

ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ACCESSION OF ROMANIA TO THE CENTRAL POWERS (1883-1914)

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ABSTRACT:

THROUGH THIS SYNTHESIS WE INTEND TO CONVEY A MORE OBJECTIVE AND REALISTIC VIEW ABOUT POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND RUSSIA DURING THE PERIOD 1883-1914, IN WHICH ROMANIA WAS PART OF THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY BLOC OF THE CENTRAL POWERS. FOR THE RULING CIRCLES IN BUCHAREST IT WAS CLEAR THAT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE GREAT POWERS, OR OF SOME OF THESE, A FOREIGN POLICY COULDN'T HAVE BEEN CARRIED IN THE ADVANTAGE OF ROMANIA. AT THAT TIME THE BEST SOLUTION WAS FOR ROMANIA TO JOIN THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE. TREATIES WHICH ESTABLISHED THIS OPTION REPRESENTED THE BASIS OF THE ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I. ON THE OTHER HAND, RUSSIA WILL BE LINKED TO THE OTHER POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC LINEOUT, THE ENTENTE, COMPLETED IN 1907. HOWEVER, ROMANIA, WHO OPERATING A POLICY OF PRESERVING THE STATUS QUO IN THE BALKANS, WAS INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING GOOD NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA. ALSO DIPLOMACY TSARIST THAT SOUGHT TO KEEP AND EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE IN THE SAME REGION WAS TAKING LARGER INFLUENCE IN BUCHAREST TO COUNTERACT THE PLANS OF THE CENTRAL POWERS.

KEYWORDS: ROMANIA, RUSSIA, CENTRAL POWERS, TRIPLE ALLIANCE, THE ENTENTE, THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

The attitude of European powers to independent of the Romanian State - from the conditions required for recognition of the historical moment from 9 May 1877 to the way Romania was treated regarding the Danube issue - demonstrated to policy makers in Bucharest that achievement of the goals of the foreign policy of the Romanian state, without the support of the great powers, had no chance of success.

After only five years of independence the country's international isolation became total. For policy makers in Bucharest, concerns were generated by the deterioration of positions acquired after 1878 and amplified by Romanian-Russian tense relations, by the more aggressive attitude of Russia and increasing Russian influence in Bulgaria.

It was required much more that Romanian foreign policy should turn towards an alliance strong enough to provide protection against external pressures, which would ensure the existence and guarantee of national borders².

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For Romanian diplomacy, finding a solution to get the country out of the diplomatic isolation was difficult, as all options had advantages and disadvantages³.

At this historic moment it was imposed the promotion of a rapprochement with Germany. Between the two countries there were no divergent interests and the existing dynastic ties, the empire created in 1871 was the main military power of Europe. Through the alliance concluded with Austria-Hungary in October 1879, Germany was a serious counterweight to the danger of pan-Slavism. Therefore, the inconvenience of an alliance with Germany was represented by its closeness to the Dual Monarchy, which clashed with the national interest of Romanians⁴.

However, this solution brought in the fewest disadvantages and most benefits. Ion M. Oprea considered that "this orientation was fully justified since at the end of the last century (*the nineteenth century - Ed*) on the European continent the Triple Alliance was the only solid consisting military bloc, and therefore able to create the opportunity for Romania to counteract successfully the aggressiveness of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans and trends by Russia to undermine Romanian national interests"⁵.

Romania's approach to the two powers mentioned was the result of bilateral action: "initiative started in Berlin, a favorable echo was found in Vienna before having in Bucharest"⁶.

The role of the Central Powers was predominantly so in the event of, but mostly in maintaining the alliance with Romania⁷ that might have been a barrier to Russian expansion in the Balkans due to the strategic position in case of a European war, and also because of military potential and material resources.

Romania adherence to the Triple Alliance⁸, completed in 1882 by joining Italy to the German-Austro-Hungarian alliance in 1879, was perfected during the journeys of I.C. Bratianu and Carol I in Berlin and Vienna in the summer of 1883, when it was agreed that this to materialize by signing a bilateral treaty between Romania and Austro-Hungary, having a defensive character, to which also Germany would adhere.

The treaty was signed in Vienna on 18/30 October 1883⁹. According to it, if Romania had been attacked by another power, without being specified the potential aggressor, Austria-Hungary was obliged to provide support and assistance, and in the event of attack on the latter, "in one of the parties neighboring states of Romania ", it would apply the clause of *the casus foederis*. These provisions were valid only if the two parties were not in a position of the aggressor state.

The treaty was secret and remained in force for five years, with the possibility of being extended for another three years if it had not been denounced by the signatory States.

On the same day it was also signed the Treaty of Accession of Romania and Germany in the Austro-Hungarian Treaty, through which the Contracting Parties assumed the

² Keith Hitchins, *România 1866-1947*, trans. George Potra and Delia Răzdolescu (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1996), 155.

³ Leonid Boicu, Vasile Cristian, Gheorghe Platon, eds., *România în relațiile internaționale. 1699-1939* (Iași: Junimea, 1980), 310-312.

⁴ Boicu, Cristian, Platon, *România în relațiile internaționale*, 312.

⁵ Ion M. Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 1st vol. (1900-1924) (București: Albatros, 1998), 28.

⁶ Boicu, Cristian, Platon, *România în relațiile internaționale. 1699-1939*, 317.

⁷ H. Mureșan, „Politica externă a României între 1871-1900 în corespondența diplomatică germană”, *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie din Cluj*, XIII(1970), 199-212.

⁸ Gheorghe Nicolae Căzan, Șerban Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță 1878-1914* (Bucharest:Edit. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1979), 112-122.

⁹ Ion Ionașcu, Petre Bărbulescu, Gheorghe Gheorghe, *Tratatetele internaționale ale României 1354-1920. Texte rezumate, adnotări, bibliografie* (Bucharest: Edit. Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1975), 257-258.

obligation to to assist each other in conditions set out in the secret treaty between the Romanian state and the Dual Monarchy¹⁰.

The treaty was ratified on November 6, 1883 by King Carol I.

Originally Romania's accession to the alliance of the Central Powers in 1883 was considered by both parties as a simple conjecture, due to the situation in Central and Eastern Europe after the Peace Congress in Berlin in 1878. By this Romania provided an effective protection against the growing influence in the region of Russia, and the Central Powers achieved a trusted collaborator in a region where territorial expansion was of interests and which they did not want to leave it to fall under the influence of the Tsarist.

Events seemed to fit into the diplomatic strategy of Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who intended to avoid political isolation of Germany and create an alliance that would provide extend the influence of the new powers in Europe and maintain relative political stability on the continent.

In the international situation at the beginning of the twentieth century, Romanian foreign policy orientation towards alliance with the Central Powers was maintained, being renewed in 1902, after the failure of the proposal to Prime Minister D.A. Sturdza to conclude direct treaties with each member of the Triple Alliance¹¹.

Treaties signed by representatives of Romania and the Central Powers would underpin Romanian foreign policy until the outbreak of the First World War. By signing them it was avoided the country's diplomatic isolation in Europe.

For Romania, the guarantee to ensure external stability consisted in alliance with the group of European powers that dominated international life and joining Romanian state to the Central Powers seemed to be for a long time as the best solution. Franco-Russian Alliance did not remove the hegemony of the Triple Alliance on the continent, and the Russo-Japanese War and the weakening of Russia maintained the impression of superiority of the Central Powers.

Important is that the guarantees were obtained from two major powers in the event of an unprovoked attack from Russia. Kingdom of Romania will enjoy high prestige externally, Central Powers diplomacy showing a constant interest in maintaining it within that alliance. Therefore, to achieve the major objectives of the period, Romania was within Bismarck's political system¹², designed to keep the peace in Europe and at the same time, to achieve the interests of the German Empire.

The Alliance with the Central Powers was not made public to avoid any challenge to Russia, whose interests were opposed to Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. On the other hand, maintaining secrecy was necessary in order not to upset public opinion in Romania, opposed to an alliance with Austria-Hungary which submitted Romanians from Transylvania to discriminatory treatment.

The main obstacle to closer the Entente to Romania was the evolution of the latter relations with the Tsarist Empire. After the Congress of Berlin, when Russia took for the second time the three southern districts of Bessarabia, was further deepened the fear of Romanian diplomacy that Tsarist continued the dream of czar Peter the Great, sent also to those who followed him, respectively the expansion to south to seize the Black Sea Straits. That was the reason why Romania continued to be part of the political and military system of the Central Powers. It is true that by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century Romanian-Russian relations had improved substantially, but were confined to external forms

¹⁰ Ionașcu, Bărbulescu, *Tratatele internaționale ale României*, 258.

¹¹ Căzan, Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță 1878-1914*, pp. 249-253.

¹² Gheorghe Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 7th vol., 2nd tom, *De la independență la Marea Unire (1878-1918)* (Bucharest: Edit. Enciclopedică, 2003), 10-14.

of manifestation, namely mutual visits of politicians, contacts between military figures and of cultural nature exchanges. These specific expressions of good neighborly relations, no matter how cordial they were, they could not even mitigate barriers between Romania and Russia.

On the other hand, there was an appreciable increase in Germany's interest in the Romanian space. Initially, German politicians ignored Romania's intention to join the alliance with the Central Powers. They considered avoiding the achievement of this goal "a political move of great intelligence"¹³. Finally accepted receiving the new Romanian state in the alliance, but had particular regard to the interests of Austria-Hungary to have on its borders an ally that does not fall under the influence of the Tsarist Empire and less the intention of Germany to expand its influence in this part of Europe. Gradually, however, due to a more pronounced isolation of the German state on the international political stage, in the period after the removal of Bismarck from the leadership of the Chancellery, also, because of increased tensions with Russia and, not least, the discovery of large oil fields in Romania, resources German economy will increasingly need, to which were added impressive amounts of grain which the Romanian state was able to export, especially in Germany, the interest of leaders in Berlin regarding this area began to grow more and more. They come to consider Romania as a territory in which was essential preponderance of German political and economic influence. Thus, explains why, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany was the most important trading partner of Romania, the largest investor in the domestic economy and, due to the influence of King Carol I and Germanophiles politicians, as well as, a part of Romanian cultural elite, Germany was also considered the closest ally within the Central Powers and an important cultural influence.

At the same time, we can say that Germany never considered its influence in Romania as a definitive win. The realities of this part of Europe, and the specifics of international relations, led the German authorities and their representatives in Romania always keep an attitude of cautious optimism towards the future development of relations with the Romanian ally. This attitude was because Germany was aware that by including our country in the Triple Alliance in 1883, it got involved in a region issues with whom were little familiar - Balkan tensed world from the late nineteenth century - belonging traditionally under the influence of another great power - Russia. Precisely this reality, of Russian influence in the region, concerned with the highest level the German authorities, especially after the Russian Empire began to look increasingly hostile to German interests and headed slowly in the years 1891-1893, towards an alliance with Germany's irreconcilable opponent of the period - France. Recently the established alliance between the two great powers mentioned above not only announce the failure of the old Bismarck's foreign policy, of isolating France in Europe - failure due, in large part, to the inability of successors of former Chancellor - but also represented a warning to Chancellery in Berlin, seeing its alliances with countries in Eastern Europe endangered, especially with Romania, which could return under the influence of Russia turned, from now, obviously hostile¹⁴.

In early 1902, the Tsarist diplomacy was convinced that between Romania and Austria-Hungary there was a treaty and warnings were meant to show the Romanian diplomacy the implications of such guidelines¹⁵.

¹³ See Central Historical National Archives, Department of Bucharest, *Casa Regală* fund, file 91/1913, 1.

¹⁴ Nicolae Ioniță, *Imaginea relațiilor româno-ruse din perioada 1878-1908 în documente diplomatice germane*, available: <http://www.arhivelenationale.ro/images/custom/image/serban/RA%201%202009/13%20ionita,%20nicolae.pdf>, accessed : December 3th 2014.

¹⁵ Boicu, Cristian, Platon, *România în relațiile internaționale. 1699-1939*, 353.

Accession of Romania to German-Austro-Hungarian political and military bloc, – meant, implicitly, its position allied with potential enemies of Russia. Consequences of adhesion of the former to the Central Powers alliance were to grow through membership of Russia in Triple Alliance.

The establishment of the second German-Austro-Hungarian political and military bloc in Europe lasted a decade and a half, during which were covered several stages. As already mentioned, until 1890, by a very clever policy, Bismarck initiated a system of alliances that allowed the Chancellor to keep various pacts not only with its allies but also with opponents of his partners.

European powers found themselves unable to create a system of alliances which would constitute a counterweight to the influence of Germany, as Bismarck's diplomacy led to the isolation of France, the formation of the Triple Alliance - consisting of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy - he sought the friendship of Great Britain and managed signing the Treaty of Reinsurance with Russia in 1887¹⁶.

Abandoning the political line followed by Bismarck, Franz von Holstein and Caprivi gave up the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, after Emperor Wilhelm II accepted the resignation of the Chancellor in 1890¹⁷. Effects appeared quickly: Russia and France signed a military convention in 1892 and in 1899 an alliance agreement.

Franco-Russian Alliance, which brought France of isolation due to Bismarck's policy, led to the establishment of the second political-military bloc on the European continent, the Triple Alliance, known as the Entente. In 1904, Britain concluded with France an cordiale Entente based on regulation of mutual colonial interests.

Three years later, after the delimitation of spheres of influence in Asia, Russia and Britain made a deal of economic and political nature. With this latest agreement, the foundations of the Triple Entente were established¹⁸.

Romanian diplomacy reviewed its international position due to changes occurring through completion in 1907, of the second political and-military bloc, the Entente. Concluding the agreement between Britain and Russia and the establishment of the Triple Entente brought important changes in the balance of power internationally. Alliance of Central Powers would have a serious counterweight.

Romania antipathy towards Russia gradually ebbed. This status was reached following the establishment of a new balance of power between the Entente and the Central Powers. Strengthening this balance allowed Romania reevaluation of its foreign policy.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, despite maintaining foreign policy under the auspices of the alliance with the Triple Alliance, appeared some improvement in Romanian-Russian relations.

It is a period during which stakeholders from Bucharest, promoting a wise and prudent policy, which aimed to maintain the status quo, carefully sought evolution of events in the Balkans: Russian-Bulgarian agreement was signed in the summer of 1902, intensifying Macedon-Bulgarian Committee, uprising in Macedonia in August 1903, Turkish repression, the possibility of a war breaking out between Bulgaria and Turkey¹⁹.

All these, due to higher to Romania disagreements with the Dual Monarchy were able to determine the Romanian government to pursue good neighborly relations with Russia.

¹⁶ Serge Berstein, Pierre Milza, eds., *Istoria Europei*, 4th volume, *Naționalismele și Concertul european, Secolul XIX (1815-1919)*, 2nd edition, trans. Monica Timu (Iași: Institutul European, 1998), 179-193.

¹⁷ Geoff Layton, *De la Bismarck la Hitler: Germania. 1890-1933*, trans. Simona Ceașu (Bucharest: All Educational, 2002), 53-54.

¹⁸ Layton, *Germania: 1890-1933*, 55-57.

¹⁹ Căzan, Rădulescu-Zoner, *România și Tripla Alianță 1878-1914*, 254-256.

On the other hand, tsarist diplomacy began to act more vigorously to mitigate the closeness of the Triple Alliance to Romania. An important moment was coming at the end of 1902, of the Minister Plenipotentiary of Russia in Bucharest, Giers Jr., who was active in efforts to influence the foreign policy of Romania.

Even after the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan, officials in St. Petersburg continued to pay attention to relations with Bucharest. Russian Ambassador to Constantinople supported approaches of Romanians on the rights of Aromanians in Macedonia, approaches that were successful in 1905²⁰.

During this period, Russian diplomacy intensified its efforts to reduce German influence in Bucharest and also to attract Romania at side of the Entente its actions coming mostly from Russia and France. This became the reason of mutual visits: Predeal meeting in September 1907 between King Carol I and also senior officials of the Russian imperial family around; as well as the visit the Crown Prince of Romania, Ferdinand, at Petersburg in March 1908²¹. Russian interest in the attitude of a neighboring country with an important strategic position was natural.

Actions which aimed vicinity of Romania to Russia became more intense after Serghei Sazanov took over the leadership of Russia diplomacy in 1910²².

The new Foreign Minister established good relations with the Romanian minister in St. Petersburg, Russian representative in Bucharest was given instructions to maintain relations of friendship, but discrete, with the Romanian government, demanding the same behavior and the representatives of other European capitals.

There were also visits and cultural events. French representative in Bucharest, Blondel said in July 1910 that "Russia put everything in motion to prepare a positive future in Romania"²³.

Also, other partners in the Entente expressed their willingness to establish closer relations and even cooperation with Romania²⁴. Important steps in this direction were made in Bucharest with the arrival of a British military mission in 1910 and also with the visit of important political figures from France in 1912²⁵.

French diplomacy was trying to gain ground in Romania, to regain lost positions mostly because of their own attitudes. Blondel did not stop repeating that "if the influence of Germany daily gain ground, then the fault is our compatriots who have abandoned the fight in terms of trade and have been able to take advantage of the Romanian friendly feelings towards our country"²⁶. Moreover, the French action was facilitated by some Romanian diplomats. Named in Paris in 1908 Alexandru Lahovary endeavored to show that it was necessary to alter the image of Romania completely subservient to the Triple Alliance.

Although the external situation was relatively favorable for the growth of French-Russian influence, it was countered by a domestic event. In January 1911, the government was taken over by conservatives, with Petre P. Carp as prime minister and Titu Maiorescu leading Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both advocating a policy of alliance with the Central Powers. Petre P. Carp had said this very clearly, since 1909.

Consequently, Romanian-Russian relations had experienced a period of "lassitude" according to Giers's phrase. He reckoned that it will be extended as long as both (P. P. Carp

²⁰ Boicu, Cristian, Platon, *România în relațiile internaționale. 1699-1939*, 358.

²¹ Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 57.

²² Hitchins, *România 1866-1947*, 168.

²³ Platon, *Istoria Românilor*, 278.

²⁴ Mircea N. Popa, "Contribuții privind relațiile româno-franceze. 1900-1914", in *Studii. Revistă de istorie*, 22 th tom, 1(1969), 98-102.

²⁵ Gheorghe Platon, *Istoria modernă a României* (Bucharest: Edit. Didactică și Pedagogică, 1985), 446.

²⁶ Apud Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 278.

and Titu Maiorescu) will be in charge. This "lassitude" did not mean, however, a total cessation of action to get closer relations, especially using some visits and even, the visit of Tsar Nicholas II himself.

So did the French diplomacy, which also benefited from the favorable attitude of many Romanian politicians. It is true, Maiorescu could have done, in April 1911, the observation that all matters relating to relations between France and Russia and the politics of the two powers "are indifferent to Romanian politics"²⁷.

However, Count Czernin, a few months later, ascertained that in a crucial moment the king's authority would be sufficient to maintain Romania near the Central Powers, though Carol I prompted him about the achievements of Franco-Russian propaganda.

The solidity of the alliance with the Central Powers was questioned even by the king because of relations with them. He pointed out to Rosen that over time "Romania will not be able to follow her alliance obligations to the Triple Alliance, if, as has been lately, Germany leaves its direction in the hands of Austria-Hungary"²⁸.

Trends in Russia to establish an approach to Romania took shape better on the eve of the Balkan Wars. Russian government acted to cause Romania's withdrawal from the alliance with the Central Powers and whether or not it joined the Entente, neutrality, in case of a Balkan conflict, was an option which Tsarist diplomacy would have liked to obtain from the Romanian government²⁹.

The Great Powers which formed the Entente noted that beyond the availability shown by King Carol I for strengthening relations of Romania with them, some facts demonstrate that the Romanian ruler was still consistent to the policy which he followed for about 30 years with the Central Powers. In this respect, the visit to Romania of the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, Franz Conrad von Hoetzendorf, held on 16/29 - 17/30 November 1912, was a real test on the efficiency of Russia's and France's diplomatic activity in the purpose of Romania's detachment from Central Powers. As it is known, the Austrian general mission in Romania was successful for the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. During the meeting King Carol I promised that in the case of a European war, Romania would be Austria-Hungary's ally, and military agreement signed by the generals Alexandru Averescu and Conrad von Hoetzendorf provided a common plan of mobilization if war broke out against Russia and Serbia.

Conscious of Romania's position in an eventual conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Tsarist diplomacy continued, however, even in these circumstances, to intensify efforts to detachment of Romania from the Triple Alliance and attracting the former allied with the Entente. Since the presence of the Austrian general in Bucharest caused great indignation at Petersburg³⁰, Russian diplomacy sought to counteract by sending the Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich in Romania, on the anniversary of the fall of Plevna, on 23 November 1912. Officially presented as a gesture of courtesy, to hand from the Tsar Nicholas II the Marshal baton of the Russian army to King Carol I of Romania, Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovich³¹ visit was aimed more precise objectives and the Romanian government knew it. It sought to probe the ground to find intentions of Romania in a possible Russian-Austrian-Hungarian conflict. On this occasion, King Carol I was asked to join the Balkan Confederation. Such a perspective was not realized due to disagreements between the Balkan states. Maintaining the status quo in the Balkans, constant objective of Romanian policy, to

²⁷ Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 279.

²⁸ Platon, ed., *Istoria Românilor*, 279.

²⁹ Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 51.

³⁰ ³⁰ See Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fond 71/1900-1919, vol. 11, f. 142.

³¹ See Cental Historical National Archives, Bucharest Department, Microfilm Rusia, rola 227, cadrele 3-17..

some extent, and of the tsarist one, contributed to the removal of mistrust between Romania and Russia³².

It is obvious that tsarist diplomacy efforts made in Bucharest through the the Grand Duke, reflected the new orientation engraved by Sazanov on Russian foreign policy in relations with Romania. Among other things, he aimed to attract Romania on the side of Russia, but was not willing to admit "mistakes" that the Russian government made in the Congress of Berlin. Instead, Sazanov "tried to speculate with ability the Romanian aspirations of achieving national ideal, the union with Romania of territories inhabited by compatriots across the Carpathians, which implied a benevolent attitude to the Romanian state, even an effective support from the east"³³. Although the visit of Grand Duke in Romania was an important moment in the Romanian-Russian relations, it was commented rather negatively Bucharest newspapers. Thus, Bucharest press used this opportunity to evoke the fate of Bessarabia of whose loss recently turned a century³⁴. However, it was an opportunity to exchange views and another important step in improving relations with Russia, although it wasn't established how the two countries would react when starting a general conflict³⁵.

We conclude that the Balkan wars³⁶ were the starting point of separation of Romania and the Central Powers, however, of approach to the Entente. In this situation was due to several causes. First, political leaders in Bucharest no longer ignored the Hungarian policy of denationalization taken against the Romanians in Transylvania. Another reason was the coming to power in January 1914 of a Liberal government led by Ion I.C. Bratianu, who considered the treaty with the Central Powers could not be applied. Last but not least, the visit of Tsar Nicholas II in Constanta was an event with a strong echo in the domestic and international political circles that foreshadowed the stronger approaching of Romania to future allies in the First World War.

Although at that time _ a total rupture from the Triple Alliance couldn't have been questioned, the scene for diplomacy of the alliance that included Russia was largely prepared. At this contributed the emergence of new disputes between Romania and Austria-Hungary related to the situation in the Balkans³⁷.

Despite existing tensions, the Romanian government was concerned with ensuring stable situations internationally. In this respect, following the same direction of maintaining good neighborly relations, Romania responded guardedly towards the attitude of Russia and St. Petersburg's actions.

³² Oprea, *România și Imperiul Rus*, 52-53.

³³ Nicu Pohoată, *Relațiile româno-ruse și politica Antantei față de România în contextul desfășurării primului război balcanic*, available from http://cogito/relatiileromanorussipoliticaantanteinicupohoata_6.pdf, accessed on December 3th 2014.

³⁴ Gheorghe Zbucnea, *România și războaiele balcanice. 1912-1913. Pagini de istorie sud-est europeană* (Bucharest: Albatros, 1999), 80.

³⁵ Anastasie Iordache, *Criza politică din România și războaiele balcanice, 1911-1913* (Bucharest: Paideia, 1998), 196-197.

³⁶ <http://cultural.bzi.ro/războaiele-balcanice-4799>, accessed: September 18th 2014.

³⁷ Boicu, Cristian, Platon, *România în relațiile internaționale. 1699-1939*, 362.

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