of the totalitarian regime. Mobilization became nonexistent since the time of the change. The following typology transitions decomunizată world, we discuss three phases of democratization, being the other one in succession, each comprising certain mandatory steps: 1) initial democratization: comprising the steps membership and training, compromise and habituation; 2) partial democratization: the alignment of the international system and capitalism and market development; 3) total democratization: the last step comprises parliamentary institutions and political development.

<sup>34</sup> Pasquino, *Course of Political Science*, 291

<sup>35</sup> A se vedea Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 43-51

<sup>36</sup> For a complete analysis see Adrian Gorun, *Introduction in Political Science*, (Cluj-Napoca: Cluj University Press, 2003)

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## **GLOBALIZATION IN FACTS: THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS AND THE EURASIAN UNION. POLITICAL PARALLELS TO THE EUROPEAN EXAMPLE**

**Silvian-Emanuel MAN<sup>1</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

*THE EUROPEAN UNION IS SERVING FOR OVER 60 YEARS AS A MODEL OF UNIFICATION ON ALL LEVELS, BEING AROSE IN A SPACE WHERE THE IDEA OF NATIONAL STATE AND NATIONALISM ARE BASED ON WELL ROOTED HISTORICAL FACTS. OUR PAPER WILL CAST A GLANCE OVER THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS OR THE SOUTH AMERICAN UNION AND ON THE EURASIAN UNION, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT BUILT UP IN CONTINENTAL AREAS WHERE COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM CREATED THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF LIVING UNDER ONE FLAG. THE CURRENT DIRECTIONS ARE POINTING TOWARDS COMPLETE CONTINENTAL UNIONS, THUS BRINGING CLOSER THE PERSPECTIVE OF A WORLD GOVERNMENT. AS SCHOLARS, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DIFFERENT HISTORIOGRAPHIC APPROACHES, TEND TO NEGLECT RECENT HISTORICAL FACTS, THIS PAPER IS ALSO CONSTITUTED AS A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL EFFORT IN THE TERMS OF LATE CONTEMPORARY TIMES, BY OUR USE OF TREATIES, OFFICIAL STATEMENTS, POLITICAL ANALYSIS AND INTERNATIONAL PRESS AS REFERENCE.*

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**KEYWORDS:** GLOBALIZATION, POLITICAL UNION, UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS, EURASIAN UNION, WORLD GOVERNMENT

### **BOLIVAR'S HERITAGE: THE UNION OF SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS**

The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) is an economic and political union which includes all the South American states, excepting French Guyana and the British possessions, consisting of two previous unions: Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina in Spanish, abbreviated CAN). UNASUR claims its whole historical heritage from the times of the Latin American Wars for Independence, having as "founding father" the Venezuelan General Simon Bolivar (1783-1830). The organizational pattern is being molded, as recognized even by its creators, after the model of the European Union.

It is known about Simon Bolivar, "El Libertador", that he was raised in the spirit of the French Revolution, beginning in his early days and with the assistance of his professors, to

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<sup>1</sup> Silvian-Emanuel Man, undergraduate student, Faculty of History – "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, Romania, Carol I blvd., no. 11, Iași 700506; e-mail: silvian.man@gmail.com

admire Jean-Jacques Rousseau for his nihilist concept of „free thought”. He grew up in Spain, along with his future king and enemy, Ferdinand VII. In this timespan he began developing powerful republican and anti-monarchist views, which will guide him during his life. In 1803, whilst at Cadiz, in Spain, he will meet his future collaborators, Argentinean general Jose de San Martin (1778-1850) and Venezuelan revolutionary Francisco de Miranda (1750-1816), seen as „El Precursor” – the precursor of Simon Bolivar.<sup>2</sup> Bolivar was influenced by the Masonic rhetorical thought, thinking about himself as a savior: „I am the father of the centuries, the Arcanum of fame and secret knowledge. My mother was Eternity. Infinity sets the limits of my empire. There is no tomb for me, because I am more powerful than Death. I behold the past, I see the future and the present passes through my hands”.<sup>3</sup> „I have been chosen by fate, to break your chains. Fight and you will win!”<sup>4</sup>

After liberating the colonies from the Spanish crown, which were to be organized into a union after the common will of the revolutionaries, Simon Bolivar prepares his political will towards perpetuating the spirit of Enlightenment: “All of you must work for the inestimable good of the Union; the people obeying the government in order to avoid anarchy; the ministers praying to heaven for guidance; and the military using its sword in defense of social guaranties. [...] If my death contributes to the end of partisanship and the consolidation of the Union, I shall be lowered in peace into my grave”.<sup>5</sup>

The one who contributed the most to the unification of South America was the Peruvian communist leader Victor Raul Haya de la Torre (1895-1979), who founded the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, with the purpose of unifying Latin-Americans under the red flag of communism, against both USA’s spanning and soviet influence. Another well-known contributor of the unification of the South American space is Ernesto Che Guevara, constant militant for a Marxist union of the South American nations.

Today, Bolivar’s will is accomplished as two base organizations emerged: Mercosur and CAN. Mercosur has its origins in the Brazil-Argentina Integration and Economics Cooperation Program (signed in 1985),<sup>6</sup> being founded through the Asuncion Treaty (1991) and the Treaty of Ouro Preto (1994), which gives its final form.<sup>7</sup> The latter one creates a customs union with a free trade market, comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela,<sup>8</sup> having its own functional parliament since 2005.<sup>9</sup> Its historical basis relies on the necessity to limit a possible military conflict between Brazil and Argentina as regional powers, just as the case of the historical conflict between Germany and France.<sup>10</sup>

CAN was founded on the premises of the Andean Pact (1969) as an economical union with the objective of creating a common market between Columbia, Bolivia, Ecuador and

<sup>2</sup> see Gerhard Masur, *Simon Bolivar* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1948).

<sup>3</sup> Francis J. Bell, “True Believers: Freemasonry, Revolutionary Thought and the Rise of Simon Bolivar”, *Pietre-Stones Review of Freemasonry*, accessed February 9, 2013,

[http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/freemasonry\\_bolivar.html#\\_edn27](http://www.freemasons-freemasonry.com/freemasonry_bolivar.html#_edn27)

<sup>4</sup> Luran Paine, *Bolivar the Liberator* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1970), 90.

<sup>5</sup> Elmer E. Rogers, “Simon Solivar”, accessed February 9, 2013,

[http://www.masonicworld.com/education/files/artaug04/simon\\_bolivar.htm](http://www.masonicworld.com/education/files/artaug04/simon_bolivar.htm)

<sup>6</sup> “Tratado de integracion, cooperacion y desarrollo entre la Republica Argentina y la Republica Federativa del Brasil”, [http://www2.uol.com.br/actasoft/actamercosul/espanhol/tratado\\_de\\_integracion.htm](http://www2.uol.com.br/actasoft/actamercosul/espanhol/tratado_de_integracion.htm)

<sup>7</sup> “Protocol of Ouro Preto”, <http://actrav.itcilo.org/actrav-english/telearn/global/ilo/blokit/mercopro.htm>

<sup>8</sup> “Lugo Calls Congress to vote for Venezuela’s Mercosur incorporation”, accessed June 29, 2010, <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/06/28/lugo-calls-congress-to-vote-for-venezuela-s-mercosur-incorporation>

<sup>9</sup> “Protocolo Constitutivo del Parlamento del Mercosur”,

[http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Protocolo\\_Constitutivo\\_del\\_Parlamento\\_del\\_Mercosur](http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Protocolo_Constitutivo_del_Parlamento_del_Mercosur)

<sup>10</sup> Anestis Papadopoulos, *The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 283.



Peru, the first acting as a regional power.<sup>11</sup> As from 1999, the two organizations started to negotiate, creating SAFTA – South American Free Trade Agreement – and from 2004 started on merging into the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), based on the Cusco Declaration, which demanded a common market, common currency and a common parliament.<sup>12</sup> On the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May 2008,<sup>13</sup> at the Third Summit of the Heads of States and Governments, held in Brazil’s capital, Brasilia, the UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed by the twelve leaders of the founding countries.

According to the Treaty, UNASUR is an intergovernmental union on a continental basis, with a common market, no internal borders, providing the requirements for developing free trade and free movement of individuals.

Its main institutions are the South American Parliament, with headquarters at Cochabamba in Bolivia, and the Bank of the South with headquarters at Caracas, in Venezuela. The two institutions are coordinating each other in two major projects that aim creating a stronger integration. The first is the common South American currency, called *gaucho*,<sup>14</sup> a project firmly supported by the World Bank.<sup>15</sup> The second is the Ciudadano Americano (American Citizen) right, offering the juridical possibility for one to become a continental citizen of South America, without the need to obey the law of national states directly, thus creating a larger juridical integration by community law. This is already put into action by releasing passports and ID cards having Mercosur as their eminent authority. Furthermore, for a better integration, the Parliament considers unifying the administrative system, using forced e-government.<sup>16</sup>

Both the South American Parliament and the Bank of the South are coordinated by the President of the Union and the Secretary General. The President of the Union is leading the Council of Heads of State and of Government of UNASUR, office being held by each of the twelve heads of state, for one year, in the alphabetical order of the countries. The current president pro tempore of UNASUR is Ollanta Humala, incumbent president of Peru, a controversial figure due to his allegiance towards extreme left-wing ideologies, including public admiration for the Peruvian dictator Juan Velasco Alvarado<sup>17</sup> and implication in the 2000 uprising and overthrow of Alberto Fujimori.

On the current agenda of the Council of Heads of State, primary objectives include the unifying all communication, transport and energy systems, through the Initiative for regional infrastructure integration<sup>18</sup> and the development of a common defense strategy through the South American Council of Defense.

The Secretary General is the legal representative of UNASUR’s General Secretariat, appointed by the Council of Foreign Ministers, on a two year term. Incumbent is Alí Rodríguez Araque, a top Venezuelan politician.

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<sup>11</sup> Bruce Bagley, *Regional Powers in the Caribbean Basin: Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983).

<sup>12</sup> “Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones”, [http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/dec\\_int/cusco\\_sudamerica.htm](http://www.comunidadandina.org/documentos/dec_int/cusco_sudamerica.htm)

<sup>13</sup> “South America nations found union”, accessed May 2011, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7417896.stm>

<sup>14</sup> “Subsecretaría de Política y Gestión Comercial”, <http://www.comercio.gov.ar/dnpce/mercosur/conceptos.html>

<sup>15</sup> “Nobel economist endorses Chávez regional bank plan”, accessed March 21, 2013, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2007/oct/12/venezuela.banking>

<sup>16</sup> “eGovernment Resource Centre”, accessed June 10, 2013, <http://www.egov.vic.gov.au/focus-on-countries/north-and-south-america-and-the-caribbean.html>

<sup>17</sup> Simon Tisdall, “Another angry neighbour for Bush”, accessed March 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/04/world.usa>

<sup>18</sup> “Banco de Desarrollo de America Latina”, accessed June 2011, <http://www.caf.com/view/index.asp?ms=17&pageMs=41608>

## AFTER THE LIGHT OF THE EAST, A NEW DAWN: THE EURASIAN UNION

Contrary to the South American continent that was only under the influence of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires, Eurasia is not also the cradle of human civilization, but the largest land mass on the globe, with two centers of civilization at its extremities (Western Europe and Far Asia) and who peripheral continents (Africa and Oceania), thus being the playground of diverse colonial and world powers over time, most notably being Great Britain and Russia in the context of The Great Game. That's mainly why Eurasia should be seen in a post-colonialist context, where the idea of national state became impetuous in the latter decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>19</sup>

Today's Eurasia is actually constructed as an anti-paradigm in Post-Soviet context,<sup>20</sup> as its nations had enough of the Soviet episode, refocusing towards the Western Civilization,<sup>21</sup> primarily dominated by the USA which developed a special strategy for Eurasia,<sup>22</sup> including the consolidation of a stability anchor in the region, represented by Uzbekistan.<sup>23</sup>

Even if strategies of human development and human security are currently employed,<sup>24</sup> the reality of national identities cannot be ignored,<sup>25</sup> as the development of democratic institutions is marked by a powerful dynamic of the so-called "patronal presidentialism", a mark of state-nationalism in Eurasia.<sup>26</sup>

Integration down south is based on Russia filling the vacuum left by colonial British and afterwards American influence in the southern band of Eurasia's Islamic crescent,<sup>27</sup> with an emphasis on trade as catalyst<sup>28</sup> of Inner Eurasia (ex. Soviet Union and Mongolia), understood as a distinct political, geographical and ecological unit of world history.<sup>29</sup>

Since 1991, we live with the false impression that the Soviet Union collapsed and all the ex-soviet republics won their independence and sovereignty. On the 8<sup>th</sup> of December 1991, through the Belavezha Agreements,<sup>30</sup> the representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus agreed to replace the USSR with an almost identical, but modern organization, the Community of Independent States (CIS). At that time, it received the appreciation of George Bush Sr., stating that „despite the potential of instability and chaos, these events are clearly in our interest”.<sup>31</sup> Ex-president of the Supreme Soviet, Anatoli Lukianov, testified 20 years later,

<sup>19</sup> William R. Thompson, "The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the World System", *Journal of World History* 10, 1 (1999): 143-178.

<sup>20</sup> Mark von Hagen, "Empires, Borderlands, and Diasporas: Eurasia as Anti-Paradigm for the Post-Posviet Era", *The American Historical Review* 109 (2004): 445-468.

<sup>21</sup> Valery V. Tsepikalo, "The Remaking of Eurasia", *Foreign Affairs* 77, 2 (1998): 107-126.

<sup>22</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A Geostrategy for Eurasia", *Foreign Affairs* 76 (1997): 50-64.

<sup>23</sup> S. Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable", *Foreign Affairs* 75, 1 (1996): 80-91.

<sup>24</sup> Vladimir Petrovsky, "Human Development and Human Security in Eurasia", *International Journal on World Peace* 22 (2005): 17-74.

<sup>25</sup> Ronald Grigor Suny, "Provisional Stabilities: The Politics of Identities in Post-Poviet Eurasia", *International Security* 24, 3 (1999): 139-178.

<sup>26</sup> Henry E. Hale, "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia", *World Politics* 58, 1 (2005): 133-165.

<sup>27</sup> Robert V. Baryliski, "The Russian Federation and Eurasia's Islamic Crescent", *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, 3 (1994): 389-416.

<sup>28</sup> Nicklas Norling and Nikas Swanström, "The Virtues and Potential Gains of Continental Trade in Eurasia", *Asian Survey* 47, 3 (2007): 351-373.

<sup>29</sup> David Christian, "Inner Eurasia as a Unit of World History", *Journal of World History* 5, 2 (1994): 173-211.

<sup>30</sup> "Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств (1991)", [http://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Соглашение\\_о\\_создании\\_Содружества\\_Независимых\\_Государств\\_\(1991\)](http://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Соглашение_о_создании_Содружества_Независимых_Государств_(1991))

<sup>31</sup> *Известия*, 26 decembrie 1991 via Виктор Иванович Илюхин, *Обвиняется Ельцин* (Москва: ФТМ России, 1999), accessed June 2013, [http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/Ilyuhin\\_VI/Ilyuhin\\_VI.htm#Page\\_5](http://1993.sovnarkom.ru/KNIGI/Ilyuhin_VI/Ilyuhin_VI.htm#Page_5)

that the Belavezha Agreements were a desperate try to save the USSR, as the events in 1991 offered Russia the possibility to gain the upper hand, none foreseeing its true sense at that time, but the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher: „For now, a *de facto* dissolution of the Soviet Union has been accomplished. However, *de jure* the Soviet Union exists. I can assure you that next month you will hear about legal registration of the Soviet Union”.<sup>32</sup> Several weeks later, on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December 1991, by signing the Alma-Ata Protocol,<sup>33</sup> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were joining the Community. Georgia joined subsequently in 1993. In the moment of the ratification of the CIS Charter<sup>34</sup> the number of member states was twelve.

Today, the official number is down to eleven. The danger represented by the CIS for the national integrity of its member states has been evoked by the Ukrainian Government, which refused to sign the CIS Charter. Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Volodimir Oshchuk, stated that “If it is a kind of friendship, there is a question whether it is a friendship or merely a cover [...] Ukraine does not recognize the legal personality of this organization, we are not members of the CIS Economic Court, we did not ratify the CIS Statute, thus, we cannot be considered a member of this organization from international legal point of view. Ukraine is a country-participant, but not a member country.”<sup>35</sup>

Turkmenistan undertook a similar step in August 2005, withdrawing its status of full-member, and becoming an associate one, testifying therewith its international military neutrality.<sup>36</sup> After the armed conflict in South Ossetia, Georgia announced its definitive withdrawal in August 2008<sup>37</sup> and expressed immediately its intention of joining NATO.<sup>38</sup> The uprising towards Moscow’s authority extended over Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, as the respective leaders refused to participate at the CIS Summit held in Chişinău in October 2009.<sup>39</sup> Both Ukraine and Georgia have now as top priorities strengthening up the relations with the EU and NATO.<sup>40</sup>

The solution offered for the renewal of the CSI is the Eurasian Economic Community (Евразийское экономическое сообщество – ЕврАзЭС, shortened EurAsEC in English), alike the European Community. It has its origins in the Customs Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan,<sup>41</sup> completed by the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2012.<sup>42</sup> The Treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community was signed on 10<sup>th</sup> October 2000 by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan joining

<sup>32</sup> “Анатолий Лукьянов: Это была отчаянная попытка спасти Союз”, accessed May 2011, [http://www.ng.ru/ng\\_politics/2010-05-18/9\\_lukianov.html](http://www.ng.ru/ng_politics/2010-05-18/9_lukianov.html)

<sup>33</sup> “The Alma Ata Declaration”, [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by\\_appnc.html](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/belarus/by_appnc.html)

<sup>34</sup> “CIS Charter”, <http://www.therussiasite.org/legal/laws/CIScharter.html>

<sup>35</sup> “Ukraine to analyze expediency of taking part in CIS projects”, accessed June 2011, <http://www.unian.info/news/268085-ukraine-to-analyze-expediency-of-taking-part-in-cis-projects.html>

<sup>36</sup> Valentinas Mite, “CIS: Turkmenistan Reduces Ties To ‘Associate Member’”, accessed June 2011, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1061002.html>

<sup>37</sup> “Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on Georgia’s withdrawal from CIS”, accessed July 10, 2011, [http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang\\_id=ENG&sec\\_id=36&info\\_id=7526](http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=36&info_id=7526)

<sup>38</sup> “Georgia’s quitting CIS council will not affect security”, accessed July 2011, <http://en.rian.ru/world/20060203/43324440.html>

<sup>39</sup> Bruce Pannier, “Russia Facing Resistance With Allies on CIS’s Southern Flank”, accessed June 2011, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia\\_Facing\\_Resistance\\_With\\_Allies\\_On\\_CISs\\_Southern\\_Flank/1847880.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Russia_Facing_Resistance_With_Allies_On_CISs_Southern_Flank/1847880.html)

<sup>40</sup> Valentinas Mite, “CIS: If It’s So Ineffectual, Why Do Leaders Keep Meeting?”, accessed June 2011, <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1060959.html>

<sup>41</sup> “Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus plan on common economic space”, accessed March 23, 2012, <http://www.rbcnews.com/free/20081225170003.shtml>

<sup>42</sup> “Ukraine cannot get observer status at Eurasian Econ Union due to Association Agreement with EU, Russia”, accessed June 14, 2013, <http://www.interfax.co.uk/ukraine-news/ukraine-cannot-get-observer-status-at-eurasian-econ-union-due-to-association-agreement-with-eu-russia-2/>

afterwards.<sup>43</sup> Still, there are some skeptics too, like Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova, which are only observers, while Ukraine announced that will never become a member of EurAsEC.<sup>44</sup>

The main aims of EurAsEC are a common market (based on free trade) and total customs union, including energy, transportation and foreign investments, by converging national legislation towards a community one. General goals and strategies are set by the Interstate Council (similar with EU's European Council) and confirmed by the Interparliamentary Assembly. The executive is taken by the Integration Committee, whilst legal issues are managed by the Community's Court of Justice. All together, they are inter-coordinated via a General Secretariat and by a Commission of Permanent Representatives.<sup>45</sup>

As common currency, Russia wishes to impose the ruble, but Kazakhstan president proposed the creation of a new currency, after the euro model, called yevraz, hoping that it will become a world-currency, under the high patronage of the United Nations, in order to diminish the effects of the economical crisis. CSI member states were more than happy to take such a challenge,<sup>46</sup> as they have an anti-crisis reserve fund administrated exclusively by Russia<sup>47</sup> through the Euro Asiatic Development Bank, primary catalyst of Euro-Asian integration.<sup>48</sup>

In the absence of a Warsaw Pact, the CIS member states created the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)<sup>49</sup> based on the Tashkent Treaty and the Tashkent Charter, on the 15<sup>th</sup> May 1992 and 7<sup>th</sup> October 2002. The current members are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as Azerbaijan and Georgia left the organization in 1999. CSTO gave birth to a Collective Rapid Reaction Force (КСОР – Коллективные Силы Оперативного Реагирования), a common armed force supposed to defend CSI members in case of armed conflict, currently accomplishing in times of peace missions against world terrorism.<sup>50</sup> Besides assiduous military drills, it has not proved its necessity.

The continuous integration of the ex-soviet space is threatened by Ukraine, which turns its back on Russia, and the opposition of Belarus,<sup>51</sup> which offered political asylum for the Kyrgyz ex-president, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, after the coup of April 2010. The events, according to the new Kyrgyz power, took place with Russian support,<sup>52</sup> Vladimir Putin

<sup>43</sup> "Agreement on Foundation of Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC)", accessed June 14, 2013, <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/eaecfta.pdf>

<sup>44</sup> "Presidential administration official: Ukraine not to join customs union", accessed March 9, 2013, <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/nation/detail/60687/>

<sup>45</sup> "Структура ЕвразЭС", accessed April 10, 2010, <http://www.evrazes.com/about/structure>

<sup>46</sup> "Kazakhstan Suggests New Currency", accessed March 12, 2013, <http://www.oilandgaseurasia.com/news/p/0/news/4238;>  
<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kazakhstan-suggests-a-new-currency/375212.html>

<sup>47</sup> "Russia to control Eurasec anti-crisis fund – Medvedev", accessed June 2011, <http://en.rian.ru/business/20090204/119985469.html>

<sup>48</sup> "Евразийский Банк Развития", accessed May 2011, <http://www.eabr.org/eng/about/chairman/>

<sup>49</sup> "Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности", accessed May 2011, <http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm>

<sup>50</sup> "Страны ОДКБ обсуждают создание сил быстрого реагирования", accessed March 2010, <http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=249784>

<sup>51</sup> "Belarus leader raps Russia, may snub security summit", accessed June 14, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6300PT20100425>; "Belarus-Russia rift widens, Minsk snubs Moscow meet", accessed June 14, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE55D07I20090614>

<sup>52</sup> "Putin recognizes Kyrgyzstan's provisional government, scored credit among most Kyrgyz", accessed April 11, 2010,

having denied it.<sup>53</sup> However, Belarus doesn't give up, being one of the main supporters of Euro-Asian integration.<sup>54</sup>

Nevertheless, a new horizon opens and a dawn of a new continental union is expected, as Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus join their forces to sign a "Maastricht of their own", in order to establish a fully-operational Eurasian Union.<sup>55</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Historical German-French antagonism and post-WWII political realities, after a totalitarian experience, are the main reasons for creating a "unity in diversity" on the European continent. Step by step unification and integration, alongside with American support brought us to the super state that EU is becoming today. But what are South America's or Eurasia's means to raise one flag for all?

Whilst South American countries brace their post-colonial, revolutionary and socialist heritages, without a historical superpower on the continent to firmly determine the unification process, things are going rather slowly and stuttering. We must also add their inclusion among Third World states and their lack of historical exercise in creating or being included in a modern, international recognized political structure.

Since the first tsars, Eurasia has been united subsequently under the banner of the Russian Empire, transformed after 1917 into the Soviet Union, afterwards into the CIS and today in the Eurasian Union. Multi-imperial tradition and a vast experience owed to its diversity over time of political regimes could support Eurasia's attempt of shifting the World's civilization center back from where it begun. Institutionally, the Eurasian Union follows its European Example more carefully than its South American counterpart, being actually the second continental union by organization degree. In its future, it will get closer to the EU, stepping closer towards a World Government.

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<http://politicom.moldova.org/news/putin-recognizes-kyrgyzstans-provisional-government-scored-credit-among-most-kyrgyz-208029-eng.html>

<sup>53</sup> "Russia not involved in Kyrgyz events – Putin", <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20100407/158472404.html>

<sup>54</sup> "9 декабря 2010 г. в Кремле состоялось заседание Межгосударственного Совета ЕврАзЭС (Высшего органа Таможенного союза) на уровне глав государств", *accessed May 5, 2010*, <http://www.tsouz.ru/news/Pages/10-12-2010.aspx>

<sup>55</sup> "Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня", *accessed March 12, 2013*, <http://izvestia.ru/news/502761>; "Russia sees union with Belarus and Kazakhstan by 2015", *accessed March 14, 2013*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15790452>

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## THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS ON MIDDLE EAST GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS

Răzvan MUNTEANU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*AS PROVEN BY HISTORICAL EVENTS, THE MIDDLE EAST IS A HIGHLY INTERCONNECTED GEOPOLITICAL ARENA, THERE CHANGES IN THE INTERNAL STATUS QUO OF ONE ACTOR, SUCH AS SYRIA, IN THIS CASE, AFFECTS THE STATUS QUO OF THE ENTIRE REGION IN A PROFOUND MANNER. REGIONAL CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS SUNNI-SHIA RIVALRY, POOR GOVERNANCE, EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM AND ARCHAIC AUTHORITARIAN RULING ARE SUPERIMPOSED OVER INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS FROM THE UNITED STATES OR RUSSIA. THIS ARTICLE TRIES TO SUMMARIZE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST FROM THE STARTING POINT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS.*

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**KEYWORDS:** SYRIAN CRISIS, MIDDLE EAST, SHIA, SUNNI, IRAN, ISLAMIC STATE, YEMEN, BORDERS, GEOPOLITICS

### INTRODUCTION

If at the beginning of 2014, UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-moon, had stated he hoped for a solution for the Syrian crisis, events that followed proved to be much more complex though, giving rise to a very hard to predict evolution for most experts studying the Middle East.

Regarding Syria, the protests started in March 2011 thus, the violent reaction from the part of the Damascus regime and the geostrategic position of the country led to the outbreak of an internal armed conflict that has at its roots various regional and international interests. Moving forward, Syria is now an insecurity hotbed, already affecting countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Turkey and Israel, while high interconnectivity and interdependence factors, specific to globalization, make this risks and security threats to be felt on a global level.

So far the Syrian crisis left behind hundreds of thousands of victims and over two million refugees, most affected countries affected by the spilling being Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon and Turkey. Noticeably, each and every one of these countries has internal affairs issues regarding the management of the massive refugee flow, benefiting from underfinanced social services. If Ankara announced that foreign support for the management of immigrants is only symbolic, for the other states involved things are far more complicated. Jordan faces a massive water shortage crisis and Egypt with grave economic problems, authorities in Cairo taking into consideration to rationalize foods. Furthermore, native populations show

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<sup>1</sup> PHD in Political Science, SNSPA, CEO Global News Intelligence



discontent regarding the fact that immigrants of Syrian origin accept jobs for far less pay, thus increasing unemployment rates and poverty. The development of the underground economy substantiated by economic problems represent real hotbeds for insecurity, leading to mass protest in 2013 against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and unrest against the Jordanian monarchy, which geopolitical role of pivot is very important for the stability of the Persian Gulf countries.

Regarding Lebanon, it suffered from the import of violence from Syria, the tensions and armed confrontations between Sunni and Shia, the latter benefiting from Alawite support, are evermore present. The precarious situation could be observed since the beginning of last year, when Hezbollah was accused of the assassination of Wissam al-Hassann, the head of the Lebanese intelligence service. On this backdrop, of course Hezbollah is one of the catalysts of the sectarian tensions as a result of the direct involvement in the conflict in the neighboring country, thus accelerating in this way societal cleavages to the prejudice of geopolitical interests, as a result of the fear that a new government in Damascus, led by Sunni, would weaken ties with Tehran, making it virtually impossible for Iran to provide logistical support for Hezbollah, which could lead to the delegitimization of the organization within the Lebanese society.

In this logic, if it fails to keep the current regime in power, the best mid-term solution for Hezbollah is to perpetuate the Syrian crisis and weaken all the actors involved, thus avoiding the emergence of a force that would control all of Syria.<sup>2</sup>

### **GEOPOLITICAL IMPLICATIONS**

On this backdrop, the Syrian crisis managed to fuel the clash of the geopolitical axes, placing head to head, the two biggest branches of Islam, Sunnis and Shies, which lead to the escalation of sectarian tensions not only in Lebanon but in Libya, Iraq, Pakistan or even Bahrein.

Notwithstanding regime change that came with the Arab Spring, Yemen for example, didn't manage to implement socio-economic reforms, long awaited by the population, thus the separatist threat scenario remaining possible in the near future. The inability of the Sana'a regime to win back control over the whole national territory led to a rise in influence for Houthi rebels in the north and to the development of the Al-Qaeda branch, Al-Qaeda in the Arabic Peninsula (AQAP), in the south. If the Saudis always feared that a unified Yemen at their southern border, would allow the emergence of a powerful regional actor, presently Ryad takes all measures possible in order to maintain territorial integrity of this country, because if borders shift to their pre-1990 configuration and South and North Yemen reappear on the Middle East map, the latter would become a Shia geopolitical pivot for Iran which Tehran would use to win indirect access to the Bab el-Mandeb strait and to the Red Sea. Furthermore, the awakening of the Shiite axis could be imported in other Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia and Bahrein being the most exposed.

As in the case of Yemen, Syria's national security is affected on all sides, the government failing to control the entire national territory which lead to the rise of Islamic State (IS) and the foundation of a new Caliphate which incorporates Syrian and Iraqi territories.

Based on Al-Qaeda Iraq, Islamic State detached itself from the Osama bin Laden founded group because of divergent interests on the Syrian front. Nevertheless, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi managed to bring to his side the old military junta of Saddam Hussein, marginalized by the Shiite government of recently replaced PM Maliki. From an economic

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<sup>2</sup> John Calabrese, *The Regional Implications of the Syria Crisis*, Middle East Institute, december 2012, <http://www.mei.edu/content/regional-implications-syria-crisis>

point of view, the Caliphate survives mostly over the control of Syrian oil fields, managing also to capture 600 million USD, captured from the Central Bank in Mosul. From a geopolitical point of view, territorial expansion will draw opposition from Saudi Arabia in the Southern flank, Turkish opposition in the North-East and Israel's in the South-East.

Thus, one of the biggest weaknesses of IS is the lack of support from a regional power, similar to the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran or Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey, which makes the future of the Caliphate uncertain.<sup>3</sup> The same cannot be said regarding the Kurds in northern Iraq where the steps made towards independence are ever more visible.

After the conquest of Kirkuk, the regional government of Northern Kurdistan managed to double the oil quantities exported via its own infrastructure in nearby states, especially in Turkey. With a developed economy, delivering 400.000 barrels of oil per day and with Peshmerga military forces extremely well organized, the Kurds benefit from US, Israeli and Turkish support, which half a decade ago would have seemed very hard to believe.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, the peace dialogue initiated between Ankara and PKK, and the withdrawal of Kurdish militants in northern Iraq, raises the hypothesis of the creation of Kurdistan by severing Kurdish populated territories in Iraq and unifying them with Kurdish populated territories in Syria. The newly developed situation could give Turkey internal stability by solving the terrorist threat that lasted for more than 30 years and also could provide territorial integrity. Furthermore, Ankara is consolidating its energy security by already signing a gas supply treaty with the regional government of Kurdistan in Iraq, avoiding energy vulnerability with Russia and Iran.

The idea of founding a Kurdish state was first proposed by France and Britain immediately after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but the Treaty of Sevres was objected by Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern day Turkey. According to the Treaty, the Kurdish state was to be founded in two steps: independence for Turkish Kurds and unification with the Kurdish population in Iraq. Mostly Sunni and organized in a tribal fashion, Middle East Kurds had been living scattered in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran but it seems that the great losers of the fall of Ottoman Empire could become the great winners of the Syrian crisis.

We see a new paradigm of the Muslim world, where leaders like Hafez Assad or Saddam Hussein, even though being considered promoters of pan-Arabism, were above all, guardians of their own borders, which are now at risk to be changed for the first time since there were sketched by the colonial powers.<sup>5</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

By making a brief analysis of the Extended Middle East, we see a arc of instability which stretches from Afghanistan to the shores of the Mediterranean, thus fueling the clash between Shia and Shiite axes, leading to increased social tensions in Bahrain, Lebanon and Pakistan. So, despite 9/11, the Clash of Civilizations theory proposed by American political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington proves to be far from realization because Muslim states in the Middle East are too divided between divergent interests. Thus, Yemen is on the brink of secession, The Conference on National Dialogue issued by president Haidi being stalled

<sup>3</sup> Gregory Gause, *ISIS and the New Middle East Cold War*, BROOKINGS Institute August 25, 2014

<sup>4</sup> *Kurdistan and the future of Iraq*, Financial Times, June 30, 2014

<sup>5</sup> Karim Emile Bitar, *The Regional Implications of the Syria Crisis*, Geneva center for security policy, <http://www.gcsp.ch/Regional-Capacity-Development/Publications/GCSP-Publications/Policy-Papers/Whither-the-Old-Order-The-Regional-Implications-of-the-Syria-Crisis>

while territories that once belonged to Syria and Iraq are now part of the so called Islamic Caliphate.

All the events of the last decades managed to prove that the current Middle East resembles the 20<sup>th</sup> century Balkans. On this backdrop, the Syrian Crisis substantiates what we can call the end of the Sikes-Picot Accord.

Although less speculated in public space and academic media in Romania, the reconfiguration of the Middle East is an old and thoroughly discussed topic on the international agenda, taking shape around the year 2006, when US general, Ralph Peters published in *Armed Forces Journal* a possible future map of the Extended Middle East, then further exploring the subject in depth in a book called *Never Quit to Fight*. Although the map is not an official version of the Pentagon, it was and is intensely debated, including in the NATO College in Rome.

According to Peters, the new outline will fix the mistakes committed at the end of the First World War. Thereby, Iran would remain a wholly Shiite state, losing territory to the new Kurdish state and to a Greater Azerbaijan which will enhance its surface as a result of US interests and support in the Caspian Sea region. Iraq would be divided in three: a Shiite state in the south, a Sunni state in the center and a Kurdish state in the north. Saudi Arabia would also cede territories to Yemen and Jordan and lose control of Mecca and Medina which will transform into a Sacred State of Islam, similar to Catholic Vatican. Israel will have the same configuration as pre-1967 while Greater Lebanon would occupy the Syrian coastline depriving Damascus of access to the Mediterranean Sea. Pakistan would suffer the biggest changes through the realization of Baluchistan in the South, by ceding territories in the West to Afghanistan but mostly by losing territories in the North to India, which will become the new US pivot in Asia-Pacific, through Washington will try to counterbalance Chinese interests in the region.

Of course, other new maps have been speculated upon and analyzed, but space and time does not allow us to explore them. Regarding Peters's opinion, until now it appears that it confirms the division of Iraq and the foundation of a new Kurdish state, but, at least for now, it does not confirm the foundation of a Greater Yemen. As stated above, the Sana'a regime didn't manage to cope with internal crises, being on the brink of secession.

Concerning Syria, an internal solution is hard to achieve right now, because, although it has military superiority over anti-Assad combatants, it doesn't manage to decisively win in armed conflict and the use of SCUD missiles proves, according to analysts, the desperation with Damascus tries to hold onto strategic positions.<sup>6</sup> The rebels themselves are failing to conquer large cities, despite the fact that they dominate numerous adjacent settlements. So, Deraa, Homs, Hama, Damascus, Idlib or Dayr al Zawr are either in the possession of Assad or taken back shortly afterwards.

Foreign military intervention by Arab states and not Western states stumbled on Russian opposition, while neither Saudi Arabia, the promoter of this scenario, doesn't benefit from a positive image on the international or internal stage, because of the contradiction between supporting Syrian protesters and suppressing any form of dissent amongst Saudi citizens.

At the same time, some analysts take into account a coup in Syria, in which the army takes command. Even though it is hard to believe that it could be achievable, because Syria is led by the Assad family, the supporters of this idea consider that on the mid and long term,

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<sup>6</sup> Calabrese, *The Regional Implications of the Syria Crisis*

military power could take into account a coup as a last resort for the internal security of Syria.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore, the armed prolongation of the conflict could cause the territorial disintegration of the country and lead to Alawite-Christian led state in the North-East part of Syria which could allow continued access to port Tartus for Russia. No matter the final solution, either being one presented here or not, the Syrian crisis is a direct threat to regional and international security that upon solving, will modify the balance of power on a regional and global scale.

Despite any solution, Syria will be a weakened state, grinded by its socio-economic problems, incapable to impose its own national interest beyond its own borders, which backs the idea of the foundation of a new Kurdish state in the region.

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<sup>7</sup> Fehmi Agca, *The effect of Syria crisis on the transformation and integration of the Middle East*, Journal of Bilge Strateji, Vol 5, nr.8, 2013m 109-110

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## CASE OF UKRAINE AND INTERESTS OF THE MAJOR PLAYERS

Crina SOROIU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*THE UKRAINE CRISIS IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES INVOLVING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF THE XXITH CENTURY, CHARACTERIZED BY MANY TRANSFORMATIONS AND THREATS AND INVOLVING SOME OF THE MAJOR ACTORS ON THE GLOBAL SCENE. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECURITY THREATS, BOTH ACTORS - NATO AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, MUST ADAPT THEIR VISION, DOCTRINE AND BEHAVIOR TO NEW REALITIES. RECENT, CASES LIKE RUSSO-GEORGIAN WAR IN 2008 AND UKRAINE CRISIS IN PRESENT, ARE REAL TESTS OF BOTH NATO CAPACITY AND EUROPEAN UNION CREDIBILITY. RUSSIA WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE AND WON'T ACCEPT INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER ACTORS, IN ORDER TO CHANGE THIS STATUS QUO.*

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**KEYWORDS:** CRISIS, SECURITY, EASTERN PARTNERSHIP, RUSSIA, UKRAINE, EUROPEAN NEIGHBORHOOD POLICY, REALISM THEORY

### INTRODUCTION

Ongoing events in Ukraine are important because they show a constant behavior in the neighborhood of the Russian Federation, generating concern among major global actors. The purpose of this analysis is descriptive and explanatory one, but rather by identifying causal relations that led to the attention this tense reality. The main thesis is that the maintaining interests of the major actors on stage of the international relations generates the inability to solving or improve the crisis. This justifies the realistic optics applied to issue and the choice of case study as an research method is based on epistemological value wich it has.

We can notice a lack of substantial security guarantees issued by the main actors amid the plurality of interests that guide their actions. Russian Federation intends to dominate the neighborhood and defines the power in terms of interests. Thus, theoretically defined ideals are far from a reality where the power struggle involves all the capabilities and resources.

### THE REALISTIC OPTICS ON THE UKRAINE CRISIS

Everything observed in the EU Eastern neighborhood generated an general regional and global concern. The meeting in Minsk, although it has been defined as an attempt negotiation between leader of Russian Federation, leader of Ukraine and representatives of

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<sup>1</sup> Master degree graduate *European Integration and Security Studies*, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Iași, crina.soroiu@gmail.com

OSCE has a consequence the alarming and tense situation by the end of august with change the balance of power in favor of the separatists and moving front. A new meeting in Minsk, in september exposed an armistice signed by Kiev and pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. However, the EU is seen to be forced to respond with new sanctions against Russian Federation since it found the recently signed armistice failure. European officials have reported the serious reason of undermining the sovereignty of Ukraine.

It is difficult to predict how much this plan will have the intended effect of sanctions on the Russian Federation, most likely consequences will be felt in the short or medium term. It is clear that russian interest is not to have peace, but rather to create instability and a real lack of cohesion in the area. Mobilized military forces of both sides were very considerable, wich can be a real factor of concern. Russian leader, Vladimir Putin intends to carry on the offensive, in the context wich stability in Ukraine would be a favorable factor in development of NATO and EU interests in the area.

The hostile attitude of the Russian Federation in relation to Ukraine's rapprochement with the West is clear and is visible, both, in words and in fact, considering the ongoing actions and attacks. The action of the russian side is not surprising, because it wants to rebuild its sphere of influence. To deny in declarative level and then, to confirm aggressive policy lines is a constant offensive attitude of the Russian Federation on the international relation stage. On the other hand, NATO and EU officials have expressed disagreement with the eventual membership of Ukraine bringing to attention the complexity of the problems it faces today and will persist in the future if hostilities in the East will not end. Political and security realities today confirms that "the material and ideal interests and not ideas dominate directly the people's actions, but the images of the world created by these ideas have often served as a indicator for directions wich the dynamism of interests has guided those actions"<sup>2</sup>.

The complex, interdependet and dynamic challenges from international environment and psyisognomy of security environment, too, in the EU Eastern neighborhood determines certain requirements. One of these wants to define a security and defence policy able to harmonize the security interests of the member states. NATO's role cntinues to present itself as one very important internationally, while EU lies only a complementary role to the soft power in terms of security. A difficulty in achieving the objective of a common security policy consists of unequal military capabilities of member states and the lack of consensus on the definition of defence within the organization.

Moreover, amid ongoing tensions in Ukraine another challenge to security, becomes energetic aspect. This problem can be defined in terms of dependence of member states on imported gas and oil. What is needed on the EU agenda is finding an alternative to dependence on russian supplier, especially given the heightened demand for gas in the future. All these demands generated by the current, dynamic and unpredictable security environment are permanent imperatives on the EU agenda. The need to identify an appropriate response to the new security challenges determines redefining the EU as a major actor globally, not regionally only. The recently, conflict reality in the eastern neighborhood of the EU in the case of Georgia in 2008 and the current crisis in Ukraine confirms this objective.

## **RECONFIGURING THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE AS A GLOBAL SECURITY ACTOR AMID NEW CHALLENGES**

Resorting to an incursion, into the area of the European Union's efforts, to improve the tense situation in the neighborhood, it is important to recall The European Neighborhood Policy or, in another way, in 2003, the new ENP. This has become necessary in the context of

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<sup>2</sup> Max Weber, *Etica protestantă și spiritul capitalismului*, ( București: Editura Humanitas, 2007), 260

considerable expansion with new ten members. The enlargement has had important implications on the stability and security, creating new tasks, for the EU as a global security actor. This should solve different and complex problems derived from the enlargement process: terrorism, ethnic conflicts, migration, arms trafficking, need for help in Central and Southeastern Europe, plus the frozen conflicts.

Unresolved conflicts in the eastern neighborhood brought a permanent dimension of security issues on the EU agenda. Experience in Georgia, in 2008, raised fears among member states on possible impediments in political or economic field, that may derive from the EU's non involvement in area in the context of lack of cooperation with directly affected partners.

To increase the ENP's contribution, to regional security, it is vital to define a real confidence between states. This goal is difficult in a context where is not a convergence in economic, political, legislative, meaning the favorable conditions for social inclusion. In this context it is very important to analyze how much the combination of efforts for border assistance for Ukraine and Moldova is effective. Watching how is the evolution of crisis in Ukraine, it is important to note if the EU turns out to be able to assume a greater role in conflict's solution in neighborhood. An effective way would be represented by the political dialogue between the EU and each member state of the ENP and, surely the dialogue between the EU and other international actors.

It also requires reconciling the positions of the Commission and the Council on the possibilities for resolving conflicts. The unanimous opinions of EU's officials and specialists since 2006 that emphasizes the eastern neighborhood states have not received a consistent support from the organization. Defining relations with the countries of this region eliminated from the calculation or diminished importance of frozen conflicts, with the threat potential to stability and democratization of ENP's members, but also to the EU. Current Ukraine issues also represent a consequence of inefficient EU behavior in the neighborhood, regarding security. Observing a lack of concerted efforts of the EU states, as well as a clear strategy, the attitude of the Russian Federation becomes firmer and more adapted to an expansion policy of widening and accentuation of their sphere of influence. This policy considers the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as the expression of a real threat to the Russian sphere of influence.

## **EASTERN PARTNERSHIP, A REAL THREAT TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

The problems proposed on the EU agenda by the former Soviet Republic (referring to those who "signed on May 7, 2009, in Prague, the EaP Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine"<sup>3</sup>) are complex, with unpredictable potential in evolution, highly dynamic and require concerted efforts. This cooperation agreement between the mentioned republics and EU Member States intend bringing the eastern neighbors to a level of democratization and economic development, freedom of movement, as close as possible to the requirements of the organization. This initiative has not been approved by the Russian Federation so the context of their delimitation was tensed and defined by post-conflict realities with Georgia in 2008 and outcome of Ukraine gas crisis in 2009.

It is important to observe to what extent the Eastern Partnership has exerted influences on the EU-Russian Federation. The fact is that this cooperation agreement was perceived by Russian leaders as an attempt of the EU to define the sphere of influence or even outline a partnership against Russia. Russian attitude in relation to the EaP, is different from previous ones in the context of adopting ENP or EU accession of former Soviet republics (Estonia,

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<sup>3</sup> *What is the EaP?*, <http://www.easternpartnership.org/content/eastern-partnership-glance>, accesat la data de 10.09.2014



Latvia, Lithuania). Russian fears were defined by relation to NATO's intentions to expand the sphere of Soviet influence.

The conflict in Georgia illustrates again the hostile attitude of the Russian Federation to NATO behavior by military intervention in the region, qualifying the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine (roses and orange) as expressions of US mixture in former Soviet spheres of influence. It is interesting to see whether the EaP is a tool able to diminish Russian influence in eastern EU's neighborhood and facilitate states road to accession. Indeed, if the EaP goals become reality, the former Soviet Union's Eastern neighborhood states will be characterized by greater stability and independence, related to the Russian Federation. By looking carefully to the EaP goals, we can see that they are similar to the Copenhagen criteria, needed to be implemented by all the states who want to be EU members.

The partnership aims to be a neoliberal institution, but the realistic perception of the Russian Federation defines it as a threat to its interests. Thus, the prospect of cooperation with the EU is excluded. It should be noted that the Russian Federation has accused the EU that by this EaP aims mixture in its sphere of influence, for which considered reasonable amending a law that enables national defense by armed interventions in other neighboring countries, in order to ensure the security of Russian citizens. This represents the expression of the EU's desire to ensure stability in the eastern border and also an initiative confidently received by former Soviet states, which tend towards a detachment of Russian Federation and its influence in the region. The EU's strength does not come from military power, so it is a hard power, rather than a soft one, based on values.

Russian Federation relates to the former Soviet republics that tend to get closer to the EU, with an aggressive attitude, proofed by the recent situation in Ukraine or Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. The trust of ex-Soviet Russian Federation is doubted, in the context of its policy defined by self-interest and by preventing this entities from exiting its sphere of influence.

### **THE CASE OF GEORGIA AND UKRAINE: RUSSIA'S SAME GOAL AND NATO'S ATTITUDE CHANGE**

A proper definition to NATO's attitude towards the tensed realities in the neighborhood involve bringing to attention its conduct in Georgia's conflict in 2008. It is also important to notice the permanent hostile behavior of the Russian Federation in relation to the near NATO states in its sphere of influence. Its permanent susceptibility to a potential threat from NATO or the EU characterizes its actions in relation to the major players on the global and regional security scene. This explains the fact that this unreported and unrecognized Russian war aims to destabilize Ukraine so this is no longer an entity of great interest that receives attention from NATO or the EU.

The NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008 has a great significance in this analytical framework, where the hopes of Georgia and Ukraine to become members of the alliance have not materialized. There were invoked "difficulties which have prevented the approval of both NATO aspiring applicants"<sup>4</sup>. Currently, the Ukrainian problem becomes more pronounced since there is not a clear choice in favor of the alliance. NATO's reaction to the tensions in Ukraine is more appropriate than its reaction involving the conflict in Georgia in 2008. In this direction, the recent NATO Summit in Wales drew clear lines for future actions. An important aspect is the inclusion of cyber-attacks in military category, realizing the fact that this security environment requires a reconsideration of the dangers and threats, a redefinition

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<sup>4</sup> *Bucharest Summit Declaration*, [http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc\\_201.html](http://www.summitbucharest.ro/en/doc_201.html), accesat la data de 08.09.2014

of the dimensions on which they act. Amid these tensions in Ukraine, moving a NATO rapid reaction force in Eastern Europe, was another important element of the summit.

Only in this context, based on the current tensions, the 2008 Bucharest Summit is of great importance. Ukraine must make its option known to NATO and to the EU, in order to facilitate the identification of a concrete plan to resolve or at least improve this situation. In response to Russia's intention to expand and enhance its sphere of influence in the neighborhood, NATO's project emphasizes the effort to pull these states that have not yet defined a clear option. By the time they express such an option, NATO has declared its availability to provide military and technical support to Ukraine.

The example of Abkhazia as a proclaimed state, more exactly "a static formation unrecognized internationally, created after a secessionist rebellion"<sup>5</sup>, has to be mentioned for relevance regarding NATO's attitude in relation to Russian ambition to maintain instability in its neighborhood. The Russian Federation behavior regarding the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict can be considered as a characteristic one, in relation to the neighborhood. Its attitudes in 2008 and 2014 are part of the great project of maintaining and accentuation of the Russian influence in the region. Problems in Georgia and the Ukraine can be considered as "a result of the threats of the environment correlated with the weakness of a system"<sup>6</sup>, when threats from the environment interact with the weaknesses of the system.

Also, it can be stated that the behavior of Russian aggression against the Occident was influenced by the decision to postpone granting the MAP status to the applicants from Tbilisi, as seen at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, by increasing Georgia's vulnerability near Russian power. Thus, this vulnerability constitutes a favorable ground for Russian hostilities against Georgia's desire to join the Occident security structures. It is important to note that the Occident have often ruled in favor of maintaining peaceful relations with the Russian Federation, a solution preferred in relation to the alternative of its international isolation. The Occident therefore rejected the internationalization of peacekeeping in the breakaway province of Georgia, and the isolation of the Russian Federation on the global geopolitical scene. EU involvement in Russian-Georgian conflict has illustrated its role as the main diplomat, while the current crisis in Ukraine exhibits a disconcertingly fragile diplomatic activity coming from European leaders. Russian's intention is not to provide an alternative to Ukraine, but only the option to accept control from Moscow. Thus, without the option of EU or NATO, Ukraine would depend on Russian factor. In both cases, however, the Russian Federation has received favorable contexts for displaying its military might and "to claim a sphere of influence in order to inspire fear to its neighbors"<sup>7</sup>. The Ukraine Crisis and the frozen conflicts gave Russia the opportunity to become the most important player in the region, confirming the thesis that maintaining the interests of a security actor causes hindrances in effective resolution of a dispute or conflict freezing.

The following developments in the region under analysis will show to what extent a freeze of the conflict in Ukraine will be possible and how justified is the characterization of Cold War for the conduct of both parties involved: NATO and EU on the one hand and the Russian Federation, on the other hand. Analyzing and linking present data on the realities of the EU's eastern neighborhood and the range of actions and behaviors, challenges and responses of all stakeholders, there can be outlined some conclusions and directions for future actions.

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<sup>5</sup> Oleg Serebrian, *Dicționar de geopolitică*, (Iași: Editura Polirom, 2006), 265

<sup>6</sup> Thierry Pauchant, Ian Mitroff, *Transforming the crisis prone organisation*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), 447

<sup>7</sup> Robert English, *Power, Ideas, and New Evidence on The Cold War's End*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 72

## FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Recent historical and political experience shows that the types of the crisis and political-military conflicts is rooted in the dynamics and interests of various players, keeping their interrelation footprint. There are often observed merges of conflicts coordinates in a region: coordinate resources, establishing borders, the identity issue, that generate considerable difficulties in the area of management, both conceptually and especially in the empirical area and effective management. The current security context is one of the fluctuations and the reconfiguration of international relations as a new formula, with several power poles.

NATO was formed as an entity designed to establish and implement an effective crisis management and political-military conflicts, while providing real support to the EU in its interventions in the neighborhood. What is missing “is the unity of views absolutely necessary in this regard”<sup>8</sup>. Without a convergence in the EU Member States regarding security agenda, we can’t clearly delineate a framework for action designed to resolve or at least improve the eastern neighborhood tensions, faced with various and serious problems. Moreover, the question about the chances of dialogue between the players in Ukrainian crisis arises. The answer points the impossibility of short term solutions, since there is no clear choice of Ukraine in relation to the EU, and its persisting doubts regarding the support of the Union.

EU as a soft power that “has considerable potential in pursuit of a positive impact in the area of conflict, in terms of situation improvement”<sup>9</sup>. Although it became active through the ENP, it didn’t show enough determination in resolving the situation in Ukraine. Germany has demonstrated involvement and activism in tension easing towards the Eastern neighborhood of the EU, by its Chancellor Angela Merkel. She pointed the need for awareness among European states on geopolitical importance of the EU Eastern neighborhood, and the costs of non-involvement. The series of sanctions against the Russian Federation will not have the desired effect if this initiative will be accompanied by an effort of a real high-level dialogue, with the reflection about EU’s decision-making process, in security terms. It is this lack of consensus, specific to EU and serious economic problems of Ukraine that are considered vulnerabilities which the Russian Federation uses in his own interest, and basing its behavior upon. What matters in this new context is the energy problem, which discloses a European cohesion amid the awareness of Russian Federation energy dependence. We desire a strategy of regional and global peace building through the sustained efforts of the players involved in the conflict. National and international security practices diversify amid global scene dynamics and complexity, so it began to take shape a requirement of reconfiguration of the analytical foundation and terminology in the field of political dynamics and security studies. It should be noted that based on recent developments on the security scene is required to review the conceptual and empirical basis of conflict management, especially because of the insufficiency and incoherence of the management in various conflicts until present times by the players involved, at state and organizational level.

European Union should accelerate efforts to portray the eastern neighborhood and help to stabilize other regions, concentrating attention both, on old frozen conflicts and the new points of conflict. It excludes, surely, the focus on short term sanctions targeting Russian factor. It should be noted than the EU could not win the final and immediate peace, but could

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<sup>8</sup> Cristian Băhnăreanu, *Actualități și perspective în Politica Europeană de Securitate și Apărare*, ( București: Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare, Carol I, 2006), 32

<sup>9</sup> Hans Binnendijk, Richard Kugler, *Transforming European Forces*, (Washington D.C., National Defence University, 2006), 128

help to improve the situation in the future, not by punishing the Russian Federation, but through effective engagement. As the wars in Balkans, as the Russian-Georgian conflict, crisis in Ukraine is a direct threat to a European project which aims to replace old paradigms such as balance of power, spheres of influence, military conquest with integration, negotiation and rule of law. From a Russian perspective limited cooperation in the future is more threatening than diplomatic sanctions from the West, in the short term. The EU strategy should include answers to the situation in Ukraine and integrate turn into a more comprehensive strategy for the entire eastern neighborhood. Regarding NATO, it will have to demonstrate, if possibly, a unity of views on the challenges and ways to respond to them, in the new security environment, under the sign of unpredictability and dynamics.

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# **SIMULATION SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE COMPOSITE MATERIALS**

**Diana Catalina CAZANGIU<sup>1</sup>**

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## **ABSTRACT:**

*IN THE RECENT YEARS, THE COMPOSITE MATERIALS WERE USED FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STRUCTURES FROM THE MOST ENGINEERING AREAS. CARBON FIBER REINFORCED POLYMER IS A COMPOSITE MATERIAL THAT IS OFTEN USED IN AEROSPACE INDUSTRY. TO DEVELOP LIGHTWEIGHT ADVANCED MATERIALS IT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW VERY WELL THE MECHANICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THESE MATERIALS UNDER DIFFERENT LOADING CONDITIONS. THIS PAPER PRESENTS THE WAY TO DEVELOP COMPUTING SOFTWARE OF THE TENSILE STRENGTH OF THE COMPOSITE MATERIALS USING THE GRAPHICAL PROGRAMMING. BASED ON SOME REAL VALUES OF THE TENSILE FORCES AND DISPLACEMENTS OBTAINED FROM THE TENSILE TEST OF CARBON FIBER SPECIMEN, ONE COMPUTES, BY THIS METHOD, THE TENSILE STRENGTH AND THE SPECIFIC ELONGATION OF THE MATERIAL.*

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**KEY WORDS:** TENSILE STRENGTH, CARBON FIBER, LABVIEW, COMPUTING SOFTWARE, SPECIFIC ELONGATION.

## **INTRODUCTION**

The widespread use of the composite materials for all the mechanical structures means that it is a major interest in the development, analysis, designing of structural components realized by composite materials.

The composite materials are defined, in [1], [2], as being the solid and deformable bodies, which are obtained through the assembly, with the specific technological methods [1], of two or more distinct materials, from chemical point of view.

These composite materials are characterized [2], of the high resistance and stiffness, the inhomogeneous structure, the low weight, the insulator properties etc.

According to [3], the modern applications starts with the glass fibers followed by the more recent fibers as, carbon, aramid, boron, silicon carbide, etc. A typical example is the carbon fibers that are widespread used in the aerospace industry and for the sports equipment. These materials are of 5 – 10 times more resistant than the Aluminum alloys and these have only 60% from the alloys weight.

Due to the fact that these materials are used in the aerospace area, it is very important for a designer engineer to know its mechanical behavior under different loading conditions.

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<sup>1</sup> PhD stud., Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, diana.cazangiu75@gmail.com.

This paper presents easy computing software that can be applied for the calculations from the strength of materials area, especially for the determination of the tensile and compressive strength. For the software development, a graphical programming environment was used, LabVIEW (Laboratory Virtual Instrumentation Engineering Workbench). LabVIEW [6] is a system developed by NI (National Instruments) that allows the user to design software using a graphical language.

For the software testing, the real values of the initial data were used. These were extracted by the experimental testing of the carbon fiber specimen under tensile loading. A set of numerical were obtained and one draws the  $p - \sigma$  and  $p - \Delta \ell$  curves..

## THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TENSILE STRENGTH COMPUTING

A more accurate knowledge of mechanical properties of the materials used in aerospace industry represents a very important condition for their more efficient use. The mechanical properties of materials are defined by established characteristics, representing their behavior working conditions and these are expressed by some parameters. The physical and mechanical properties of the materials determine the behavior of the structures from aerospace industry under different working conditions.

The determination of the mechanical characteristics is realized by the specimen testing using special testing machines, adequate for its task. During the testing it is followed the material behavior till the specimens fracture by acquiring the specific parameters and analyzing the values of these parameters and the fracture aspect.

In the real working conditions, the loading applied under the structures are eccentric; in these cases, it can appear besides the axial tensile force,  $p$ , some bending moments,  $M_{iy}$  and  $M_{iz}$ . According to [4], in the case of the eccentric traction, the total normal tensile stress is given by the relation:

$$\sigma = \frac{N}{A} + \frac{M_z y}{I_z} + \frac{M_y z}{I_y} = \frac{P}{A} \left( 1 + \frac{y_P y}{t_z^2} + \frac{z_P z}{t_y^2} \right),$$

(1)

where  $i_z$  and  $i_y$  are the main inertial central radii of the cross section.




Fig. 1 The axial efforts diagram for the tensile – compressive loading [4]

For  $\sigma = 0$ , the neutral axis equation ( $a^n$ ) results (Fig. 1):

$$1 + \frac{y_P y}{t_z^2} + \frac{z_P z}{t_y^2} = 0.$$

(2)

The neutral axis is a straight line that intersects the axis of the reference system in D and E points of coordinates:

$$\left. \begin{aligned} y_D = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad z_D = -\frac{i_y^2}{z_P}; \\ z_E = 0 \quad \text{and} \quad y_E = -\frac{i_z^2}{y_P} \end{aligned} \right\}.$$

(3)

The neutral axis divides the cross section in two parts, a bigger one where the tensile normal stresses are developed and a smaller one, with the compressive normal stresses. As in the case of the oblique bending, the value of the normal stress  $\sigma$  is proportional with the distance of the considered point to the neutral axis. If the neutral axis doesn't intersect the section surface, then in the section the tensile stresses are developed. The maximum normal stresses appear in the distant points of the neutral axis, (1) and (2):

$$\sigma_{1,2} = \frac{P}{A} \left( 1 + \frac{y_P y_{1,2}}{i_z^2} + \frac{z_P z_{1,2}}{i_y^2} \right).$$

(4)

From the previous relations, some observations could be highlighted [5]:

- The neutral axis cross by the opposite frame to the one that contain the tensile force;
- If the specimen weight is neglected, then the position of the neutral axis depends only of the place where the tensile force is applied;
- From (3) results that the neutral axis is move away of the weight centre of the section when the tensile force is near; if the tensile force is move away then the neutral axis is near.

Based on the strength of materials considerations, software for the tensile strength determination was developed. It is considered, from [4] that the tensile strength can be determined with the relation:

$$\sigma_t = \left( \frac{p}{A} + \frac{M_{iy}}{W_y} + \frac{M_{iz}}{W_z} \right).$$

(5)

where:  $A$  is the cross sectional area of the specimen in  $[\text{mm}^2]$ ,  $p$  is the tensile force in  $[\text{N}]$ ,  $M_{iy}$ ,  $M_{iz}$  represents the bending moments on  $Oz$ , respectively  $Oy$  axis in  $[\text{Nmm}]$ ,  $W_y$ ,  $W_z$  are the axial strength modulus, on  $Oy$ , respectively  $Oz$  axis in  $[\text{mm}^3]$  and  $\sigma_t$  is the tensile strength of the material in  $[\text{MPa}]$ .

According to [4], [5],  $W_y$  and  $W_z$  can be obtained using the following relations:

$$W_z = \frac{b \times h^2}{6} [\text{mm}^3];$$

(6)

$$W_y = \frac{h \times b^2}{6} [\text{mm}^3],$$

(7)

where:  $h$  is the thickness of the specimen in  $[\text{mm}]$  and  $b$  represents the width of the specimen in  $[\text{mm}]$ .

For the determination of  $M_{iy}$  and  $M_{iz}$ , the following equations can be used [4]:

$$M_{iy} = p \cdot z \quad \text{and} \quad M_{iz} = p \cdot y,$$

(8)



where  $y$  is the distance from the tensile point to the  $Oz$  axis in [mm] and  $z$  represents the distance from the tensile point to the  $Oy$  axis in [mm].

The specific elongations were noted with  $\Delta\ell$  and calculated using the relation (9):

$$\Delta\ell = \frac{\ell - \ell_0}{\ell_0} \cdot 100 [\%],$$

(9)

where:  $\ell$  is the displacement value, read on the  $p - \ell$  curve,  $\ell_0$  is the initial length of the specimen and  $\Delta\ell$  represents the specific elongation in [%].

## MATERIALS AND METHODS

The tensile properties indicate how the material will react to forces being applied in tension. A tensile test is a fundamental mechanical test where a carefully prepared specimen is loaded in a very controlled manner while measuring the applied load and the elongation of the specimen over some distance. Tensile tests are used to determine the modulus of elasticity, elastic limit, elongation, proportional limit, reduction in area, tensile strength, yield point, yield strength and other tensile properties.

The main product of a tensile test is a load versus elongation curve which is then converted into a stress versus strain curve. Since both the engineering stress and the engineering strain are obtained by dividing the load and elongation by constant values (specimen geometry information), the load-elongation curve will have the same shape as the engineering stress-strain curve. The stress-strain curve relates the applied stress to the resulting strain and each material has its own unique stress-strain curve. If the true stress, based on the actual cross-sectional area of the specimen, is used, it is found that the stress-strain curve increases continuously up to fracture.

Using the mathematical relations from previous chapter, computing software for the determination of the tensile strength and the specific elongation was developed.

The LabVIEW software application is divided in two main parts: the diagram, or the code, where are created the links between the inputs and outputs and the panel, where the user introduces the inputs and obtain the outputs (results) that can be numerical or graphical.

For the developing of the mathematical algorithm, in the diagram a Stacked Sequence structure with two frames was used. The LabVIEW code (Fig. 2, a) and b)) contains mathematical elements and C++ based programming components as, Node Formula. One used this element to introduce the more difficult relations. In the first frame (Fig. 2, a) the determination of the tensile strength was performed and the second frame (Fig. 2, b) presents the way to obtain the specific elongations. In this case, a Node formula element was used, too.




Fig. 2. The LabVIEW code of the application of the simulation of the mechanical behaviour of the composite material: (a) first frame – tensile strength computing, (b) second frame – specific elongation computing

The panel of the software (Fig. 3) contains the controls (inputs) and the indicators (outputs). The inputs are placed in the left side of the panel (represents with green color) and the outputs that are marked with red color are placed in the right side. A LED was put on the panel to alert when the obtained tensile strength value exceeds the admissible value of the tensile strength that was set related to the used composite materials.

The specimen dimensions as length, width and the thickness, the tensile forces and the displacements were considered as being inputs and the outputs were the tensile strengths and the specific elongations. The values from the tensile forces and the displacements were been taken from the experimental data.

As the work procedure, after the introduction of the initial data, the developed software will compute the final values and will specify if the maximum value of the tensile strength is higher than the admissible value.




Fig. 3. The panel of the application of the simulation of the mechanical behaviour of the composite material

## RESULTS

In order to test the functionality of the proposed LabVIEW algorithm, one used the real data extracted from the experimental results in the tensile loading conditions of a carbon fiber specimen. The geometrical dimensions of the specimen were considered 250 x 10 x 3 mm and the values of the tensile forces were red on the  $p - \ell$  diagram from Fig. 4.




Fig. 4. The characteristic curve force – displacement for the case of tensile loading of the carbon fiber specimen

The admissible value of the tensile strength of the carbon fiber material used in aerospace industry was considered as being of 800 MPa. The values of the tensile forces and the displacements were centralized in the Table 1.

Table 1 Tensile forces and the displacements values.

Point	Tensile force (N)	Displacement (mm)
1	1450	0.05
2	2950	0.13
3	4450	0.24
4	5950	0.31
5	7450	0.38

Applying these values and considering the values for “z” and “y” as being 3 mm, respectively 1 mm, one computes by the software developed the tensile strengths corresponding to the five points,  $\sigma_i$  (in the LabVIEW panel  $\sigma_i$  is equal with  $S_i$ ) and the specific elongations  $\Delta \ell$  (that is  $d\ell$  in LabVIEW application). The numerical results obtained after the computations can be observed in Fig. 5.




Fig. 5. The numerical results of strength of materials calculation using the graphical programming software

The numerical results were registered in Table 2.

Table 2 Tensile strengths and the specific elongations values.

Point	Tensile strength (MPa)	Specific elongation (%)
1	232	-0.009998
2	472	-0.009948
3	712	-0.009904
4	952	-0.0099876
5	1192	-0.0099848

In order to comment the numerical results, the characteristic curves tensile force – tensile strength and tensile force – specific elongations for the carbon fiber material were plotted. So, Fig. 6 and 7 present the distribution of the tensile strength values, and respective the specific elongation versus tensile force.

From the Table 2 it can be observed that the values for tensile strength  $\sigma_i$  are positive that is absolutely normal because the tensile force is oriented upward. It observes that the graphic dependence between tensile force and tensile strength and tensile force – specific elongations are of linear distribution.




Fig. 6. Characteristic curve tensile force – tensile strength for carbon fiber




Fig. 7. Characteristic curve tensile force – specific displacement for carbon fiber

## CONCLUSION

Taking into account that the mathematical relations from strength of materials area can be sometimes a little difficult and basing on saving time criteria, nowadays, the engineers tends to use more and more different computing software.

The main purpose of this paper is to show and describe an easy way to compute many formulas in the same algorithm. This software graphical programming code is not general, it can be used only for tensile and compressive loading, but it can be considered a point to start for other complex software algorithms.

Using a graphical programming environment, it is showed the way to combine two different programming languages: graphical (G) and C++. Certainly this software could be developed using only mathematical graphical elements, but the introducing the C++ code in the Formula Node component consists a way to simplify the algorithm and to make it more understandable for the beginner users.

The using of the Stacked Sequence structure in the diagram was preferred because the code is complex and in this way, one could presents two distinct results: ones for the tensile strengths and others for the specific elongations.

As a final conclusion it can asserts that is a strong connection between the programming and the engineering area of any type. Certainly, the engineering is in the front but it is well known that all the computing engineering software is based on a programming type. Thus, this paper wants to present a way to link two distinct researches areas in one domain.

As a future research topic one proposes to develop software to monitor, locate and evaluate the damage (micro crack) inside a structure.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), ID137516 financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government.

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## THE CONTENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF TERPENE COMPOUNDS IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF BERRIES OF GRAPE VARIETIES SELECTED IN REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Natalia FURTUNA<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT:

THE CURRENT STUDY AIMS TO EXPLORE THE AROMATIC COMPOSITION OF THREE GRAPE VARIETIES OF LOCAL SELECTION FROM REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA (STARTOVYI, VIORICA AND MUSCAT DE IALOVENI). THE GRAPES WERE SUBMITTED TO SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC ANALYSIS FOR QUANTITATIVE DETERMINATION OF FREE AND BOUND TERPENES AND TO GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY COUPLED WITH MASS-SPECTROMETRY (GC/MS) FOR IDENTIFICATION OF COMPOUNDS. BY THE GC/MS ANALYSIS WERE DETERMINED 30 VOLATILE COMPOUNDS, INCLUDING: TERPENES, ALCOHOLS, ESTERS, ALDEHYDES AND CETONES. AFTER THE SPECTROPHOTOMETRIC ANALYSIS IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT VIORICA IS THE VARIETY WITH THE LESS AROMATIC POTENTIAL. THE RATIO BETWEEN THE BOUND AND FREE TERPENES VARIES IN DEPENDENCE OF LOCATION IN THE GRAPE BERRY, THE HIGHEST VALUE WAS ATTEND IN THE BERRY SKINS. THIS RESULTS CONFIRMED THE IMPORTANCE OF MACERATION TO THE AROMA QUALITY OF WHITE WINES.

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**KEY WORDS:** AROMA, TERPENES, GAS CHROMATOGRAPHY (GC), MASS-SPECTROMETRY (MS), SPECTROPHOTOMETRY.

### INTRODUCTION

Le raisin de la plupart des cépages de *Vitis vinifera* est un fruit aux caractéristiques odorantes peu développées, mais qui contient déjà divers constituants qui donneront à l'arôme du futur vin des notes caractéristiques spécifiques du cépage<sup>2</sup>.

La qualité du vin est directement liée à la composition du raisin qui ne peut pas être défini seulement par la richesse en sucre et l'acidité du moût, mais en même temps par leur composition en arômes et, pour les cépages non-aromatiques, en précurseurs d'arômes variétaux, intervenant d'une façon déterminant pendant les traitements technologiques appliqués. À ce titre, on peut dire que le potentiel aromatique des raisins est un paramètre important pour la qualité de futurs vins. Les composés constitutifs de l'arôme variétal

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<sup>1</sup> PhD Candidate, senior lecturer, Technical University of Moldova, furtuna.utm@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> Razungles A., Guerin-Schneider R. "Les arômes responsables du fruité des vins, nature et origine". *Les Entretiens Viti-Vinicoles Rhône-Méditerranée*, (2007): 6-10.



peuvent se rencontrer principalement sous deux formes: sous forme odorante – l'arôme variétal libre ou sous forme non odorante – les précurseurs d'arôme variétal<sup>3</sup>.

Dans la plupart des variétés de raisin, les monoterpénols se trouvent sous forme libre ou sous forme glycosylée. Les terpénols glycosylés peuvent être hydrolysés par les acides ou par les enzymes<sup>4</sup> dans des conditions données et peuvent avoir lieu le réarrangement des monoterpénols, même si les conditions de distribution en mode naturel sont minimales<sup>5</sup>.

La famille des composés monoterpéniques se rencontre dans des nombreuses variétés de *Vitis vinifera*, dans les variétés avec des arômes florales. Ce sont essentiellement le linalool, le nérol et le géraniol qui sont responsables des notes olfactives florales des moûts de ces cépages, qui se retrouvent ensuite dans leurs vins. Bien qu'aucun de ces composés pris individuellement n'apporte pas une caractéristique aromatique de type muscat, le mélange de l'ensemble donne une note aromatique qui s'en rapproche. Il a été démontré<sup>6</sup> que, si la somme du linalol avec la celle du géraniol et nérol était trop faible (jusqu'à 650 µg/L), l'arôme de muscat perdait sa typicité, à l'inverse – une trop forte concentration (jusqu'à 1400 µg/L) dénature la typicité, l'optimum se situant autour de 1000 µg/L.

L'analyse des cépages blancs de sélection moldave représente un intérêt spécifique pour la vinification de cette région, parce que de plus en plus les consommateurs sont à la recherche d'un vin caractérisé par la fraîcheur et la richesse de l'arôme riche.

## EXPERIMENTAL

Les aromes terpéniques libres et glycosylées des raisins et du vin peuvent être déterminées par la méthode spectrophotométrique élaborée par Dimitriadis et Williams<sup>7</sup>. Le principe de la méthode est basé sur la séparation des arômes par l'entraînement à la vapeur d'eau (hydrodistillation) et la détermination colorimétrique des arômes terpéniques libres (TVL) en milieu neutre et liées sous forme des précurseurs (TVP) en milieu acide par la réaction de coloration de la vanilline sulfurique.

### a) Les échantillons

Les raisins de trois cépages *Vitis vinifera* L. cv. Startovii, Viorica et Muscat de Ialoveni, sélectionnés dans le cadre de l'Institut de Horticulture et Technologie Alimentaire de Chişinău, ont été récoltés dans le vignoble du même établissement dans la campagne de vendanges de 2011. Les raisins frais ont été choisis au hasard à partir de grappes entières pour donner la masse totale de l'échantillon d'environ 1000 g. Les échantillons de raisin ont été congelés immédiatement après la récolte. Avant l'analyse, les raisins ont été décongelés, homogénéisés et filtrés à travers une étamine. Le jus obtenu a été centrifugé à 150 rpm pendant 15 min et ensuite préservé à 4 °C.

<sup>3</sup> Razungles A., Guerin-Schneider R. "Les arômes responsables du fruité des vins, nature et origine". *Les Entrepreneurs Viti-Vinicoles Rhône-Méditerranée*, (2007): 6-10.

<sup>4</sup> Wilson et al., "Changes in free and glycosidically bound monoterpenes in developing muscat grapes". *Journal of Agricultural and Food Chemistry*, 32 (1984): 919-924.

<sup>5</sup> Cordonnier R., Bayonove C. "Mise en évidence dans la baie de raisin, variété Muscat d'Alexandrie, de monoterpènes liés révélables par une ou plusieurs enzymes de fruits". *Comptes Rendus de l'Académie des Sciences*, D-278, 26 (1974): 3387-3390.

<sup>6</sup> Boidron J.M., Torres P. "Etude et recherche d'un indicateur aromatique des VDN muscats". *Bulletin technique des P.O.*, 105 (1982): 107-112.

<sup>7</sup> Dimitriadis E., Williams P.J., "The development and use of a rapid analytical technique for estimation of free and potentially volatile monoterpene flavorants of grapes". *American Journal of Enology and Viticulture*, 35 (1984): 66-71.

*b) Les conditions expérimentales:*

La détermination des arômes terpéniques par la méthode spectrophotométrique a été menée dans le cadre du département d'Enologie de l'Université Technique de Moldova.

Premièrement il a été préparé les solutions de calibrage selon les étapes suivantes. Dans cinq ballons jaugés de 50 ml on introduit 0,2 ; 0,5 ; 1,0 ; 2,0 ; 3,0 ml de solution standard de linalool et on mène jusqu'à la jauge avec de l'eau distillée. La concentration du linalool dans les solutions obtenues est respectivement 0,4 ; 1,0 ; 2,0 ; 4,0 ; 6,0 mg/L. Dans le ballon de distillation à vapeur on a mis 50 ml de solution. La distillation s'arrêtait à l'accumulation de 20 ml du distillé. Dans une autre éprouvette à rodage de 10 ml, préalablement mis dans l'eau avec de la glace, à l'aide d'une pipette on a ajouté 5 ml du distillé de la solution étalon. Après, on a ajouté 2,5 ml de solution de vanilline sulfurique concentré, en mélangeant minutieusement et en évitant le chauffage de la solution obtenue. On a passé après l'éprouvette dans un bain-marie et la maintenait 20 minutes à la température de  $60 \pm 1^\circ\text{C}$ . L'éprouvette était refroidie sous un jet d'eau froide jusqu'à la température de chambre, on a mesuré la densité optique à la longueur d'ondes de 608 nm.

Après la construction du graphe de calibrage on a procédé à la détermination. La distillation se fait comme antérieurement expliqué, sauf que la solution de linalool a été remplacée par le jus ou les macérées des différentes parties des baies.

La concentration des alcools terpéniques libres et liés était déterminée à l'aide des courbes de calibrage. En tant que résultats finaux a été prise la moyenne arithmétique des résultats de deux mesures parallèles. La teneur en TVL et TVP était calculée selon la formule :

$$\text{TVL ou TVP} = a \times b / c \times d \text{ (mg/L)} :$$

a – concentration du linalool pris de la courbe d'étalonnage, mg/L ;

b – volume du distillé, L ;

c – volume de la matière première utilisée (jus, mout), L ;

d – volume de l'aliquote utilisé pour les déterminations spectrophotométriques, L ;

A l'analyse chromatographique ont été soumis les jus de raisins étudiés. Le jus de raisin a été analysé en utilisant un système Shimadzu GC composée d'un seul spectromètre de masse quadripolaire GC/MS QP2010SE couplé à un système automatisé en trois dimensions pour l'injection d'échantillons AOC-5000.

La GC/MS a été équipée d'une colonne capillaire Rtx-5MS (30 m x 0,25 mm; 0,25  $\mu\text{m}$  épaisseur de film). Le spectrophotomètre de masse est utilisé en mode d'ions sélectif dans des conditions d'autorégulation et l'aire de chaque pic a été déterminée par un logiciel ChemStation (Agilent Technologies).

L'identification des pics a été réalisée à l'aide des spectres et des temps de rétention de la bibliothèque mass spectrale NIST-08<sup>8</sup> et FFNSC 1.3<sup>9</sup>, une bibliothèque qui a été spécialement développée pour les saveurs et les parfums (disponible chez Shimadzu Europa GmbH).

## RESULTATS ET DISCUSSIONS

### a) Le contenu des composés volatiles dans les raisins

Les cépages qui n'appartiennent pas au groupe des Muscats ont une quantité des terpènes volatiles d'environ dix fois moins que dans les cépages de type Muscat. Cependant, ces cépages contiennent des composés inodores, mais qui, après l'hydrolyse, seront une source des composés avec impact olfactif typique pour le cépage donné<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>8</sup> NIST/EPA/NIH Mass Spectral Library (NIST 08)

<sup>9</sup> FFNSC 1.3 - Flavors and Fragrances of Natural and Synthetic Compounds Library - Mass Spectral Database

<sup>10</sup> Mateo, J.J. and M. Jimenez, "Monoterpenes in grape juice and wines (review)", *Journal of Chromatography A*, 881(2000): 557–567.

La teneur en composés terpéniques dans les trois cépages étudiés (Startovyi, Viorica et Muscat de Ialoveni) a été établie par la méthode spectrophotométrique.

Les résultats obtenus ont été indiqués dans la figure 1, d'où on peut remarquer des différences significatives entre la teneur en terpènes volatiles libres (TVL) et précurseurs terpéniques (TVP) dans le jus de raisins.

La teneur des TVL et TVP a été plus haute dans les cépages Muscat de Ialoveni et Startovyi, ayant des valeurs entre 0,310 mg/L et 0,498 mg/L, respectivement. Les raisins du cépage Viorica contiennent une quantité plus faible de terpènes, cependant le contenu de TVP a été 1,78 fois plus grand que la forme libre. Le cépage Muscat de Ialoveni a la plus grande quantité de glycosides terpéniques, ce fait signifiant un potentiel élevé des terpènes libres.




Fig. 1. La teneur des terpènes volatiles (TVL) et des précurseurs terpéniques (TVP)

Dans la figure 1 on peut observer que les cépages Startovyi et Muscat de Ialoveni ont le rapport TVP/TVL plus grande que Viorica (2,055 et 2,422 comparatif au 1,783), ainsi suggérant un potentiel aromatique plus élevé.

Pour une meilleure compréhension des composantes du complexe aromatique présent dans les raisins étudiés, les jus ont été analysés par voie chromatographique. Suite à l'analyse GC/MS, précédée par la micro extraction en phase solide, ont été identifiés environ 30 composés volatiles, y compris : terpènes, alcools, esters, aldéhydes et cétones. L'identification des pics a été réalisée à l'aide des spectres et des temps de rétention de la bibliothèque mass spectrale. Les résultats expérimentaux sont indiqués dans l'ordre d'élution dans la figure 2.

Comme on peut le remarquer de la figure 2, les profils volatils des cépages étudiés sont très distincts. De même, après l'analyse de la fraction libre de chaque cépage, on peut observer que les cépages Startovyi et Muscat de Ialoveni ont le plus grand nombre de composés volatils détectés en comparaison avec le cépage Viorica, respectivement 12 et 20.

Les monoterpènes les plus importantes identifiés dans les raisins de trois cépages (Viorica, Startovyi et Muscat de Ialoveni) sont: *géraniol*, *myrcène*, *d-limonène*, *eucalyptol*, *ocimène*, *γ-terpinène*, *linalool*, *oxyde de linalool*, *α-terpineol*, *DL-menthol*, *α-isomenthone*, *nérol*, *myrcénol* etc.

Les plus importants composés terpéniques du jus de cépage Viorica sont : *linalool*, *DL-menthol*, *α-terpineol*, *nerol*, *geraniol*, *β-damascenone* qui offrent au vin le caractère floral spécifique et des caractéristiques de fraîcheur.




Fig. 2. Le pourcentage des composés volatils identifiés dans les raisins étudiés, %

Les terpénols sont les substances les plus importantes dans le potentiel aromatique des raisins et représentent environ 40-50 % de la quantité totale des composés volatils d'arômes avec un seuil de perception très faible (0,1-0,5 mg/L)<sup>11</sup>.

Dans l'arôme du jus de raisin Startovii ont été identifiés plusieurs esters: *l'éthyle-méthyl butyrate*, *éthyle hexanoate*, *éthyle octanoate*, *éthyle-9-decenoate*, qui donnent au vin des nuances fruitées, d'agrumes et tropicales caractéristiques pour ce cépage.

Les raisins du cépage Muscat de Ialoveni se distinguent par le contenu élevé du *linalool* (environ 28 %) qui est spécifique pour les variétés de type Muscat et une

<sup>11</sup> Rosillo et al., "Study of volatiles in grapes by dynamic headspace analysis - Application to the differentiation of some *Vitis vinifera* varieties". *Journal of Chromatography A*, 847 (1999): 155-159.

concentration assez haute de *p-menthanone* et *DL-menthol* qui confère au jus de raisin et au future vin de fraîcheur et nuances camphrées et balsamiques.


#### b) La distribution des terpènes dans les différentes parties des baies.

Mateo et Jimenez<sup>12</sup> ont démontré que le contenu des terpènes libres et sous forme de glycosides manifeste des changements dynamiques évidents au cours de l'évolution des baies des raisins du groupe Muscat. Les connaissances sur la distribution des terpènes entre les différentes parties composantes de la baie, de même que le rapport TVP/TVL, sont très importantes pour le choix du régime optimal de contact entre la phase solide et liquide afin d'améliorer la qualité aromatique des vins.

Dans la figure 3 est présenté la distribution des TVL et TVP entre le jus, la pulpe et la pellicule, qui sont rapportés au kg des baies entières. Les valeurs du contenu en TVL (respectivement 0,048; 0,027 et 0,076 mg/kg), de même que celles des TVP (respectivement 0,146; 0,071 et 0,309 mg/kg) dans les pellicules ont été plus basses que dans les jus pour tous les trois cépages.


Parmi les trois cépages étudiés, Viorica se caractérise comme étant un cépage avec un potentiel aromatique plus faible, ayant les plus basses teneurs en TVL et TVP dans le jus (0,096 et 0,180 mg/kg baies) et dans la pulpe et les pellicules (0,016 et 0,017, respectivement 0,027 et 0,071 mg/kg baies).

Le cépage Muscat de Ialoveni fait partie du groupe des cépages aromatisés, ayant un arôme spécifique de muscat et des fleurs. Dans la figure 3 on peut remarquer que ce cépage se manifeste par les plus hautes valeurs de contenu des terpènes libres et des glycosides terpéniques, comparatif aux autres deux cépages étudiés.




a

<sup>12</sup> Mateo, J.J. and M. Jimenez, "Monoterpenes in grape juice and wines (review)", *Journal of Chromatography A*, 881(2000): 557–567.



b



c

Fig. 3. Distribution des terpènes volatiles et des précurseurs terpéniques entre les différentes parties de la baie des raisins de cépages Startovyi (a), Viorica (b) et Muscat de Ialoveni (c)

L'analyse des données concernant le rapport TVL/TVP, présentés dans la figure 3, suggère le choix du régime de macération pelliculaire des trois cépages. Par conséquent, le cépage Muscat de Ialoveni représente le potentiel terpénique le plus élevé pour le jus et les pellicules, la pulpe du cépage Startovyi ayant un rapport TVP/TVL plus haute que les autres

deux cépages. Ainsi, on peut constater que la macération pelliculaire est très importante pour les trois cépages de sélection moldave.

### **CONCLUSION**

Les résultats obtenus après l'évaluation initiale du contenu des terpènes volatiles libres et des précurseurs terpéniques (sous forme de glycosides), ainsi que la distribution entre les différentes parties composantes de la baie dans les trois cépages de sélection moldave sont d'un haut intérêt pour la production des vins blancs aromatiques dans la région.

Les connaissances sur la distribution des terpènes entre les différentes parties composantes de la baie, de même que le rapport TVP/TVL, sont très importantes pour le choix du régime optimal de contact entre la phase solide et liquide (macération pelliculaire).

Ainsi, par l'hydrolyse des glycosides terpéniques et la libération ultérieure des terpènes libres, devient indispensable l'amélioration de la qualité aromatique des vins par des divers processus technologiques.

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# RESULTS OF KANBAN METHOD IMPLEMENTATION ON A FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM

Nicolae(Mănescu) RALUCA<sup>1</sup>  
Nedelcu ANIȘOR<sup>2</sup>

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## ABSTRACT:

MODERN MANUFACTURING SYSTEMS USING ADVANCED TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES SUCH AS STATISTICAL QUALITY CONTROL, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (TQM) SYSTEMS, MANUFACTURING PLANNING AND CONTROL (MPC), LEAN SIX SIGMA STRATEGY, KANBAN METHOD. IN THIS ARTICLE WE WILL SHOW THE ADVANTAGES AND RESULTS OF IMPLEMENTING KANBAN METHOD ON A FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM. THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS THAT THE DESIRED PRODUCTS ARE MANUFACTURED: THE DESIRED TIME, THE QUANTITIES PLANNED TO SATISFY SPECIFICATIONS FOR PRODUCT QUALITY AND MINIMUM COSTS [5]. ADVANCED METHODS SUCH AS TOTAL PRODUCTIVE MAINTENANCE (TOTAL PRODUCTIVE MAINTENANCE - TPM) SYSTEM JUST IN TIME (JUST IN TIME - JIT), WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF TYPE DRAWING (PULL SYSTEMS) AND KANBAN CARDS REQUIRE A PHASED APPROACH. IT WILL FOLLOW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELEVANT INDICATORS TO MONITOR PROGRESS AND CHANGES NEEDED TO ACHIEVE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, BUT MUST HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY CREATED CONDITIONS FOR IMPROVED RESULTS BECOME IRREVERSIBLE [6]. USING KANBAN METHOD LEADS TO REDUCED STOCK PRODUCTION IN THE TOYOTA PLANT THEM REDUCING THE NEED FOR A MONTH AND A HALF TO THREE DAYS NEEDED FOR PRODUCTION.

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**KEY WORDS:** MRP, KANBAN, FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM, CARDS, CONTAINER.

## INTRODUCTION

Flexible manufacturing system (SFF) is an integrated complex system, commissioned by computer, automatic lathe, automatic installation tools and parts handling, automated measurement and test conditions minimized manual intervention and reduced time adjustment can process any items belonging to a specific family of products and capacity limits of a program (algorithm) manufacturing default [1].

Flexibility implies the ability of a manufacturing system to react quickly to changes in demand terms and conditions of delivery. Flexible manufacturing systems have been developed in a sequence of consecutive stages [3]. Kanban is often seen as a central element of the "Lean" manufacturing and is likely the most widely used application system. Kanban can be associated with Just-In-Time (JIT). However Kanban is another name for Just-In-Time

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<sup>1</sup> PhD, Nicolae(Mănescu) RALUCA, Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, nicolae\_raluca3@yahoo.com.

<sup>2</sup> Prof. Eng., Nedelcu ANIȘOR, Transilvania University of Brasov, Romania, a.nedelcu@unitbv.ro.

system is a part of Just-In-Time, Kaizen and 5S ones. A requirement of the operation in Kanban method is for people to work together.

First Kanban system was now created more than 60 years at Toyota in trying to excel in the market for cars. Toyota could not compete on technology, market development and the volume of cars produced, chose to compete by redefining the organization of the production process [4]. Using Kanban system, linking all operations in production back through cards, signs, buffer stocks. For proper operation of the Kanban system, signaling the card is used while conducting surfaces Kanban or other methods from the same category [6].

## METHOD

In translation, the Japanese word "Kanban" means the card. Toyota production system is one of the most improved in the world and is instrumental Kanban he leads. In figure 1, will show the characteristics of this system in parallel mode. Toyota Production System fulfills customer requirements efficiently and quickly by creating a connection between all the business of manufacturing and real market demands. In practice, more information on the implementation of Kanban method is very useful. These may be [2]:

- When consumers and producers are not close enough to be able to see and can not communicate with them, use a card, a flag, a light, empty space on the production platform to signal the lack of parts;

- When a workstation must be supplied with several types of components, use multiple sites or card Kanban to distinguish between them;

- In an MRP system production schedule can be analyzed as a construction authorization and method "Kanban" is a system that "Close" or initializes the current production, in construction of buildings. Process design approach and implementation of integrated systems for complete computerization of organizations / companies involves the stages preceding market research and choosing the right business solution, steps should include a comprehensive understanding of the concepts required MRP (Manufacturing Requirements / Resource Planning). If MRP is very important to know the necessary materials with certainty about the exact nomenclature, entity, quality and lead times of products;

- "Kanban" cards provides direct control over the workload for the production cells. It is a production management technique that uses cards attached to components / containers to monitor the flow of materials in the factory. The method was designed on the model of organization behavior observed in the teamwork of ants and bees.

- Kanban - kanban pull system is a visual production control using reusable containers, cards or areas / open spaces to facilitate pulling / pull products from the respective storage locations.

The Japanese were the ones who introduced a system where different products in manufacturing processes are "pulled" by the processing centers corresponding to each individual product, all to reduce stocks [2]. For this, they have created a system to signal when required parts to jobs by using a set of cards. The card authorizes the sending of a new container components.

Usually, a Kanban signals the need to supply container parts by submitting a power stage or suppliers. A command is initiated by the Kanban container and depending on the complexity of production so that can find in a production system with several "Kanban"-s. While the system had to change, so the card does not exist, the system still bearing the name of Kanban.




Fig.1 KANBAN system paradigm

## STUDY CASE

The case study is conducted on a flexible manufacturing system that processes flat and spare parts to the exterior surfaces of revolution (like trees), as in Fig. 2, composed of:

- Cutter
- Lathe
- Robot
- Two semifabricate lockers
- Transmission system loading / unloading of raw materials and spare parts finite elements





Fig. 2 Integrated manufacturing and assembly

Kanban system is a system for production scheduling indicating that occurs when to produce and how much to produce. In essence, the Kanban system is a method of "authorization" of production and material flow in JIT system.

In Fig.3 is shown how Kanban method works using all units produced by the succession of phases of production. By Kanban approach aims to remove those parts for production and to be just as many parts to replace parts removed after the system stops.

When stock is depleted computer system sends a signal to the warehouse, warehouse replenishment suppliers [2]. Operators sit idling systems have immediately seen by the human factor, which must act immediately to make things going better.

Authorized stock level is determined by the number of cards (containers) Kanban. To see the number of containers moving back and forth between the area of food production and the size of each container will be calculated. Thus we calculate the lot size; for this you have to know the time required to produce a container of parts and safety stock levels to cope with variability in the system. Finished products are made by leveling production by a series of buffer stocks associated with Kanban system that provides control over stock levels that are unfinished production on stream.



**Fig. 3** Workpiece by Kanban method in manufacturing.

We consider a flexible manufacturing system as in Figure 2, which produce finished parts. We want to reduce the stock of parts by introducing a „Kanban”. The data obtained are the following:

Table 1.

Daily demand	500 parts
Time for the production cycle	2 days
Safety Stock	0,25 days
“Kanban” size	300 parts

We determine the number of „Kanban”- s production process. For this you have to determine the demand for parts in [2]:

$$\frac{PT \times AD + SS \times AD}{CQ}$$

Number of “kanban”- s= (1)

PT - production time = waiting time + during the handling time of raw materials + processing time = 2 days

AD- daily demand = 500 parts

Demand for parts during a production cycle: 2 days × 500 parts = 1.000 parts ; (2)

SS - Safety Stock : 0,25 × 500 = 125 parts ; (3)

CQ - „Kanban” size = 300 parts

$$\frac{1000 + 125}{300}$$

Number of kanban containers will be: = 3,75 , about 4 containers. (4)

## RESULTS

The approach is based on manufacturing small batches, but in large numbers. Reducing a batch may not be economical so that it will resize lots eschewing the production process scheduled using Kanban system is that it will focus on reducing bad time wasted, production scheduling, cost reduction on manufacture and handling preparation for production.. The main objective of using kanban system is to ensure 100% availability of materials and constantly improve the level of inventories. Although the principle of Kanban was introduced more than half a century ago, its application in various fields in various forms continues to increase the interest of researchers. Among the advantages of this method still include: improving communication between production processes, reducing the number of defects and allowing total control and increase predictability (forecast). The containers are very small, the entire system has a very precise programming and manufacturing process must be conducted smoothly with little variability in the length of economically.

Basically applying this method of production scheduling is done so that the production of each day to meet the daily demand. We can talk about programming manufacture demand levels.

Advantages processing cycle for any additional storage has an impact on the entire flexible manufacturing system. All these advantages lead to greater flexibility, quality, employee involvement.

## CONCLUSION

Flexible manufacturing systems need to be addressed in an interdisciplinary manner globalist, ie from the perspective of a science of production. Task analysis of production remains the fundamental element in the design of manufacturing systems where science has a crucial role. The reliability of flexible manufacturing systems is relatively little addressed in the literature.

The flexible manufacturing system is a very different nature. It generates accumulations that can maintain its operation upon failure of some components, thus ensuring time required reserve maintenance interventions. Resulting flexible manufacturing systems have a strong inertial behavior. Within enterprises an important way to raise the technical level of existing flexible manufacturing systems based on this input and technical progress in the enterprise is the upgrading.

This can be achieved either with incorporation of an integrated system or as a self-contained, aiming to remove the effects of obsolescence and the operation of their systems as close to the technical and economic parameters and indicators of a new machine built with a higher tech.

Upgrading equipment is an embodiment of extended reproduction, ensuring the constructive and technological improvements of renewal and improvement and increase its technical and economic performance. It is funded investment, resulting in increased baseline machine.

In conclusion we can say that any company that wants to remain competitive must adapt to the needs of the market by demanding the adoption of sustainable strategies by opening the new and the introduction of new technologies not only in all the areas: production, logistics, without limited to concepts and standard procedures that characterized the beginning of the century.

Kanban method application in different areas, "less is more" is true every time. Kanban is distinguished by the ease with which any process, and the basic principles of simplicity and rapid effects of quality improvement and process work

#### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP HRD), ID134378 financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government.

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# A STUDY OF CRACKS OCCURRING IN DENTAL MATERIALS

Traian Eugen BOLFA<sup>1</sup>


## ABSTRACT:

EVALUATION OF THE MODE OF FAILURE AND CRACK PROPAGATION IN METAL, CERAMIC AND RESIN COMPOSITE DENTAL MATERIALS EXPOSED TO CYCLIC OCCLUSAL LOADING SIMILAR TO MASTICATORY LOADS SHOW THAT IN ORDER TO INCREASE THE SUSTAINABILITY AND LONGEVITY OF DENTAL MATERIALS MUST DEMONSTRATE SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO DYNAMIC STRESSES. IN THE CASE OF MASTICATORY FORCES WITH HIGH CONTACT TENSIONS, THE CONTACT AREA OF THE SUPERFICIAL LAYERS IS UNDER A STATE OF SPECIAL-COMPLEX VOLTAGE. STRUCTURAL OR MATERIAL VARIATIONS, IMPURITIES, SCRATCHES AND VOIDS CAN DIRECTLY INFLUENCE THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE MATERIAL AND RESULT IN MICRO-CRACKS WHICH PROPAGATE UNDER REPEATED CYCLIC LOADING LEADING TO CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE DENTAL RESTORATION.

**KEY WORDS:** fatigue strength, implant, plane distortion, plane tension.

## 1. INTRODUCTION


Internal tensions of appreciable values (400-600) Mpa, negatively influence the durability of metallic and nonmetallic materials. Detailed research of the tension state in the contact area has been undertaken by many researchers. [2], Figure 1.



**Fig.1** The fringe order or a measure of the magnitude of the stress at the periphery


<sup>1</sup>PhD, Transilvania University of Brasov, Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Romania, t.bolfa@unitbv.ro





Elastic testing at a macro-scale has effects of plastic distortion started at the micro scale, which then transforms to the macro scale, with the increasing number of cyclical stresses, producing cracks that represent the fusing of the breaking phenomenon under fatigue circumstances.

**Fig.2** Micro irregularities of the areas of contact



Plastic strains of small value occur even at light loadings due to micro irregularities of the areas of contact (Figure 2). Elastic distortion or  $\Delta$  proximity between areas of contact varies linearly with the load  $F^{2/3}$  (Figure 3).

**Fig.3** Graphic representation of the elastic distortion between the areas of contact


## 2. THEORETICAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ASPECTS

The deformability variation of a material with temperature must be studied in order to choose the field of distortion temperature at which the deformability is maximized to obtain the desired structure and hardness. By controlling the deformability being obtained the required form and properties can be achieved. The material's deformability is expressed by several reports:

$$\varepsilon_l = \frac{l - l_0}{l_0}; \quad \varepsilon_d = \frac{d_0 - d}{d_0}; \quad \psi = \frac{A_0 - A}{A_0}; \quad \varphi = l_a \frac{l}{l_0} \quad (1)$$

where  $l_0$ =the length,  $d_0$ =the diameter and  $A_0$ =the area of the tube's section before distortion and  $l$ =the length,  $d$ =the diameter and  $A$ =the area of the minimum section after the breaking.

On repeated stresses occurring during mastication, the materials are destroyed, sometimes without evidence of remaining strains. The initial crack starts from a defect within the material or processing of the surface. In the case of masticatory loads, a limit of tensions at which fatigue damage does not occur cannot be determined. Materials break at a number of stress cycles, behaving according to curve type 2 from Figure 4.




**Fig.4** Materials' behavior in case of masticatory loads

Both imperfections and surface defects are weaknesses. In the vicinity of these weaknesses, due to repeated stresses, strong local concentrations of tensions with local modifications occur, resulting in the initiation of the first micro-cracks. Localization of plastic distortion in a small volume of crystals in the cyclical stresses and not its development over most of the crystals in the static stresses radically distinguishes phenomenological variables in time, from the static ones. Generally for metals, the fatigue endurance  $\sigma_{-1}$  is contained in the interval  $(0.40-0.55) \sigma$


Titanium and its alloys are ideal materials for the performance of implants under variable stresses, even under unfavorable environmental conditions. The elements of alloys such as molybdenum, chromium, vanadium and wolfram increase fatigue strength and decrease the sensitivity to tension concentrators. Surface scratches and the number of inclusions may have a negative influence on the structural integrity of the material and may lead to premature destruction of the implant even after a low number of mastication cycles (Figure 5). Chemical and dimensional homogeneity of networks guarantees obtaining high limits of strength to fatigue.



**Fig.5** Premature destruction of the implant



**Fig.6** Numerical modeling of the state of tension depending on the thickness of the material



**Fig.7** The shape of J curves for ductile materials.

- 1) Rounding phenomena at the crack's extremity;
- 2) Crack's extension-stable propagation;
- 3) Instable propagation of the crack.

Cracks develop starting from interatomic dimensions. The way of occurrence and development of a micro-crack is determined mainly by the crystallographic nature of the material. There are several ways of breakings at the microstructural level:

- fragile transgranular fracture
- fragile intergranular fracture
- fragile shearing fracture
- ductile fracture

### 3. THE FRACTURE OF CERAMIC MATERIALS

Ceramic materials have a structure based on covalent or ionic bonds. Tensions' values of breaking are lower than the theoretical values, due to defects located at grain limits. Ceramics exhibit a type of intergranular fracture. Impurities in the initial powders with additional substances lead to the formation of segregations at the limit of the grains.

In practice, fractures of ceramic materials sometimes occur because of the static fatigue as consequence of the progressive development of superficial micro-cracks, a phenomenon accelerated by the presence of saliva (in fact, there is an erosion phenomenon under tension).

Experimental studies have shown that the initiation of a crack in areas where tangential tensions are maximal coincides with the material's discontinuities. Cracks are propagated towards the surface through the effects of indentations. Generally, the state of tension at the crack's extremity is spatial (Figure 6). Using finite element modeling, it is shown that in areas of the material located towards the surface, the state of tension becomes smooth and distortions occur after the second direction, manifested by a

#### 4. THE FRACTURE OF COMPOSITE MATERIALS

There is not a general valid pattern of fracture with composite material. The aspect and mechanisms that occur are dependent on the internal composition of the composite, the components' nature and fabrication technique. Frequently encountered causes of damage and fracture are residual tensions arising from differences in coefficients of thermal expansion among the constituents<sup>1</sup>.

In the case of short fiber composites used as restorative materials, fracture mechanisms are similar to those of metal alloys, through the appearance of the voids and their growth and union in macro-cracks.

#### 5. THE PROPAGATION OF THE CRACKS UNDER FATIGUE

The phenomenon of catastrophic failure caused by variable cyclical stresses that occur for a number of times constitutes the overwhelming cause of failure of materials used in restorative dental procedures<sup>2</sup>. Cycles represented in Figure 8 have approximately the same effect in terms of fatigue strength. In general, during the mastication process random requests such as those in Figure 9 appear. Materials' fatigue studies the changes that occur in mechanical properties of a material subjected to cyclic applications.




Fig.8 Cycles of fatigue strength





Fig.9 Random stresses occurring during mastication

Fatigue strength depends on the materials composition and structure. A fixed and uniform structure leads to a greater strength than a structure with large granulation size. A surface's state and technical treatments also influence fatigue strength (Figure 10).

<sup>1</sup>T. Bolfa, *Strength of Materials* (Brasov: Lux Libris, 2000), 86-89.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Craig and Floyd Peyton, *Restorative dental materials*(St. Louis: Mosby, 1996), 75-83.



**Fig.10** The propagation of a crack's length produces a variation of  $K_{min}$  size

The increasing length of  $\Delta a$  crack to fatigue will be dependent on:

- the value of maximum factor of intensity of  $K_{max}$  tensions
- the value of intensity factor's variation of  $\Delta K$  tensions
- the value of asymmetry rapport of  $R$  cycles


$$(R = \frac{\sigma_{min}}{\sigma_{max}} = \frac{K_{min}}{K_{max}})$$

The propagation speed of the crack at fatigue depends on at least two parameters; as a general expression, it may be written:

$$v = \frac{da}{dN} = f(K_{max}, \Delta K) \quad \text{or}$$

$$v = \frac{da}{dN} = f(\Delta K, R) \quad (2)$$

The study of the fatigue phenomena of materials seen in the perspective of exploitation lies in determining the propagation speed of cracks in a certain quality of material. The occurrence of fatigue cracks takes place from the surface through the material phenomena of intrusion-extrusion along slip bands generated by the cyclical application (Figure 11).



**Fig.11** The development of microcracks starting from the material's surface

As observation, it can be concluded that any structure of any material contains micro-cracks after the first cycle of operation. Studying the phenomena of fatigue, the number of cycles  $N$  is a reference value, uniquely determined and the crack's length is a questionable value, as the front to propagate the fatigue cracks has an irregular, complex shape. The general shape of a phenomenology model is:

$$\frac{da}{dN} = C(\Delta K)^m \quad (3)$$

where  $C$  and  $m$  are constants determined experimentally.

Determining the life-span or duration, in the case of cyclical stresses, from the law of expression of cracks' propagation is of practical interest. For the general case of an exponential law:

$$N = \int_{a_i}^{a_f} \frac{da}{C(\Delta K)^m} \quad (4)$$

where  $a_i$  is the initial length and  $a_f$  represents the final length of the crack ( $a_f$  can be considered as critical length and is dependent on the material's ductility).

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Resilience has particular importance in the evaluation of orthodontic wires because the amount of work expected from a particular spring in moving a tooth is of interest.

As with other mechanical properties, aging or storage in a simulated oral environment or at elevated temperatures can decrease the fracture toughness. Attempts to correlate fracture toughness with wear resistance have been mixed, and therefore it is not an unequivocal predictor of the wear of restorative materials. Also, numerical analysis techniques have been applied to composites and the tooth-denture base joint to determine energy release rates in the presence of cracks.

A variety of brittle restorative materials, including dental amalgam, cements, ceramic materials, plaster and stone, and some impression materials, is important to dental practice.

The shear strength is the maximum stress that a material can withstand before failure in a shear mode of loading. It is very important in the study of interfaces between two materials, such as a porcelain fused to metal restoration or an implant tissue interface.

A variety of tests are recommended to measure the bond strength between two materials such as porcelains to metal; cements to metal; and polymers, ceramics, resin composites, and adhesives to human enamel and dentin.

When the stress is frequently repeated, the strength of the material may be drastically reduced and ultimately cause failure. Failure under repeated or cyclic loading is therefore dependent on the magnitude of the load and the number of loading repetitions.

The rate of loading is important in many materials, particularly polymers and soft tissues.

Tear strength is a measure of the resistance of a material to tearing forces. Tear strength is an important property of dental polymers used in thin sections, such as flexible impression materials in interproximal areas, maxillofacial materials, and soft liners for dentures. Specimens are usually

crescent shaped and notched. Many materials used in dentistry are not homogeneous solids but consist of two or more essentially insoluble phases. As a further illustration of the factors that effect the properties of a composite, consider the filled polymer resins used in dentistry. For many of these dental composites a random arrangement of the dispersed phase is used, even though a random orientation results in about a sixfold lower strength compared to an oriented dispersed phase.

The property of hardness is of major importance in the comparison of restorative materials. Hardness represents the resistance to permanent surface indentation or penetration. Hardness is therefore a measure of the resistance to plastic deformation.

The importance of friction in dentistry lies in the concept of roughening the surface of a dental implant to reduce motion between the implant and adjacent tissue. It is perceived that a rough surface and resultant decreased motion will provide better osseointegration.

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# A NEW PROCEDURAL MEAN TO UNIFY THE JUDICIAL PRACTICE

Iulia BOGHIRNEA\*

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## ABSTRACT:

THE NEW CODES OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NEW PROCEDURAL MECHANISM FOR THE UNIFICATION OF THE UNITARY JUDICIAL PRACTICE, TOGETHER WITH THE REFERRAL IN THE INTERESTS OF THE LAW, NAMELY THE NOTIFICATION OF THE HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE REGARDING A PRIOR DECISION FOR SOLVING A POINT OF LAW. IN THIS PAPER WE AIM TO ANALYZE THE ADMISSIBILITY CONDITIONS FOR THE ACT OF APPREHENSION, THE OWNERS OF THE ACT, THE TRIAL PROCEDURE, THE EFFECTS AND CONTENT OF THE DECISION.

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**KEY WORDS:** ORDERING A PRIOR DECISION SOLVING A POINT OF LAW, NON-UNITARY JUDICIAL PRACTICE, HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE.

## INTRODUCTION

### 1. RELEVANT PROVISIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE REGULATION

Art 126 Para 3 of the revised Romanian Constitution states that “*the High Court of Cassation and Justice shall provide a unitary interpretation and implementation of the law by the other courts of law, according to its competence*”.

Beside the referral in the interests of the law (Art 514-518 of the Civil Procedure Code), a new instrument insuring the unification of the judicial practice, which has been adopted by the new codes of procedure, is the preliminary ruling, which the High Court of Cassation and Justice shall order solving certain points of law, on whose explanations it depends the solution of a litigation by a judicial court.

A similar procedure – “*saisine pour avis de la Cour de Cassation*” – exists in the French legal system, stated by Art 1031-1 and next of the French Civil Procedure Code for the implementation of Art 441-1 and next of the new French Code of Judicial Organization. Also, in the European Union’s system of law there is a procedure regarding the preliminary question addressed to the Court of Justice seated in Luxembourg, stated by Art 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the “preliminary ruling”, similar in many aspects with this new internal mechanism<sup>1</sup>

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\* Postdoctoral scholar “Acad. Andrei Rădulescu” Legal Research Institute of Romanian Academy

\* Lecturer PhD, Faculty of Law and Administrative Sciences, University of Pitesti.

<sup>1</sup> G. Boroi și alții, *Noul cod de procedură civilă, Comentariu pe articole, 1<sup>st</sup> Volume Art 1-526*, (Bucharest: Hamangiu Publ.-house, 2013), 1007

Thus, Art 97 Point 3 of the Civil Procedure Code states that the “*High Court of Cassation and Justice rules: [...] the requests regarding a preliminary ruling for solving certain points of law*”.

In civil matters, the legal framework is represented by Art 519-521 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Book – “The contentious procedure”, Title III – “Provisions regarding the insurance of a unitary practice”, chapter II – “Requests submitted to the High Court of Cassation and Justice for ordering a preliminary ruling solving certain points of law”, and by Art 516 Para 6-9, Art 517 Para 3 and Art 518, which become regulation norms because the legislator refers to these provisions stated by Chapter I “Referral in the interests of the law” of the Civil Procedure Code<sup>1</sup>.

In criminal matters, this legal institution is stated by Art 475-4771 of Title III – “The trial”, Chapter 5 – “Provisions insuring an unitary judicial practice”, Section 2 – “Notification of the High Court of Cassation and Justice requesting a preliminary ruling in certain points of law” and by Art 473 Para 5-8, Art 474 and 4741, which become regulation norms because the legislator refers to them in Section 1 titled “Referral in the interests of the law” of the Criminal Procedure Code<sup>2</sup>.

According to Art 19 Para 2<sup>1</sup> of the republished Law No 304/2004 on judicial organization, with subsequent modifications and amendments, among the High Court of Cassation and Justice functions [...] the United Divisions for judging referrals in the interests of the law [...].

The purpose of this procedure, stated by the Explanatory Memorandum to the draft of the New Civil Procedure Code, is “the creation of a new mechanism for the unification of the judicial practice which shall contribute, beside the referral in the interests of the law, to the transformation of the Romanian jurisprudence in a predictable one, which shall answer to all reasonable expectations of litigants and, also, lead to the shortening of the trial, preventing the completion of all means of appeal”<sup>3</sup>.

The doctrine states that the notification of the High Court of Cassation and Justice requesting a preliminary ruling for certain points of law represent “a mechanism created to prevent the emergence of a non-unitary practice in the application and interpretation of the law by the courts, mechanism whose implementation is welcomed in the context of the European Commission’s recommendations in this area”<sup>4</sup>.

## **2. THE MOVING PARTIES AND THE CONDITIONS FOR ELIGIBILITY FOR THE INITIATION OF THE PROCEDURE TO MOVE THE COURT FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING**

The analysis of Art 519 reveals that the High Court of Cassation and Justice can be notified only by the judges, members of different panels of judges from courts, courts of appeal or from the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

<sup>1</sup> Law No 134/2010 on the Civil Procedure Code, republished, with subsequent modifications and amendments, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 545/3 August 2012

<sup>2</sup> Law No 135/2010 on the Criminal Procedure Code, republished, with subsequent modifications and amendments, published in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I, No 486/15 July 2010

<sup>3</sup> Explanatory Memorandum to the draft of the New Civil Procedure Code, as it has been sent to the Parliament, [http://www.just.ro/Sections/PrimaPagina\\_MeniuDreapta/ProiectulnouluiCoddeProcedur%C4%83Civil%C4%83/tabid/648/Default.aspx](http://www.just.ro/Sections/PrimaPagina_MeniuDreapta/ProiectulnouluiCoddeProcedur%C4%83Civil%C4%83/tabid/648/Default.aspx)

<sup>4</sup> Boroi, *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 1007

The parties in a trial may emphasize the existence of a point of law to the court competent to solve their litigation, but the “findings” of its existence belongs only to this court<sup>5</sup>.

Art 519 of the Civil Procedure Code states the cumulative fulfilment of the following requirements on which it depends the act of apprehension, namely:

- a.) The existence of a case file in course of trial;
- b.) The panel of judges, notifying the High Court of Cassation and Justice, is invested with the ultimate resolution of the case; the case, in course of trial, must be in the legal competence of the tribunal, court of appeal or of the High Court of Cassation and Justice;
- c.) The act of apprehension must be related to only one point of law, which requires a principle solution by clarifying the meaning of a legal norm, which is susceptible of various interpretations.

The act of apprehension of the Supreme Court of Justice shall be inadmissible if it shall refer to *a matter of fact* of a certain case, namely it shall be required the opinion on the merits of the case<sup>6</sup>.

- d.) The matter of law is new, namely upon it the High Court of Cassation and Justice did not stated yet, nor is the object of a pending referral in the interests of the law.

In literature it is considered that the matter of law, if the High Court of Cassation and Justice “ruled a sufficient number of decisions as to shape a constant jurisprudence” can no longer be considered a novelty, nor that upon it the High Court of Cassation and Justice did not stated<sup>7</sup>.

- e.) The awarding of a solution on the main issue of the matter on trial shall depend on the matter of law which must be clarified.

### **3. THE COURT RULING NOTIFYING THE HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE**

The court ruling is the document by which certain courts, invested with the competence to solve the case as final court, *only after contradictory debates*, shall be able to request, to the High Court of Cassation and Justice to rule a decision, solving a question of material/substantial national law, on whose clarification rests the settlement of the case.

The existence of *contradictory debates* on a matter of law, during the trial, creates the opinion of the court that the judicial norm applicable for this case may have different interpretations.

The panel shall decide, by a court ruling, the notification of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, if it ascertains that all conditions for admissibility stated by Art 519 of the Civil Procedure Code are fulfilled.

Therefore, the court ruling is the judicial act that triggers the procedure in front of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, which must have certain elements useful for a pertinent interpretation, namely: the reasons supporting the admissibility of the act of apprehension, the panel’s point of view and the point of view of the parties of that litigation.

Thus, the court ruling is not subjected to any appeal (Art 520 Para 1) even more so because the legislator considered the fact that the parties of a trial would have no interest in

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<sup>5</sup> I. Deleanu, *Noul cod de procedură civilă, Comentarii pe articole, 1<sup>st</sup> Volume*, (Bucharest: Universul Juridic Publ.-house, 2013), 706

<sup>6</sup> Boroi , *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 1008. See in this regard also the Guide for submitting a prior act of apprehension, available at [http://www.scj.ro/s\\_complet%20chestiuni.asp](http://www.scj.ro/s_complet%20chestiuni.asp)

<sup>7</sup> Boroi , *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 1010

opposing the solution of the matter of law on which it rests the fair and legal resolution of their case<sup>8</sup>.

The closing court proceedings suspend the case trial until the preliminary ruling for solving a point of law.

We are talking here about a mandatory suspension because if the trial would continue it is possible to reach a different interpretation of the matter of law, on whose clarification rests the solving of the case, than the one offered by the Supreme Court, whose decision is mandatory for the court of referral.

Art 520 Para 3 of the Civil Procedure Code states that the court ruling shall be published on the website of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, after registering the pending litigation.

The reason for which is brought to the public knowledge the court ruling of the Supreme Court is that courts with pending litigations to be able to suspend them (the suspension, in this case, being optional) until the solution of the notification, as stated by Art 519 Para 4, though Art 520 Para 3 states that the decision solving a question of law is mandatory for the other courts from the moment of its publishing in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part I.

It must be emphasized the fact that between the two moments of solving the notification, until which the other courts shall suspend the litigation, and that of the publishing of the ruling is a period of 45 days.

Until the fulfilment of the desideratum of a unitary and coherent judicial practice for all courts, so that it will insure for the justice seeker predictability over the justice act, we consider that courts with similar cases pending, to have the obligation to suspend them until the requested resolution of the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

#### **4. TRIAL PROCEDURE IN THE HIGH COURT OF CASSATION AND JUSTICE**

The procedure is free of the legal stamp duty and of the judicial stamp in order to be accessible.

The distribution of the act of apprehension is made by the president or, in his absence by one of the vice-presidents of the High Court of Cassation and Justice or by the person appointed by them (Art 520 Para 5 of the Civil Procedure Code).

The formation of the panel of judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, according to Art 520 Para 6-9 of the Civil Procedure Code, shall be established depending on the point of law representing the object of the act of apprehension.

Thus, the act of apprehension shall be trialed by a panel formed by the president of the correspondent section of the High Court of Cassation and Justice or by a judge appointed by him, any by 12 judges from that section. The section's president or, in case of impossibility, the judge appointed by him is the panel's president and shall adopt the necessary measures for the random selection of judges.

After the formation of the panel, its president shall appoint a judge to draft a report on the point of law subjected to ruling.

When the point of law refers to the activity of several sections of the High Court of Cassation and Justice or if there is no section correspondent to the one that ascertained that the point of law has not been unitary solved by the practice, its president, or in his absence, one of the High Court of Cassation and Justice's vice-presidents shall submit the act of apprehension to the presidents of the sections interested in solving the point of law.

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<sup>8</sup> Deleanu, *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 709.

In this case, the panel shall be formed by the president, or in his absence, by the vice-president of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, who shall chair the panel, of the presidents of the sections interested in solving the point of law, as well as by 5 judges from those sections, randomly appointed by the panel's president.

After appointing the panel, for the elaboration of the report the panel's president shall appoint a judge from each section. The rapporteurs are not incompatible.

For the elaboration of the report, the panel's president shall request the written opinion of some known experts regarding the matters of law which can generate different interpretations in courts.

The report shall provide the arguments on which it is grounded, the relevant jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, of the European Court of Human Rights or of the Court of Justice of the European Union, if necessary, the doctrine in this area, as well as the opinion of the consulted experts.

The report shall be communicated to the parties, who, within maximum 15 days may submit in written, by their lawyer, or their legal counsel, their points of view regarding the matter of law subjected to clarification.

It must be shown that, according to Art 520 Para 1, the parties would have told their point of view regarding the matter of law, which must be recorded in the court ruling, and Para 10 of the same article states that the legislator must ask, once again, but only to the parties, to express their point of view, with the option to submit it or not. We consider that, in this case, it is about an incomplete expression of the legislator, who probably aimed to ask the parties for a point of view regarding the "*matter of law subjected to trial*" as it results from the report drafted by the rapporteur judge, the text should have been continued.

The panel meeting is summoned by its president with at least 20 days before. With the summoning each judge shall receive a copy of the report and of the proposed solution.

At the meeting shall participate all judges of the panel and the solution is adopted by at least two thirds of the number of judges of the panel. Abstentions from voting shall not be accepted.

The meeting debating the act of apprehension is not public, namely without the summoning of the parties, but, as the Civil Procedure Code states, they have the possibility to submit their points of view, in written when they receive the report.

The act of apprehension shall be trialed within maximum 3 months since the investiture.

## **5. THE CONTENT AND EFFECTS OF THE PRELIMINARY RULING FOR SOLVING CERTAIN POINTS OF LAW**

Art 521 Para 1 of the Civil Procedure Code states that the High Court of Cassation and Justice, by its Panel for solving certain points of law, shall rule on the act of apprehension by a *decision*.

Solving the points of law is mandatory for the court that requested it from the *ruling* of the decision, and for the other courts from its publication of the decision in the Official Gazette of Romania, Part 1 (Art 521 Para 3).

In literature is shown that the wording of the legislator is "uninspired" because the panel of judges who issued an act of apprehension for the High Court of Cassation and Justice is not present when adjudication, effectively knowing the content of the decision when is communicated<sup>9</sup>.

The decision is mandatory for the pending cases and for those submitted subsequent the preliminary ruling.

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<sup>9</sup> Deleanu, *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 711

Regarding the termination of the effects of the preliminary ruling, its applicability ends with the modification, repeal or when the legal provision subjected to interpretation was found unconstitutional, Art 518 of the Civil Procedure Code being applicable according to Art 521 Para 4.

In literature it is stated that the legislator has “ignored” the situation of falling into disuse of the decision and that of the decision’s resurgence. In the latter case, it shall be imposed due to the jurisprudence of the two European courts, which may adopt “norms mandatory” for the internal law<sup>10</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

By this new procedural mechanism we consider that the High Court of Cassation and Justice may fulfil the role offered by the constitutional provisions “to provide a unitary interpretation and implementation of the law by the other courts of law, according to its competence” and “to satisfy the principles of law and to point the jurisprudence of the supreme court for the other courts of law”<sup>11</sup>.

This paper has been financially supported within the project entitled ***“Horizon 2020 - Doctoral and Postdoctoral Studies: Promoting the National Interest through Excellence, Competitiveness and Responsibility in the Field of Romanian Fundamental and Applied Scientific Research”***, contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/140106. This project is co-financed by European Social Fund through Sectorial Operational Program for Human Resources Development 2007-2013 **Investing in people!**

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<sup>10</sup> Deleanu, *Noul cod de procedură civilă...*, 704

<sup>11</sup> N. Volonciu, *Tratat de procedură penală. Parte specială, 2<sup>nd</sup> Volume*, (Bucharest: Paideia Publ.-house, 1996), 375

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## CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS OF OWNERSHIP

Ion Cristinel RUJAN<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT:** *THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP IS ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND IS CLOSELY RELATED TO THE RIGHT TO LIFE, HUMAN EXISTENCE, EXPRESSION AND THE FOUNDATION OF ITS INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS. PROTECTION AND GUARANTEE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY IS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT, AND DEFENDING THE RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP FINDS ITS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN THE ROMANIAN AND EUROPEAN LAW. THIS ARTICLE DEVELOPS AN ANALYSIS OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS AND THEORIES RELATING TO PROPERTY IN GENERAL, AND THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY, IN PARTICULAR, CONCEPTS THAT HAVE BEEN THE SOURCE OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONS OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE DOMAIN.*

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**KEYWORDS:** *OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHT, NATURAL LAW, UTILITARIANISM*

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### 1. OUTLINING THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS ABOUT OWNERSHIP

In ancient Greece, as shown by Aristotle, there is a conflict of an economic nature between the rich and the poor, which had a direct link with the property, because either the poor people, many in number, killed, sent into exile and expropriated the rich, or the rich deprived the poor of their rights as citizens and changed the laws concerning in order to make life harder to the latter. Laws of antiquity, both Greek and Roman ones were harsh with regard to debtors who could not pay their debts, so that the body of the debtor would become the property of his creditor. In Athens, these practices have been removed by the Constitution promulgated by Solon, which forbade people to borrow money by offering as pledge their own person.<sup>2</sup>

Plato reflected in his work, the Republic, to the social order based on altruism, where people don't crave for gains and conflicts between classes no longer have meaning. Plato's concept is based, firstly, on the will of the ruling class, which had to relinquish all personal possessions, no more than necessary, and thus need no longer existed temptations based on greed either from the outside, or the inside. At the same time, in Plato's vision, the rulers of the State had to sacrifice family life and ownership of lands and houses in order not to forget

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<sup>1</sup>Assistant Professor PhD Faculty of International Relations, Law and Administrative Sciences, "Constantin Brâncuși" University of Târgu-Jiu, rujan72@gmail.com..

<sup>2</sup> Aristotel, *Politics*, (Bucharest: National Culture Publishing House, 1924), 234 and seq.



that, although leading the State, they are its servants and not to be preoccupied with their own land or homes, but with guarding the State.<sup>3</sup> The links between the abolition of private property and abolition of the family was not accidental, since, regardless of social class from which they originated, the Greeks regarded property as family-run property and less individual property in the modern sense of the term.<sup>4</sup>

This non-individual way of perception on property would be able to steer us towards the idea of individual altruism, but the conception about property focused on the family generated more than altruism, namely "amoral" familiarism or "curse of backward societies", as it was commonly referred to in sociology. The most eloquent example in support of this opinion is the peasants' obsession to ensure the survival of their own families and disinterest for another form of community loyalty. Plato's writings reveal the fact that family pride was a more common motivation in sacrificing public goods in favor of private ones than greed.

In his view, an ideal Republic implied the existence of a minimum property on the estate and tools required for the trade, for ordinary people, as well as the absence of any personal possessions of the rulers, which would have solved simultaneously two major problems: the conflict between private interests and public goods and the conflict between the rich and the poor. Plato regarded property as a source of trouble and the only way to counteract its negative effects on the policy was that those who have power should not have properties, and those with fortunes should be powerless.

In his writing *Laws*, Plato makes only limited concessions to the idea of taking ownership from public control and doesn't make any kind of concession to the idea of trade and profit. In this respect he presents the community of Magnesia, which is autonomous and does not trade with any other State. The land is divided into quotas, established by majority and no-one can have more than four such units. But the State interfered in the allocation of quota shares in the sense that every male citizen had to have at least one unit and also in the confiscation of any property that exceeded the upper limit. In this community only farming was permitted, not trade because trade implied the use of money, and obtaining cash profits were believed to encourage an uncontrolled urge to have more and more of what was a negative influence for the soul and distracted the citizen from fulfilling his duties.

Unlike Aristotle, Plato does not see anything salutary in the need to establish a balance between what is private and what is public, between family and polis. It tends towards the perfect polis and in this sense he considers that if the property sits at the root of disagreement, then the property should be abolished. Aristotle's view on the property lies at the opposite pole from Plato. Aristotle's debate on economic activities and forms of property is based on the belief that the State is an association of producers. He insists on the fact that keeping the family represents the aim of property. Thus, Aristotle defends private property, in the non-individualistic sense and highlights its positive aspects, considering that, if things are to be used as required by nature, they must be owned by someone who feels that he has a personal interest in his caring for them.<sup>5</sup>

During the Renaissance it was analyzed the relationship between ownership, military organization and constitutional theory, relationship that originated in Roman times, when former soldiers were given farms to pay for their services. One of those who debated the

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<sup>3</sup> Platon, *The Republic*, (Bucharest: Scientific and Encyclopaedic Publishing House, 1986).

<sup>4</sup> For some legal, philosophical, sociological, economic and theological considerations in our doctrine, see O. Ungureanu, C. Munteanu, *Civil law. Rights in Rem*, 3rd Edition, (Bucharest: Rosetti Publishing House, 2005), 88-92, and for the sociological, philosophical, legal, perspective of property right; V. Stoica, *Civil law. Primary rights in rem*, (Bucharest: Humanitas, Publishing House, 2004), 218-223

<sup>5</sup> In his *Politics*, Aristotle stated: "In a way it is necessary that the properties should be common but generally it's good to have a private character. Those who mind their own business do not quarrel with each other but they will rather be generous if they concern themselves with their business", Aristotel, *Politics*, 21.

relationship between the ownership of lands, civic virtue and military effectiveness was Machiavelli, who praised the Romans for their materialistic vision, which did not imply lack of respect for deity. Roman religion was closely linked to the household and farm, strengthening the ordinary people's belief in the sanctity of tradition and family life. Independent owners, accustomed to hard work, raised and educated to accept the lack of comfort and luxury, were the essence of uncorrupted Republic and an invincible army. The themes addressed by Machiavelli also appeared in the works of Francis Bacon, which were adapted in English context, because the Roman soldier put in possession of land and the English farmer played the same role in the vision of the two authors. The essence of Bacon's opinion is that "the plough must be kept by the hands of the owners and not by some mere leaseholders".

Along the same line were inscribed the opinions of James Harrington in his work *Oceania*, where, for political harmony in the republic, he proposes a division of the land, so that a part as big as possible of the population should be established as the owners and the confiscation of the estates producing crops worth more than £ 2,000 a year, except for those received as an inheritance. A keen analyst of J.Harrington's philosophy was Hume, who saw a lot of good things in the former's theory such as, for example, the fact that a smaller property in the hands of a single man will give him more power than a large property shared between several people.

Hume speculated on two different pictures of the politics, one being represented by civic tradition, which for Harrington was "ancient prudence" and the other by a vision of politics as the influence of certain legitimate economic interests in a legal framework. The first image appeared for Hume as a 'perfect Republic, but not immortal, "which included a scheme of gradual representation by mixing democratic, aristocratic and monarchical elements of the theory of mixed governance and argued that the representation is based on the property, with direct reference to the idea of Harrington, whereby balance of constitutional law must match the property.

The issue of private property was analyzed in the eighteenth century by J. J. Rousseau. In his work entitled *The Origin of Inequality among People* he made a remark that has remained famous: "the first man who enclosing a plot dared to say that it is mine and he found people quite stupid as to believe it was the true, that was the founder of the civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders, how many miseries and horrors would have spared mankind the man who taking off the pegs or plugging the ditch, would have shouted to his fellows: beware to listen to this impostor, you are lost if you forget that the crops belong to all and that the land is not no man's land".<sup>6</sup>

Later in his *Encyclopedia* he is more reserved, in that he acknowledges that the property is the most sacred of all citizens' rights, the true foundation of civil society and the foundation of the social pact.<sup>7</sup> Marxist philosophers were the ones who attacked property virulently in favor of collectivism. In the Communist Manifesto of 1848, K. Marx and Fr. Engels fr. asserted: "what characterizes Communism is not to abolish a property but bourgeois property".<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> O. Ungureanu, C. Munteanu, I.C.Rujan, *The historical evolution and philosophical, legal, sociological and theological foundations of property on land*, Romanian Pandects, No. 5/2005, p. 122-123.

<sup>7</sup> Legally J.J.Rousseau's thinking will be resumed later by P.J.Proudhon who, in 1840, publishes 'Qu'est-ce que la propriété?' and responds in a challenging way: "c'est le vol"(It's a theft) (as J.L. Bergel, M. Bruschi, S. Cimamonti, *Traité de droit civil. Les biens*, L.G.D. J, 1999, 77). (as J.L. Bergel, M. Bruschi, S. Cimamonti, *Traité de droit civil. Les biens*, L.G.D. J, 1999, 77).

<sup>8</sup> For details, see, Fr. Terré, Simler Ph., *Droit civil. Les biens*, édition 6, Dalloz, 2002, 85-93, Cimamonti, *Traité de droit civil*. 76.

## 2. PROPERTY IN THE UTILITARIAN CONCEPTION

A philosophical conception on property right is the utilitarian one, which starts from the idea that, if individuals had not been entitled to appropriate, to use, to pass from one to another and to leave as a legacy valuable objects or those of interest, they would have been unable to use the raw materials provided by nature for anything other than the simplest way of immediate consumption. Usefulness is therefore the one that creates such rights.

Utilitarianism is a normative theory, which argues that the moral and legal rules are acceptable as far as accepting and respecting them brings happiness. This theory is hostile to the doctrines of natural law, arguing that legal rights should be a matter of positive law and that moral rights can be explained as the freedoms and powers that individuals must have in order to promote the most important interests. Utilitarians consider that, although the ownership rights are not dictated by nature, the assumption that an individual who has acquired a good without doing any harm to another person, must be able to freely enjoy it, is based on utilitarian considerations.

A.M. Honore best characterised the property in a developed system of laws: "property entails the right to possession, the right of use, right of administration, the right to the income that can be earned from work, entitled to capital, the right to safety, rights, or the possibility of transmissibility or absence of term, prohibition of the use with harmful effects, compulsoriness of execution and the possibility of inheritance; all these are eleven major cases". It was stressed that talking about ownership as a sum of rights is inadequate insofar as it excludes the compulsoriness of execution, i.e. vulnerability of property to be seized and sold as payment for the debts of the owner.

A legal order acknowledges property in a fully modern sense when all these rights and duties are assigned to a single person. As they are scattered and assigned to several people, or some of them do not even exist, we are talking about a pre- or postmodern system. Simple societies often consider community or the extended family as the beneficiary of the right to inheritance—that is, when all the less important rights no longer exist, the object returns to the family rather than to a specific individual.

Utilitarian defense of property, in any form, is thus the defence of the legal recognition of property as an instrument for promoting total happiness. It has been suggested that it makes no sense to ask whether property should be recognized; if the property is defined as the totality of relations between people relating to things, then we have to defend the view that all societies must consider that property is useful in some way and that the only question raised now is what kind of property they have to acknowledge. People may relate one to another by reference to things without property being involved. The hunters who allow the ones who kill the hunted animal to take the first piece of meat from wild game do not claim to be the owners of the hunted animal, nor do they assign ownership of this animal to the hunter who killed it.

It is claimed that, from an analytical point of view, it is best to distinguish between the claims expressed on property or based on the property and any other claim on things. A person can have good reasons to use another person's bike—for example, he hurries to do the right thing; this person's relationship with the owner of the bicycle is not a matter of ownership, but the right of the bike owner to accept or reject the claims of the person to use his bike is a matter of ownership. Property satisfies safety needs and allows the natural incentives of labour to act successfully—we are urged to work of mere desire to remain alive, but no one will sow where someone else will be able to reap the harvest in his stead; by

guaranteeing the situation of not being able to call what is ours as ours, only property rules make our desire of well-being to urge us to work.<sup>9</sup>

What cannot be ascertained is the distinction between the need of property and the need for private property. Here arises the question of the utilitarian conception followers: would it be better developed the idea of utility if it were left, for example the right of capital in the hands of families and only the income in the hands of the individual? The conclusion is that there is no difficulty in doing something like this when a fortune is inherited by will; it's not unusual for a widow or widower to receive an income throughout her life while the capital itself belongs to the deceased's children. Along the same line is the question of whether to accept a property without a time limit for entities such as the land is the best solution possible. Maybe the land in general, or a specific land, in particular, should be owned on the basis of a kind of lease term, after that period returning in possession of the community or of any body representing the community.

The argument in favor of something closer to our own system of indefinite property is that it allows us to buy and sell clearer and more destate titles of property. If the civil law allows a person to accumulate all of the situations of property, then some individuals may have to do with things in the most absolute manner permitted by law. Moreover, in this case the owner will be able to claim all sorts of subsidiary rights in addition to the rights of the owner. The owner who can get a loan for the safety of his land may, if he is reasonable or if he uses the money he gathered efficiently, to increase revenue well above the amount needed to repay the credit. The fact that he can do such a thing promotes general happiness; the law will have to allow mortgages. If the potential creditor will be pleased with the guarantee provided only if the powers available to the owner of the land are total; we have thus an argument for an unrestricted, property unlimited by different conditions from which can be extracted only little interests.

In the utilitarian arguments relative to the property rights hopes are crucial. Their fulfilled hopes constitute an important source of happiness; the property is based on hopes and generate hopes. Thus, it is able to provide much happiness or can be the cause of great despair if hopes are frustrated. Utilitarian arguments provide a good defense, but a not too firm one of public property. Since property rights are justified resorting to the idea of general benefit, without neglecting the importance of the security of the individual and freedom of beliefs and actions, ownership of anything else other than consumer goods and all that resembles them is a matter of convenience. Moreover, given the conception of property as a bundle of rights and duties, utilitarians are happy about the idea that the property will be destroyed, so that control of the capital can be separated from the right to the income, and the rights to inheritance to be removed from the area of influence of the ordinary control.

Utilitarians can not accept Hegel's idea that human will is essentially individual and that, therefore, property is private property nor its Marxist counterweight according to which production is fundamentally social and all pre-Communist societies have been an aberration endorsed by brute force and ideological deceptions. Utilitarian approach of property rights builds upon a concept of ownership based on other rights that are not necessarily related to property. By contrast, certain theorists of natural rights derive all rights from a conception of property as a property on one's own person.

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<sup>9</sup> In economic thinking the idea of property is justified by the notion of work. The economist F. Bastiat, for instance, sees in property "*the principle of progress and of life*" and Demolombe declared that "*God who created man as a sociable human being also gave him the means to fulfill his destiny, i.e. the property*". Planiol rejects the explanation based on the idea of work considering that it contains in germ the denial of ownership right itself (G.N. Luțescu, op. cit., p. 252)

### 3. TRADITIONAL THEORY ON PROPERTY RIGHT

The traditional theory of property rights starts from the idea that individual rights derive from God's laws<sup>10</sup> of Nature or Reason. The Declaration of Independence of America shows that its authors believe these truths to be „self evident“, that all people are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable Rights, among them the right to Life, Liberty, and the desire for Happiness. To obtain these rights, Governments are instituted by and with People receiving their right power from the consent of those who govern them. " Similar claims were made by the Declaration of the rights of man and of the citizen in France.

In many of these „natural rights assumed a natural right to property; Article II of the of the French Declaration from 1791 claims that "the Goal of any political associations is the conservation of natural and imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression "<sup>11</sup>. Similar claims are listed in the Declaration of the Commonwealth of Virginia which is, in many ways, a model for the Declaration of Independence. The question that the followers of this theory put was :What does ownership right allow a person to have or to do and what are the elements of traditional claims that could survive in a more skeptical and more materialistic period , during which it doesn't seem too reasonable to speak about God's dictate, of Nature and of Reason?

Natural rights were regarded as such by virtue of the fact that they preceded, from a historical point of view, moral and legal rights; Governments were considered legitimate if they transgressed these rights. Moreover, the doctrine was different from utilitarianism because it was clearly individualistic, on the grounds that every person is obliged to submit to the leadership as long as it promotes its natural rights, but only until their violation, because then there is no longer any obligation of submission to the governance. And where the violation could be justified in terms of usefulness, there is no obligation to obedience. The rights established for individuals are constituted within the limits of manifestation for governance, which have the positive task of defending individuals against infringements of the granted rights. Regarding the size of ownership one of the extreme ideas of argues that natural law refers only to the right to continuously use things without harmful consequences and in their natural state, the rest being social convention. The other extreme idea argues that the fact of acquiring something in its natural state entitles the owner property indefinitely, like the one recognized by modern law systems.

The theory of natural rights should consider property rights developed in the framework of a system of laws developed as essentially conventional. If they exist, they should be judged with responsibility and it is necessary to serve the purposes of all legal conventions, namely, the maintenance of our natural rights, and must be created and kept in force by means which do not infringe upon our natural rights. A minimalist perspective moves the approach to the ideas of some contemporary authors such as Rawls or Dworkin. The concern for rights as trumps, or to the idea that a theory of rights reflect the need for the society to guarantee a sphere within which the individual is inviolable and invulnerable even to well-intentioned utilitarian calculations of governance, directing to the opinion that Governments should establish private property in what might be called final consumption goods, because they are essential for the person in order to have individuality.

In this view private or public property on the producing enterprises is a matter of political caution. In this respect it is noted that, if it is easier to run an economy based on private property, then this type economy should be adopted. But, if private property creates the possibility of accumulation of power, making it more difficult to obtain individual freedom and civil rights observance , then it is justified to limit private property. Finally, if it

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<sup>10</sup> For details of theological considerations concerning ownership, see Ungureanu, Munteanu, Rujan, *The historical evolution and philosophical*, 128-130.

<sup>11</sup> A. Ryan, *Property*, translated by I. Busuioac , ed. D.U. Style, (Bucharest Publishing House, 1998), 87

were extremely hard to reconcile private property with access to occupations, then it would be justified to give up private property. Another approach starts from the concept of rights in terms of property considered generically and passes to individualized private property. In the 17th century, Grotius and R. Nozick argued that the "natural right to private property" means that when you get something on which nobody else has ownership we have a full and unrestricted property on that something."<sup>12</sup>

The main idea is that, since a person owns an object so acquired, he may make any agreement with someone else, and third parties whose position is less favored by these conventions may not complain about them, unless he prevents them to use their own resources in the same way in which those people use their own. Our natural right to use freely anything we possess or get it legitimately is not affected by competition with others, regardless of the impact on our welfare. This doctrine clearly favors private property. R. Nozick in his work *Anarchy, State and Utopia* launches the idea that we are born our own owners and talks about people as "properties", and Locke argued that people have a "property founded on their own person. Thus, these authors believe that each of us has in full possession, indefinitely, his own person.

This perspective launches the idea that any property is naturally a total property indefinitely, considering that the world is divided into things that are subject to possessions and things that are still not possessed, but that all people come into their own possession. Along another line, analyzing the aspects of legitimacy of private property, J. Locke, argues that if the appropriation of property is legitimate, then the person becomes, legitimately, the owner of those goods<sup>13</sup>, and P. Manent, continuing the vision of J. Locke, says that "the right of ownership is a fundamental right which underlies other rights, natural too, and this right is not in any way limited because it is based not on nature, but on work".<sup>14</sup>

#### 4. CONCLUSIONS

Regardless of the perspective from which has been addressed property and ownership right through the ages, by the principles and content of the ideas expressed by theorists of philosophy and law, an important issue emerges as a common denominator, that property is closely related to the person, his life and his work, and, therefore, all the rights which derive from property must be protected and guaranteed by the law.

These philosophical conceptions of ownership, classified into several categories as against the targeted patrimony, public or private, have led to the adoption of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a document in which, in article 17, property and property rights are among the fundamental human rights.

The importance of property evoked in these legal-philosophical principles outlined comprehensively, as an outcome of the various theories born and developed within the various philosophical trends, was based on drawing up rules of constitutional law on guaranteeing private property for most countries of the world. In Romania, after the Communist era, in which private property was almost annihilated, being invented a new type of property-Socialist property, protection and guaranteeing of the right of ownership was assigned by the Constitution adopted in 1991 and revised in 2003, and through a series of

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<sup>12</sup> Ryan, *Property*, 94-95

<sup>13</sup> J. Locke appears as the philosopher who best expressed the thesis of jusnaturalist type. For him "*the biggest and the main aim which is proposed to people (...) is to preserve their properties*"; that's why you could say that "*Locke sees property everywhere and uses it to justify his moving from the natural state to social state*" (A. Beriaux, *Le droit naturel*, Coll. Que sais-je?, PUF, 1993, 76).

<sup>14</sup> A. Gorun, *Freedom. Concept and reality*, (Cluj-Napoca: Argonaut Publishing House, 2002), 84-84.

incidental normative acts that have made the legal framework necessary for the establishment, recovery and defence of property.

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# **BRIEF CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE UNDER THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS**

**Dana VULPAȘU<sup>1</sup>**

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## **ABSTRACT:**

*THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ACTION OF ENSURING PUBLIC ORDER IS CALLED ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE AND REGROUPS AN ENSEMBLE OF REGULATIONS TRADITIONALLY DEFINED BY A CLEAR AND IDENTIFIABLE PURPOSE, THAT OF PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER, AND BY A CONCILIATION REGIME BETWEEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLIC ORDER AND THOSE OF PUBLIC FREEDOMS. CURRENTLY THE PURPOSE AND THE CONCILIATION REGIME DO NOT FULLY CHARACTERIZE THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE ACTIVITY, WHICH EXTENDS AS A NECESSITY FOR THE PRESENT NEEDS OF SOCIETY. THIS ARTICLE, BOTH CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC, TRIES TO ASSOCIATE THE RULES CONTAINED IN THE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WITH THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES TO VERIFY THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE IS A PROCESS COMPATIBLE WITH THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND TO IDENTIFY A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES THAT COULD BE GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A EUROPEAN MODEL FOR PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC ORDER.*

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**KEY WORDS:** ADMINISTRATIVE POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER, EUROPEAN CONVENTION

## **1. THE CONSECRATION OF RESTRICTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS EXERCISE ON GROUNDS OF PUBLIC ORDER BY THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION**

Whatever the administrative or judicial organizational schemes states have, the European Convention did not lead to the conviction of the administrative police, but even confirmed it in several aspects.

In light of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, states are authorized to prevent a potential threat, the European Court of Human Rights never condemning the administrative police activity done internally through which the

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<sup>1</sup> PhD Candidate, National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Doctoral School in Administrative Sciences, Romania, danavulpasu@yahoo.com.

Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships for young researchers in the fields of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences and Sociology” POSDRU/159/1.5/S/134650 financed through the Sectoral Operational Programme for Human Resources Development 2007-2013, co-financed by the European Social Fund.

exercise of protected rights was justifiably limited for express reasons of administrative police.

A first case is that under Article 5 of the Convention, which provides that everyone have the *right to liberty and security*. However, this right may be prejudiced, from the perspective of administrative police as a way of preventing riots, if in question is a person capable of spreading infectious diseases, a persona of unsound mind, alcoholics, drug addicts or vagrants.

The same article mentions in letter f) that people can be deprived of their liberty in order to prevent unauthorized entry into the country or when against them action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition. In this context, according to Article 1 of the Protocol no. 7 from 1984, States shall expel a foreigner in the interest of public order or on ground of national security.

In fact, the public order clause in the broad sense is a condition for the exercise of most rights under the Convention, which public authorities can invoke when they restrict the exercise of rights for administrative police reasons.

In this respect, we recall Article 8 according to which everyone has the *right to respect for his private and family life*, his home and his correspondence, the interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right being accepted only to the extent that is required by the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the *prevention of disorder or crime*, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

*The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion*, under Article 9, which includes the freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, to manifest his religion or belief, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, in worship, teaching, practice and observance, shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of *public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others*.

*The right to freedom of expression*, under Article 10, includes the freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

It has to be noticed a peculiarity of the administrative police regarding this article, namely that concerning the possibility that states have to subject broadcasters, cinema or television to authorization. Authorization is one of the legal measures that the administrative police have at its disposal. Therefore, the Convention does not prevent the implementation of this legal instrument of authorization through which the administrative police authority shall ensure the public order.

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law in a democratic society. These are necessary measures for the protection of public order, the prevention of crimes, the protection of health, morals, reputation or rights of others.

Another right is specified in Article 11 and considers *freedom of assembly and association*, whose exercise can be also restricted only by law in a democratic society for the *prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others*.

As regards the *freedom of movement*, under Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (1963), everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, but this right may be restricted,

under the law, when necessary *to maintain public order, prevention of crime, protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others*.

Except these situations that are expressly and exhaustively set, Article 15 authorizes states in a *general manner and in exceptional circumstances*, as in the case of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, to take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention to the strict extent that the situation requires and provided that such measures are not in contradiction with other obligations under international law.

The same article notes that states cannot derogate from the right to life, except for deaths resulting from lawful acts of war, prohibition of torture and the prohibition of slavery and forced labor.

In turn, the European Court of Human Rights has never condemned the administrative police activity by judging it as inconsistent with the principles of the convention or a protected right.

A proof of this is the Judgment of 17 July 2001<sup>2</sup>, according to which the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 in the case of Ekin Association on a ministerial order prohibiting the circulation, distribution and sale of the book in France, on the basis that it promoted separatism, justified the use of violence and therefore represented a potential danger to public order. The contested measure was adopted on the basis of statutory provisions which allowed the Ministry of Interior to prohibit the circulation of any publication written in a foreign language or of foreign origin<sup>3</sup>.

The provision at issue pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public order and preventing crime. The question was whether it was “necessary in a democratic society”<sup>4</sup>.

The Court considered that *these prior restrictions were not incompatible to the Convention*, but they “must be part of a legal framework that limits in strict terms, the application of such prohibitions and provide effective judicial remedy against any abuse”<sup>5</sup>. The prohibition at issue did not satisfy these two requirements, and the contents of the book did not justify the gravity of the infringement of the applicant's freedom of expression especially in order to protect national security and public order. Therefore, the interference was not “necessary in a democratic society”<sup>6</sup>.

## **2. RECOGNITION OF NATIONAL COMPETENCE IN MATTERS OF PUBLIC ORDER IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECHR**

States enjoy a margin of discretion to ensure their security. This margin is inferred from the wording of the Convention authorizing proportionate interference in the exercise of the majority of rights. The judge ensures of the its need and of the existence of clear and accessible rules to determine the interference's framework.

The exercise of the Conventional right may be restricted even to not risk disrupting public action. Under Article 6 of the Convention, the right to a fair trial is actually enforceable only to measures affecting civil rights and obligations or expressing a criminal charge.

The core area of public power is excluded from Article 6, administrative police measures cannot be a priori contested in light of the right to a fair trial.

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<sup>2</sup>[http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/libertadexpresion/docs/le\\_europeo/ekin%20association%20v.%20france.htm](http://www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/libertadexpresion/docs/le_europeo/ekin%20association%20v.%20france.htm), accessed on 02.06.2014.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.infoeuropa.md/files/libertatea-de-exprimare-in-europa-jurisprudenta-cu-privire-la-articolul-10-al-conventiei-europene-a-drepturilor-omului.pdf>, accessed on 02.06.2014.

<sup>4</sup> Agenția de Monitorizare a Presei, *Jurisprudența internațională în materia libertății de exprimare*, Volumul III, 2008, p. 59, document can be found at: <http://www.activewatch.ro/Assets/Upload/files/jimle%20-%20spete%20III.pdf>, accessed on 02.06.2014.

<sup>5</sup> Hotărârea Curții din 17 iulie 2001, cauza *Association Ekin c. Franța*, nr. 39288/98, para. 58.

<sup>6</sup> Hotărârea Curții din 17 iulie 2001, cauza *Association Ekin c. Franța*, nr. 39288/98, para. 64.

A person's right to a fair trial and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law cannot be enforced against acts of administrative police as these measures do not affect the civil rights and obligations or express a criminal charge.

In this regard, the former Commission considered that an ordinance ordering the expulsion of a foreigner does not involve any civil right of foreigners in this situation, so that the provisions of art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention cannot be implemented in such cases<sup>7</sup>.

The Court also held that the measure to authorize or not a foreigner to remain in the territory of a State shall not imply any decision on civil rights and obligations<sup>8</sup> within the meaning of art. 6 para. 1 of the Convention<sup>9</sup>.

This situation is due to the discretionary nature of the administrative police activity.

The decision to authorize or not, that has an administrative nature, of foreigner to remain in the territory of a State is a discretionary act of the immigration public authority. The administrative police authority can prevail on the Court's attitude which does not control the pertinence of a way of action, but must ensure its compatibility with the Convention's provisions.

The case of *Cha'are shalom ve tsedek against France*<sup>10</sup> involved a Hebrew organization certifying as kosher the meat sold in its members' restaurants and butchers. Since it considered that the way animals were slaughtered by the existing Hebrew organization no longer conformed to the strict precepts associated with kosher meat, the applicant requested a permit from the state to conduct its own ritual slaughter of animals. This application was rejected on the grounds that it is not sufficiently representative for the Hebrew community in France and there are already approved slaughterhouses to perform such rituals. ECHR found that, in the given circumstances, there was no real downside to the organization, since it could obtain from other sources meat from animals that are slaughtered according to the required method<sup>11</sup>.

In its defense, the Hebrew association applicant claimed a violation of Article 9<sup>12</sup> of the Convention by the French authorities which refused to grant the necessary approval for having access to slaughterhouses in order to perform ritual slaughter in accordance with ultra-

<sup>7</sup> Comis. EDO, raportul din 19 martie 1981, nr. 8118/1977, in cauza OmKaranadava contra Elveției; raportul din 15 mai 1984, nr. 9990/1982, în cauza Bozano contra Franței, apud V. Pătulea, *Proces echitabil. Jurisprudența comentată a Curții Europene a Drepturilor Omului*, Editura I. R. D. O., București, 2007, p. 49.

<sup>8</sup> With regard to civil rights see A. Tabacu, *Principiul dreptului la un proces echitabil, în termen optim și previzibil, potrivit Noului Cod de procedură civilă și contenciosului administrativ*, în *Revista Transilvană de Științe Administrative* 2(3)/2012, pp. 140-151. The text can be found at: <http://rtsa.ro/files/RTSA%20-%2031%20-%209TABACU.pdf> accessed on 03.06.2014.

<sup>9</sup> CEDO, decizia din 5 octombrie 2000, în cauza Maaouia contra Franței, în „Recueil...”, 2000 – X; para. 36 apud V. Pătulea, *Proces echitabil. Jurisprudența comentată a Curții Europene a Drepturilor Omului*, (București: Editura I. R. D. O, 2007), 49.

<sup>10</sup> [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?%22dmdocnumber%22:\[%22696615%22\],%22itemid%22:\[%22001-58738%22\]](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?%22dmdocnumber%22:[%22696615%22],%22itemid%22:[%22001-58738%22]), accessed on 04.06.2014.

<sup>11</sup> Agenția pentru Drepturi Fundamentale a Uniunii Europene, *Manual de drept european privind nediscriminarea*, Oficiul pentru Publicații al Uniunii Europene, Luxemburg, 2010, p. 120. The document can be found at: [http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra\\_uploads/1510-FRA\\_CASE\\_LAW\\_HANDBOOK\\_RO.pdf](http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1510-FRA_CASE_LAW_HANDBOOK_RO.pdf), accessed on 04.06.2014.

<sup>12</sup> Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.

Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

Orthodox religious prescriptions of its members, showing that foods that can be consumed by Hebrew must be prepared in accordance with the rules of Kashrut<sup>13</sup>.

Ritual slaughter is nevertheless authorized under French law and Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter adopted on 10 May 1979 and Directive 93/119/EC of 22 December 1993 on the protection of animals at the time of slaughter or killing.

Subject to the provisions of French law, ritual slaughter may be performed only by slaughterhouses approved for this purpose by religious bodies which have been approved by the Minister of Agriculture, on a proposal from the Minister of Interior. Slaughterhouses must be able to provide documentary evidence of such authorization.

These bodies must inform the Minister of Agriculture about the names of authorized persons and those whose authorization has been withdrawn. If no religious body has been approved, the prefect of the department, in which is located the slaughterhouse used for ritual slaughter, may grant individual authorizations.

The Court also noted that Article 9 applies only to restrictions that would prevent consumers from being able to obtain meat from animals slaughtered ritually.

Thus, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (not unanimous) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the case of *Cha'are Shalom*, there are allowed restrictions on ritual slaughter, but only if it does not prevent the faithful to obtain meat religious sacrificed.

So, we see that regulatory measures of the ritual slaughter of animals taken by the administrative police authorities pursue a legitimate aim, namely to protect health and public order<sup>14</sup>, while the organization by the State of the exercise of a cult contribute to religious peace and tolerance<sup>15</sup>.

Another case in which the Court has refrained from ruling on police means that administrative authorities have at their disposal to implement them when public order is endangered, we find in the Judgment of 9 April 2002.

In this case, *Cisse against France*<sup>16</sup>, the applicant, part of a group of people who did not have a residence permit in France, decided to engage in a collective action in order to draw attention to the difficulties he faced to obtain the review of their administrative situation<sup>17</sup>.

This movement culminated in the occupation of a church in Paris by a group of about 200 people undocumented to stay in France, the majority of African origin, of which 10 men decided to go on hunger strike. This movement was supported by many human rights associations, and some of their militants decided to sleep in front of that church<sup>18</sup>.

After about two months, the Paris police chief has ordered the evacuation of the area because the church occupation is foreign to the exercise of religious rights, hygiene conditions are precarious and that such a decision is necessary to protect public order, public health, tranquility and public safety. The next day, police evacuated the area in force, and some of the people, who were there, including the applicant, were subject to criminal convictions<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> For more information on *Kashrut* see: <http://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ka%C8%99rut>, accessed on 04.06.2014.

<sup>14</sup> Para. 68.

<sup>15</sup> Para. 84.

<sup>16</sup> [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60413#{%22itemid%22:\[%22001-60413%22\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60413#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-60413%22]}), accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>17</sup> <http://jurisprudencedo.com/Cisse-c.-Franta-Libertatea-de-manifestare.-Limite.html>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>18</sup> <http://jurisprudencedo.com/Cisse-c.-Franta-Libertatea-de-manifestare.-Limite.html>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>19</sup> <http://jurisprudencedo.com/Cisse-c.-Franta-Libertatea-de-manifestare.-Limite.html>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

None of the priests of the church in question opposed the occupation of their church by demonstrators. Therefore, the Court found that the evacuation was ordered by a public authority, so that there is an interference with the applicant's right to reunite. This interference was prescribed by law and aimed at a legitimate aim. The Court found that the state's reason was not the illegal situation of most Protestants, since they manifested for two months without the authorities to intervene. Their intervention came amid *order and health degradation* in the church area, so that it cannot be considered disproportionate to the aim pursued. Therefore Article 11 on freedom of assembly and association hasn't been violated<sup>20</sup>.

Thus, in the cases of "*Plattform «Ärzte für das Leben» against Austria*", 1988<sup>21</sup> and "*Rassemblement jurassien against Switzerland*", 1979, the European Court of Human Rights held that art. 11 implies that each State is able to take reasonable and appropriate measures to ensure peaceful conduct of lawful demonstrations of its citizens and that for meetings taking place on public roads is not exaggerated to impose the obligation to obtain prior authorization, as authorities may, under these circumstances, ensure the observance of public order and take necessary measures so that freedom of demonstrations can be fully ensured<sup>22</sup>.

Through the Judgment of 7 October 2008 in the Case of "*Eva Molnar against Hungary*"<sup>23</sup>, the Court of Strasbourg established that paragraph 2 of Article 11 of the Convention entitles *states to impose legal restrictions on freedom of assembly*. However, these restrictions of freedom of peaceful assemblies held in public places *are designed to protect the rights of others, particularly as regards the prevention of disorder and maintaining traffic order*<sup>24</sup>.

The European Court of Human Rights held, by Judgment of 18 December 2007 in the Case of "*Nurettin Aldemir and others against Turkey*", that, in principle, the requirement to obtain prior notification does not affect the essence of freedom of assembly and the imposition to prior authorization - for reasons of *public order and national security* - to organize and conduct a public meeting are not contrary to the spirit of Article 11. In the court's view, on one hand, any demonstration in the public space can cause some damage to the normalcy of daily living, and, on the other hand, it is important that the *authorities take the necessary measures*, for example, providing a first aid crew at the demonstration of any kind may be. It is therefore essential that the organizers and participants of any public gatherings - as actors in the democratic process - to comply with the rules of democracy, by respecting legal rules governing this field (Judgment of 29 November 2007 in the Case of "*Balgik and Others against Turkey*")<sup>25</sup>.

In conclusion, the Court should not assess the appropriateness or effectiveness of the tactics adopted by the police in these situations, but must determine whether there is an arguable claim on the fact that the competent authorities failed to take appropriate action<sup>26</sup>.

The margin of appreciation of the states refers to the nature of the defense mechanism established by the Convention, which is subsidiary in relation to the national systems of guaranteeing human rights. States have a duty to ensure the rights and freedoms consecrated by the Convention, the institutions created by it bringing their own contributions to the

<sup>20</sup> <http://jurisprudencedo.com/Cisse-c.-Franta-Libertatea-de-manifestare.-Limite.html>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>21</sup> <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57558#%22itemid%22:%22001-57558%22%22%7D>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>22</sup> [http://193.226.121.81/cedo/199\\_1999.html](http://193.226.121.81/cedo/199_1999.html) accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>23</sup> <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-88775#%22itemid%22:%22001-88775%22%22%7D>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>24</sup> <http://www.jurisprudenta.com/lege/decizie-1351-2010-qz6127/>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.jurisprudenta.com/lege/decizie-1351-2010-qz6127/>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>26</sup> Cauza Plattform "Ärzt für Das Leben" contra Austriei, para. 36.

mentioned subject, but become involved only through contentious proceedings and once all domestic remedies have been exhausted<sup>27</sup>.

Therefore States are not accountable for their actions in front of an international body before they have been given the opportunity to improve the situation in their domestic law<sup>28</sup>, the Convention guaranteeing according to Article 13 the right to an effective remedy which provides that any person whose rights and freedoms recognized by the Convention have been violated has the right to an effective remedy before a national authority even if the violation was due to persons acting in an official capacity.

So an example in this respect is the case of “Handyside against the UK”, 1976, in which the Court held that the comments made above apply in particular to Article 10 paragraph 2 which states that the exercise of freedom of expression, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The Court reasoned that it is not possible to find in the domestic law of the various Contracting States *a uniform European conception of morals*. The viewpoint of national laws on moral requirements vary from one period to another and from one place to another, especially in our century which is characterized by rapid and comprehensive evolution of the views on this subject. Due to continuous and direct contact with the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements and the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them<sup>29</sup>.

Therefore, the Court accepted that *states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation*, while making the statement that this is not unlimited in terms of the use of restrictions. The final decision on its compatibility with the Convention belongs to the Court. Also the need in a democratic society means that state interference must correspond to a pressing social need and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued by its adoption<sup>30</sup>.

Returning to the subject of the case of “Handyside against the United Kingdom”, 1976, the Court held that the State was entitled to apply restrictions to the publication of “Little Red Manual” for pupils, a book aimed at sexual education of young people but was considered an “obscene publication” under the negative influence that might have on the morals of young readers<sup>31</sup>.

The public order conventional clause does not give states an unlimited power of appreciation. This is subject to a European supervision that is directed on the purpose and necessity of the measure.

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<sup>27</sup> Hotărârea din 7 decembrie 1976, Cauza *Handyside c. Regatul Unit*, para. 48. The document can be found at: [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{%22itemid%22:\[%22001-57499%22\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57499%22]}), accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>28</sup> P. Dourneau-Josette, *Principiile generale cu privire la CEDO și articolul 10*. The text can be found at: <http://www.acces-info.org.md/index.php?cid=132&lid=133>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>29</sup> Hotărârea din 7 decembrie 1976, Cauza *Handyside c. Regatul Unit*, para. 48. The document can be found at: [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{%22itemid%22:\[%22001-57499%22\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57499#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57499%22]}), accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>30</sup> <http://jurisprudentacedo.com/Handyside-contra-Marea-Britanie-Conditii-de-aplicare-ale-libertatii-de-exprimare.html>, accessed on 05.06.2014.

<sup>31</sup> [http://www.ivozambello.net/Bucharest\\_ways\\_expr\\_freed\\_con\\_rel\\_int\\_facts\\_rom.htm](http://www.ivozambello.net/Bucharest_ways_expr_freed_con_rel_int_facts_rom.htm), accessed on 05.06.2014.

If this control should not be substituted to the one performed by the domestic courts, it must allow assessment of the decisions conventionality taken in the exercise of the power of discretion by the national authorities.

These requirements are not new in itself. They refer to the obligation of police powers in a clear and accessible text, to act for reasons of necessity and adopt proportionate measures.

## CONCLUSIONS

Analyzing the influence that the Convention on Human Rights has on the administrative police activity, it can be concluded that the latter is a process compatible with European practices, being in the power of each state to develop its own strategy and its adequate structure for implementing it in order to maintain national public order.

In turn, the European Court of Human Rights has never considered administrative police activity to be inconsistent with the principles of the Convention or a protected right.

In the context of ECHR case law the following principles have outlined:

- Prior restrictions are not incompatible with the Convention, but must be part of a legal framework that limits in strict terms the application of such prohibitions and provides for effective judicial remedy against a possible abuse;
- The right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention is not opposable to administrative police measures;
- National authorities have the possibility to watch over the compliance with public order and to take necessary measures for the freedom of demonstrations to be fully insured; prior authorization to conduct demonstrations is not an exaggerated obligation;
- Restrictions on freedom of peaceful assemblies held in public places are designed to protect the rights of others, especially in terms of preventing disorder and maintain traffic order;
- The requirements of morals varies from one period to another and from one place to another;
- States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation, but it is not unlimited in terms of the use of restraints, the final decision on its compatibility with the Convention belonging to the Court.

It can be concluded that the Europeanization of administrative police could provide a precise direction for states in their attempt to bring near their national practices and to unitary and preventively ensure a European public order.



# **PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT A SCIENTIST INVESTIGATING NICHE COMMUNITIES. ETHNOPEDAGOGICAL RESEARCH IN THE COMMUNITIES OF THE OLD ORDER AMISH IN PENNSYLVANIA IN THE US**

**Dagna DEJNA<sup>1</sup>**

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## **ABSTRACT**

*THE PRESENT TEXT REFERS TO ISSUES RELATED TO METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN IDENTIFYING NICHE COMMUNITIES - THE OLD ORDER AMISH LIVING IN PENNSYLVANIA IN THE UNITED STATES. THE RESEARCHER CONDUCTED HER ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY IN A CLOSED, HERMETIC COMMUNITY OF THE CONSERVATIVE ANABAPTIST. HIDING COMPUTER, CHANGING CLOTHES AND BEHAVIOR WERE SYMBOLIC PLEDGE OF LOYALTY TO THE HOSTS. THE RESEARCHER TREATS THE AMISH AS A NICHE GAP IN THE PRESENT, AND THEIR EDUCATION - DEFINES IN THE TERM ENDEMIC EDUCATION.*

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**KEY WORDS:** ENDEMIC EDUCATION, ETHNOGRAPHY, ANABAPTIST, CLOSED COMMUNITY, CONSERVATISM

## **INTRODUCTION**

The area in the strict sense of the word. Field studies on the backend. In this way this conference has been called by the organizers, therefore, as a person delivering a lecture I should follow these words. What then was the area that I want to describe you and what smells prevailed in the kitchen? What difficulties I faced conducting my research? Who exactly are these niche Amish and why getting to them was almost as hard as for a woman enter the gate of the Camaldolese or Carthusian Order cloister?

Amish roots date back to the time of the Reformation. It is assumed that the Amish are a splinter of the Alsace- Swiss-South German Anabaptism, which was the result of a schism made by extremely radical Jakob Ammann of Erlenbach (in Germany), the leader of the Church of the Swiss Anabaptists, who wanted to religious laws govern all possible spheres of life. Anabaptism is a religious movement that was created and developed in the sixteenth century, among heavily oppressed German peasantry and urban plebeians. Characterized them: strict discipline, religious and socio-religious radicalism. They rejected all social differences, postulated the community of goods and assets. This preacher Jakob Amman, pointed out sins of his coreligionists: luxury, the pursuit of worldly goods, curiosity of the

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<sup>1</sup> PhD, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Poland, e-mail: ddejna@wp.pl, dagnadejna@umk.pl

world, he reminded also of the need to renounce violence, the need for modesty, humility and hard work obligation. It was Amman, who, in 1693, created a new community - Amish. For the United States the first Amish arrived in 1720.

I ran for a few weekends ethnographic research in the old Order Amish congregations in Pennsylvania in the US (Region Lancaster County). The trip to Pennsylvania was preceded by a multi-month and painstaking efforts to establish contact with the scientific community that has developed around the research center on the Anabaptists - The Young Center Anabaptists and Pietist Studies, which is a part of the Elizabethtown College. Thanks to the recommendation of one of the Amish respected professors, an author of many excellent publications on the history and culture of the Amish and thanks to my perseverance and determination I could barely go to the vestibule of the researched community. It was the first and the most important step. I found myself in the Beachy Amish family home, so in a place where custom and dress is closer to American neighbors. It is the community created by people from many other denominations of Anabaptism; running a small family business, rearing horses, connected to the Internet and using modern technical equipment. They were pious, extremely family and friendly people, a little amazed at my audacious research plan. Consistently tried to discourage me to the idea of entry into the world of the Amish of Old Order (law), the world tightly closed, inaccessible, hermetic and above all inhospitable.

The news of the visitor from Europe who wants to write a book about the most conservative, peaceful mainstream of contemporary Anabaptism spread through the grapevine. I was slowly gaining their trust. I was committed to attending on household chores, worked with dedication to livestock, worked hard and as best I could. Often, I looked to the neighboring farms of the Old Order families, and I was building the foundation of trust. Sometimes I was entrusted to the care of children. Finally, I lived in the house of an Old Order Amish family. I just knocked on the door and asked if I could stay, and I got a permit for two days. The next morning I got up at dawn to work together with the hosts. It's probably convinced them and they let me stay longer sleeping in the kitchen, getting to know the test area just from the kitchen. I was creating a portrait of the inside and from the inside. The Amish kitchen mingled odors of everyday life. Not all were bearable for a European. It is the center of their world steeped in the smell of modest, mainly vegetable and cereal dishes, the smell of children and sweat of adult busy people. Once these are the smells of old wooden furniture and a dried soap, which covered the edge of a small metal bowl used for Saturday baths. Another time it is mold fruit and effect of washing in considerable intervals.

Old Order Amish are a niche, and maybe even a crack. And, that's how I perceive them -as a niche in a niche or/and an oasis giving breath of life and life-giving fresh moisture - the medium of life. Why niche? Dictionary definition explains that the niche is a small semi-circular or rectangular recess in the rock / facade of the building, in which are placed cult objects, mainly images of saints. In a recently published book on phenomenon endemic Amish education I wrote that I treat Amish niche as the conscience of modern times, a kind of examination of conscience, which is done in silence and the soothing tranquility. Indeed, everyday life of these people is away from the rush of civilization, is a conscious departure from the arrogant, unstable by its speed world. Amish everyday is attentive and rhythmic, and its rhythm is given by weddings, pregnancies, births and deaths of loved ones. This is inviolable and unchangeable order. Amish consciously refrain from the world, where (and with whom) one can speak be a name, retreated into their recess to their secure slit. In the name of what's important and good in their eyes, for the sake of their own identity their resigned from the world of rotting manipulation, politics, common banditry and symbolic, ritualistic rape of children. That's how I understand the niche, it is devoid of sharp

edges concavity, a place at which you can stare and listen to. With astonishment, rising higher than usual sight to see compass in proud form that clearly and without introducing chaos of relativism leads the way. The Amish are such a gap in the present day, which I think of as a refuge from the noise that causes insanity, from the fetish of speed in the race for nothing, nowhere, with nobody. They live slowly. This niche lines the Amish identity, something not to be underestimated. Obedience, inner peace, family, devotion and unbelievable modesty and plainness. Once Professor Alexander Nalaskowski called simplicity plainness. He wrote that, in order that the man was really rich internally, his education must be simple. That's what I understand Amish niche plainness, as an attribute of enriching, giving space for the wealth coming from the inside, as a privilege. This plainness is a greyish background on which it may emerge vividly, what is really valuable and important.

Why oasis? Because, just in the oases is crystal clear, spring water at a height such that it could reach plant roots. Here, the identity of the Amish is such a thriving white tamarisk, depending on the life-giving oasis moisture. This oasis is seen as a carefully waited promised land, as a place providing shelter, releasing from desire, a place where you can be born again.

Let's go back to the area when viewed on the backend. What was this area? In the beginning was invented, unrecognized and therefore mysterious. I knew little about the Amish, their environment and culture, so I naively figured them myself. It was a bland and painfully romantic image taken from movies that do not reflect smells, for example. Fortunately, that image was shattered quickly in Pennsylvania, blurred by the Amish roughness, distrust and plainness. It disappeared into the surprising everyday. And the thing became fascinating. Sources of my research are based on a very simple premise, which corresponds to the classical school of anthropology of M. Mead and B. Malinowski: as a researcher, I explore and describe, in the name of my home environment, the exotic, inaccessible community. Above all, very little known. So, I took part in the natural everyday rituals of community that has created its own culture. My few weeks and complete, in the sense of the fulfillment of the community tasks and daily chores, stay, resulted in a rich collection of empirical material. The vast majority of this material are field notes and memories, members of the community did not let me register any of the discussions on electronic media. Need of taking pictures also caused insurmountable difficulties. I repeatedly asked the Amish about this possibility, almost every time obtaining the same answer. Refusal. When I asked about the decision reason, I was repeatedly obtaining the same answer: *because I'm Amish*. After all, it's so natural! Only a few times I was able to get permission for photos. I thought that in these studies, images play a role similar to the role of sketches in the early work of Bronislaw Malinowski; verbal description here seemed to be too poor, so I sought for photographs with real determination. I was explaining calmly that the image is necessary to tell the members of my community about the Amish. Necessary was tact and patience. From the working these studies were lined with the conviction that *the slower, the faster*. Therefore, I trod the penetrated area with caution and prudence. Almost with deference. This area was full of twists, places where it is not difficult for tipping, which would make my further stay pointless. A slightest falsehood and cunning would jeopardize the whole project. The gesture of pity or ignorance. Laziness and other sins for which orthodox Amish find not excuses.

I ran ethnopedagogical research, where the central object of study is a man in a particular situation, called - *educational*. I have visited many Amish schools, each time knocking on inhospitable doors and asking for granting a moment inside to speak with a teacher. I won the pious and industrious people by the truth. Always revealing the real purpose of the visit, never dodging between shapely lies.

I focused my attention on the first experiences, letting myself to be surprised, letting for astonishment. I resisted observations on the image (as Malinowski did), on the "first contact" and a very strong sense of alienation. What previously was only imagination, over time, with every step that allowed more accurately see the area, was now subject to skew and deformation. Ideas gave way to observation. I treat my fieldwork not only in terms of story, but primarily in terms of meticulously analyzed images and scenarios. Each observation I was writing down in the diary, writing down single words and whole dialogs. That observation, understood as an act of perceptual phenomena and recording them I have done my dominant research technique.

Observation in the community completely unknown from autopsy was based on the entrance, recognition and total submission to the rules prevailing among the Amish. And, just this total submission caused me the majority of problems. It meant a wake up at 4:30 am and the day filled with long hours of hard work. It was a very quick succession of breaking habits. This meant changing clothes, hairstyle and hygiene rituals. Suddenly, from the young woman with manicured hands I have become a marked spinsterhood, dusty, not very clean and constantly sleepy babysitter. I quickly abandoned jeans and all other elements of the outfit betraying that I had come from the outside. It also meant giving up makeup. In return, I received a modest, traditional Amish dress and a black practical apron. Smoothly combed hair, worn in a tight bun. A bath once a week, preceded by painstaking preparation: first the water had to be transported to the home, then at least slightly warmed. Change of clothing, careful hiding of my computer, obedience, redefining the word "hygiene", were my accelerated and at the beginning painful initiation to the Amish environment, but above all it was a kind of symbolic oath of loyalty to my hosts. It was surprising that after some time the above-described problems become were less and less burdensome. This Amish niche, or this world, which is far from stringent hygiene standards over time became very friendly. Living in a community that so lovingly cares for its own identity, so safe and uncompromised can be engaging and addictive. Escape to so strongly seducing niche, provided that it is devoid of signs of gibberish, tourism expansion marked by violence and conquest, cannot be forgotten. While conducting my research I was obtaining more and more evidence that the boundaries set by the Amish are impassable, and non-transferable. This consistency and orthodoxy is very appealing. Reservoir and a key medium of these attributes are just great and multi-generational Amish families.

### SHUTTLES INTERTWINING

This is important to note that this intricate weave must be seen as a finite whole, in any case, do not watch the alienated fragments of tissue without taking into account the structure and functioning of its parts because the weave has sense only as a part of a whole complex of smaller, interrelated pieces. This sense (just like all others) is formed by the essence, the structure of the values and structure of the duties of the whole. It's a job for the whole body. It is intricate and thoughtful unblocking the shuttle between the warp strings.

Returning to the weave: **firstly**, weaving shuttle is a school. School children's education is based on the unshakable belief in the sanctity of a teacher's words, on the belief that laziness, disobedience and ignorance is a sin. For this type of sins orthodox Amish find no excuses. In the Amish school the most important thing is work, it shapes and prepares children to become a full member of the community. Fixing the duties at the school is an exercise before adulthood, which is filled with: work, prayer, family and community responsibilities. So the school is seen during daily meals and evening family prayers. This belief stems from the family, increases in subsequent generations conveyed not only through words, but also through a number of gestures towards the school. An indispensable condition

for the successful education of the young Amish is to teach children to respect adults because on it is based the entire education system. School education leads to a smooth purchase of more packages of behaviors that make up the so-called pedagogical deposit, namely: obedience, self-reliance and responsibility. Finally, so constructed school sets the path which transmits the values that build an identity of the community. Amish school is a kind of polytechnic educating future engineers-builders of a social order which cannot be upset. Solid foundations and stable design effectively prevents any deviation from the right angle.

**Secondly: language.** Language is without doubt one of the shuttles weaving the fibers of defense against external influences, but it also can be called a storehouse, in which are kept inaccessible to the rest information on community life, family rituals, history, and so things rooted in a particular place. This is a kind of invisible and robust fence, providing conditions for the continuity of tradition. All members of the community speak *pennsylvania dutch*. This language is a combination of German, English and native dialects assigned to a small geographical areas. It is endemic formation, assigned not only to that particular place, but above all, to a small group of residents. This is a product that sets limits, but is completely useless outside the designated boundaries of the community. English is only used to communicate with *englisch*, i. e. the non-Amish, with people from the outside, and the children learn English only in school (like German). *Pennsylvania dutch* does not work in the pages of any dictionary, it is not written anywhere, no one gave its words alphabetical order. In *pennsylvania dutch* one increases, it is the language of a home and of first words, steps, prayers. In this language, maybe for the first time in her life, young mothers murmur over the cradles of their children.

**Thirdly, home,** so the shuttle weaving the thread of family life. *Ordnung* is a word of German origin meaning order, i. e. a set of rules by which the Amish operate. Hence, comes the word *ordo* or *order*, *order* or *law*. This is the key to understand this community. It means a way in which they organize their social reality. The Amish are in some way a variation of an order, to which also applies a specific set of rule, treated as a *guideline*, a *constitution*. This rule makes the Amish live away from the world and builds the fear of the world, separates from it.

It points the limits, behind which there is sin, and behind which there is no return. These limits are transmitted to future generations through cultural transmission. It is impossible to ignore at this point the classical text of Margaret Mead, who described the ways in which it comes to the transmission of culture. She mentioned three models (ways): post -figurative, pre -figurative and co-figurative. In the Amish culture reproduction takes place without any doubt in the post-figurative way, where about the formation of the younger generation decides older, passing previously recognized values and standards. In the language of the European tradition we would find the equivalent of this in Thomist order. Home is here the source of value and structure of the standards. Culture is then vertical dimension, which allows its members to root out, to set in the world in which they grow. This allows the contact with the past, and the past of the adult Amish is the future of the youth. Every piece of cultural behavior is carried out according to the same pattern. With a surprising straight literality. The continuity of the system of values is based here on meeting the expectations of the older generation of parents and grandparents. Post-figurative community formulates ready answers to the fundamental questions: *who am I, how to live, speak, walk, love and die?* These responses are universal, non-negotiable and not open to discussions, tradition formulate them and protects against malicious modifications.

## CONCLUSION

There are other parts of the weaving, which continuously protect the identity of the old Order Amish groups against undesirable. You could talk about the school course content,

Amish relation to the common in the US obligations to the state (taxes, military service, health care), and finally, more specifically on the shape of a tailor-made school, school of choice, where every single piece is created with a view of specificity of the recipients, in which education has nothing to do with education of "equal opportunities". It was in fact converted to consciously uneven. Niche, endemic, requiring not only special material conditions, but above all social conditions. Intergenerational agreement fits this community in a specific niche, making it endemic. This community (like other species of endemic fauna, for example marmot, or marine iguana and of flora, e. g. dwarf birch and ginkgo) cannot tolerate even the slightest variations in ecology, and its endemic education understood as the use of justifications and persuasion leading to the empowerment of specific values shows characteristics of narrow specialization.

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## RECREATING LANGUAGE – THE ART OF EXPRESSING A SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

Elena BRAN<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT:** THE PRESENT ARTICLE SUMMARIZES SOME OF THE MAIN LANGUAGE CHARACTERISTICS USED BY MALCOLM BRADBURY IN HIS NOVEL *RATES OF EXCHANGE*. THE MAIN AIM OF THE ARTICLE IS TO DEMONSTRATE THE AUTHOR'S SUCCESS IN USING THE LANGUAGE SOLELY TO PRESENT AND INVENT A SYSTEM, INSPIRED FROM THE COMMUNIST ONE. HIS SYSTEM IS SEEN THROUGH THE EYES OF THE FOREIGN TRAVELLER WHO CANNOT ADAPT TO THE RULES WHICH HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND. THE PAPER IS ORGANIZED INTO FOUR DISTINCT SUBCHAPTERS EACH OF THEM DESCRIBING BRADBURY'S PERSPECTIVE OVER THE COMMUNIST REGIME: THE STATUS OF THE REGIME, THE INVENTED LANGUAGE, THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SLAKAN AND ENGLISH AND THE FINAL CONCLUSIONS. FURTHERMORE, THE ARTICLE PRESENTS NOT ONLY THE SYSTEM BUT ALSO THE SOCIETY, THROUGH ITS MAIN CHARACTERS. THESE CHARACTERS ARE PRESENTED BOTH AS PART OF THE SYSTEM, BUT ALSO AS INDIVIDUALS TRYING TO ADAPT TO THESE CHANGING RULES.

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**KEY WORDS:** SLAKAN LANGUAGE, PROTOTYPICAL SOCIETY, IRONY AND SARCASM, LINGUISTICALLY DEFINED CHARACTERS

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### 1. COMMUNIST REGIMES: BEFORE AND AFTER THE FALL OF THE IRON CURTAIN

Malcolm Bradbury takes the exchange concept to another level. He makes exchange an art form both at a theoretical level, and at a practical one. This exchange becomes the new currency for him. He exchanges ideas both in language and characters through his fiction. When speaking about a different level of exchange; Bradbury can be considered a creator of a 'new' language. He does this in *Rates of Exchange*; and continues in *Why come to Slaka?* two fictional settings in which he creates a language, a country and a political system. In both novels, even if the latter is more of a guide book, language and fiction become currencies of the same concept: existence. They recognise - and then deny it! Just as Katya's manuscript could not exit the borders of her country, Bradbury's exchange of ideology can only be understood by those who create and live according to it. This is clear as Bradbury continues his fascination of east European communist regimes by recreating a harsh regimen and placing the action inside it, shortly before the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Bradbury's interest is not solely focused towards communist regimes, but with the causes and the effects of their failings. There is always this dialogue between anti-communist perspectives and post-communist realities. Bradbury uses the communist period as a

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<sup>1</sup> Ph.D., Teaching Assistant – University of Medicine and Pharmacy "Carol Davila" (Bucharest).



metaphor for modern times, without actually trying to understand the people who were living through it or the process of adaptation and change to a new society. He creates societies and characters, inspired by real examples, without fully comprehending their situation.

Slaka is a prototype of a typical communist country; a composite of the characteristics for all East European states living under communism. Even though the novel is written before the actual moments that marked the existence of these states, the future is entirely predictable. Bradbury at least had the opportunity to see these movements that led to the fall of communism so he could know about the period before and after their demise.

This is how communism ends, but what comes after is still going through a process of adaptation and change after more than 20 years. There have been many other political revolutions, but not major systemic ones. There are probably only a few who mourn the passing of communism and it was through revolution people found their strength to overcome unhappiness. Bradbury marks this point of view very well in *Rates of Exchange* and *Dr. Criminale* when he emphasizes the idea that besides the political forces that rule a country, the lack or the plenitude of goods is still a factor to be considered. The first thing that a foreigner coming to Budapest after the fall of the regime notices is the abundance of new products, inaccessible before such as McDonald's, hamburgers, jeans, and BMW cars.

## **2. LANGUAGE – THE RATE OF EXCHANGE OF THE COMMUNIST SOCIETY**

Bradbury tries to offer a definition of communist regimes by summing up their characteristics before and after the fall of a regime. *Rate of Exchange* and *Why come to Slaka?* are two of Bradbury's novels depicting communist reality at a time when these regimes were in their final years. When writing them, Bradbury had no idea the end was about to come, but probably, for somebody who had had the chance to experience both communist and American societies, the end was probably not so difficult to anticipate. What makes us say this with any certainty comes from the amount of stereotyping he uses to describe the communist way of life.

The fact of the matter is these stereotypes of Communism are the essence of his humour throughout the novel. From the very beginning of the novel we can relate to the professor coming from the West who finds it difficult to adapt or understand, even for short periods, the processes inherent in a communist society. On the other hand, the virtues of a socialist state are so well implemented, there is little opportunity for those to impress with their experiences from the West.

Apart from the perspective of the two opposing societies, what creates an impression of authenticity in the novel are the examples of communism as orthodoxy, such as, the existence of listeners – people who are everywhere, who scan you and without whom the structure cannot exist. The novel can also be seen under the shadow of an espionage novel, as everything revolves around Petworth's briefcase, where besides his lectures and academic writings, the reader can learn about his character. This briefcase is subject to officials' scrutiny both on entering and departing Slaka. Furthermore, everybody wants something from Petworth when he returns from the UK: the British Council woman wants a short description of the academic environment in Slaka, the British ambassador asks for reports on military matters and Pliptov wants him to carry the manuscript of Katya's book. Not every one of these listeners are employed by the state to do this, yet they do it and they are referred to as listeners and not simply as spies. Except for the listeners, the system is also governed by a bureaucracy involving a lot of people, time, resources and at times, money.

The ever-present bureaucracy is linguistically developed by Bradbury, by the use of abbreviation and capitalized names for institutions and places: MUG (for department stores), WICWOK (for foreign currency stores), HOGPO (for the state security system/ the secret police),

COSMO PLOT (for the police offices). Despite the names of institutions, there is no reference at all in the novel to descriptions of the city except for the mentioning of 'characters' in a historical sense: *Comrade Marx*, *Comrade Lenin*, *Comrade Brezhnev*, *Comrade Grigoric*, our great liberator, and *Comrade Wanko*, president of the praesidium of the party<sup>2</sup>.

Even where the system is not undergoing any kind of change or the fall of the regime is not eminent, there are still elements that suggest that this is about to happen, or that the existence of these people will have to be marked one way or another. The point is, not even the author is aware of this possibility, because as we have already mentioned, the novel was written before reality hit these states, but even so, there are signals that suggest changes. Again, these signals are represented by language. Regardless of the fact his language is created and invented - the spelling in 'the Slakan language' can at times be guessed. And this is where the source of much of the humour lies. But Bradbury also goes beyond this by presenting the people's dissatisfaction and amusement in the way the spelling of certain Slakan words change overnight. And this also happens in the case of words that represent the ideas of institutions or official newspapers. But as an innocent, Petworth is not actually a man of history, and so he does not recognize or acknowledge them.

On the other hand, there is certain awareness in the main character; that he is a part of a wider story; and that everything around him is part of a pre-written plot. This explains one reason for the little we know about him in the novel. But the main character is not the only one who notices this. The other characters also provide arguments in favour of this idea, as they toy with the main character's name. Up to a point, Petworth is the great linguist everyone has been expecting, who gave Slaka the honour of coming and giving lectures about new linguistic dynamics and theories from the West. In this, even under communism, Slaka is open to everything that is new. However during the course of the novel his name goes through a number of transformations and misinterpretations becoming in turns *Petwit*, *Petwurt*, *Pitvit*, *Petwet*, *Pumwum*, *Petworthi*, *Patwat*, and the most ironic, *Pervert*. As we see again, Bradbury's language proves to be the novel's *tour de force*. These pronunciations demonstrate the minimal effort taken by foreigners to understand and include a person's name in theirs. Even the accurate spelling of, *Petworth*, is taken to represent a pet, an idea that imparts few opinions, obedient to the rules established by its owner and not worth the effort of explaining why some things should be done in a certain way. The last example, *Pervert*, is not only comic and ironic, but also represents one side of his character which cannot be shown as he has some sort of pent-up sexuality. To make things worse, this man has absolutely no personal style or identity and as Bradbury uses the intertextuality to remind us of another of his characters, the sociologist Petworth, from the University of Watermouth in *The History Man*. The only small personal characteristic this character has is his position in the British Council, which differentiates him from the rest of the other similar characters, even if this institution is not actually represented in Slaka it becomes 'a sterile sign, a meaningless meaning'<sup>3</sup>.

Throughout the book the reader finds a Petworth who has only one expertise: teaching and delivering lectures. This is the only aspect of his character Bradbury does not mock. Otherwise, in the rest of his life, he is depicted as naïve and an ingénue: he is attracted by the sexual offers made by the Slakan women, without understanding anything of their motives or the political intrigues that characterize a Communist country. Petworth is at the crossroads of his life's experience to date, as he is neither young nor socially innocent. This is what makes him a non-history man, in comparison to Howard Kirk in *The History Man*. Thus, there is both the narrator and the characters that consider Petworth to be just another of life's

<sup>2</sup> Malcolm Bradbury, *Rates of Exchange*, (London: Picador, 1986), 88

<sup>3</sup> Malcolm Bradbury, *Rates of Exchange*, (London: Picador, 1986), 54.

passengers<sup>4</sup>. For Bradbury, the fate of his character is just a part of the wider fate befalling the entire age undergoing a process of dehumanization. That is why the games he is playing with language do not come as a big surprise since the linguistic surface is just another component that needs to be re-evaluated. As a consequence, Bradbury also decides to play with his character's identity. Again this game does not appear exclusively in his name but in his profession as well. Petworth is placed in between the linguistic 'battle' of the period<sup>5</sup>.

Apart from the use of language as a way of presenting opposition through the eyes of an 'identity-less' character, Bradbury uses all forms of language, ranging from language function to a form of computer 'speech'. The type of language in the narrative of the novel varies because of Bradbury's interest in the language of non-native speakers. Again attraction can be traced back to the author's personal interest in analysing and mocking the way English is spoken in Eastern Europe. This came from his considerable experience of being British Council lecturer in these countries. The link here is the way the language in the novel can be described as particular to ESL guidebook lecture talk, body language, orthography and typography (see, for example, the computer speech identified at the beginning of each chapter, e.g. *1-ARR, 2-RECEP, 3-ACCOM, 4-MINKULT., 5-CD/GB, 6 – LECT, 7- OPER., 8 – TOUR., 9 –NATKULT.*). This multiplicity of language highlights the ambiguity of speech and can be linked to the mispronunciations and misunderstandings. This is how Bradbury frames the comic potential of language which defines the basis of this novel: Bradbury takes the potential of language to the upper limit of ambiguity adding humour and comedy to great effect. Furthermore, the text is more of a monologue, mixed with a mangled syntax of Eastern European origins. On the other hand, this can be seen as a lesson Bradbury is trying to teach the readers a lesson on how we all seek to find meaning in everything we hear or see.

One of Bradbury's main aims in this novel is to give language a currency, just like a coin. In order to get that smile or groan from the reader, Bradbury makes use of the sharpness and force language can acquire if the context is relevant and powerful enough. Language is the instrument Bradbury uses to show the gaps between the West and East of Europe, drawing from his real life travelling experience to create a mythical land of Slaka. This country gathers together elements of communist regimes which at times can resemble the situation in countries such as Bulgaria, Poland or even Romania. These perspectives depend on the reader.

The plot is not what impresses the reader; rather, it is the funny and burlesque moment that keeps it going. In the summer of 1981, Professor Angus Petworth is sent to Slaka, a communist country in Eastern Europe. Here he meets various people, who are meant to take care of him, one of them being his interpreter and local guide Marisja Lubijova and the other, the so-called novelist, Katya Princip who, unlike her name suggests, has no principles and shares her bed and shower with Petworth even though this type of behaviour is unacceptable to the regime.

As we can concur from the above ideas, there is a clear connection, in terms of language between the names of the characters and the parts they play in the plot - intentionally implying the opposite meaning. This is why the name of the main character, Angus Petworth, suggests a fear and anxiety towards liberty and independence; yet in reality

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<sup>4</sup> *He may be a speech without a subject, a verb without a noun, certainly not a character in the world historical sense; but he has a story to tell, and now he is telling it. And telling it, he becomes himself an order, a sentence that grows into a paragraph and then a page, a page and then a plot, a direction incorporating due beginning, middle and end.* (Malcolm Bradbury, *Rates of Exchange*, London: Picador, 1986, 212)

<sup>5</sup> *Petworth also possesses a rich international sub-language – he would call it an idiolect – composed of many fascinating terms, like idiolect and sociolect, language and parole, signifier and signified, Chomsky and Saussure, Barthes and Derrida, not the sort of words you say to everybody, but which put him immediately in touch with the vast community of those of his own sub-group.* (Malcolm Bradbury, *Rates of Exchange*, London: Picador, 1986, 35)

Petworth us of a pet, a companion who has no identity, is unreliable, and the only thing you can do is take care of him. And this is what Marisja Lubijova does all the time. Similarly, her name makes us think of the idea of love, the altruistic person who loves doing things for others, possibly derived from the Russian word: любовник (lover) or любить (to love). Moreover, Marisja is without doubt a secret agent, even if her position implies something else, and transforms her relationship with Petworth into one of the drastic mother – naïve son relationships<sup>6</sup>. As we have already mentioned, Katya Princip is everything except principled. She manipulates Petworth, causes him problems and raises the risk of danger in his dull life. Plitplov's name conjures up the natural sounds produced by small birds singing or fish struggling to survive on land. He is in fact a communist spy, who knows all about Petworth's life both in Slaka and England, whose existence is motivated by a will to fight against a doomed system.

Contrary to what one might expect from an author of the 80's, Malcolm Bradbury's voice is more than present in this novel. We can even say his voice is actually a very confident one in an era when most novelists tended to be invisible. His voice can even be seen from the metaphor of the title. He references the real exchange of currency, something which used to be common in Europe before the introduction of the euro, to a time when every traveller had to adopt a national currency and become a temporary member of a different country. On the other hand, this rate of exchange, whose price the reader is invited to discover while reading, also involves figurative exchanges – cultural, diplomatic, political, linguistic, and even sexual. His voice is mostly 'audible' within the first 60 pages of the book, especially when setting the scene and describing Slaka. He does this in order to raise the reader's interest and also to establish his expectations.

Bradbury not only uses language as a currency, but he also continues something he started in some of his other novels, that of mocking non-native speakers of English. This time he lets himself do it to a very large extent since he is both the creator of the Slakan language and also the Slakan nonsense dialogue in English. He assumes the language legitimacy by telling the reader Slaka is a Slavonic country still using the Cyrillic alphabet. This is how these dialogues become nonsense in English and instigate the reader's amusement whilst maintaining the novel's fluidity. Another aspect which keeps the reader in suspense is the originality and the comedy inducing laughter. The reader's interest in this novel is created by the combination of bad English and a communist system with lots of rules a foreigner cannot understand or apply.

### 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF SLAKAN LANGUAGE AND SLAKAN ENGLISH

This imaginary linguistics exercise can be seen in this novel from two perspectives: the creation of a new language, the Slakan one inserted into English and in combination with the poor English spoken by most of the characters in the book. More than 70% of the novel consists of monologues performed by the Slakan characters, purposely written by Bradbury in EFL English. Most of the speeches are hilarious, at least in the beginning, but by the second half, they concentrate on the life philosophies of Katya Princip and then Marisja Lubijova. The plot itself finds Petworth, the linguist, in the middle of this revolutionary change in the Slakan language. Even as an expert in phonemes and vowel shift, Petworth

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<sup>6</sup> *'Did you remember to call your wife?' 'She wasn't there' says Petworth. 'So, I suppose I must make a new arrangement,' says Lubijova, 'You go, I will do it. And did you get your passport?' 'I have asked for it last night' says Petworth, 'It wasn't ready,' Lubijova looks at him crossly: 'Oh, Petwurt, can't you do just one thing? Now you are not a person, is that what you want? Do you like it that you don't exist? That I can't take you to the Mun'stratu?' 'I'll go and ask for it now,' says Petworth. 'Go upstairs now, bring your coat,' says Lubijova. (Malcolm Bradbury, *Rates of Exchange*, London: Picador, 1986, 119).*

cannot understand a word until he leaves the country. The only things he can barely recognize are the signs written on the streets and at different institutions. And even as a specialist in linguistics and phonetics, this does not help him to integrate in the Slakan world of change and paradigm shifts. As is to be expected, Bradbury mocks this change: even after the public mood for change in Slaka and the students' rebellions in the public square, we find out at the end of the novel the only substantive change was turning the letter 'i' into 'u', the party newspaper form *P'rtyii Populatii* to *P'rtyuu Populatuuu* and the Slakan word for thank you changes from *slibob* to *slubob*.

The text of the novel is a combination of English and Slakan language, represented both as separate words and as complete sentences. Furthermore, the use of English is divided into two parts: correct English, as used by the narrator and at times by the main character (as he does not speak too much in the novel), and ESL English, spoken by the rest of the novel's characters. Bradbury identifies three classes of ESL mistakes: word order, prepositions and tenses. Thus over the course of the text, we find it necessary to further analyze and establish criteria for understanding the formation of this Slakan language. As we have already noted in this paper, this language is pure invention so we need to try to trace back the cognitive mechanisms that were used to form the basis of this language. The criterion decided is a phonological one, in terms of pronunciation. Considering therefore pronunciation as the main criterion by which the Slakan language was created, we can establish two different classes of words. The first category comprises words formed according to a foreigner's pronunciation in English. An example is the way a foreigner hears Romanian, Bulgarian or Czech when coming here because he does not understand a word. All of the words in this category are invented; their roots can be traced back to either a Slavonic language, or a Latin one, just like Romanian. The second category comprises words formed through the perspective of an English person who hears his language pronounced by a foreigner with words of English origin.

Another interesting observation concerns the spelling of words from the first category. The majority of words invented by Bradbury in the first category have an apostrophe in the middle of the word or very close to the end. This apostrophe probably denotes the accent of the word, as the reader has to take a pause when reading these words. On the other hand, the accent can also suggest the existence of double *ii*-s in some of the words.

It is the first category of words that is the most prolific and fascinating one, to explore as we can find references to basically all of the Eastern European countries Bradbury himself at one time or other visited. The words in the second category have clear references to English, as their meaning can be easily traced back to English and the only difference occurs in how they are spelt or pronounced by a foreigner. The words in the first category refer to words of Slavonic or Latin origin, pronounced by Slakans and heard in English: *tulsto'ii* (blood), *rot'vitti* (peach brandy), *sch'veppii* (soft drink), *vloska* (Slakan currency), *bitii* (Slakan currency), *camb'yii* (exchange desk), *litti* (tabaco kiosks), *bin'zini* (fuel), *invat / otvat* (exist / entrance), *kassa* (cashdesk), *domo* (cathedral). Basically, the meaning of these words is expressed both by the form and the context in which they appear. So, even if the reader does not specialize in these languages, Bradbury makes sure the context is sufficiently relevant for them to understand them. In the second category, we have words of English origin pronounced by non-native speakers and used in everyday Slakan, such as *p'rtyii* (party), *gal'erri* (art gallery), *busop* (bus stop), *barr'ii* (bar), *tacksi* (taxi), *prohibito* (forbid), *congresso* (unite), *sausidge* (sausage), *sheese* (cheese), *eggi* (eggs).

A third category of invented Slakan words have a hilarious onomatopoeic dimension, as Bradbury uses sounds from nature for well-known words. For example, from *Why come to Slaka?* we find out that in Slakan, the clock is called *tictoc*, the duck is *crak'aki*, the name for

jeans is *levii*, a pop group is called a *poppi'gruppi*, a shower is *sprey'sprey*, the tank is *bombom* and the dance is *bongo'bongo*.

In terms of grammar, the only peculiarities that can be identified are the ones of Slakans speaking English. It is true the main character only has to deal with those who are supposed to speak English such as his official guide, airport staff, writers and academics from the upper ranks of this country. Some of the biggest mistakes in language acquisition that can be seen in the speeches of these non-native speakers mostly involve wrong word order, the lack of auxiliary verbs in questions, wrong forms of past tense or the incorrect use of perfect tenses, mistakes and confusions in terms of aspect and indirect questions and the lack of prepositions. As we have already noted, these grammar mistakes do not interfere with the understanding or the meaning. We also have to take into account that these mistakes Bradbury repeatedly refers to as examples of his own experience as a language teacher. On the other hand, these language mistakes can be seen from a native speaker's perspective of the language acquisition of Eastern Europeans peoples as mistakes which can be traced back to the structure of their native language.

#### 4. FINAL REMARKS

Creating a new country and a new language gives Malcolm Bradbury another opportunity to explore the power of language. He also creates an anti-hero, not a man of history, as expected, but a linguist caught between the bureaucracy and absurdities of a Communist country. Reading between the lines, this can be any one of the ex -Eastern bloc countries, speaking a language related to Slav and Latin. The change and eventual exchange are the key words of the novel. In his short stay in Slaka, the main character is introduced to a world in which nothing is sure; he is led by an interpreter who is always bad-tempered; he cannot understand the changes in language that the country is undergoing. Even if he showed a keen interest in phonetics and language, Slakan remains a mystery to him until the end of the novel.

The language invented by Bradbury transforms this book into a masterpiece. Through language and the characters' discourse the reader is introduced to a regime full of bizarreness and duplicity. Bradbury simultaneously mocks the regime, ESL speakers and history. He creates a new language by combining the syntax, the phonetics and vocabulary from Slavonic and Latin languages. He might, on the other hand, fail to see the frailties of his own language through the eyes and pronunciation of foreigners? The novel *Rates of Exchange* brings a new perspective to what fiction can offer to its readers. We find here different dimensions, linked by an invented language: culture, society and history. And this interaction forms the basis for the irony and sarcasm.

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# THE SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY IN APPROACHING OF THE THEME: "*THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF DOMINATION AND VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.*" THE RESEARCH PROJECT (III)

Nicolaie MĂNESCU<sup>1</sup>

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**ABSTRACT:** THIS PRESENTATION CONTINUES THE SERIES OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN THIS JOURNAL WHICH ARE PROPOSING AN ORIGINAL PRESENTATION REGARDING THE METHODOLOGY OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN ADDRESSING THE THEME: "*THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE DOMINATION AND VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.*". THE RESEARCH PROJECT, WHICH PREPARES THE WAY OF THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, OPENS NOW NEW STAGES: THAT OF SPECIFYING OF THE DIMENSIONS, INDICATORS AND INDICES OF THE INVESTIGATED SOCIAL REALITY, THE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONAL INDICATORS, THE TRANSITION FROM INDICATORS TO INDICES, THE OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS WHICH ARE THE OBJECT OF THE RESEARCH, THE SETTING AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINATION AND SERVITUDE ARE DETERMINANT IN ESTABLISHING THE VARIABLES AND FIXATION OF INDICATORS. THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES INVOLVES, THROUGH THE CHOICE OF INDICATORS, THE TRANSLATION OF CONCEPTS IN INDICES.

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**KEY WORDS:** DOMINATION, VOLUNTARY SERVITUDE, METHODOLOGY, RESEARCH, OPERATIONALIZATION, VARIABLES, INDICATORS.

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## 1. THE SPECIFICATION OF THE DIMENSIONS, INDICATORS AND INDICES OF INVESTIGATED SOCIAL REALITY

### 1.1. THE ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONAL INDICATORS

The indicators are observable and measurable signs with the help of which can be characterized the social units and their qualities. The indicators are signals by which we find the empirical entities subsumed of a notion, in the case of those attributive or which fall in a particular class or receive a certain value, for the ones of variable type.

In relation of waiting *social status-role*, the *servitude* can represent an indicator that characterizes an individual's position within a group or among different social groups and in society, in general. The indicators, of the kind taken as example, used in the operationalization of concepts are called *definitional indicators*. The *domination* as and the *servitude*, respectively the *voluntary servitude*, are indicators which reflect the level of obedience, the degree of voluntary subservience or the one of exercise of political power in a

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<sup>1</sup> Ph.D. Student, University of Craiova; Assistant Researcher, "Constantin Brâncuși" University of Târgu-Jiu, ROMANIA, E-mail: nicolaiemanescu@yahoo.com.



state. Between the definitional indicators and concepts defined operational is born an interdependence relation. The one who has a high *social status*, a certain social rank, has more rights than obligations, has a considerable fortune, and is part of the state power structure and dominates the needy of these qualities to which the obligations are more numerous than the rights. The servitude / voluntary servitude is a syndrome of the lack of power. It does not occur in the absence of which, representing power in the state, are empowered to exercise it. "The analysis of the definitional indicators aims to determine the probability or correlation between *indicators* and *indicated*, in order to retain within the empirical research those indicators that are strongly correlated with indicated. In establishing the definitional indicators we will seek to maximize both the power of content and the power of rejection, so that *the correlation between indicators and indicated to tend to 1*, when using a single indicator for defining operational. In such situations we talk about *the power of discrimination* of the indicator. Between two definitional indicators considering can be born a *space of indeterminacy* which is desired to be as small as possible." <sup>2</sup> At the choice of the definitional indicators we will consider the type of indicators on which we will call using either *expressive indicators* or *predictive indicators*. Taking into debate the authoritarian personality and obedience to authority, the American sociologist *Paul F. Lazarsfeld*, exemplifies a type of *expressive indicator* under the form of a forming urge in the spirit of obedience to power: "*The obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues which the children must learn*" and like *predictive indicator* enunciates the following assumption: "*Most people do not realize how much our life is directed by the conspiracy woven by politicians*, this last prediction being interpreted to those who asserts, as a antidemocratic action".<sup>3</sup> The response to the exercise of political power in the state and to its dominant character may be an indicator of the degree of authority and legitimacy of power in a society, regardless of ideology or forms of manifestation of power.

*Daniel J. Levinson*, former professor of psychology at Yale University, United States, launches in the field of political sociology a scale of antidemocratic attitude from which we will choose, as an example, a few steps:

- "*the authoritarian submission* - is an exaggerated emotional need to subordinate to others through uncritical acceptance of the decisions that come from the state power or from a leader who holds power;
- *the authoritarian aggression* - is an iron discipline, an attitude of the power of total rejection of behaviors that deviate from generally accepted values of severe punishment of persons who have an anti-social and anti-system attitude and favoring of their condemnation;
- *strength and obstinacy* – the alienation of person with what represents the force, thus imposing itself the power system and thus achieving the need for subordination and servitude;
- *destructiveness and cynicism* - the rationalized aggression, even the cynicism, allows those who hold the power and represents an authority of the state, not always legitimate, to be aggressive because they can justify the aggression by holding the power, sometimes through an inhuman behavior that will be regarded and received with helpless hostility".<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Septimiu Chelcea, *The Sociological Research Methodology, The Quantitative and Qualitative Methods*, (Bucharest: The Economic Publishing House, 2001), 114-116.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Lazarsfeld, *Methodes de la sociologie* (vol.I), *Des concepte aux indices empirique*, (Paris: Mouton et Co., 1965; in Septimiu Chelcea, 2001), 116.

<sup>4</sup> M.J.Saks, E.Krupat, *Social psihology and its application*, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers Inc., 1988), 104.

## 1.2. THE PASSING FROM INDICATORS TO INDICES

An immediately following step within the research project and analysis of investigated social reality is the passing from indicators to indices. From the observable and measurable signs by which we can characterize the social units it passes to a set of variables which must be sorted by classes. By index it is meant "*one-dimensional variable with  $r$  values on which are sorted  $v$  classes of possible combinations of features in a multidimensional space of attributes*".<sup>5</sup>

## 2. THE OPERATIONALIZATION THE CONCEPTS WHICH ARE THE OBJECT OF THE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

### 2.1. THE CONCEPTS OF DOMINATION AND SERVITUDE

The concepts constitute the essence of any scientific theory. The sociology elaborates itself a conceptual system specific related to its object of activity: structure and social relationships, social action, groups and human communities etc. The sociological theories are constituted into a rich database that are of real use.

The scientific research is an empirical research that starts from a theory, certain fundamental hypotheses or of working or *concepts*, of which adaptation to operational concrete requirements involves:

1) "The establishing the dimensions of the concept which correspond the reality, state of fact, of the manifestation of the relation or phenomenon;  
The concepts of "*domination*" or that of "*servitude*" include at least the following dimensions: types, forms, trends, proportions, beliefs, attitudes and practices.

Indicators of the concept of domination and servitude can be:

- the grade of conscious and voluntary assuming of compliance with laws;
- the submission level of the dominated;
- the level of coercion in exercising of the state power;
- the undemocratic or democratic character of designating of power (free elections);
- the guarantee and respecting citizens' rights and freedoms.

2) The fixation of the variables or factors that determine or influence the conduct of social phenomena (for example: age, profession, social environment, religion, social state, etc.);

3) The choice of indicators that are features or concrete aspects of the concept, which can be observed and measured directly (for example: the servitude is indicated by the level of domination or as appropriate, of oppression. Indicators of the domination can be: the presence of a dominant political class and of some dominated groups, classes or social groups, the disproportionate distribution of power in society, the element relational dominant-dominated, the level of consolidation of power, the level of acceptance and submission to power, the voluntary predisposition for the servitude of social groups and of individuals);

4) The formulation of indices (for example: indices "*dominant*" and "*dominated*" become operational through the consideration of social position, income, status and social role of individuals in society). "The method determines the concrete ways of using the procedures. The process or procedure refers to the order of successive operations that are imposed to the researcher in the process of knowledge and it is considering the formal organization of data ".<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Renate Mayntz (coord.), *Einführung in die Methoden der empirische Soziologie*, (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969), 44.

<sup>6</sup> Dumitru Otovescu, *General Sociology*, The fifth edition, (Craiova: Beladi Publishing House, 2009), 112-113.

a) *The determination of the significance of concepts* is achieved by configuration and imposing in a particular area or sector of research of what we call *definition*. By the operationalization of concepts or of variables construction is designated the entire process of the dimensions and indicators highlighter of a given field, for transposition of the theme into a concrete investigation procedure. Between the general concepts and empirical reality reflected by these it is established a relationship mediated by the so-called vertical and horizontal operationalizations.

*Paul Felix Lazarsfeld* is the sociologist who elaborates the paradigm of the operationalization of the concepts in sociological research. "This paradigm includes: the imaging representation of the concept, the specification of the concept by establishing the dimensions, the choice of indicators and construction of empirical indices." <sup>7</sup>

The problem of operationalization of concepts is directly related to determine the modalities through which is realized the link between the conceptual-theoretical part and empirical reality. In the methodological theory and practice it has been defined as being *the operationalization of concepts* that assembly of operations through which the characteristic features of the notions are identified, evaluated and measured through the practical process of scientific research. This operation represents a characteristic approach to epistemology, the theory of scientific knowledge. Within the sociological surveys it operates with two types of notions, some of attributive type and others of variable type. The attributive type ones highlight the scope and the content of the notion. For example, in the survey appear notions of attributive type such as: fired, unemployed, employer, employee, but the attributive type traits are much more numerous. The attributive notions are easier to operationalize, they assuming only the identifying the presence of a trait or a complex of traits and not the measurement of intensity of their manifestation. The notions of variable type can presume subjects, of the type of human individuals, social groups, state power, etc., which is constituted in "object" of empirical research but, particularly, we are interested in those traits, states, manifestations and even a gradual variation of the intensity of some characteristics of the type which are the object of our study, as well as the exercise of state power, domination and voluntary servitude. This is just what we are more interested. There is no question the existence or inexistence of the exercising of state power or domination, but of the gradual variable, of the intensity of manifestation, of the social supportability levels, the level of domination and correlative level of manifestation of servitude or revolt, in response to the dominating stimuli of the power. In the case of voluntary servitude, if this act of will is not recognized as a phenomenon, as a state of attitude and manifestation of individuals and the social groups, it arises first of all the problem of its identification as a variable notion and then of the determination of the influence and the gradual variable on the relations between the power state and society, as well as the social equilibrium in general. The analysis will be determined by the theoretical part of the study, while the concrete research needs that every dimension should be operationalized, namely transposed in practical indicators of using.

The renowned American sociologist *Paul Lazarsfeld* synthesizes the stages that must be completed from the concept to the empirical study, which is the essence of operationalization as follows:

➤ "Originally there is an image or a vague representation of what we mean by a notion, resulting image, either of the highlighting of some common features subjacent to more disparate phenomena, or from the attempt to explain certain constant regularities. The created concept has the role to make it possible to understand the meaning of the observed relations.

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<sup>7</sup> Ion Cauc, Beatrice Manu, Daniela Pârlea, Laura Goran, *The Sociological Research Methodology, Methods and Techniques of Research*, The second edition, (Bucharest: "Romania de Măine" Foundation, 2004), 21.

➤ The second stage regards the specifying of the concept and means the decomposition of representation into components that constitute the different aspects or dimensions of the concept. Such components are derived from the theoretical analysis of the concept;

➤ It is following the choice of indicators, the indicator being that simple element of behavior, of manifestation or phenomenal, which can be detected in the empirical reality. An indicator can have a numeric value or a specification like yes / no. A benchmark indicator concerning domination, for example, can give solutions to another indicator regarding the correlative element of servitude or individual and collective submission. In the case of the investigation and surveys, the indicators always takes the form of questions in the questionnaire.

➤ The fourth stage is the one of indices formation; it is realized thus a synthesis of information gathered using indicators that can be global, based on a global score, (global index) or can be constituted partial indices for reasons related to the interpretation of the concept. This stage is the one of the synthesis, because it is trying the reconstruction of the concept based on information collected with the help of the chosen indicators." <sup>8</sup>

If, for example, we want to know which is *the global index* of domination from the data processing of a survey questionnaire, like the one we propose, with the theme: "*The social impact of the exercise of state power, of domination and servitude voluntary*", from the cumulating of resulted values from the investigation of every individual, to those *n* questions it will get a total figure that is even the global index. The higher number of responses (indicators) is not determining in ensuring a higher degree of representativeness and nor the size beyond measure of the proposed sample. For the analysis of model consistency it can be used several genres of statistical procedures that are based on the analysis of the matrix of correlation coefficients between the pairs of items. The most frequent method used is the one of *the factorial analysis*. "*A concept once operationalized, once specified and pursued some its dimensions, the empirical survey results will describe only the retained aspects by the dimensions and the used indicators*". <sup>9</sup>

#### **b) The defining of sociological concepts through the nominal procedure**

*The definition* is a logical-semantic operation of the knowledge and interpersonal communication. To define is to follow a logic operation by which it is appreciated the meaning of the terms used.

*The functions of definitions* systematized by *Cornel Popa* are recognized and mentioned by others sociologists, such as *Septimiu Chelcea*, as well we render them in the following:

- a. the *referentially-designating* function consisting in delimitation of a class of objects;
- b. the function of *introduction of new terms in the vocabulary of a knowing agent*;
- c. function of *concentration of information*, of shortcut of communication;
- d. the function of *revealing the changes intervened in the process of knowledge*;
- e. the *synthetic-calculating* function that allows the information processing in another language.

*Carl Gustav Hempel*, in "*Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science*", distinguishes in social-human sciences three types of definitions: *ostensive*, *nominal* and *operational*.

<sup>8</sup> Traian Rotariu, Petru Iluț, *The Sociological Investigation and Opinion Survey*, (Iași: Polirom Publishing House, 1997), 179-180.

<sup>9</sup> Traian Rotariu, Petru Iluț, *The Sociological Investigation ...*, 181.

✓ "With the help of *ostensive definition* a knowing agent finds the meaning of a word without using other words. It speaks the new word and at the same time it shows the designed object.

✓ *The nominal or verbal definition* consists of the specifying the meaning of a term with other terms, respectively from verbal description of the significance of a concept. The word whose meaning must be shown (*the definiendum*) has the same meaning as the word with which the new term is introduced (*the definiens*). The explicit definition (*the definiens*) can consist either from revealing *the proximate genre* (the term of reference of the definition, the closest in meaning to the notion defined and of *specific difference* (the characteristic feature of the notion which differentiates it from the others notions contained in its proximate genre) or by enumerating the objects that belong to the class called definiens.

✓ *The operational definition* is applicable to the objects and designed qualities that cannot be directly observable. In such cases, it tries a "translation" of concepts in "observable events".<sup>10</sup> This procedure is called "*the operationalization of concepts*".

### **c) The establishing of the dimensions of concepts**

The concepts, so delimited regarding the significance, are subject in their turn to a sub classing that should allow the study of the space of basic conceptual attributes. These dimensions of a concept are classes of information regarding the range of features on which the concept extracts them from reality. The new sub conceptual dimensions are the same correlative concepts, with a lower degree of generality than the essential concept.

## **3. THE ESTABLISHING OF EXPERIMENTAL VARIABLES (THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLE AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE)**

### **3.1. THE CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES**

The assumption which we must prove must be confronted with the problem of *constructing of variables*, namely of the transition / translation of the concepts and notions in defined research operations. *The construction of variables implies, through the choice of indicators, the translation of concepts in indices.* It makes the transition from the abstract definition or from the intuitive connotation to notions sociological according to criteria that allow the definition of a classification of these variables.

*Lazarfeld in "Le Vocabulaire des sciences sociales describes four such passages":*

1. The figurative representation of the concept;
2. The specification of concept;
3. The choice of indicators;
4. The construction of indexes.

Once constructed the variables, the experimental situation and subjects are established in the experimental and control groups. The manipulation of the variables, in the first stage of the investigation, will allow eventually their measured.

### **3.2. THE VARIABLES EXPLANATORY (INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT) IN THE EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH**

The experiment can provide an advantage by the rigor of the procedure and quality of the obtained information. *Raymond Siever* makes a comparison between observation and experiment, showing that the experiment is, most often, associated with the analytical approach of the phenomenon, unlike the observation, that spontaneously is associated with the descriptive approach, the experimental sciences being always considered superior ones. *Claude Bernard* said: "*We must not believe in our observations, in our theories, only subject to experimentation.*"

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<sup>10</sup> Septimiu Chelcea, *The Sociological Research Methodology...*, 107-110.

The experimental research constitutes an iterative process that starts with the verification of the causality relationships and ends with the formulation of some new hypotheses. The necessity of repeating the experiment is dictated by the fact that any experiment is not complete and so good in order to respond suddenly to the questions which we formulate. The repeated investigation can give answers close to enlighten us about the causes of some behaviors or social phenomena. "Any relevant experiment starts from theory to perform the cognitive functions. Because of this, experiment occurs in a late phase of scientific knowledge. The experiment is a natural continuation of the study of theory. In the case of the observation can be discovered unexpected facts, some particularly important, through the so called "*serendipiness*", which can initiate the theory. The experiment is based on theory, checking it, and the theory is based on the experiment. A different approach through disjunction, leads to the failure of knowledge. In order to be fulfilled the function of « *modality of the testing of causal hypotheses* » three conditions are necessary:

- 1) Between the independent variable and the dependent variable must be a temporal anteriority relationship, the cause preceding the effect;
- 2) Between the two variables to be a covariance ( $p < 0.05$ );
- 3) to be no alternative of explaining the modification of the dependent variable only through the independent variable.

The last two conditions take into account the *statistical validity* and *internal validity* of the experiment." <sup>11</sup>

What we are interested are the concrete interactions of human individuals, the relations determined by the internal and external causes in society that represents not only object of study of the research theme but also the object of study of the social and human sciences in general. The particularity of the experiment is that it aims to highlight questions less approached and known, such as the correlation between domination and servitude, in the power relation between state and society.

We are launching questions such as:

- *Is there an antagonistic relationship between state and society?*
- *Does the state manifest against society?*
- *Is the society in its evolution against the state?*

An experiment is concretely the verification of a hypothesis that implies a contrasting situation that can be powered by an antagonistic relationship, in the present case between society and state power. The experiment tries to highlight the two factors who are in a causal relationship. There will be controlled a series of factors besides of that it interests, this is the cause or the hypothetical effect.

*Ernest Greenwood* insists on two characteristics: the capacity of the experiment to verify the causal hypotheses and the control of experimental situation.

*Septimiu Chelcea*, in the same context, offers us a definition of the psycho-sociological experiment that consists in "*the analysis of the effects of independent variables on the dependent variables in a controlled situation with the purpose of verifying causal hypotheses*." <sup>12</sup>

In the case of our investigation, of the form of a social-political investigation, we will use, like techniques and instruments of research-investigation, the questionnaire and interview. The main causal assumption is related to the influence of *domination* as type of *causal independent variable* on the *voluntary servitude*, effect with role of *dependent variable*. The effect is not one singular, the experiment following the analysis of several

<sup>11</sup> Thomas Cook, Donald Campbell, *The Design and Conduct of Quasi-Experiments in Field Settings*, (Chicago: Rand Mc Nally College Publishing Company, 1976), 224.

<sup>12</sup> Septimiu Chelcea, *The Sociological Research Methodology...*, 399.

effects related to servitude. This aspect can take different forms and ways of manifestation, depending on the dynamics of domination, from the minimal forms, almost imperceptible and easily supportable, to the exacerbated domination, unbearable, generating riots and even revolution. The experiment implies to create a situation controllable and controlled. The elaboration of such procedure does not only mean control but subtlety and discernment in such a situation.

*Maurice Duverger*, the father of the French sociological and methodological school, defines *the experiment* through a methodical explanation, thus: "*In the conduct of a phenomenon they are introduced one or more artificial factors; comparing the obtained results with those that would give the phenomenon in the absence of any intervention, one can measure the influence of introduced factors.*"<sup>13</sup>

We presented a single variable, but in the same way, we can handle two or more independent variables, close to exposed underlying variable or being in conjectural or functional connection with the domination. We can expose a group or several groups at one or more variables, after which we can analyze the change or the produced changes in the variable and dependent variables. The purpose must be one precise and possibly fulfilled not only of description of the object to be known but also of the referrals of known elements and of novelty, of the essence and laws that govern it. The ensuring of *control* is done by the repeatability of similar conditions during the research which would lead to verifiable results, similar or very close among them. The control aims in particular the factors introduced in the experiment for triggering some specific behaviors. It is known the fact that result of the experiment is given, in especially, of the control over variables.

*The explanatory variables*, also called experimental or internal, are different and are divided into *independent variables* and *dependent variables*. In the sociological research undertaken regarding the exercise of state power and the social impact of domination and voluntary servitude, as determinants of social will, we chose as basic variables, as it was natural, *the domination* as an *independent variable*, a prerogative but also an act of will of state power, and *the voluntary servitude*, as *dependent variable*, which knows values increasing or decreasing depending on the influence exercised on the social groups subject to the power by domination. The independent variable, which is the domination, is introduced in the experiment by the researcher but, in fact, it is a factor or phenomenon introduced by another court which, in a social framework, it manifests itself as legitimate power what is considered that holds, by law, the attribute of authority. The variables are explanatory only when they are reported to the experimental plane where they are independent or dependent. Otherwise, outside of the experiment, they do not possess this quality even if we are tempted to discover, even outside of the experiment, causal relationships that can submit to the universal law of social determinism.

*The choice of explanatory variables* follows the stage of setting the problem that is intended to be subjected to the experiment and it is depending on the advanced hypothesis. The independent variable operationalizes the component "*if*" while the dependent variable operationalizes the component "*then*" of the hypotheses. If the scale of values of voluntary servitude has the shape of the temperature scale, then the negative values are corresponding in absolute value to the increase of the revolt level and, most of the time, signals the presence of the social change through revolution.

For the verification of the one and the same causal hypothesis or of a subsidiary or adjacent hypothesis, as in the present case, can be chosen multiple explanatory variables because the definitional indicators are interchangeable. It must be chosen the variable or variables that adequately operationalize the concepts and allow their measurement. The

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<sup>13</sup> Maurice Duverger, *Méthodes des sciences sociales*, (Paris: P.U.F., 1961), 356.

experimental variables have the same function as the definitional indicators, so the whole interrelation between *indicators* and *indicated* is translated, mainly, in the choice of independent and dependent variables. An imperceptible difference it is that the definitional indicators must be observable and measurable and the variables can be manipulated. The major limit of the experimental research is given by the difficulty of introducing the independent variable, emphasized and supported fact by the American psycho-sociologist *Jonathan Freedman*.

The experimental variables can be both *quantitative* and *qualitative*. A variable is quantitative when its values can be ordered along a single dimension. We recall here the conflict and solidarity that bind directly from the dependent basic variable of voluntary servitude. The conflict diminishes the voluntary servitude and emphasizes the domination by coercion. The coercion can determine on the moment the increase of the level of submission (servitude) but it has an opposite effect towards the voluntary servitude which tends to zero. The qualitative variables cannot be ordered one dimensional (for example, the profession that gives belonging to a particular status or social group). In an ideal experiment all external variables are controlled but this does not happen because the researcher leaves, knowingly, uncontrollable a series of variables hard to maintain at the same level due to their complexity. These uncontrolled external variables give errors that cancel each other, are *randomized*. The concept of *group* (experimental and control) we will use it alongside of the variables. The experimental *group* is made up of the assembly of the persons over which acts the independent variable introduced by the researcher. The control group makes it possible to compare the effects of the introduction of the independent variable in the experimental group. Over the control group does not act the independent variable. The experimental moment implies the consideration of two moments:  $t_1$  in which the dependent variables are measured before the introduction of independent variables and  $t_2$ , the moment after their introduction. The experimental situation includes subjects, objects and specific conditions in which the experiment takes place.

The factors which act only when introducing the independent variable are known as *catalytic factors* and the factors present at the beginning of the experiment and which act on the dependent variable are called *parallel factors*. It can be considered that the experiment is conducted in three phases: the initial situation, the situation after the introduction of the independent variable and the final situation.

*The experimental schemes.* In the social domain a factor becomes causal in certain conditions, in the presence of other complementary factors that increase the likelihood of producing the phenomenon. No experiment can be conceived without taking into account *the difference canon* imposed by *John Stuart Mill*, a method of scientific investigation which tends toward perfection, as the author argues which it concretely explains: "*If a case in which the investigated phenomenon takes place and a case in which this does not take place, they have in common all the circumstances, except for one that occurs only in the first case, the unique circumstance by which the two cases are distinguished constitutes either the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the effect or of the case of the respective phenomenon*". (Mill, 1863/1994) This inference applied to logical scheme of the experiment is one of determinist type cause-effect. In the practice of sociological research it is observed a limitation of experimental schemes to several factors considered relevant. Through the previous presented canon it is only possible the causal hypothesis testing after the preliminary observation of the conditions of producing of the phenomena and cannot be discovered the causal links. We will seek as the independent and dependent variables, in our case, to have only two values related to the presence and absence. In "*The Rules of Sociological Method*", *Émile Durkheim* applies the typical of "*the concomitant variation*" considered "*the instrument*



*by excellence of the research in sociology*" and argues that *"any phenomenon that varies in one kind or another, whenever another phenomenon varies in a same particular kind, is either because of, or the effect of the second phenomenon, or it is linked to it by a fact of causality"*. The research in the case of the present theme cannot be but one of field, a genus of research that does not exclude the theoretical knowledge but it is based on them and in which the experimenter handles an independent variable in a real social situation in order to verify a hypothesis. The field experiment can be passive, when the researcher does not handle the variables, announces the changing of situation and records the reaction of the subjects, or can be active, when the variables are handled effectively and this latter type can be in its turn directly or indirectly, as the experimental factors are introduced or not by researcher. It is considered that the researcher knows the anterior situation and is present when introducing or production the factors that change the social or socio-political situation and records its effects. The experimental factor can be introduced only once or several times. The experimental situation will be changed from a collectivity to another, it will initially aim the urban area and then, more restricted, in the rural area. The experiment is viable and applicable in the hypothesis testing only after sufficient data have been accumulated through observation and empirical verifiable hypotheses were elaborated. In establishing the subjects of experiment it is of applied the probabilistic or stratified *sampling process*. An experiment is followed by a research report. Usually, it addresses to the sponsor. In our case we have no sponsor so we cannot be influenced in the experiment evolution or the content of the report. The report addresses to an institutions interested in respecting of the research methodology and the promotion of values and the uninfluenced objective truth. Then, the results of experimental research are presented to the large public. The work, as a whole, as well the results recorded in the report, may interest and on specialists, the factors of analysis and decision from the structures of the state apparatus, even the power, in the issues mentioned above. In the content of the report that aims at the community of scientists, sociologists, the results of experiments will be integrated to the existing theories and will be signaled, by comparison, other researches having the same theme or close to the investigated theme. One interests, also, what new hypotheses have been suggested, if it is confirmed in practice through the implementation and if the whole effort is justified in the aim of solving of some social problems such as the one signaled by us regarding the necessity of maintaining a balance between the state power and society, as a *sine qua non* condition of normal development of the social life. The experiment, from such a perspective, represents a testing of the theory and the experimental or internal variables are either stimuli, as in the case of the independent variable, or response in the case of the dependent variable.

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## SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN REGION SOUTH WEST

**Marin AURELIA CAMELIA<sup>1</sup>**  
**Voicu TATIANA<sup>2</sup>**

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### **ABSTRACT:**

*IN THE CENTER OF THE DEVELOPMENT ARE THE PEOPLE, THE DEVELOPMENT MEANS THE TRANSFORMATION OF PEOPLE'S LIVES, NOT JUST ECONOMIES. LABOUR OR STRATEGIES REGARDING THE OCCUPATIONAL EDUCATION MUST BE ANALYZED IN THIS DOUBLE PERSPECTIVE, HOW THEY DEVELOPMENT AND ITS INFLUENCES ON STIMULATED INDIVIDUALS DIRECTLY. ECONOMISTS TALK ABOUT EDUCATION AS A HUMAN CAPITAL: INVESTMENT AND GUARANTEE A PROFIT INVESTMENT IN MACHINERY LIKE PEOPLE, BUT EDUCATION IS ABOUT MORE THAN THAT. EDUCATION AWARENESS OF THE IDEA THAT FACILITATES CHANGE IS POSSIBLE, THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS OF PRODUCTION ORGANIZING, TEACHES IT BECAUSE THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MODERN SCIENCE AND ANALYTICAL REASONING BOOSTS LEARNING AND CAPACITY. THE NUMBER OF YEARS IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF SCHOOLING OF LIES THE REGION LEVEL IN TERMS OF EDUCATION, BUT EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS WHAT IS TAUGHT IN SCHOOLS.*

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**KEY WORDS:** SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, THE REGIONAL AUTHORITIES

### **INTRODUCTION**

Sustainable development is a concept fairly nondescript. That evolves continuously adding new values makes them twice as hard to define. Generally when we talk about sustainability we consider three components: environment, society and economy. Currently three areas are interdependent, so that we can reach a state of one of the three areas without considering the other. For example - a healthy and prosperous society relies on a healthy environment and resources which provide food, clean water, fresh air and good for its inhabitants.

Sustainability is a paradigm in which the future is conceived as a balance between the environment, society and economy in order to develop and improve their quality of life.

Typically environmental education about dealing with two aspects: environmental protection and resource use.

The development center is the people, development means transforming people's lives, not just savings. Strategies related to education and employability of labor should be analyzed from this dual perspective, how they stimulate the development and influences on

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<sup>1</sup> Lector Ph.D., University Brâncoveanu Pitesti, Romania, cameliamarin81@yahoo.com

<sup>2</sup> Master University Brâncoveanu Pitesti, Romania, voicutatiana@yahoo.com

individuals directly. Economists talk about education as about human capital: people investing and generating a profit, like investment in equipment, but education is more than that. Education facilitates an awareness that change is possible, that there are other ways of organizing production as teaches the basic principles of modern science and analytical reasoning items and boosts learning ability. Number of years of schooling is an important element of the level at that region in terms of education, but equally important is what is taught in schools. Regional authorities have always wanted and still want education to be compatible with what people will do after graduation.

### **OVERVIEW OF THE REGION SOUTH WEST**

South West region covers an area of 29,212 km<sup>2</sup> and is made up of five counties: Dolj, Olt, Valcea County and Gorj, and coincides roughly with the old historical region of Oltenia.

Carpathians and the Danube forms the northern or southern region of Oltenia natural boundaries. The Danube is an important regional resource and aims border with Bulgaria and Serbia over a distance of 417 km. The region borders with South Muntenia, Centre and West.

South West England has a population of 2,317,636 inhabitants, with a density below the national average (79.3 inhabitants / km<sup>2</sup> compared to 90.9 inhabitants / km<sup>2</sup>). Rural-urban structure of the population is 52.8% compared to 47.2%, the most rural counties are Olt (59.6%), Valcea (55%) and Gorj (53.3%).

Relief region is relatively balanced distribution, including mountains, plains, hills, and plateaus. The northern landscape is mountainous and hilly Oltenia (Carpathians and sub-Carpathian area), predominantly forests and grasslands. Lowlands specializes mainly in cereal crop and is considered one of the most fertile in Central Europe.

Hydrological network consists mainly of Danube rivers Olt and Jiu confer energetic role mainly in Romania ( 71.57% of the total hydropower production).

The messenger Oltenia region is rich in coal, construction materials (marble, granite and other ornamental rocks), ferrous and non-ferrous minerals.

Settlement network consists in 40 cities, 11 of the municipalities and 408 communes that comprise 2066 villages. The most important cities are Craiova (302,622 inhabitants) forthe (111,980 inhabitants), Drobeta Turnu-Severin (104,065 inhabitants), Miami (96 562 inhabitants) and Slatina (79,171 inhabitants). The small towns (under 20,000 population) many do not have adequate structure and development: Vânu Great Dăbuleni, Scornicești, etc.

### **EDUCATION IN THE REGION SOUTH WEST**

In South West Regions, as in all regions of the country, education was the is considered a means of escape from rural areas, a chance to get better jobs in cities. It is now considered the modality also a refresher, revenue growth, even for those who remain in rural areas. Education is used to promote health and the environment, and the teaching of technical skills.

At regional level, primary education authorities consider essential to identify the most suitable candidates for a thorough education.

In reality not useful to have individuals higher education who do not find a job. Without adequate jobs, South West England lose this much needed intellectual capital, the most gifted children, where it invested heavily through primary and secondary education, and sometimes even at the university level, in favor of more developed regions (Bucharest Ilfov). This is often called "brain drain" and is a way more developed regions are supported by the development, such as the South West Region.

My opinion, the South West region provides all its youth education, because sometimes the best to migrate to other areas or even in the West, and the region does not receive any compensation. Most young people leave the region after graduating from high school and goes to the faculties of major universities and many of them find a job and settle there, which is a major loss for the region's economy. I think that nothing possible without the help of an educated public. Education equips people with the means to fight the challenges and gives us the necessary skills to make increasing South-West to become sustainable. When we think of education, we tend to think of the days at school, but the problem is much broader - it covers the dissemination of knowledge at all levels and a full range of topics: technical knowledge disseminated to keep us competitive, scientific knowledge that keep us healthy, educated company through sustainable choices in terms of the environment - all of which involve the dissemination of knowledge.

Sustainability means using resources in a way that allows future generations to also benefit from these resources - this includes not only natural resources but also human resources - the inhabitants of the region. Education is a means to reduce inequalities, those that exist between men and women. Now put emphasis on strengthening the knowledge and skills people along life.

### **EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

The transition effects, visible especially at the economic level, have made a mark on the education system. The quality of education and educational reform are affected by insufficient infrastructure and poor endowment of the existing staff motivation (low wages) and the precarious situation of the population.

Regional secondary educational infrastructure is in a fairly advanced state of equipment degradation and poor majority.

Below I present situation of the school population both in the system state and the individual.

Witnessing a continuous decrease of the school population, from 452,674 in 2004/2005 school year to 424,471 in 2008 / in 2009. County recorded the lowest number of school population.

Higher education is the only level where there have been continuous growth in the number of people registered, which is due to the establishment of private higher education institutions. But the fact that a number of persons occupying management positions or positions requiring higher education were trained in the process. Increase the number of students was not however accompanied by expansion of education facilities, leading to overcrowding in higher education institutions. At present university education system comprises seven higher education institutions, 3 state universities (two in Craiova - Craiova University and the University of Medicine and Pharmacy and one in Miami - State University Constantin Brancusi) and four private (two in Craiova, 2 Rm. Valcea). In addition to these local academic institutions in the region working and other branches of state universities. Today and higher education establishments began to show a decline in terms of newcomers in the first academic year.

Explicit professional qualifications must meet present and future needs of the economy in order to talk about sustainable development of regional education. Otherwise, graduates cannot find a job. To ensure their relevance, qualifications are created based on occupational analysis which result in occupational standard in consultation and partnership with stakeholders and subsequently validated by independent committees for each sector. A professional qualification is described by a standard training. Validation is a process transparent and operate according to clear criteria. Professional qualifications at national level

in Romania is based on units of competency. Demonstrate competence explicitly specified in these standards is the basis for certification.

Transition effects, especially visible in the economic, have made a mark on the education system throughout the country, but also in the South West region. The quality of education and educational reform are affected by insufficient infrastructure and poor endowment of the existing staff motivation (low wages) and the precarious situation of the population. Secondary educational infrastructure at regional level (741 schools and 151 high schools) is in a fairly advanced state of degradation and major equipment insufficient.

Paradoxically, the more a society is more educated and wealthier its negative impact on the environment is higher consumption needs are greater and pollution too. This leads to the conclusion that only educating citizens is not sufficient to achieve sustainable development. The challenge is to educate the consumer without increasing need of the population, changing consumption patterns and limiting pollution.

In areas with low education generally reduces economy to agriculture and resource extraction. The higher the level of education increases, there are industries increasingly sophisticated consumer level is high, and therefore pollution is higher.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The link between sustainable development and education is so complex. Education is what helps each region to achieve their sustainable development goals. The impact is the increase in agricultural productivity, increase attention to health, reduce the rate of population growth and raise living standards generally.

The South West region, to reorient education towards sustainable development, the developing education programs to find must balance the knowledge of the future and the traditional way of life. The traditional way of life move or surprise us with very ecological solutions to problems related to the use of resources. A turn back of traditional way of life is impossible for those who lead an urban life, but the cultivation of traditional values can be a good support for sustainable development.

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# FROM SIGHT TO THOUGHT. A DIACHRONIC VIEW ON THE GREEK VERBS OF COGNITION

**Răzvan BRAN<sup>1</sup>**

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## **ABSTRACT**

*THIS PAPER LOOKS AT THE SEMANTIC EVOLUTION OF THE VERBS OF THOUGHT IN GREEK, NAMELY VERBS WHICH MEAN 'UNDERSTAND', 'KNOW' AND 'THINK', FROM A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE (COGNITIVE SEMANTICS AND THE THEORY OF FRAMES). INTERESTINGLY, AFTER INVESTIGATING THE LEXICAL FIELD UNDER DISCUSSION, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING PATTERN OF EVOLUTION FOR SOME OF THE VERBS: THEY ORIGINALLY HAD THE MEANING 'SEE', 'WATCH', 'LOOK', 'OBSERVE' AND DEVELOPED THE SECONDARY SENSE 'UNDERSTAND', WHICH BECAME SALIENT AND REPLACED THE PREVIOUS MEANING. MORE PRECISELY, SOME VERBS, WHICH DERIVED FROM INDO-EUROPEAN ROOTS DENOTING 'SIGHT' ('SEE', 'WATCH', 'EYE' ETC.), UNDERWENT A SEMANTIC SHIFT AND, FINALLY, DENOTED AN ABSTRACT AND INTELLECTUAL SENSE. THE FINDINGS OF THIS PAPER, NAMELY THIS PARTICULAR SEMANTIC PATTERN, COULD BE COMPARED TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE SAME SEMANTIC FIELD IN OTHER LANGUAGES, IN ORDER TO IDENTIFY A MORE GENERAL LINGUISTIC TENDENCY AND SOME UNIVERSALS WHICH ARE VALID BEYOND LINGUISTIC BORDERS.*

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**KEY-WORDS:** GREEK, VERBS OF THOUGHT, SEMANTIC EVOLUTION, FRAME SEMANTICS, COGNITIVISM

## **INTRODUCTION**

Our paper envisages the evolution of the Greek verbs of 'thought'<sup>2</sup> from the perspective of cognitive semantics. Moreover, the emphasis will lay on the mental rapport between 'sight' and 'thought' and how it is represented in the lexicon. The relation between these two concepts is a very complex one and it could be investigated from a logical, psychological, cognitive and linguistic point of view.

When dealing with semantic evolution, traditional linguistics tends to relate the semantic shifts to different processes, such as specialization, generalization, narrowing, extension, metonymy and metaphor etc., but all these do not explain the specific changes of meaning. Linguists just describe what a particular word has undergone and try to classify the results (i.e. denotational changes) of a process. On the other hand, cognitive semantics tries to offer satisfactory explanations for these changes of meaning. It does not just describe the

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<sup>1</sup> Ph.D., Teaching Assistant, University of Bucharest, Faculty of Foreign Languages and Literatures – razvanbran@yahoo.gr.

<sup>2</sup> They are also called *verbs of cognition* or *verbs of cognitive attitude*.



mechanism of a change, but it tries to identify the cause(s), the reason(s) why speakers used a particular mechanism to change the meaning of a word. So this would be the main advantage of analysing the evolution of the Greek intellectual verbs from the angle of frame semantics theory and cognitivism.

This lexical field of the verbs which mean ‘understand’, ‘know’ and ‘think’ will be investigated using the means offered by the cognitive semantics and the theory of semantic frames. Briefly, the theory formulated by Fillmore claims that all words and concepts are linked together in a well-organized and hierarchic semantic net<sup>3</sup> and, therefore, it can explain the semantic evolution of the verbs of ‘thought’ within a conceptual frame.

Moreover, a diachronic investigation can reveal significant semantic changes by comparing semantic frames from two different periods of time. Due to its long history, Greek offered us the best analysis framework, as we are able to follow the evolution of the lexical paradigm under discussion over many centuries. A great deal and a wide range of literary works were produced within this long period of time. We should mention here poetry, theatre, historiography, philosophy and treaties, texts that cover a great deal of topics, with a specific (poetic or specialized) vocabulary, capable to express abstract ideas and concepts. Plato, for instance, was the creator of a complex philosophical system that required novel terms in order to express new concepts and abstract notions.

## VERBS OF ‘SIGHT’ AND ‘THOUGHT’ IN GREEK - ETYMOLOGY AND MEANING

First of all, we should look at the paradigm of the verbs of ‘thought’ in Greek. We will focus only on those lexical units derived from Indo-European (IE) roots that denoted ‘sight’ and developed the meaning ‘thought’. In the following, we will explore the verbs under discussion from an etymological perspective in order to identify their primary meaning and its diachronic development. In other words, our investigation starts from the analysis of Indo-European roots denoting ‘sight’ and their heritage into Greek.

The Proto-Indo-European language had three main roots expressing ‘sight’: *\*derk-*, *\*spek-* and *\*ok<sup>w</sup>-*. They all were inherited into Greek, but with a semantic shift as we will explain hereinafter. On the other hand, the neuter Greek verb of ‘sight’ did not derive from any of these roots in particular. The Ancient Greek verb *horáō* was created on the IE root *\*(s)wer-* / *\*(s)wor-* which did not feature the general and neuter meaning ‘see’<sup>4</sup>, but a narrow one, namely ‘observe, pay attention’<sup>5</sup>. Interestingly, *horáō*, a verb with a very irregular inflection, had more forms in the perfective aspect, namely *ópōpa* / *heōraka* and *oida*. The former two were created on the IE roots *\*ok<sup>w</sup>-*<sup>6</sup> ‘eye’ (cf. Lat. *oculus*) and *\*(s)wer-* / *\*(s)wor-*, while the latter derived from *\*weid-* / *\*woid-* ‘knowledge’<sup>7</sup>. All these verbal forms conserved the semantic content of the root they derive from, and meant ‘I have seen’ (*ópōpa* / *heōraka*), respectively ‘I know’ (the resultative perfect inflections function as present tense)<sup>8</sup>. As known, the perfective aspect of a verb expresses the completed action and the result in

<sup>3</sup> Charles J. Fillmore, *Frame semantics and the nature of language*, in *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences: Conference on the Origin and Development of Language and Speech*, Volume 280, 1976, pp. 20-32.

<sup>4</sup> In Modern Greek, the intricate flexion of this irregular verb was replaced by a more regular one, *blepo*, which denotes the general and neuter meaning ‘see’.

<sup>5</sup> Julius Pokorny, *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern: Francke, 1959), p. 1164. For this meaning, cf. Lat. *vereor* ‘respect’, ‘fear’, Eng. *beware*, *warrant*, *ward*, *warn*, *guard*, Germ. *wahren* ‘protect’, *Gevähr* ‘warrant’, *warnen* ‘warn’, *Warte* ‘guard’, *wehnehmen* ‘observe’ etc.

<sup>6</sup> On this radical was created the future tense form *ὄψομαι* ‘I will see’ and the verb *ὄσσομαι* ‘I see’, which conserve the original semantic context of the root.

<sup>7</sup> Vassilis Anagnostopoulos, *Λεξικό Πημάτων της Αρχαίας Ελληνικής* (Athens: Patakis, 2004), s.v.

<sup>8</sup> The form *oida* is generally considered to be a distinct verb, with a particular inflection, not part of the verbal paradigm of *horao*.

present<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the perfect *oida* was interpreted as the result of the act of sight in present: ‘I have seen’, so ‘I know’. Consequently, grammar (morpho-syntax) emphasizes the relation between ‘sight’ and ‘knowledge’, as the verbal aspect plays an important role in establishing the meaning of a verb. In the case of this verb, judging by its etymology, the sense oscillates between ‘sight’ and ‘think’, which mean that speakers tend to overlap these two conceptual domains.

The IE radicals mentioned above were maintained in other derivatives and compounds. Another interesting evolution was the case of the verb *sképtomai*, derived from the IE root *\*spek-* ‘watch (attentively), observe, examine’<sup>10</sup> (*skep-* reconverted from *\*spek-*). Its meaning preserved the original one, namely ‘I look (attentively), I observe’ and, consequently, ‘I examine, I think’<sup>11</sup>. In its evolution, speakers selected only the intellectual sense so that, in Modern Greek, *sképtomai* has become the common verb for the sense ‘I think’. Generally, speakers’ semantic, lexical or grammar choices can be explained by the need of expressivity. If there are two or more elements (i.e. words, senses, grammatical forms etc.), speakers tend to use the most semantically expressive or grammatically regular one. This is how the system renews itself and language evolves.

The verb *dérkomai* ‘I look, I keep the eyes open’, derived from the IE radical *\*derk-* ‘look’<sup>12</sup>. No other Ancient Indo-European language had a present verbal form derived from this root. With respect to this verb, we should make two remarks concerning its meaning. First and foremost, it does not express the general and neuter sense ‘see’. On the other hand, it does not develop an intellectual meaning (‘I think’ or ‘I know’), so it cannot be included in our semantic paradigm.

Last, but not least, we should focus on the couple *theáomai* (*theoûmai*) / *theōreō* (*theōrō*), which have the same etymological origin. More etymological interpretations have been proposed so far, but one of the etymologies widely accepted is that both verbs derive from *théa* ‘view’ and *horáō* ‘see’. The verb *theoûmai* ‘I view, I watch, I observe’, most of the times with amazement<sup>13</sup>, while *theōrō* means ‘I observe (attentively)’. In spite of its lexical components (‘view’ and ‘see’), but not surprisingly, *theōrō* developed the abstract meaning ‘observe, examine’. Cognitivism offers the following explanation: when looking attentively at a particular object we examine and try to analyse it. Therefore, philosophers use it to express the meaning ‘think, consider’. A great deal of modern philosophical and abstract terms, such as *theory*, *theoretical*, *theorem* etc., come from the Greek words *theōrō*, *theōria* etc., which denoted abstract notions even from the classical period.

From the list above, only two verbs expressing ‘thought’ can be found in Modern Greek, namely *sképtomai* (inherited *sképtomai*) and *theōrō* (borrowed from Ancient Greek). Interestingly, in Modern Greek, *theōrō* ‘consider’ was inherited under the form *thōrō* ‘watch’ with some phonetic changes from. As one can notice, it preserves the original meaning of the Ancient Greek lexical family.

<sup>9</sup> Pierre Chantraine, *Morphologie historique du grec* (Paris: Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1961).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Gr. *skopos* ‘aim, purpose’, *skopeo* ‘observe, aim’, Lat. *specio* ‘watch’, *perspicio* ‘observe carefully, scout’, *adspicio*, *auspex*, *haruspex*, *extispex*, *specula*, *specular*, *speculator*; Umbrian divinity *Speture*; Old Germ. *spehōn* (> Fr. *espier*); Skr. *pācyati* ‘see, watch’, etc. (Julius Pokorny, *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern: Francke, 1959), p. 984. Generally, as we can notice, the words cited here were religious or military term, so they had a narrow and technical meaning, not a neuter one.

<sup>11</sup> In Plato’s philosophical works, this verb is used with the meaning ‘look in order to find out and know’.

<sup>12</sup> Julius Pokorny, *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern: Francke, 1959), p. 213. Pokorny mentions other words derived from this root, for instance Sanskrit *ádārçi*, *dadārça*, Old Irish *ad-con-d<sup>h</sup> irc*, Gothic *ga-tarhjan* etc., which conserve the original meaning.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the lexical and semantic features shared with the noun *thauma* ‘wonder’.

## A SEMANTIC FRAME OF THE GREEK VERBS OF 'THOUGHT'

As we could notice from the analysis above, there is a close relation between 'sight' and 'thought', which permitted to some verbs (along with their lexical family) to develop a metaphorical, abstract and intellectual meaning on the basis of roots expressing 'sight'. This relation between 'sight' and 'thought' mirrors the relation between some internal mental processes: sensations, perceptions, on one hand, and thought, on the other hand. In other words, the act of thinking could be considered as a result of the previous act of seeing. The former is a more complex cognitive process, which entails analysis, synthesis, interpretation etc., based on the information provided by the sense organs (eyes, ears, etc.). Subsequently, psychology proves that there is a relation between these two concepts and this relation is reflected in our conceptual representations (semantic frames).

From the perspective of cognitive semantics, we can claim that the two frames organized around the concepts of 'sight' and 'thought' are interrelated. Generally, frames are characterized by the fuzziness of borders, namely they do not have clear borders and, therefore, these two frames overlap parts of the same cognitive and conceptual domain. Thus, fuzziness of borders permits frames to interfere and develop metaphorical senses. Human mind integrates words (that is concepts) in a certain net and hierarchy, developing a sort of scenarios. Concepts are characterised by attributes, values and aspects of meaning, which are part of a frame, but not all aspects are manifested in instances of use. The semantic relation between the verbs of perception and those of cognitive attitude was claimed by other researchers, such as Biriş<sup>14</sup>.

Within the frame under discussion, organised around the concept of 'thought', we can identify two main categories. The first one is made up by general, common verbs whose basic meaning is a neuter one: 'see'. They engender a variety of figurative senses (polysemy)<sup>15</sup>, have a rich lexical family and high frequency. The figurative senses that they usually develop are context-dependent, such as: 'born' or 'appear' (*cf. see the light of day*), 'think', 'consider' (*cf. As I see it, we can solve the problem quickly.*), 'meet' (*cf. I'm seeing the manager tomorrow.*) etc. In this category we should include verbs like *faínetai* and *horáō / blépō*.

The second category comprises verbs with an abstract meaning, whose primary sense is related to 'thought' and 'knowledge': 'think', 'consider', 'know'. Generally, they are derived from IE radicals that originally referred to 'sight', such as *sképtomai* 'think' and *theōrō* 'consider'.

As we have already seen, this 'sight' – 'thought' relation is bidirectional. In other words, not only the verbs or radicals expressing 'sight' developed a metaphorical and abstract meaning (*cf. sképtomai, horáō / blépō*). We also could identify verbs, which originally (i.e. in Proto-Indo-European) denoted 'thought', while in Greek they expressed 'sight'. For instance, *\*weid-* / *\*woid-* 'knowledge' was integrated in the irregular inflection of the verb *horaō* 'see' as the past tense form: *eîdon* 'I saw'. Moreover, the same IE radical *\*weid-* / *\*woid-* was later reinterpreted as a radical of 'knowledge' in order to express abstract and philosophical concepts, such as *idéa* 'idea', *eîdos* 'appearance, form, sight', *eidēsis* 'knowledge' and so on<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> In her article *Verbe de cogniție cu potențial de pragmaticalizare* (Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2013), Gabriela Biriş claims that: “Am integrat în clasa verbelor de cogniție și verbe de percepție, de tipul a auzi și a asculta, deoarece credem că sunt parte integrantă a clasei, putând explica în acest fel frecvențele „glisări” semantice dinspre percepții fizice propriu-zise înspre înțelesuri epistemice”, 33.

<sup>15</sup> Charles Fillmore claims that: „For many instances of polysemy it is possible to say that a given lexical item properly fits either of two different cognitive frames. One possibility is that a word has a general use in the everyday language but has been given a separate use in technical language”, in “Frame Semantics”, Chapter 10 (pp. 373-400), (Ed.) Geeraerts, D., *Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Readings* (Berlin / New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006), 386

<sup>16</sup> *Cf. Plato's Dialogues.*


This reinterpretation of the radical was possible in the context of the development of philosophy. Language and, especially, vocabulary mirror the socio-cultural development of the speakers' community and the most prolific and creative period in the evolution of the Greek abstract vocabulary was the development of philosophy and sciences<sup>17</sup>. It is then when a great deal of philosophical and technical terms was created, while other terms changed their meaning in order to denote abstract and novel notions, concepts, objects etc.<sup>18</sup>

### FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS

The relation between 'sight' and 'thought' can be explained both from a psychological and linguistic (grammatical and semantic) point of view, as the representations of these two concepts in speakers' mind share common areas and semantic features.

One other final remark concerning the conceptual field of verbs expressing 'thought' and their interface with the frame of 'sight' is that we deal with a complex and dynamic conceptual field, in permanent development and mutual interference.

According to cognitive semantics, vocabulary is organized in dynamic lexical-semantic fields (called frames) and our verbalization follows socio-cultural norms and determined mental patterns. The semantic evolution that we have analysed mirrors a certain way of thinking of the speakers and a mental pattern<sup>19</sup>. As we can see in Fig. 1, the frame of 'sight' overlaps with the frame of 'thought', as they reflect the cognitive rapport between 'sight' and 'thought' and express two aspects of the same internal process. That is why these denotational changes are not surprising and, interestingly, they are bidirectional ('see' ↔ 'think'), as these concepts are closely interrelated in speaker's mind.



**Fig. 1 – Relation between the frame of 'sight' and 'thought'**

A concluding remark is that the evolution of sense follow this pattern of schematisation:

'see' → 'watch' / 'look' → 'observe' / 'examine' → 'know' → 'understand' → 'think' / 'consider'

Other researchers call this pattern a continuum, where verbs do not have a stable position. They represent values that change according to semantic or pragmatic context<sup>20</sup>.

In terms of cognitive scenarios, the act of *seeing* is the first step of the process, through which we get information from the environment. Most of the times, we do not merely perceive an object, but we *look* at it attentively, if we are interested in it. This is the

<sup>17</sup> Francisco R. Adrados, *Historia de la lengua griega de los orígenes a nuestros días* (Madrid: Gredos, 1999), pp. 137-146; Paraskevi Kotzia, *To φιλοσοφικό λεξιλόγιο*, in *Ιστορία της ελληνικής γλώσσας. Από τις αρχές έως την ύστερη αρχαιότητα* (Thessaloniki: Kentro Ellinikis Glossas & Instituto Neoellinikon Spoudon, 2001).

<sup>18</sup> Terms such as *idéa* 'idea', *eídos* 'appearance, form, sight', *eidēsis* 'knowledge', abstract nouns in *-ma*, *-sis*, *-ía*, *-os*, *-syne*, *-tēt* etc.

<sup>19</sup> Referring to the Romanian verbs of thinking, Gabriela Biriş says that *a vedea* 'see' and *a şti* 'know' overlap their semantics as a result of the origin of the verb *a vedea* < IE \*weid-, which denoted both 'sight' and 'knowledge', in *Verbe de cogniție cu potențial de pragmaticalizare* (Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2013), p. 36. Etymology is merely the result that mirrors a deep mental structure, in which sight and knowledge are considered parts of the same process or cognitive scenario.

<sup>20</sup> Gabriela Biriş, *Verbe de cogniție cu potențial de pragmaticalizare* (Iași: Editura Universității „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, 2013), 34.

next level of abstraction, which entails other cognitive and semantic features. After *observing* and *examining* a particular object, concept or idea, we know something about them, we have certain information – third level. In our view, there are two final levels of abstraction, namely *understanding* and *thought*. If we understand and have a clear image about something, we are ready to formulate an opinion, through the act of thinking.

Sight plays an important role in our lives. Many researches in the domain of psychology demonstrate that the most important part of information is provided by sight and people are highly receptive to visual stimuli (images). Moreover, images can impress us more than other stimuli (noises, tastes etc.) and, therefore, they have a greater impact upon us and our feelings. Eye-witnesses are more credible than those who have just heard the information. Sight is a basic sense and the central concept of the pattern presented above<sup>21</sup>.

Some verbs can feature one or more senses listed above, as primary, secondary or figurative senses, which coexist in their semantic structure. Their conceptual development consists in gradually changing their basic meaning (for instance, ‘see’ → ‘think’). Nevertheless, as we have already demonstrated, the verbs listed above are not merely cases of polysemy. They underwent semantic shifts with a permanent character, which entered the vocabulary and the conceptual system of the Greek language.

The findings of this investigation should be compared with the frames of ‘sight’ and ‘thought’ in other languages in order to identify general tendencies in the semantic evolution of concepts and the verbalization of the extra linguistic reality. If we look at the field of ‘sight’ in other languages, we notice that verbs expressing this concept are highly polysemic. They denote not only ‘sight’, but they develop context-specific features. This is the case of the verbs Sp. *ver*, Fr. *voir*<sup>22</sup>, Eng. *see*<sup>23</sup>, which can also mean ‘understand’. Such a comparison would be very useful in order to understand the deep semantic structure of languages.

Greek developed a highly abstract vocabulary, due to its lexical and semantic possibilities of creation. It was also able to express novel and abstract notions in domains such as literature, poetry, theatre, philosophy, religion and science – some of the peaks of the Ancient Greek civilisation. That is why one could think that only in Greek the conceptual frame of ‘sight’ could develop such intellectual senses. Nevertheless, as we demonstrated, the relation between ‘sight’ and ‘thought’ is deeply rooted into our mental linguistic schemata and we expect to find it in other languages, as well.

<sup>21</sup> Interestingly, some verbs of hearing can develop a cognitive meaning. For instance, Rom. *a auzi* ‘hear’ means in some contexts ‘understand’: *Ai auzit?* (‘Did you hear me?’) as a discourse marker, which is equivalent to ‘Did you understand?’.

<sup>22</sup> These verbs (Sp. *ver*, Fr. *voir*), along with Rom. (*a*) *vedea* come from the Lat. *video* ‘I see’, formed on the IE root *\*(s)weid-* / *\*(s)woid-* ‘knowledge’. Another relevant example is that of the Skr. Aorist (past tense) *viddhi* meant both ‘I found out’ and ‘I saw’.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. *I see what the problem is.* for ‘I understand...’.

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## BYZANTINE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST FOUR CRUSADES

Raul Constantin TĂNASE\*

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### ABSTRACT:

*IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND THE LATINS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE FIRST CRUSADES, THE BYZANTINE DIPLOMATIC CEREMONIAL CONSTITUTED A SYMBOLIC STATEMENT OF THE VALUES OF THE GREEK CULTURE AND CIVILIZATION AND A WAY OF LEGITIMIZING THE UNIVERSALIST CLAIMS OF THE EMPIRE OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT TOWARDS THE FOREIGN NATIONS. FOR THE FOREIGN VISITORS, THE MESSAGE OF THIS RITUAL WAS AT THE SAME TIME CULTURAL, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL, EMPHASIZING THE GLORY AND THE MAJESTY OF THE BASILEUS WITHIN THE TERRESTRIAL AND CELESTE ORDER. AS AN INDICATOR OF THE BYZANTINE IDENTITY AND OF THE DIVERSITY BETWEEN THE GREEKS AND THE WESTERN, THE IMPERIAL PROTOCOL BECAME ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE FRAME FOR THE CULTURAL - IDEOLOGICAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN THE TWO CHRISTIAN WORLDS DURING THE AGE OF THE HOLY WARS OF THE CHRISTIANITY. THIS STUDY AIMS TO ANALYZE A NUMBER OF THE MEANS AND STRATEGIES OF THE GREEK DIPLOMACY USED BY THE BYZANTINE LEADERS FOR THE CONSERVATION AND ACHIEVEMENT OF ITS MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES.*

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**KEY WORDS:** CEREMONIAL, BYZANTINES, OATH, GIFTS, VOLUBILITY.

### INTRODUCTION

In the context of the diplomatic exchanges between the East and the West during the period of the first crusades, the imperial ceremony represented a full expression of the Byzantine ideology and a symbolic way of asserting the profound beliefs and values of a group. The ceremonial determines the functioning of the Byzantine court and Greek society as a whole, since its subjects fulfilled certain roles within it<sup>1</sup>. Because the protocol was intended to impress and to emphasize the imperial mystery, several crusaders eyewitnesses who participated, were generally fascinated by the extent of its development and the showing

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\* PhD. Candidate, Faculty of Orthodox Theology at University of Bucharest, Bucharest, Romania. Contact: tanase.raul@yahoo.com

This work was supported by the project "Excellence academic routes in the doctoral and postdoctoral research – READ" co-funded from the European Social Fund through the Development of Human Resources Operational Programme 2007-2013, contract no. POSDRU/159/1.5/S/137926.

<sup>1</sup> For example, the acclamations that are the responsibility of the people are a direct involvement of the subjects in the various rituals. Constantin VII Porphyrogénète, *Le livre des cérémonies*, tome I, traduit par Albert Vogt, (Paris: Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres, 1935-1939), cap. 2, 32.

of richness<sup>2</sup>; these elements were designed to emphasize the dignity of the protagonists and, at the same time, the majesty of the Byzantine Empire and the particular Greek sovereign's status. The discipline of the imperial court was strictly regulated by a complex system of priorities (*taxis*)<sup>3</sup>, specifying the rank and the role of the various officials within the protocol and their position in relation to the Basileus, considered the thirteenth apostle and the representative of the divine authority on earth. The divine and inaccessible nature of the Byzantine sovereign underlined the distance that separates him from his subjects, so that the contact of the latter with the terrestrial God's lieutenant was limited by a number of specific rules. The gifts offered to the Western leaders, the ritual exchanging the kiss of peace, the oath accomplished by the Latin leaders, the basileus's volubility, the banquets, the matrimonial alliances, all of this represented strategies that assured in many cases the success of the Byzantine diplomatic process during the period of the holy wars of Christianity.

### **THE BYZANTINE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES: OATH, GIFTS, VOLUBILITY.**

The Byzantine diplomacy showed flexibility and had always adjusted to the internal and international political context generated by the passage of the Crusaders towards Constantinople. The Alexios Comnenus's negotiations with the Western leaders took into account the values and customs of the opponent. In this respect, the loyalty oath required by the basileus to foreign princes constituted a way of building mutual trust and a manner whereby the treaties acquired the validity and mandatory character. Apparently, it was a vow unilaterally provided by the foreign prince, king, nobles and Italian maritime republics. The Byzantine sources don't remember ever the Byzantine emperor's homage for reinforcing the agreements concluded with the participants in the first Crusade<sup>4</sup>. With the Comneni, treaties were bilateral in content but unilateral in form; the free act of the basileus donation remained a form of the Byzantine diplomacy until 1453. The oath of allegiance represents a part of the agreement<sup>5</sup>. Although in theory it was inviolable, in practice, the Byzantines could transgress the agreement when the imperial interests were threatened. The priority principle, according to which the Greek sovereign was able to abstain in a reply to subordinates, became intolerable for the Western leaders, for which the oath obligations were mutual and could not be violate. The soldiers of Christ began to doubt the sincerity of the gestures and statements of the Constantine's successors, especially when the latter sealed the alliances and agreements with the gifts.

The homage was considered a humiliating thing in the western feudal relations. Raoul de Caen indicates that Bohemond's oath was a humiliation and injustice to the Latins<sup>6</sup>. The idea that the Greeks were unfaithful, lazy and without dignity, opposed to the honor of the soldiers of Christ<sup>7</sup>. Raoul de Caen believes that the dishonor at which the Basileus subjected the Crusaders was the reason for the oath trespass. *Anonymous* noted that, although initially

<sup>2</sup> Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem de 1095 à 1184*, tome second, trad. de Geneviève et René Métais, (Paris:1999), XX, XXII, 355-356.

<sup>3</sup> For this concept see Hélène Ahrweiler, *Ideologia politică a Imperiului bizantin*, (București: Corint, 2002), 123-135.

<sup>4</sup> Angeliki Laiou, „The emperor's word: chrysobolls, oaths and synallagmatic relations in Byzantium (11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> C.)”, in: *Mélanges Gilbert Dagron, Travaux et Mémoires*, 14, Association des Amis du Centre d'Histoire et Civilisation de Byzance, (Paris: 2002), 355.

<sup>5</sup> Angeliki Laiou, „The emperor's word: chrysobolls, oaths and synallagmatic relations in Byzantium.....”, 362.

<sup>6</sup> Raoul de Caen, *The Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen – A history of the normans on the first crusade*, translated by Bernard S. Bachrach and David S. Bachrach, (Ashgate, 2010), XII, 32-33.

<sup>7</sup> Guibert de Nogent, *Geste de Dieu par les Francs. Histoire de la première croisade*, trad. de Monique-Cécile Garand, (Turnhout: Brepols), 1998, III, 4, 100.



they refused to perform the homage, pressed by necessity, the Westerners were forced to humble themselves in front of the Greek leader<sup>8</sup>. Guibert of Nogent stated that the Franks weren't afraid of anything except to being forced to swear before the small Greeks, the most coward of the people, fact that was an everlasting shame<sup>9</sup>. The chroniclers are critical to those who have accepted the conditions of the Orientals, even if the Latin acts are explained by other more pressing reasons than the pride<sup>10</sup>.

A concluding mechanism of the treaty requiring the familiarity with the enemy constituted the ratification by oath. Employing the oath as a way to ensure the viability of the agreement involves the knowledge of the religious dogmata of the enemy and represents a manner of recognizing the other's beliefs in delicate moments of suspicion when the assurances were necessary. One of the vows was performed on the Gospel, which was the usual western procedure in making the covenant and belonged to the legal procedures of the Latin kingdom. For Christians, to swear by touching sacred relics or a holy book, served as a certainty because the involvement of the sacred character was a guarantee of the good faith of those who perform the oath<sup>11</sup>. This gesture of touching a sacred object had no significance in the Muslim world, since for the Turkish the verbal component of an agreement was essential<sup>12</sup>.

The vassalage contract was drawn up in written form rarely; usually, this happened when the two people involved were the key players on the political scene. The ritual whereby the relationships between the two were established included certain rites, gestures, as homage and faith or the fidelity oath. The homage entailed the pronunciation of the formula and, in particular, a symbolic gesture: the vassal placed his hands clasped in those of the lord. In some regions, such as in Northern Italy, the subjects didn't perform the tribute. The oath of fidelity had a necessary character: the vassal performs it by standing with his hand on the Bible or on holy relics<sup>13</sup>. In some countries, such as France, the homage and the oath were accompanied by a third rite: the kiss that the noble gave to the subject. These symbolic gestures were accomplished once and for all but, in exceptional cases, the oath may be renewed<sup>14</sup>. The main advantages arising from this contract for the subject was constituted by receiving a territory (feoff). This was accompanied by a symbolic gesture, the investiture. The lord conveyed to the vassal a symbolic object (scepter, baton, knife, gloves). This object may symbolize the transmission of the power on the feoff to the vassal, authority held by the lord until then. Initially, the subjects had the right to use the feud and benefit of what it produced. He couldn't divide it, sell it or give up. With the passage of time, as far as the vassal was fully recognized as a master of his land, he could dispose of his field as he wished.

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<sup>8</sup> *Histoire anonyme de la première croisade (Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum)*, éditée et traduite par Louis Bréhier, (Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1924), 29-31. Foucher of Chartres justifies the oath's necessity for the Crusaders leaders in that they weren't enough strong if they didn't reach an agreement with the emperor. Foulcher de Chartres, *Histoire des croisades*, in: *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, ed. M. Guizot, no. 68, (Paris: Librairie Chez J.L.J. Brière, 1825), IV, 24.

<sup>9</sup> Guibert de Nogent, *Geste de Dieu par les Francs...*, III, 4, 100.

<sup>10</sup> Raoul of Caen and *Gesta Francorum* complain that Bohemond was humiliated in front of Alexios, because he had sworn loyalty to basileus. Raoul de Caen, *Gesta Tancredi*, in: *Recueil des Historiens des Croisades: Historiens Occidentaux*, vol. III, (Paris: Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-lettres, 1866), xi, 612-613; *Histoire anonyme de la première croisade (Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum)*..., 6, 31.

<sup>11</sup> *O city of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates*, translated by Harry J. Magoulias, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1984), 46, 26-27; Ana Comnena, *Alexiada*, vol. II, trad. de Marina Marinescu, prefață și note de Nicolae-Șerban Tanașoca, (București: Minerva, 1977), XIV, 27, 251.

<sup>12</sup> Yvonne Friedman, „Peacemaking. Perceptions and practices in medieval Latin East”, in: *The crusades and the Near East. Cultural histories*, ed. Conor Kostick, (Routledge, London and New York, 2011), 247.

<sup>13</sup> For the practice of the oath on the Bible see also Yvonne Friedman, „Peacemaking. Perceptions and practices in medieval Latin East”..., 247.

<sup>14</sup> Jacques le Goff, *Le Moyen Âge*, (Paris: Bordas, 1962), 29.

At his death, the feud passed again in the lord's possession, but, in the next period, it will return to the greatest son, who had to renew the vow<sup>15</sup>. When the subject was considered violated in his rights by the senior, he could deny his faith, by keeping the land. In turn, the lord, in case of the agreement violation, could withdraw the support and the domain to the vassal, after a consultation with his staff.

The presence of mercenaries in the Byzantine army was considered inadmissible by the Latin chroniclers. This is an indicator of the Greeks cowardice and a clue of the lack of military resources in the empire. The Crusaders were afraid of being regarded as mercenaries by the Byzantine, refusing to take the risk on behalf of those who weren't enough brave to lead their troops. This problem occurred during the time of the first holy expedition, when the emperor got the Crusaders the vow that they will fight against the Turks, keeping the spoils that refused to share with the soldiers of Christ. Guillaume of Tyr and Robert of Clari claimed that basileus, aware of the fact that the Greeks were effeminate, preferred the Latin loyalty and courage and entrusted to them the main tasks.

What shocked the imaginary of the soldiers of Christ was the Byzantines' lack of loyalty to their king, which often took the form of the power usurpation. The murder of the les-majesty constituted the most reprehensible practice in the feudal world, where the obedience and the defense of the lord preceded other considerations; the assault to the sovereign power can disrupt the providential order. Michael VII is overthrown by Nicephorus III Botaniates (1078-1081); this will serve as a pretext for Robert Guiscard to attack the empire, arguing that his actions had as a reason the reinstatement on the throne for Michael and the justice restoring, especially since his daughter was engaged to the son of the deposed basileus<sup>16</sup>. Guillaume of Tyr shows that cunning Alexios maliciously usurped the throne of Nechifor Botaniates<sup>17</sup>. What was a simple coup d'état for the Byzantines, represented the most serious act of disloyalty from the point of view of the soldiers of Christ. Alexius Comnenus, for overthrowing Nichefor III Botaniates from the throne fifteen years before the start of the crusade, constituted the subject of serious complaints from the Latin chroniclers<sup>18</sup>. Guibert of Nogent refuses to recognize the legitimate succession of Alexios, who usurped the imperial title<sup>19</sup>. The emperor's betrayal was reflected on the subjects as they tolerated the tyrannical acts of their master and become accomplices in its actions. Because the murder and perjury were complementary in the Western world, the usurpation was related to the credibility of the oaths and treaties concluded by the Byzantines. The loyalty and fidelity values seemed to be respected by the Muslims rather than the Christ's fellows to the disappointment of Westerners<sup>20</sup>. The chivalrous ethics forbade the accompanying with a guilty person and postulated the punish by a divine punishment worthy of the crime.

Regarding to the sincerity of the Greek leader, the Western chroniclers denounced the volubility. The eloquence represents an important asset of imperial diplomacy, the art of convincing or to flatter in order to earn the goodwill of the partner. Odon of Deuil mentions the long phrases of the speaker and interpreter during the audience offered by the King Louis

<sup>15</sup> Jacques le Goff, *Le Moyen Âge...*, 30.

<sup>16</sup> Ana Comnena, *Alexiada*, vol. I, trad. de Marina Marinescu, prefață și note de Nicolae-Șerban Tanașoca, (București: Minerva, 1977), I, XIII, 2, 53.

<sup>17</sup> Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem de 1095 à 1184*, tome premier, trad. de Geneviève et René Métais, (Paris, 1999), II, IV, 57.

<sup>18</sup> Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem de 1095 à 1184*, tome premier..., II, IV, 57.

<sup>19</sup> Guibert de Nogent, *Geste de Dieu par les Francs...*, I, 5, 70.

<sup>20</sup> Marc Carrier, *L'Autre à l'époque des croisades: les Byzantins vus par les chroniqueurs du monde latin (1096-1261)*, Éditions universitaires européennes, 2012, 75.

VII to the basileus envoys<sup>21</sup>, while Order Vital testified that the Greeks are superior in eloquence on other peoples but regarding to the armed conflict they are lacking of courage<sup>22</sup>. The Byzantins considered this quality as an essential virtue of the ideal ruler and a manifestation of the divine inspiration by which he seduced his subjects. What Latins perceived as an exaggerated verbalism, constituted a proud for the Greeks who boasted of their oratorical skills. Ana Comnena attributed this quality to his father, who was distinguished as an exemplary general and emperor because of his eloquence and charm of his conversation<sup>23</sup>. The lie wasn't necessarily dishonorable from the Byzantine perspective, especially when it was the view of the Greek sovereign's on the other nations. The Constantine's successors considered themselves superior to the other nations and the deformation of the truth was accepted when there were taken into account the empire's interest<sup>24</sup>. For Latins, in contradiction, the volubility of the Orientals was destabilizing and elusive: the Western seniors preferred what was certain and honest, since the person's merit is quantified by deeds rather than by words. On the other hand, the Byzantines preferred the words instead of the facts, "the emperor's ambassadors gave good news but they didn't confirm it by facts; the Crusaders couldn't believe them because they used every time the same language full of excessive flattery"<sup>25</sup>. The Constantine's successors chatter was considered a way to make a diversion on the real stakes of the negotiations and produced the interlocutors' confusion through the medium of an ongoing excessive rhetoric. Their habit of hiding the truth in beautiful words caused the appearance of the heresy<sup>26</sup>. Because the volubility represented a common attribute for all Greeks, Odon of Deuil believes that one should always be suspicious about them<sup>27</sup>. According to him, even the honorable receptions questioned the sincerity of the emperor. During the journey to Constantinople in 1147, the French chronicler says that Louis VII received letters expressing an exaggerated affection to be honest, but they also emphasized the fear of the basileus regarding to the Franks to whom he was tempted to persuade with vain and honeyed words<sup>28</sup>. During the imperial audience granted to the Louis VII by Manuel Comnenus, Odon adds that the emperor's words were gracious but disingenuous: "if the body's gestures, the facial appearance and the words came from the heart, all those present could say that the emperor cherishes the king with a great affection; but such arguments were not only likely, never sure"<sup>29</sup>. As soon as the Christ's soldiers crossed the Bosphorus, the willingness of the basileus disappeared. When Louis VII sent delegates to Manuel for restoring the march from which they retired, they hadn't benefited by the special reception as a few days before; the delegates had to wait one day to get the audience, without food, and were forced to sleep on the cold marble. Raymond d'Aguilers mentions also the Byzantine's perfidy. Arriving at Durazzo, the soldiers of Christ believed to be in their country, considering that Alexios and his subjects are brothers and cooperators; however, the latter had become cruel as lions, they attacked the Crusaders and

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<sup>21</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII.*, in: *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, ed. M. Guizot, no. 68, (Paris: Librairie Chez J.L.J.Brière, 1825), II, 296.

<sup>22</sup> Orderic Vitalis, *The Ecclesiastical History*, vol. VI, trans. Marjorie Chibnall, (Oxford University Press, 1969-1980), XIII, 34, 505.

<sup>23</sup> Ana Comnena, *Alexiada*, vol. I...., III, VII, 3, 131.

<sup>24</sup> Marc Carrier, „Perfidious and Effeminate Greeks: the Representations of Byzantine Ceremonial in the Western Chronicles of the Crusades (1096-1204)”, in: *Annuario dell'Istituto Romeno di Cultura e Ricerca Umanistica Venezia*, IV (2002): 54.

<sup>25</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII....*, III, 318.

<sup>26</sup> Liutprand de Crémone, *Ambassades à Byzance*, traduit du latin par Joël Schnapp, (Toulouse: Anacharsis Éditions, 2004), 27.

<sup>27</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII...*, II, 296.

<sup>28</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII....*, II, 295.

<sup>29</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII...*, III, 320.

killed them, although the emperor sent to them letters during the way in letters talking about peace and brotherhood, words which remained without consequences. The same complaints are addressed by Guibert of Nogent to Alexios, since the latter ordered secretly the killing of the men of Godefroy of Bouillon<sup>30</sup>. During the second Crusade, the Byzantines attacked the German troops even if before they had sworn that they would facilitate the transition and will not be aggressive<sup>31</sup>. Even Nicetas Choniates recalls that as soon as the German armies were camped before Adrianople because one of the relatives of the king fell ill, the Greeks attacked at midnight and they burned the sick man and his company<sup>32</sup>. Therefore, it is not surprising that many chroniclers and Crusaders have suddenly become distrustful regarding to the Byzantine diplomacy. This doubt was apparent during the ritual of the kisses exchange at the beginning of each diplomatic meeting, a medieval tradition suggesting the good faith, honesty and loyalty of each participant<sup>33</sup>.

The gifts were a fundamental step in the process of building mutual trust within the negotiations<sup>34</sup>. The gifts of the Greeks confirmed the empire's superiority over the other nations and were a mean to gain their friendship and loyalty<sup>35</sup>. Although this method was successful in whole, the empire's products being considered of the best quality, however there was a disadvantage to the diplomatic level, since, in the time, the offerings of Constantine's successors will be seen as a tool of purchasing different people. For example, in the tenth century, the Russians believes that behind the offers of the Byzantines were hidden the deceit and, therefore, they showed caution in their dealings with the emperor. Although some nations had appreciated the basileus' generosity, those who came in direct contact with him had suspicions on the real intentions of the Orientals, considering that the latter exploited the greed of the foreigners to their advantage. The gifts of the basileus depended on the ambassadors' importance and rank, and on the existing relations between the two nations. The offers aimed at shocking the visitors and they sealed the alliance concluded.

There is a cultural difference between the East and the West when granting the offerings. In the East, bringing gifts constituted a primary gesture for opening the negotiations. In an old French manuscript of Guillaume of Tyr it is available the description of an event when the northern leaders offered gifts of gold, horses and expensive clothes of Baldwin I who was receiving them sitting on his throne<sup>36</sup>. In the West, the gifts marked the culmination of the process of negotiation and often meant the hierarchical relationship between the parties. The prominent part gave offerings to the lower, marking its dependency status. Apart from the greed of the soldiers of Christ, the Byzantine's gifts were perceived as a veil for their dishonest intentions. Guillaume of Tyr shows that basileus fills the princes with gifts, but not because of his generosity or benevolence but only out of fear and astuteness. The principles, led by their simplicity and sincerity of heart, believed in the evil of Greeks, in the persevering wiles of the emperor, especially since the latter has filled them with offerings and showed a great kindness to all. Albert d'Aix claims that the Greeks'

<sup>30</sup> Guibert de Nogent, *Geste de Dieu par les Francs...*, II, 12, 96.

<sup>31</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII.....*, III, 316.

<sup>32</sup> *O city of Byzantium, Annals of Niketas Choniates.....*, 63, 37.

<sup>33</sup> Odon de Deuil, *Histoire de la croisade de Louis VII.....*, III, 320.

<sup>34</sup> Ana Comnena, *Alexiada*, vol. II, ....., X, VII, 3-5, 92-93.

<sup>35</sup> Guillaume de Tyr, *Chronique du Royaume Franc de Jerusalem de 1095 à 1184*, tome premier ..., II, XXI, p. 80 ; II, XVI, pp. 71-72; II, XVI, 73.

<sup>36</sup> Yvonne Friedman, „Peacemaking. Perceptions and practices in medieval Latin East” ....., 244.

presents were misleading since they were returning to the imperial coffers as Christ's soldiers had to buy supplies at higher prices set by the Greek sovereign<sup>37</sup>.

The Western chroniclers believed that the offerings are a manifestation of the betrayal of the Greeks and many Latin leaders have fallen into their trap because of greed. The Byzantines easily remarked the Latin avarice; Ana Comnena presents the Franks who had always their greedy mouths open in front of the richness<sup>38</sup>. The gifts were a means by which Westerners have fallen prey to the fake of the Byzantines. Some Crusaders' leaders were aware of this danger and therefore tried to avoid to participate to the diplomatic meeting and Byzantine ceremony: according to Albert d'Aix, Godfrey of Bouillon refused several times the meeting with Alexios before encamped in front of Constantinople, preferring to stay safe from the tricks of the Greeks<sup>39</sup>, receiving what the emperor gave him from the distance<sup>40</sup>.

## CONCLUSION

The means and strategies of the Greek's diplomacy were always adapted to the needs of the empire and the values of the opponent. The Byzantine custom of adopting foreign rules aimed to include the other nations in the Greek hierarchy and taming potential adversaries through gifts and privileges. Thus, based on the tradition of western feudal oath, Alexios requested to the senior western the homage, which sanctioned the position of the basileus and the obligation of the Crusaders to return to the empire the conquered territories of the Muslim. Simultaneously, the homage represents an important step in building the mutual trust and a practical way in which treaties were ratified. The volubility of the Greek sovereign was often criticized by the Western chroniclers, since this diversion trying to attract the attention of Latin leaders and their willingness to support the cause of the successor of Constantine the Great. The lie was accepted by the Byzantines as long as thereby ensuring the fulfillment of their objectives; on the other side, the Westerners considered exaggerated the Greeks' flattery, preferring the armed struggle to the detriment of oratorical art. Contrary to the eloquence which was a feature of the knight, the volubility was considered a means to confuse the other part in front of a subterfuge. The gifts offered to the ambassadors aimed at winning their goodwill and loyalty and confirmed the superiority of the empire in relation with the foreign nations. Although they had speculated the Westerners' greed, the Greek's gifts became a veil hiding their dishonest and treacherous intentions, raising the suspicion and distrust of the Christ's soldiers. The vassalic oath, providing presents, the volubility of the basileus, constituted the means by which the Byzantines tried to ensure the efficiency of the diplomatic process and to fulfill their political, economical and military goals.

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<sup>37</sup> Albert D'Aix, *Histoire des faits et gestes dans les régions d'outre mer, depuis l'année 1095 jusqu'à l'année 1120 de Jésus Christ*, vol. I, ed. F. Guizot, in: *Collection des Mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France*, tome 20-21, (Paris: Librairie Chez J.L.J.Brière, 1825), II, 65.

<sup>38</sup> Ana Comnena, *Alexiada*, vol. II, ..., X, VI, 4, p. 89; XI, IX, 2, p. 151; X, V, 4, 84.

<sup>39</sup> Albert D'Aix, *Histoire des faits et gestes dans les régions d'outre mer....*, trad. F. Guizot, II, 58-59; Marc Carrier, „Perfidious and Effeminate Greeks: the Representations of Byzantine Ceremonial ...”, 60.

<sup>40</sup> Albert D'Aix believed that the Greeks' gifts are temporary and deceptive, since afterwards the Crusaders were forced to buy food and equipment for their journey to higher prices. Albert D'Aix, *Histoire des faits et gestes dans les régions d'outre mer....*, trad. F. Guizot, II, 58-59.

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# FERTILITY DISORDERS ASSOCIATED TO COELIAC DISEASE-RETROSPECTIVE STUDY

Cosmin CIORA<sup>1</sup>  
Mircea DICULESCU<sup>2</sup>

**ABSTRACT:** THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY IS TO EVALUATE THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN COELIAC DISEASE AND MENSTRUAL CYCLE ABNORMALITIES , FERTILITY DISORDERS OR PREGNANCY ASSOCIATED COMPLICATIONS.

**METHOD:** THIS WAS A CASE CONTROL STUDY IN WHICH 32 FEMALE PATIENTS WITH COELIAC DISEASE AND 44 HEALTHY CONTROLS WERE COMPARED, THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS EVALUATED IN BOTH GROUPS BEING: THE PRESENCE OF MENSTRUAL CYCLE ABNORMALITIES, FERTILITY DISORDERS OR COMPLICATIONS DURING PREGNANCY.

**RESULTS:** THE ANALYSED GROUP WAS COMPOSED OF 32 WOMEN WITH COELIAC DISEASE AND 44 HEALTHY WOMEN. THE MEAN AGE WAS 31.78 YEARS VS 32.29 YEARS IN CONTROLS. THE FREQUENCY OF AMENORRHEA WAS HIGHER IN THE COELIAC DISEASE GROUP VS CONTROLS (  $P=0.01$ ). THE STRONGEST ASSOCIATIONS WERE OBTAINED BETWEEN COELIAC DISEASE AND COMPLICATIONS DURING PREGNANCY ( $P=0.00$ ), MEAN AGE OF MENARCHE (13.65 YEARS VS 12.63 YEARS IN CONTROLS( $P=0.00$ )), MEAN NUMBER OF PREGNANCIES (1.84 VS 2.39 (  $P=0.005$ )).

**CONCLUSIONS:** THE OCCURRENCE OF A SIGNIFICANT CORRELATION BETWEEN CELIAC DISEASE AND REPRODUCTIVE DISORDERS (MEAN AGE OF MENARCHE, AMENORRHEA, NUMBER OF PREGNANCIES OR COMPLICATIONS DURING PREGNANCY) COULD SUGGEST TO CONSIDER CELIAC DISEASE DIAGNOSTIC PROCEDURES (SEROLOGICAL SCREENING) IN WOMEN AFFECTED BY THESE DISORDERS.

**KEY WORDS:** COELIAC DISEASE, FERTILITY DISORDERS, PREGNANCY ASSOCIATED COMPLICATIONS, MENARCHE

## INTRODUCTION:

Coeliac disease is an autoimmune chronic illness triggered by diet exposure to gluten, affecting genetically predisposed individuals (1). In general population the prevalence is aprox. 1 % (2) with a female: male ratio of 2.5: 1 (3). There are several studies in the literature reporting a higher prevalence of Coeliac disease in females with fertility disorders or in females with complications during pregnancy(4), the reciprocity being also described.

## CELIAC DISEASE AND INFERTILITY

Coeliac disease is an autoimmune illness affecting multiple organs but the symptoms are less specific, this being the cause for delayed diagnosis or even misdiagnosis. The diagnostic delay may lead to development of major complications in the long term. If once it was considered a rare disorder, nowadays 1 person in one hundred is estimated to suffer from

<sup>1</sup> Gastroenterology and Hepatology Center, Fundeni Clinical Institute; Assistant professor UMF Carol Davila Gastroenterology and Hepatology Center Fundeni; cioracs@ yahoo.com

<sup>2</sup> Gastroenterology and Hepatology Center, Fundeni Clinical Institute

this disease. Despite the high prevalence, more than 95 % of patients remain undiagnosed and this happens because almost 38 % of them are asymptomatic or are misdiagnosed given the nonspecific complainings.

Lately, coeliac disease is considered a silent illness , having few clinical manifestations or discrete gastrointestinal symptoms , such as moderate diarrhea. Females with fertility disorders or pregnancy associated complications have no other symptoms suggesting the background disease, some of them having as the only complaint a slight fatigue due to iron deficiency anemia. In many cases these fertility disorders , late menarcha, or early onset of menopause can be the only manifestations that can raise the suspicion of coeliac disease (6). These problems may be due to autoimmune complications or nutritional deficits associated with the disease (7). The highest prevalence of the disease is met in females during their reproductive life.

The “classical” illness symptoms are gastrointestinal (chronic watery diarrhea, abdominal pain and bloating, nausea) and symptoms associated with malabsorption (weight loss despite normal appetite, growth stopping in children). Atypical disease is described in case of minimal or no gastrointestinal symptoms. In these cases the patient presents with iron deficiency anemia, growth deficit, osteoporosis, infertility. Atypical disease is more frequent than the classical one, but it is often misdiagnosed because of non gastrointestinal symptoms.

There are several data that sustain a positive correlation between nutritional deficits/inflammatory response and the appearance of fertility problems, although the pathogenesis is not fully known (8). The malabsorption leads to nutritional deficits that have a clear effect on reproductive function, although in females with coeliac disease this connection cannot be fully proven, so it is less probable that the malabsorption is the only implicated mechanism. (9)

**METHODS:** This was a case control study in which 32 female patients with coeliac disease and 44 healthy controls were compared, the main characteristics evaluated in both groups being : age of menarche, amenorrhea, number of pregnancies, complications during pregnancy, menstrual cycle abnormalities, number of miscarriages and pregnancy duration.

Females between 18 and 50 years were included, with diagnosis of coeliac disease being set during pregnancy or postpartum , based on serologic testing : tTG IgA ( 1<sup>st</sup> choice in suspected CD according to latest guidelines) , AGA and anti DGP. 30 women out of 32 included accepted gastrointestinal endoscopy as a method of diagnosis and in all cases the serological diagnosis was confirmed on biopsy. The other data were collected during a telephonic interview or from patients` datacharts.

The diagnosis was supported by tTGA positivity in 26 cases (81%) , EMA in 8 cases (25%) and anti DGP in 12 cases (37 %). Gastroscopy was performed in 30 women out of 32, and the histological diagnosis was positive for coeliac disease in all cases. HLA testing was not performed. All patients were already following a gluten free diet when included in the study..

Statistical and graphical evaluations were performed with OriginPro8 programme. P Test ( TTEST function- returns probability t`Student) is statistically significant when values are less or equal to 0.05.

## **RESULTS:**

A number of 76 patients were investigated ,out of which 44 healthy controls (without coeliac disease) and 32 patients with coeliac disease. On the following presentation we will refer to 2 independent groups. We also mention the following:

Healthy controls group, n=44

Coeliac disease group , n=32






Figure 1. Procentual representation of the 2 groups components  
The graphical design was performed using OriginPro8 programme.




Figure 2. Median age in the 2 groups: healthy control group (marked as H) and coeliac disease group (marked as CD)

This graphic shows that the median age is similar in the 2 groups studied ( $p = 0.98$ )




Figure 3. Age on menarche

Mean age on menarche is 12.63 in healthy females vs 13.45 in coeliac disease, suggesting late menarche in coeliac disease group is statistically significant. The late menarche and early menopause in coeliac disease is considered an indirect factor of infertility(13).

The age at menarche in patients with CD and FGD is decreased to age at menarche in mother's, but is higher in the untreated CD patients and mother's. These findings support the hypothesis that the age at menarche in girls with coeliac disease is regulated by gluten-free diet and by other genetic and environmental factors




Figure 4. Menstrual cycle disorders ( oligomenorrhea, hypomenorrhea, metrorrhagies, premenstrual syndrome ) were more prevalent in CD group ( no statistical significance –p=0.17)




Figure 5. For  $p=0.01$  amenorrhea-CD association is statistically significant.

It is known that higher prevalence of amenorrhea in women with celiac disease is a factor of subfertility. Amenorrhea may be the first manifestation of celiac disease. 19.4% frequency of amenorrhea was reported among celiac women versus 2.2% among healthy controls (14).

Celiac disease should be considered in patients presenting with malnutrition and primary amenorrhea.




Figure 6. Number of pregnancies in the 2 groups studied

In this graphical representation it can easily be observed the difference between the 2 groups ( $p=0.005$ ), concluding that the number of pregnancies is significantly lower in the

Coeliac disease group when compared with the general population. This difference is no longer seen when free-gluten diet is adopted. Also, some studies attest a higher age of the mother when the first child is born in coeliac disease group compared to the general population.(7)




Figure 7. Pregnancy disorders associated with celiac disease are statistically significant  $p = 0.00$ . The association is statistically significant in this study. This association is reported by several studies in relation to nutritional deficiencies or immune-mediated mechanisms.

The number of miscarriages is higher in the celiac disease group, but this theory has no statistical significance ( $p = 0.39$ ). The pregnancy duration is lower in CD, this also having no statistical significance ( $p = 0.11$ ). Premature birth was defined as giving birth before 37 weeks of pregnancy.

## DISCUSSION

Coeliac disease is rarely considered as a diagnosis when evaluating infertility, and the literature term for this connection is “neglected clinical association”. In North America 7-14 % of the women are infertile. Among these, approx 15 % have idiopathic infertility, once the anatomic and endocrine causes are excluded(10). This leads to the conclusion that approx 1 % of women suffer from idiopathic infertility. Female patients with Coeliac disease may present with amenorrhea, repeated spontaneous miscarriages, iron deficiency anemia, premature births, low weight babies on birth, but sometimes they may be completely asymptomatic (11). If we consider the mean age on diagnosis as 40-50 years and the delay in diagnosing, we can say that most of the women suffering from Coeliac disease are undiagnosed when they are close to menopause. This means that most of their reproductive life can be affected by an undiagnosed coeliac disease (12).

There are several studies in the literature evaluating the association between coeliac disease and menstrual cycle disorders, fertility problems and complications during pregnancy (3).

In this study the age on menarche was significantly higher in coeliac disease patients comparing to healthy controls. This is also available for females complaining of menstrual cycle abnormalities. Most of the patients described this disturbance as first manifestation of disease.

The study also proved the association of coeliac disease with complications during pregnancy. The miscarriage rate was double in the coeliac disease group compared to the healthy controls, but the association was not statistically significant, and this may be due to reduced number of cases. The rate of complications during pregnancy ( severe anemia, uterine hiperkinesia, intrauterine growth deficit, miscarriage imminence, pregnancy related hypertension) was significantly higher in Coeliac disease as in healthy controls. Also, a shorter duration of pregnancy was observed in patients affected by the disease, but this observation was not proven to be statistically significant.

The number of babies born by coeliac disease affected females was significantly lower than the one of healthy ones.

Most of the females cu coeliac disease had a histological confirmed diagnosis (30 of 32) and this percentage is so high probably because the illness was diagnosed in a tertiary center of Gastroenterology.

The study described a significant association between late menarcha, number of pregnancies, amenorrhea and complications during pregnancy , suggesting the fact that coeliac disease is a potential cause for all these fertility related problems. As serological screening is easily performed and its cost is not high compared with all the other tests performed in investigating feritilty disorders, it seems rational that serological tests should be performed as routine investigation in these cases. The recommended strategy is individually case-oriented.

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## ELECTRICAL STATUS EPILEPTICUS IN SLEEP SPECTRUM IN CHILDREN

Raluca Ioana TELEANU <sup>1</sup>

Magdalena SANDU <sup>2</sup>

Daniel Mihai TELEANU <sup>3</sup>

Smaranda NIȚĂ <sup>4</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

ELECTRICAL STATUS EPILEPTICUS IN SLEEP (ESES) REPRESENTS AN ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHIC PATTERN CONSISTING IN GENERALIZATION AND ACTIVATION OF EPILEPTIFORM DISCHARGES DURING NON-REM SLEEP. IT IS ASSOCIATED WITH A HETEROGENEOUS GROUP OF CLINICAL SYNDROMES AFFECTING CHILDREN IN VARYING DEGREES OF SEVERITY, WITH COMMON AND OVERLAPPING FEATURES. THE IMPORTANCE OF RECOGNIZING AND TREATING ESES LIES IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE CHILD'S PSYCHOEMOTIONAL AND COGNITIVE STATUS AND EVOLUTION. IN THIS ARTICLE, WE PRESENT DIFFERENT ELECTROCLINICAL CASES WITHIN THE ESES SPECTRUM, THAT HAVE BEEN DIAGNOSED AND MANAGED IN OUR CLINIC.

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**KEY WORDS:** ESES, CHILDREN, COGNITIVE, SLEEP

### DEFINITION OF ESES

Electrical Status Epilepticus in Sleep (ESES) represents an electroencephalographic pattern illustrating a marked potentiation of epileptiform activity during non-REM sleep, leading to near - continuous bilateral or occasionally lateralized 1-3 Hz spike-wave (S-W) complexes, that occupy a significant proportion of the non-REM sleep. The exact proportion varies, according to the literature, between 25-85%, with no clear cutoff value being universally recognized<sup>5</sup>. We know that the epileptiform activity tends to be more marked in the first sleep cycles, especially in sleep-deprived patients. However, consensus on the definition of ESES, regarding the exact portion of sleep analyzed, still needs to be met.

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<sup>1</sup> Assoc. Prof. MD, PhD, "Carol Davila" University of Medicine, Bucharest, ralucate@gmail.com

<sup>2</sup> PhD MD "Carol Davila" University of Medicine, Bucharest

<sup>3</sup> PhD MD "Carol Davila" University of Medicine, Bucharest

<sup>4</sup> MD Department of Pediatric Neurology, "Dr. Victor Gomoiu" Children's Hospital, Bucharest, Romania

<sup>5</sup>Scheltens- de Boer M., Guidelines for EEG in encephalopathy related to ESES/CSWS in children, Epilepsia, 2009; 50(Suppl. 7):13-17

## CLINICAL SYNDROMES

ESES manifests in clinical syndromes which tend to evolve according to common patterns, displaying an age-related evolution, summing the presence of seizures, the aforementioned sleep potentiation of epileptiform activity and neuropsychologic regression, as the interictal electroencephalographic discharges tend to persist even after seizure freedom<sup>6</sup>.

Initially, ESES was associated with the syndrome of Continuous Spikes and Waves during Sleep (CSWS), a childhood epileptic encephalopathy, the terms CSWS and ESES being used interchangeably. In time, however, ESES has been recognized in relation to more clinical entities, leading to a heterogeneous group, with common and overlapping features, all pertaining to a continuum along the ESES spectrum.

CSWS and Landau Kleffner Syndrome (LKS) are severe epileptic encephalopathies associated with regression in the child's development. While CSWS is associated with a global developmental regression manifesting in previously normal or abnormal children, Landau Kleffner Syndrome particularly consists in regression in language development.

At the other end of the spectrum lie the pediatric focal epileptic syndromes, previously thought to constitute benign conditions, associated with a good outcome and no negative impact on the child's development.

Benign childhood epilepsy with centrotemporal spikes (BECTS) is the most frequent pediatric focal epileptic syndrome. Most seizures appear at the transition from wakefulness to sleep, are short and consist in unilateral sensory and motor manifestations in the oropharyngeal area. The EEG frequently shows a normal interictal tracing with superimposed usually unilateral clusters of high voltage spikes or sharp waves in the centrotemporal area, which tend to activate and generalize during non-sleep, up to a pattern consistent with ESES.


Panayiotopoulos Syndrome (PS) and Late Onset Childhood Occipital Epilepsy (Gastaut), separated by age of onset and clinical aspect of seizures, are both associated with unilateral epileptiform discharges in the occipital area, which also tend to activate during sleep.

All partial epileptic syndromes mentioned above are usually known to be associated with spontaneous improvement before puberty. However, careful psychological monitoring might reveal mild cognitive impairment, learning disabilities or behavioral problems, raising the need to monitor the child through sleep EEGs and psychological evaluations, periodically.

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<sup>6</sup> Sanchez Fernandez I. et al., *Electrical Status Epilepticus in Sleep: Clinical Presentation and Pathophysiology*, Pediatric Neurology, 2012; 47(6):390-410






### EEG ASPECTS


The following figures illustrate cases of patients with various clinical epileptic syndromes, united under the ESES spectrum, which have been diagnosed and managed in our clinic.

#### Case 1 - CSWS


**Figure 1** shows an interictal EEG recorded during wakefulness (500 $\mu$ V sensitivity) in a 6 year old child with global developmental delay, polymorphic seizures and underlying hypoxic ischemic perinatal injury. The child was on valproic acid. Generalized aperiodic 3 Hz spike-wave complexes.



**Figure 2:** Sleep EEG (500 $\mu$ V sensitivity) - ESES/CSWS. Continuous generalized 2-3 Hz spike-and -waves.




**Figure 3:** EEG (500µV sensitivity) aspect following 1 month of ACTH treatment and supplementation of antiepileptic treatment with clobazam. Marked reduction in epileptiform discharges.



## Case 2 - LKS

**Figure 4:** Sleep EEG in a 11 year old child admitted initially to the ENT department for loss of expressive language and suspicion of hypoacus. Even though the child had no other clinical signs, nor epileptic seizures, the sleep EEG revealed near-continuous 1-2 Hz spike-wave complexes, prompting to Landau Kleffner Syndrome.




### Case 3 - BECTS

**Figure 5:** Awake EEG (500 $\mu$ V sensitivity) in an otherwise healthy 6 year old boy with one focal sensory-motor seizure and one generalized seizure, with no identifiable lesions on the cerebral MRI. Spikes and spike-wave complexes over the left centro-temporal area.



**Figure 6:** Sleep EEG (500 $\mu$ V sensitivity) - important activation of epileptiform discharges, which are near-continuous but distributed asymmetrically between the two hemispheres.



### PROGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT

The syndromes associated with ESES have a common tendency towards remission of seizures into adolescence. However, the epileptiform EEG discharges may persist and there is a residual and often progressive cognitive and neuropsychological decline.

**Psychological monitoring** is therefore an important aspect of the management of children with ESES. Simple psychological assessment at various times might miss important information unless directed precisely at the evaluation of different abilities, while keeping in mind the overall development of the child and his medical history.

Because of the impact on the child's development and cognitive function, an electrical aspect consistent with ESES needs prompt treatment irrespective of clinical seizures, in order to improve neuropsychological functions and to prevent further decline.

**The therapeutic options** include corticosteroids, adrenocorticotrophic hormone and antiepileptic drugs such as benzodiazepines including clobazam, levetiracetam, valproic acid, ethosuximide<sup>7</sup>. The therapeutic schemes vary according to the underlying pathology and type of epileptic syndrome. Some options include: oral benzodiazepines combined with valproate

<sup>7</sup> Veggiotti P., Pera M. C. et al., *Therapy of Encephalopathy with Status Epilepticus During Sleep (ESES/CSWS syndrome), an update*, Epileptic Disord, 2012; 14 (1): 1-11

or steroids such as ACTH (80 UI daily with a taper of 3 months) or high dose prednisolone (2-5 mg/kg daily with a taper of 3 months)<sup>8</sup>.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The article aims to bring into attention the electroclinical entity of ESES by illustrating it with cases from our pediatric neurology practice. The importance of performing sleep EEGs and psychological assessments comes from the understanding of the impact that aberrant brain electrical activity has on the child's development.

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<sup>8</sup> Panayiotopoulos C.P., *A Clinical Guide to Epileptic Syndromes and their Treatment*, Springer; 2nd edition, 2007; 258- 259

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## POST SURGERY TROMBOFLEBITIS, MAJOR RISK OF PULMONARY EMBOLISM

**Dan Vasile POP<sup>1</sup>**  
**Marius TEODORESCU<sup>2</sup>**  
**Daniela RADU<sup>3</sup>**

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**ABSTRACT:** ONE OF THE UNDESIRE COMPLICATIONS FOLLOWING A SURGERY IS THE TROMBOFLEBITIS OF THE INFERIOR LIMBS, WHICH CAN LEAD TO PULMONARY EMBOLISM. MASSIVE PULMONARY EMBOLISM STARTING FROM THE DEEP VENOUS SYSTEM OF THE LOWER LEGS IS ONE OF THE POST SURGERY COMPLICATIONS THAT SETS IN VERY QUICKLY AND HAS A DEATH RATE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO SAVE. I HAVE ANALYZED ORTHOPEDIC SURGERIES IN DEVA COUNTY HOSPITAL AND THE SURGERY CLINIC 1, TIMIS COUNTY HOSPITAL FOR FIVE YEARS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE OBSERVED THAT THE THROMBOEMBOLISM RISK DEPENDS BOTH ON THE SIZE OF THE SURGERY AND THE CO-MORBIDITY OF THE PATIENTS (VENOUS, MALIGNANT OR CARDIAC DISORDERS, SPLENECTOMIES, BLOOD DISORDERS, ETC). DEEP TROMBOFLEBITIS REQUIRES ENERGETIC MEASURES OF MEDICAL SURGICAL TREATMENT TO RENEW THE PERMEABILITY OF THE DEEP VENOUS SYSTEM AND TO PREVENT PULMONARY EMBOLISM. IN CONCLUSION, DEEP TROMBOFLEBITIS CANNOT BE PREVENTED IN ALL OF PATIENTS WHO HAVE UNDERGONE SURGERY. THIS COMPLICATION EXISTS IN ALL SURGICAL CASES REGARDLESS OF THE APPLIED PROPHYLACTIC MEASURES.

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**KEYWORDS:** TROMBOFLEBITIS, THROMBOEMBOLISM, PULMONARY EMBOLISM,

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### INTRODUCTION

One of the undesired complications following a surgery is the tromboflebitis of the inferior limbs, which can lead to pulmonary embolism. Massive pulmonary embolism starting from the deep venous system of the lower legs is one of the post surgical complications that sets in very quickly and has a death rate almost impossible to save. For this reason, deep venous thrombosis and pulmonary embolism are severe disorders with a major risk of death. Repeated pulmonary embolism can generate pulmonary hypertension, whereas massive pulmonary embolism is fatal most of the times. Mostly neglected, the post-

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<sup>1</sup> PhD student, University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes Timișoara, Romania, popdan\_68@yahoo.com

<sup>2</sup> Professor PhD, Surgical clinic 1, Timișoara Emergency County Hospital, University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes Timișoara, Romania,

<sup>3</sup> Lecturer PhD, Surgical clinic 1, Timișoara Emergency County Hospital, University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes Timișoara, Romania, daniela\_radu@hotmail.com

thrombotic syndrome caused by the deep venous thrombosis of the lower limbs results in venous reflux and obstruction, with tegumentary and soft tissue changes, with the occurrence of ulceration, which affects the quality of patients' lives and requires high curing costs.

In North America and Europe the annual incidence of these disorders is approximately 160/100,000 for deep venous thrombosis, 20/100,000 for non-fatal symptomatic pulmonary embolism and 5/100,000 for fatal pulmonary embolism, diagnosed after autopsy.

Following the lack of preventive measures, the incidence of deep venous thrombosis is high and depends on the patients' age, the presence and the number of thrombogenic risk factors, the type and the duration of the surgery. The main factors are patients' extended immobilization, injuries, surgeries, malignant disorders and previous thromboembolic problems. Other factors include age, obesity, infection, postpartum period, varicose disease, dehydration, hormonal therapy. Thrombophilia represents the triggering etiological factor. The patients hospitalized for medical or surgical treatment who present a thromboembolic risk require specific therapeutic measures. Moreover, this risk still exists after the patients are discharged from the hospital.

Gonarthrosis is a degenerative disease, especially met among the elderly. The total arthroplasty of the knee is one of the most modern and efficient methods used to improve pain and reestablish articular mobility. One of the post ATG complications is the thromboembolic disease represented through two clinical entities: deep venous thrombosis at the level of the operated limb and pulmonary embolism, sometimes with a fatal prognosis. This complication appears among the patients with a thromboembolic risk, being the result of the lack of appropriate prophylactic measures.

The purpose of this study is to assess the efficiency of the preventive measures in the case of deep venous thrombosis during two surgical services which involve a major occurrence risk of this undesired post surgical incident.

## **MATERIAL AND METHOD**

I have analyzed the orthopedic surgeries at Deva County Hospital and general surgery interventions at Surgical Clinic 1(Timișoara Emergency County Hospital, University of Medicine and Pharmacy Victor Babes Timișoara) for five years.

Within the orthopedy-traumatology department at Deva County Hospital, during 2009 and 2014, there were 110 patients with unilateral or bilateral gonarthrosis who did not react very well to the traditional medical treatment; therefore they were considered candidates for ATG. Among these, 35 (28, 18%) were clinically diagnosed with troncular varicosity of the affected lower limb and were assessed with a view to having the venous disease operated. The total knee arthroplasty was carried out after a variable 8-12-week period using a standard technique. The thromboembolism prophylactic measures were applied to all the patients and consisted of: administering heparin with a low molecular weight in prophylactic doses, starting 2 hours before the surgery and continuing then for 2 weeks; the right hydroelectrolytic equilibrium to prevent the rise of blood viscosity; early rising from bed after surgery – passive starting from the first day, associated with isometric contractions, and active from the fourth day; compressive bandage before gaining mobility; administering dicumarinics (Trombostop or Sintrom) starting from the eleventh day and continuing for 6 weeks under periodic control, so that the Quick time should be maintained between 30-40% and INR between 1,8-2,5.

## **RESULTS**

The 35 patients, aged between 32 and 72, with an average age of 58, 7, were mostly women (66, 67%).



A number of 12 patients (40%) had co morbidity: chronic ischemic cardiomyopathy – 6 (20%), II/III-degree obesity – 4 (13,3%); atrial fibrillation – 2 (6,66).

Following the data during the clinical examination, the 35 cases were classified into several stages of chronic venous insufficiency (CEAP):

- 18 cases in stage II: troncular varicosity - in 8 cases only one inferior limb was affected; in 3 cases the disorder was bilateral;
- 5 cases in stage III: troncular varicosity, perimalleolar edema, cramps, paresthesia, the syndrome of nocturnal restlessness of calves;
- 4 cases in stage IV: troncular varicosity, stasis dermatitis, perimalleolar edema, dermo-hypodermatitis phlebopathy;
- 3 cases in stage V: troncular varicosity, cicatrized ulceration.

All the patients operated for varicosity had no problems and no post operative complications; whereas after the total knee arthroplasty there were 4 cases of post operative thromboembolic disease (12, 9%). Thus:

- 2 cases of deep venous thrombosis (6, 67%) which occurred on the 7<sup>th</sup>/10<sup>th</sup> day after the surgery. It was the case of patients with chronic venous insufficiency in stage IV CEAP, surgically treated before the knee arthroplasty. They also showed signs of popliteal-femoral thrombosis with edema at the level of the knee. Its treatment was conventional and consisted of: heparin 5000ui, i.v. every 4 hours for 7 days, associated in the last 3 days with dicumarinics (Sintrom® or Trombostop®), checking the Quick time until the value of 25-30% was reached; then the treatment with Sintrom® continued for 3 months; rest in bed with the affected inferior limb in proclive position; anti inflammatory and analgesic pills.
- 1 case of symptomatic pulmonary embolism (3,3%), which occurred 8 days after the surgery of a patient with chronic venous insufficiency, class 5 CEAP, previously treated medically and surgically; the patient also had paroxistic atrial fibrillation and followed a treatment prescribed by the cardiologist. The clinical symptoms and the EKG suggested symptomatic pulmonary embolism accompanied by dyspnea, atrial fibrillation at a fast pace, thoracic pain, cough with sanguinolent saliva. Specific treatment: heparin 5000 ui, i.v. every four hours for ten days + Trombostop® per bone from the 7<sup>th</sup> day for 6 months + papaverine 50 mg i.v. + oxygen therapy + Miofilin® i.v. + Digoxin® i.v. slowly. The evolution was favourable, the symptoms disappeared and there were no complications.

The patient with class 2 CEAP chronic venous insufficiency who refused its treatment before the knee arthroplasty developed from the 7<sup>th</sup> day after the surgery deep ilio-femoral venous thrombosis, resistant to the specific treatment presented above, despite the preventive measures taken. The patient also developed chronic edema at the level of the calf and the thigh, which persisted even after 6 months of treatment with dicumarinics.

In the case of the patients without associated venous pathology there were no clinic manifestations suggestive for thromboembolism.

Thrombosis prevention with small doses of heparin diminished significantly the frequency of post surgical deep venous thrombosis. Calcic or sodium heparin 5,000 u is administered hypodermically two hours before the surgery and then every 8-12 hours. Heparin with low molecular weight and strong antithrombotic action are mostly used today (anti Xa). Mostly used are Fragmin (0,2-0,4 ml s.c.); Clexane (20 mg/day s.c.); Fraxiparine (0,3 ml/day) and Clivarine (0,25 ml s.c) before the surgery, then in daily single dosage similar s.c for 7010 days after the surgery. Anti-aggregation therapy, which includes Dextran 40, Aspirin, is associated.



## DISCUSSIONS

When we decided to approach the problem of gonarthrosis with an indication to the total knee arthroplasty in the case of patients with varicose diseases we were motivated by the high number of patients who presented the two associated diseases. The primary varicose disease of the inferior limbs is a disorder often met, 30-50% in the case of adults (60% women), and its incidence increases with the ageing process. It is one of the general and local risk factors in the case of thromboembolic disease. Due to the thromboembolic risk, a number of patients can be excluded from ATG, despite the obvious indication and the lack of other risk factors of TVP. The varicose disease benefits today from efficient medical and surgical treatment so as to prevent evolucional complications such as shallow and deep tromboflebitis or chronic venous insufficiency. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, their pre-ATG treatment should eliminate the risk of post surgical TVP. As there is no precise information regarding this hypothesis, we wanted to create a prospective study to assess the risk of TVP after ATG for patients with varicose disease of inferior limbs, who were already operated on.

The risk of deep venous thrombosis after the total knee arthroplasty beyond any preventive measures (medicamentary or mechanical) is between 40 and 84%. The occurrence of thrombus at the level of the inferior limb can be popliteal (with a frequency between 9 and 20%) or with a frequency higher than 40-60% for the calf. The first has a higher risk of migration and of producing pulmonary embolism. The risk of asymptomatic pulmonary embolism can reach 10-20% whereas the risk of symptomatic pulmonary embolism can reach 0,5-3%; the death rate can reach 2%.

The reference method for diagnosing TVP was phlebography, but the development of Doppler echography offered a non-invasive and reliable exploration, lacking risks and complications and being repeatable with a sensitivity of 67-86% compared to phlebography. Its accuracy is though dependent on the surgery, fact demonstrated in a multicentre study in which the values of sensitivity varied between 20 and 90%. In our study we have used it in explorations before surgery and mostly in confirming the TVP diagnostic in an evocative clinical context. We have focused on the incidence of symptomatic TVP without insisting on the incidence of asymptomatic TVP as the latter was difficult to appreciate correctly, considering the risks arising from the phlebography being too invasive and the lack of complete accuracy of the echography.

Once the venous thrombosis installed, we must face the problem of treating it as quickly and correctly as possible with a view to preventing the post thrombophlebitis complications.

At Surgical Clinic 1 from Timisoara, which has an average of 2,500 surgeries/year, 60% of the cases have a moderate or high risk of thromboembolic disease, through the risk of the surgery or/and the risk of associated diseases. These patients benefited from preventive pharmacological treatment (fractioned heparin s.c, single dose) and mechanical treatment (external flexible contention of the inferior limbs).

We adapted the dose of fractioned heparin to particular cases (liver diseases, clotting disorders, over 70 years, body weight of less than 50 kg, in laparoscopic bariatric surgery). The evaluation before surgery consisted of:

- complete clinical examination
- local examination accompanied by the specific clinical screening to have an accurate ostial reflux at the level of the communicating vessels
- Doppler echography of the deep venous system so as to appreciate its permeability, the accuracy of the ostial reflux or at the level of the external saphenous vein

Tracking down the patients with a thromboembolic risk is marked:

**3 points**

- age >50
- major surgery in pelvis or abdomen

**2 points**

- extended surgery >3 hours, femur or hip fracture
- major post surgical complication (bleeding, peritonitis, occlusion)
- neoplastic disease

**1 point**

- more than 10-day immobilization
- the presence of varicosity
- thromboembolic previous problems
- sanguine discrasia or anemia
- associated cardiopathy
- shock during or after the surgery >30 minutes
- intra abdominal or retroperitoneal infection
- dehydration
- obesity
- abdominal distension
- pregnancy or estrogen therapy

The points are added and the factor of thromboembolic risk is established:

Minor risk: 0-2 points

Major risk: 3-6 points

Extreme risk: >7 points

The prophylaxis of venous thrombosis is addressed to patients with a high thrombosis risk: cardiovascular diseases, neoplastic diseases, traumatism, obesity, abdominal and pelvic surgeries. The preventive measures of the thromboembolic disease consisted of:

- administering heparin with a low molecular weight in prophylactic doses, starting 2 hours before the surgery and continuing for 48 hours after the surgery, until the patient could rise
- flexible and compressive bandage applied at the end of the surgery on the entire pelvic member and, after 48 hours, compressive stocking for 7-10 days
- the slight proclivity position of the resting pelvic limb

The anticoagulant treatment for maintenance (Aspirin or dicumarinics) was replaced with fractionated heparin administered 12 hours before the surgery (for spinal anesthesia) or 1-2 hours before surgery (for general anesthesia). The mechanical prophylaxis was applied before surgery and continued until the patient could rise.

Deep thrombophlebitis requires energetic measures of medical and surgical treatment for the re-permeabilization of the deep venous system and the prevention of pulmonary embolism.

**RESULTS**

By applying the preventive protocol of the thromboembolic disease in a combined variant, pharmacological and mechanical, we have observed the significant reduction of thromboembolic accidents in patients with a significant thromboembolic risk. The immediate post surgical incidents in the last 5 years decreased to 3% (mortality < 2%).

Applying this protocol reduced the number of hemorrhagic accidents significantly. All patients with high thromboembolic risk were conscripted early and were recommended to continue the anticoagulant treatment after leaving the hospital, receiving advice regarding the

signs and symptoms of thromboembolism, the importance of the treatment and the side effects.

**In conclusion,** using fractioned heparin, easy to administer, associated with external flexible contention, has greatly improved the post surgical results of elective interventions in general abdominal and vascular surgery for people with moderate and high thromboembolic risk.

This study has proved that the thromboembolic risk depends on the extension of the surgical intervention as well as on the co-morbidity of the patients (venous, malignant, cardiac diseases, splenectomies, blood disorders etc).

Deep thromboflebitis cannot be prevented in all cases of operated patients. This complication exists in all surgical services, regardless of the preventive measures we apply.

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## THROMBOPHILIAS – PREGNANCY RELATED RISK CATEGORIES

Iulia SAVU<sup>1</sup>

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### ABSTRACT

*THROMBOPHILIA REPRESENT A GROUP OF PROTHROMBOTIC CONDITIONS, EITHER ACQUIRED OR INHERITED, WHICH PREDISPOSE TO THROMBOEMBOLISM. IT IS CHARACTERISED BY A HYPERCOAGULABLE STATE, A TENDENCY OFTEN REPEATED OVER AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME, WHICH CAN LEAD TO VENOUS THROMBOEMBOLISM AND/OR OBSTETRICAL SEVERE ADVERSE OUTCOMES. RECENTLY HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THROMBOPHILIA IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERE PREECLAMPSIA, STILLBIRTH, ABRUPTIO PLACENTAE, RECURRENT FETAL LOSS AND INTRAUTERINE GROWTH RETARDATION. THIS REVIEW AIMS TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT THROMBOPHILIAS, ACCORDING TO THEIR ETHIOGENY, CLINICAL EFFECTS AND PREGNANCY RELATED RISK CATEGORY. THE LATEST THERAPEUTIC STRATEGIES ARE ALSO TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.*

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**KEY WORDS :** THROMBOPHILIA, PREGNANCY, INHERITED, ACQUIRED

The thrombophilic disorders appear to be associated with some pregnancy related pathologies. These include recurrent embryonic loss, fetal loss, intrauterine growth restriction, preeclampsia and/or eclampsia, even HELLP syndrome, placental abruption and stillbirth [1].

Thrombophilias can be divided in two large categories, depending on the thrombogenic risk they determine. The low risk thrombophilic profile include: heterozygous factor V Leiden mutation, heterozygous G20210A prothrombin gene mutation, protein S and protein C deficiency. The high risk thrombophilic profile include: antithrombin III deficiency, the association between both heterozygous factor V Leiden and G20210A prothrombin gene mutations, homozygous factor V Leiden mutation or homozygous G20210A prothrombin mutation.

There are also some additional risk factors which modify the individual global thrombogenic risk. These are called environmental factors. They include a first degree relative with a thrombotic event which occurred before the age of 50 years, obesity, or smoking. Other additional factors are estrogen containing medications, such as oral combined contraception or hormonal replacement therapy. Furthermore, some other transient conditions are implied in the occurrence of a prothrombotic state: pregnancy and the postpartum first six

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<sup>1</sup> MD, PhD Student, Dept. of Obstetrics-Gynecology, Life Memorial Hospital Bucharest, iuliasavu@yahoo.com

weeks period, surgery (especially orthopedic and pelvic ones), fractures, long time strict immobilization, or cancer [5].

According to their ethiogeny, thrombophilias are divided in two main groups: acquired and inherited. The acquired thrombophilias are associated with a great variety of diseases, such as the antiphospholipid antibodies syndrome, hyperhomocysteinemia, pregnancy and the first 6 weeks of the postpartum period, neoplasia, estrogen therapies, heparin induced thrombocytopenia, Behçet disease, inflammatory bowel diseases (ie Crohn's disease or ulcerative colitis, during their active stages).

The most important acquired thrombophilia is antiphospholipid antibody syndrome. These antibodies occur at a rate of 1 to 5% in healthy patients, but their frequency is much higher in patients who are diagnosed with autoimmune diseases, such as systemic lupus erythematosus. The antiphospholipid antibodies are lupus anticoagulant and anticardiolipin antibodies. Patients with this syndrome have an increased risk of venous thrombosis. In pregnant patients, the antiphospholipid antibodies increase the risk of recurrent pregnancy loss, usually during the first 6 weeks of gestation [11]. Studies couldn't agree on the exact mechanism of thrombosis induced by this type of antibodies. The accepted mechanisms include modulation of the expression of the phospholipid binding proteins involved in the clotting cascade regulation, disfunctions of the endothelial cells, injury of the vascular endothelium mediated in an oxidative manner [8].

Hyperhomocysteinemia can result either from genetic factors, such as a mutation of the 5,10-methylenetetrahydrofolate reductase (MTHFR) gene or from environmental factors that affect its circulating level [7]. These include reduced intake of folate or vitamins B12 or B6, increased methionine intake (from eggs, nut and seeds – especially sesame seeds, Brazil nuts, fish, meats, fast foods and cereal grains), smoking, high amounts of coffee intake, thyroid deficiency, renal impairment, drugs (such as methotrexate, anticonvulsants, cyclosporine, steroids).

The inherited thrombophilias include genetic conditions. There is a strong interconnection between this category of thrombophilias and the environmental additional risk factors described before.

Most thrombophilias play an important role in the occurrence of the venous thrombi, rather than the arterial ones. In the latter localization, the main role is played by the endothelial defect caused by atherosclerotic damages and the activated platelets. The arterial site of thrombosis is found in patients with antiphospholipid antibody syndrome and hyperhomocysteinemia. The venous thrombosis is usually associated with the inherited, genetic thrombophilias, in which case the activated platelets only play a minor role.

It has been noticed that a rare adverse outcome associated to a specific form of thrombophilia usually occurs in a population that has a high prevalence of a given inherited thrombophilia. Judging upon the different prevalence of the yet known genetic mutations implied in thrombophilias in different geographic areas, it can be assumed that a certain adverse outcome is more likely to be found in that specific region where the prevalence of the associated mutation is the highest.

In fact, many patients who have a form of thrombophilia never experience a complication during their entire life. The environmental factors seem to play no role in this scenario. We cannot approximate the exact risk of a serious adverse outcome in patients with acquired or inherited forms of thrombophilia. Nevertheless we can divide these patients in two large risk categories: high and low. Caution should be used in interpreting case-control studies among patients of a certain race, known for their high prevalence of thrombophilia, such as Caucasians.

In the past thrombophilia used to be associated with patients who had an unusual manifestation of venous thrombosis. This was the case of young age at the onset of the

disease, an insolate site of thrombosis (ie mesenteric or cerebral sinus veins), recurrent episodes of venous thrombosis or a significant family history. Presently, it is known that the risk of any venous thrombosis is increased by the thrombophilia. Most of the patients who carry a thrombophilic mutation register their first episode of venous thrombosis in conjunction with a prothrombotic state, either acquired or transient.

The mean age at the time of the onset of the first thrombotic episode in this kind of patients is usually ten years lower than in the general population. Thrombosis at a young onset age is considered a criterion of inclusion in the thrombophilic condition. The intrinsic prothrombotic state found in patients diagnosed with thrombophilia is not sufficient per se to determine a thrombotic event. It may otherwise determine the onset of thrombosis when other risk factors arise. These factors also include age, so that thrombosis in the older patients may lean on the thrombophilic disorders as well.

The most common inherited form of thrombophilia is the factor V Leiden mutation. It has a prevalence of about 5% in the general Caucasian population, while in the venous thrombotic group it raises to about 21% of the cases. It is transmitted in a co-dominant autosomal way and it is the most frequent cause of hereditary thrombophilia in Caucasian population. This mutation is found in 10 to 20% of the patients who experience their first venous thrombotic event. It is also found in 40% of the patients under the age of 50 years at their first venous thrombosis and in 60% of the pregnant patients with a venous thrombosis [9]. The risk of a thrombotic event depends on the mutation form, either homozygous or heterozygous.

The mutation responsible for this disorder makes activated factor V resistant to inactivation by the activated protein C. This is known as activated protein C resistance or APCR. The point mutation takes place on the 1q23 chromosome, thus replacing the amino acid arginine by glutamine in the position 506 of the proteic clotting factor V - the cleavage site for activated protein C. This mutation leads to a 10 fold slower inactivation of the factor V Leiden than normal, as well as a longer persistence of the modified clotting factor in the blood stream, with consecutive higher amounts of thrombin and eventually hypercoagulability. This mutation is held responsible for 85 to 90% of the cases with resistance to activated protein C. The individual risk of thrombosis increases 4 to 8 fold in heterozygous than in wild factor V genotype, while in homozygous the risk is 80 to 100 times higher. The risk is exponentially higher in patients who have other thrombotic risk factors, such as pregnancy, estrogen therapies or other coexisting genetic defects. The latter group includes protein S, protein C or antithrombin III deficiency, homozygous C677T mutation of MTHFR gene with consecutive hyperhomocysteinemia. When diagnosed in pregnant patients, factor V Leiden may lead to high risk of recurrent pregnancy loss, especially during the second or third trimester [12]. The same goes for G20210A prothrombin gene mutation and homozygous C677T mutation of MTHFR gene. Screening for factor V Leiden can be useful in patients who plan to get pregnant or to get oral contraception, in cases with family history of recurrent thrombosis with onset under the age of 50 years.

The prothrombin G20210A mutation, also called factor II mutation, is mostly exclusively present in Caucasians, in which the prevalence of the heterozygous form is about 2-3%. In the venous thrombosis group, it comprises about 7% of the patients, conferring a 2 to 3 fold higher risk of VTE [6]. This is a point mutation in the non-coding region of the prothrombin gene, where guanine is replaced with adenine, specifically in the 3' untranslated region nucleotide 20210. This mutation is responsible for higher levels of the inactive form of prothrombin than it is to be found in the wild genotype, a form that is otherwise normal in structure [3]. Hyperprothrombinemia is one of the most common risk factors for VTE, apart from factor V Leiden mutation and the non-O blood types.



The physiologic inhibitors of the coagulation cascade known today are protein S, protein C and antithrombin III. Any deficiencies in these natural anticoagulants generate a prothrombotic state, through the increased amount of thrombin. These disorders are found in about 1% of the general population, while in the venous thrombotic group they are found in 7% of the patients. The risk of VTE is 5 to 10 fold higher than in general population.

There are two forms of protein S found in the blood stream. About 40 to 50 percent of it is the active, free protein S. The rest of it is bound to a certain protein of the complement – C4b binding protein. This explains the three different types of protein S deficiency, depending on the amount of antigen and its activity. The type I deficiency is characterised by reduced antigen level and activity; type II has a normal amount of antigen, with reduced activity; while type III is found in patients with total antigen level within normal range, but reduced level and activity of the free antigen. The different types of deficiencies are generated by many mutations which are only partially studied until now, and whose clinical significance is yet unknown. Antithrombin III deficiency is a very thrombogenic condition, though its frequency is lower than protein S or protein C deficiencies. There are over 250 mutations that can lead to reduced gene transcription, thus producing either a decrease of the antigen quantity and activity, or alteration of the structure and function, which is translated in normal antigen level, but with lower activity. The frequency of antithrombin III deficiency is approximately 1/2500 patients. In non-pregnant patients, the venous thromboembolism risk is 25 fold higher. In pregnant patients, this risk is substantially elevated, because of the prothrombotic state induced by pregnancy alone. Without a personal or family positive history, the risk is considerably reduced.

Elevated levels of the antihemophilic globulin, also known as clotting factor VIII:C, is also known to be a risk factor for venous thrombosis. This condition is found to respect a family clustering and is persistent over time. This shows at least partial genetic determinism, since the exact ethyologic mechanism remains yet unknown [16]. It is noteworthy that the prevalence of the increased levels of factor VIII:C in the general population is the highest of all the inherited thrombophilias taken under consideration, reaching about 11%. In the venous thrombosis group, the prevalence of this condition is also the highest one, about a quarter of these patients being diagnosed with it.

Methylenetetrahydrofolate reductase (MTHFR) catalyses the reduction of 5,10-methylene-tetrahydrofolate to 5-methylenetetrahydrofolate, which is a cofactor implied in the remethylation of homocysteine to methionine. A point mutation in the MTHFR gene, C677T, gives rise to a thermolabile variant of the reductase, which in turn is 20% less efficient in metabolising the homocysteine. This hyperhomocysteinemia usually occurs especially in patients with preexistent folate deficit. About 10% of the patients that experience a venous thrombotic event are diagnosed with hyperhomocysteinemia, while the prevalence in the general population is of 5% [20]. The homozygous C677T mutation is to be found in about 11% of the Caucasians. These patients have greater risk of obstetrical adverse outcomes such as chromosomal defects, fetal malformations, recurrent fetal loss, abruptio placentae and severe preeclampsia [13]. The risk of venous thromboembolism with late onset during pregnancy or during the first six weeks of the postpartum period is also increased in these patients. The heterozygous form of the C677T mutation implies no greater risk of hyperhomocysteinemia or thrombotic episodes. There is another possible mutation in MTHFR gene, known as A1298C. Neither its homozygous, nor its heterozygous forms induce hyperhomocysteinemia. On the other hand, the association between both heterozygous forms of each mutation, C677T and A1298C, may lead to similar severe outcomes as the homozygous C677T mutation of the MTHFR gene. This particular association is also held responsible for neural tube defects. Patients who carry the heterozygous form of MTHFR gene mutation have a 2 to 3 fold higher risk for spina bifida or anencephaly. The exact

mechanism of action of the MTHFR gene mutations is not sufficiently known. It is yet accepted that the associated hyperhomocysteinemia affects the vascular endothelial cells, thus causing venous thromboembolism and placental insufficiency.

A series of other thrombophilias have been taken under consideration. These include alternative factor V gene mutations, a promoting PAI-1 gene mutation, protein Z deficiency as well as mutations that lead to increased activity of other clotting factors genes. Despite their independent venous thrombosis risk which is rather low, when associated to the above mentioned mutations the thrombotic risk increases considerably.

Many studies have been conducted in the last decade in order to establish the determinism of inherited thrombophilias over different adverse obstetrical outcomes. Their results are often contradictory and demonstrate potential preferential reporting.

Prospective cohort studies found no association between inherited thrombophilias and recurrent pregnancy loss, although meta-analysis and retrospective cohort studies showed a possible association between first trimester pregnancy loss and genetic thrombophilias [19]. There is insufficient evidence to support the association between hereditary thrombophilias and an increased preeclampsia incidence [14]. Many case-control and cohort studies have been conducted to determine whether there is significant association between factor V Leiden and intrauterine growth restriction (IUGR). Their results were inconclusive [15]. There is a similar lack of significant association between G20210A prothrombin gene mutation and MTHFR gene mutations on the one hand, and IUGR on the other hand. Placental abruption incidence has been found to be higher in patients with hyperhomocysteinemia, with a titer that rises over 15  $\mu\text{mol/L}$ . These data are extracted from the Hordaland Homocysteine Study, which was a population-based study conducted in Western Norway on more than 18,000 men and women, during 1992-1999. It has also concluded that there is a slight association between the homozygous MTHFR C677T polymorphism and abruptio placentae.

Screening for thrombophilia is quite controversial. It can be useful if the results have an influence upon the clinical behavior. If the appropriate treatment is already indicated for other risk factors, the screening becomes useless. There are some clinical situations where screening has proven to be useful. These include personal history of venous thromboembolism, associated to incidental risk factors, such as bone fractures, surgery, long term immobilization [18]. The recurrence risk among pregnant patients with such personal history is 16%. Another clinical situation when screening needs to be undergone is represented by patients with a first degree relative who have personal history of venous thromboembolism with onset below the age of 50 years, without any other risk factors. Testing for thrombophilia is not routinely recommended in any other circumstances.

Testing for inherited thrombophilia in patients with recurrent pregnancy loss or placental abruption is not indicated. Although a possible clinical association has been demonstrated by some authors, there is insufficient data to support the conclusion that antepartum prophylaxis with heparine or low molecular weight heparine would prevent a possible relapse in these patients. Nevertheless, screening for antiphospholipid antibodies might be suitable for patients with recurrent fetal loss history.

There is insufficient data to sustain an association between inherited thrombophilia and intrauterine growth restriction or preeclampsia [17]. Therefore, screening or prophylaxis of these poor pregnancy outcomes is not recommended. Because of the lack of association between MTHFR mutations and obstetric pathologies, screening for homocysteine and MTHFR gene mutations are not indicated [10].

The therapeutic decision for the initiation of thromboembolism prophylaxis during pregnancy and postpartum period is influenced by the personal venous thromboembolism history, the severity of the patient's form of thrombophilia and the presence of any additional

risk factors. Every patient with a genetic form of thrombophilia should be assessed from the individual risk point of view, which can influence a great deal on the final therapeutic decision [4]. This decision should take into account some other major risk factors, such as the potential cesarian section, long term immobilization, obesity, family history positive for thrombophilia or venous thrombosis events.

Patients with low risk thrombophilias without a personal history of venous thrombosis or with a family history of VTE should only get antepartum surveillance, without anticoagulant prophylaxis. The same approach is recommended in patients without thrombophilia, having a previous single episode of VTE associated with a transient risk factor, which is no longer present, other than pregnancy or estrogen therapy. In patients with low risk thrombophilia with a single previous VTE event, as well as in high risk thrombophilia without previous VTE episode, either clinical surveillance or prophylactic dose of low molecular weight heparine (LMWH) should be used antepartum [2]. In patients with high risk thrombophilia not receiving any long term anticoagulation therapy, who have a history of a single episode of VTE or an affected first degree relative, with onset age below 50 years, prophylactic or adjusted dose regimen of LMWH should be used [2]. In patients with no form of known thrombophilia, with a previous single episode of VTE associated with a transient risk factor, either pregnancy or estrogen therapy, as well as patients without an associated risk factor, not receiving long term anticoagulation therapy, prophylactic doses of LMWH are recommended during antepartum period. The same prophylaxis should be done in patients with or without a positive diagnosis of thrombophilia, who have at least two episodes of VTE, but who are not receiving any anticoagulation therapy [2]. A therapeutic dose of LMWH is only indicated for patients who are already receiving long term anticoagulation therapy, either diagnosed with thrombophilia or not, but who have a personal history of two or more episodes of VTE [2].

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## CONTACT:

Phone: +40766665670

Mail: [revistarst@yahoo.com](mailto:revistarst@yahoo.com)

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