

MULTILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE

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ABSTRACT:

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IS AN AREA WHERE ASEAN (SPECIFIC INSTITUTION SOUTHEAST ASIA) MAY CONTRIBUTE BUT DON'T GET INVOLVED (NORTH KOREA, CHINA-TAIWAN, SITUATED IN NORTH-EAST ASIA), BUT NOT IN THE CASE OF MILITARY INCIDENTS (THE CLASH BETWEEN CHINA'S PATROL VESSELS AND PHILIPPINE, VIETNAMESE EXPLORATION VESSEL BLOCKAGE BY CHINA, BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA) LEAVING THEM IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. TAIWAN, A TRIANGLE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS OVERLAPS ON A DIPLOMATIC FUND WHICH PREVENTED THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT BROKE OUT OPENLY, MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN ANY REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FORMAT.

IN EAST ASIA, OUTBREAKS OF CRISIS THAT CAN ESCALATE INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT - THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT TO WHICH IT ADDS THE DISPUTES RELATED TO ARCHIPELAGOS FROM THE EAST CHINA SEA SOME UNDER THE CONTROL OF CHINA.

THE MIMETIC ADOPTION OF THE OSCE MODEL IN SEARCH OF THE LEGITIMACY FOR THE REGION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, NAMELY THE ASEAN AS A SECURITY INSTITUTION WITH AN AGENDA OF ITS OWN IS THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR LONG TIME.

KEY WORDS: THE ARMS RACE, THE MILITARY ARSENALS, THE MILITARY EXPENSES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS,

THE ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND NUCLEAR POWERS

The security environment of East Asia may be characterized as an “anarchic society” tributary concept of sovereignty, which leaves little space for diplomacy and measures to increase confidence (CBMs) where it plays a signified role: increase military spending (precondition of the arms race), reposition the powers (the Japan and China case), the potential escalation of low-intensity conflicts into war (North Korea and Taiwan), disputes concerning control of the seas (the East China Sea and South China Sea).

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Nuclear ambitions put enormous pressure on the Asian security environment; the action of relevant actors² can have exponential consequences especially because four of the nine nuclear powers are Asian countries and have deployed nuclear weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Security Council, IAEA does not lend itself to solve the Asian security problems and the Asian correspondences of the Council of Europe and the OSCE³ does not exist. The regional security institutions⁴ based on non-aggression treaties with different degrees of regulation - from formal arrangements, cooperation agreements ad hoc - uses a range of tools of preventive diplomacy-early alert/prevention, mediation, reconciliation, CBMs - proving value in many delicate situations.

Multilateralism, mutual trust, compromise, finding a mutually agreed solution is very difficult to achieve the asymmetric structures. The Asian nuclear powers share a history strewn with hostility and antagonisms religious and ideological,⁵ even though the Asian nuclear arsenals can not ensure the second blow, however the coup, preventive or pre-emptive favored by geographical proximity of these powers can be decisive, potential with the fundamental meanings for the Asian security environment.⁶




Figure no. 1-Regional Security Institutions of ASEAN family⁷

² Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Iran plus peripheral Russia and Israel.

³ Politico-military cooperation was situated in the so-called first Helsinki basket, which included the joint military inspections, exchange mechanisms, constant information flow, early warning instruments, confidence-building measures mechanism, and the standing panel of state representatives (the so-called Permanent Council). See Mărcău Flavius Cristian, Ina Raluca Tomescu, "Coordinates of NATO – EU cooperation", in proceedings *Strategic changes in Security and International Relations*, 2014, 258-265.

⁴ The Organization of American States - OAS (American continent), African Union - AU (Africa), Council of Europe and OSCE.

⁵ The Soviet Union-China over the demarcation of its long land border, China-India territorial gain, India-Pakistan over Kashmir, the Korean peninsula the direct military confrontations of Japan, USSR, Chinese as well as the US. France, Britain, Russia nor the US does not even share the land borders. Bajrektarevic Anis H., "No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution," *Geopolitics, History and International Relations* 3, no. 2, 2011, 196-207.

⁶ Especially in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the Middle East.

⁷ The ASEAN Family of Regional Security Institutions. See Jörg Friedrichs, "East Asian Regional Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July/August 2012), University of California Press, 757.

In the Asian space the bilateral asymmetric relations are usually⁸ the existence of a structure of pan-Asian security similar to the European, American and African security institutions, is being challenge with many facets. Bilateral Diplomacy is the main formula as there is not a common prospect for China and Japan on regional institutions as a diplomatic centre.⁹

The San Francisco (1951) system inspired from the US, included a system of bilateral alliances centered on (Japan and South Korea), strategic relations (e.g., Thailand and the Philippines), military relations (Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore) is in dialogue with regional multilateral arrangements like the ASEAN having in regard to possibility of reconfiguration of the regional arrangements by China.¹⁰

APEC is an economic forum bringing together the riparian States in the Pacific Ocean on both sides, OIC and NAM (transcontinental entities without permanent secretariats) with unclear competence in the field of safety-organizations that do not include all Asian countries.

KEDO (nuclear) and the contact group for Iran P-5 + 1¹¹ have asymmetric security mandates, namely to deter and press a state (North Korea and Iran).

GCC asymmetric structure created by the Americans focused on Saudi Arabia to counter threat pan-Arabism (the leftist Nasserist pan-Arabism) and Iranian influence in the Gulf region (after 1979) has a series of reactions after "Arabic Spring"2011.

SCO is a security parity structure based on the Sino-Russian relationship for deterring international actors¹² to issue claims on values that they share.

SAARC structure dedicated to the Indian subcontinent with a safety and a permanent secretariat office which depends on India-Pakistan relationship, although India plays a central role.

ASEAN symmetrical structures¹³ build on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs with real insights to underpin a legit pan-Asian forum.

SAARC and ASEAN could achieve a pan-Asian arrangement, or a multilateral organization with security expertise.

BIS(s) C/S (the Wall Street bankers) linked to the BRICS might draw attention to the importance of the pan-continental Asian issues.

ASEAN multilateral framework for East Asia promotes CBMs that cannot resolve the tensions in Northeast Asia (avoiding deciding on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait) it is possible to create a framework for this region.

A trilateral framework in Northeast Asia not only did not reduce the importance of ASEAN but it contributes to solving the regional problems, including in South Asia.

⁸ The examples are numerous: the US-Japan, the US-S. Korea, the US-Singapore, Russia-India, Australia-East Timor, Russia-North Korea, Japan-Malaysia, China-Pakistan, the US-Pakistan, China-Cambodia, the US-Saudi Arabia, Russia-Iran, China-Burma, India-Maldives, Iran-Syria, N. Korea-Pakistan, etc. [...] Asia today resonates a mixed echo of the European past. See Bajrektarevic Anis H., "No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution," *Geopolitics, History and International Relations* 3, no. 2, 2011, 198.

⁹ SEATO pact defense treaty organization for SEA which was essentially dissolved as soon as the imminent threat from communism was slowed down and successfully contained within the French Indochina. See Bajrektarevic Anis H., "No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution," *Geopolitics, History and International Relations* 3, no. 2, 2011, 199.

¹⁰ See Leszek Buszynski, "The San Francisco System: Contemporary Meaning and Challenges," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 35, no. 3, August 2011, 315–35.

¹¹ The Iran-related Contact (Quartet/P-5+1) group.

¹² The US, Japan, Korea, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

¹³ Triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia represents the core of the ASEAN.

ASEAN has a positive role in CBMs¹⁴, the previous diplomatic reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-1967), prevented the escalation of the situation created by the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and the counter Khmer Rouge based in Thailand (1978). The role of ASEAN is taken to a larger scale by ARF and an extended vision, alongside CBMs to conduct a preventive diplomacy and building of conflict resolution mechanisms.¹⁵

A division of responsibilities in this space: ASEAN with regional security and CBMs and trilateral from Northeast Asia for the tension in the Korean peninsula and lifting China's control.

Extinguish the conflict is not a corollary of ASEAN and other regional institutions from East Asia; the crisis in East Timor (1999-2000), the territorial conflict from the South China Sea (involving member states ASEAN and China).¹⁶

Conflict management is an area where ASEAN (specific institution Southeast Asia) may contribute but don't get involved (North Korea, China-Taiwan, situated in North-East Asia), but not in the case of military incidents (the clash between China's patrol vessels and Philippine, Vietnamese exploration vessel blockage by China, border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia) leaving them in charge of international diplomacy.

Taiwan, a triangle of bilateral relations overlaps on a diplomatic fund which prevented the outbreak of conflict broke out openly, much more effectively than any regional institutional format.

Configuring security architecture through the action of multiples determinants required reporting to the author's vision states "Eastphaliene," ASEAN as a central policy "Easphaliene."¹⁷

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY AGENDA THROUGH ASEAN COOPERATION

In the early 1960s, Southeast Asia is declared by the States of the region "nuclear weapons free zone" (SEANWFZ).¹⁸ In this context, no ASEAN Member State does intend to use the nuclear technology critical (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) to support production of nuclear weapons; speculation regarding a program to produce nuclear weapons by Myanmar proved unfounded.¹⁹

¹⁴ "Confidence building has been the hallmark activity of the ARF in its first decade." See Yuen Foong Khong and Helen E. S. Nesadurai, "Hanging Together, Institutional Design, and Cooperation in Southeast Asia: AFTA and the ARF," in Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (eds.), *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 2007, 37.

¹⁵ The ARF has remained stalled at the first stage of confidence building. See Takeshi Yuzawa, "The Evolution of Preventive Diplomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Problems and Prospects," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 46, no. 5, September/October 2006, 785-804.

¹⁶ *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea*, signed by ASEAN and China in 2002.

¹⁷ Jörg Friedrichs, "East Asian Regional Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July/August 2012), University of California Press, 776.

¹⁸ 1997 The Bangkok Treaty establishes the Southeast Asia Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). Only Indonesia had nuclear weapon aspirations, but these ambitions were short-lived. Cornejo Robert M., "When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s," *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 7, no. 2, Summer 2000, 31-43.

¹⁹ *Statement by the Leader of Myanmar Delegation H. E. U. Tin Win to the 55th Annual Regular Session of the IAEA General Conference*, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, Sept. 19-23, 2011.

ASEAN Member States are Member States of the NPT and the Treaty of Bangkok (SEANWFZ), only three have ratified the CTBT and it remains lots to be done on the line of nuclear safety and security in accordance with IAEA standards, preventing nuclear terrorism.²⁰

Moreover, the new requests relating to proliferation are considered outside the universal agreements are negotiated and are regarded with suspicion as being obstacles affecting their development.²¹ SEANWFZ signed in 1955 and entered into force in March 1997, China and the United States have not signed the Treaty has a number of potential effects in the future; Thus, the accession of China to the Treaty could limit its activities to the military in the South China Sea, even though they declare sovereignty over this space.

The Spratly Islands dossiers of the Exclusive economic zones (EEZs)²² depend on the position of Japan and Taiwan to BMF relative to SEANWFZ, the countermeasures of China in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean that can seriously affect the US dominance to control the maritime lines, forcing ASEAN states to take a cautious position.

	<i>Interstate Trust</i>	<i>Peaceful Change</i>	<i>Regime Stability</i>		<i>Conflict Resolution</i>
			<i>Economic</i>	<i>Coercive</i>	
ASEAN	+	+	±	±	-
APT	±	±	±	-	-
EAS	±	±	-	-	-
ARF	+	±	x	-	-
ASEAN-China Special Relationship	+	+	±	+	-
Other forms of international relations	±	±	+	+	±

SOURCE: By author.

NOTE: + = significant contribution; ± = weak contribution; - = no contribution; x = not applicable.

Figure no. 2 - Powers and contributions of family security institutions ASEAN²³

Association of South Asian States (ASEAN)²⁴ pursues an agenda for cooperative security model OSCE - CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, conflict-resolution, mechanisms for crisis management - declaring their intention as ASEAN and ARF to be cooperative security

²⁰ Santoro David, *ASEAN's WMD Scorecard: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the Global Safety, Security and Nonproliferation Regimes*, Honolulu: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2012.

²¹ Leggi Stephanie, *The Nonproliferation Tiger: Indonesia's Impact on Nonproliferation in Asia and Beyond*, NTI Issue Brief, March 5, 2012.

²² Exclusive Economic Zones - EEZs.

²³ What the ASEAN Regional Security Toolbox Can (Not) Do. See Jörg Friedrichs, "East Asian Regional Security," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July/August 2012), University of California Press, 776.

²⁴ Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN.

institutions.²⁵ The ASEAN States are reserved in relation to develop BMD systems combined with geopolitical stakes of the South China Sea in the China-US relationship as well as the opposition of Russia and China, especially when US-China conflict related to Taiwan is ready to burst.²⁶

In East Asia, outbreaks of crisis that can escalate into an armed conflict - the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait to which it adds the disputes related to archipelagos from the East China Sea some under the control of China - Paracel Islands/Xisha (West Sand) the Scarborough Shoal, Zhongsha (Middle Sand), Nansha (Spratly Islands/South Sand - other under the control of Taiwan-Pratas Islands/Dongsha (East Sand), and Itu Aba/Taipung Island.²⁷

Claims of sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea can be resolved through diplomatic negotiations or protecting the rights claiming the use of force (Malaysia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Brunei, China and Taiwan). The Philippines claims related to the Spatley Islands could involve US by invoking the bilateral treaty²⁸ but also as an actor in East Asia. Within ASEAN it cannot harmonize political security cooperation because of divergences of interests of Member States, making it CBMs unlikely in South China Sea together with China.

ASEAN supports the peaceful exploitation of resources in the East China Sea, but also there is the forum that Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam raises claims related to sovereignty in this great against China but also against one another. Against the South China Sea regime in some countries are favorable to the position of China (Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar), some are reserved in relation to the involvement of the United States (Malaysia and Indonesia), other favors US involvement (Vietnam and the Philippines) and other neutral (Thailand and Singapore).²⁹

The South China Sea dossier has been the subject of several meetings, ASEAN, ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS; moreover, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia addressed the ASEAN as a regional diplomatic structure in the sense of a negotiation based on consensus with China on the basis of UNCLOS.³⁰

ASEAN takes over and adapt the OSCE model for conflict management - internal and international conflicts to be managed collectively in the framework of regional security institutions through cooperation - while respecting the autonomy of the institution in relation to foreign powers, sovereignty, decisions made by consensus.³¹

The security agenda through cooperation of the ASEAN it focuses on cooperation with foreign powers at the expense of its institutional autonomy and collective managing conflict with

²⁵ See Katsumata Hiro, "Mimetic adoption and norm diffusion: 'Western' security cooperation in Southeast Asia?" *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, Issue: 2, Apr 2011, Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 557-576.

²⁶ "Blind to the Nuclear Reality," *Financial Times*, 27 July 2000.

²⁷ See Shaohua Hu, A framework for analysis of national interest: United States policy toward Taiwan, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 09 Mar 2016, Wagner College, Taylor & Francis, pp. 144-167, <http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fcsp20>. (Accessed on 12 January 2017).

²⁸ The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the U.S.

²⁹ See Sheldon W. Simon, "Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 52, No. 6, November/December 2012, University of California Press, 995-1018.

³⁰ The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). When Beijing ratified UNCLOS in 1996, its reservations rendered that ratification largely meaningless because, as one of the disclaimers stated, China reaffirmed "sovereignty over all archipelagos and islands" listed in its 1992 law.

³¹ ASEAN Way of diplomacy. See Katsumata Hiro, "Reconstruction of Diplomatic Norms in Southeast Asia: The Case for Strict Adherence to the ASEAN Way," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 25, Issue:1, 2003, 104-121.

restricting the sovereignty of its members. The implementation of this agenda has resulted in two streams, one active ASEAN-6³² and a second reluctant CLMV.³³

The level of cooperation is low especially in crisis management for which there are not regional institutional capabilities, unable to speak of a security of the Asian-Pacific community as long as China is an authoritarian State.³⁴

In 2015, the initiative of creating a regulatory framework is within ASEAN on security, safety and nuclear non-proliferation, for regional cooperation rules (3S)³⁵ as a result of plans for the development of nuclear energy. After the accident at Fukushima (2011) in this region a special emphasis is given to independent regulations ensuring transparency and a good public information, separated by the promoters and users of nuclear technology.³⁶

In the region, there are several States with an interest in nuclear power plants (NPP),³⁷ signatories to the Treaty of Bangkok with the normative provisions of the framework document;³⁸ there is a mutual interest that led to the creation of ASEANTOM.³⁹ In furtherance of regional normative framework concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is the development of infrastructure, human resource, legal framework and institutionalization of national resource management.⁴⁰

It is estimated that the first NPP within ASEAN will enter service in 2025. Vietnam proposes building of first NPP, two reactors of Russian production of 1,000 MWe (Phuoc Dinh, Ninh Thuan 1) and another NPP with Japanese assistance (Vinh Hai in Ninh Thuan 2).⁴¹ Indonesia has at its disposal three experimental reactors, but due to tectonic zone there is strong opposition to the use of nuclear energy. Malaysia is under pressure of demand for energy took into study the construction of a nuclear reactor as well as opposition to nuclear power of public opinion.⁴²

³² Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei.

³³ Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.

³⁴ See Sorpong Peou, *Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific: Theory and Practice*, Praeger, Santa Barbara, California, 2010, 5.

³⁵ Regional cooperative norms on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (3S).

³⁶ See Amano Yukiya, "Atoms for Peace in the 21st Century," Transcript of speech delivered at the Energy Market Authority Distinguished Speaker Programme, Singapore, January 26, 2015. www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/atoms-peace-21st-century-1. (Accessed on 12 January 2017).

³⁷ Nuclear power plant (NPP). Interested are Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines.

³⁸ See Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1995. [...] „develop a coordinated ASEAN approach that would contribute to global undertakings to improve nuclear safety, in cooperation with the IAEA and other relevant partners, as well as promote and uphold IAEA standards of safety and security in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful use." *Phnom Penh Declaration on ASEAN: One Community, One Destiny*, Joint Ministerial Statement 2012.

³⁹ The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy – ASEANTOM. The Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS), In Indonesia there is no Nuclear Energy Implementing Organization (NEPIO), In Malaysia, Malaysia Nuclear Power Cooperation (MNPC) was established as a NEPIO.

⁴⁰ See Mely Caballero-Anthony and Julius Cesar I. Trajano, "The State of Nuclear Energy in ASEAN: Regional Norms and Challenges," *Asian Perspective* 39, no. 4, Oct, 2015, 695-723.

⁴¹ *Sustainability of Nuclear Energy in ASEAN: Opportunities and Challenges*, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2014.

⁴² www.thepetitionsite.com/745/599/785/public-petition-to-stop-nuclear-power-plants-in-malaysia, supported by the Malaysian Coalition Against Nuclear, MY-CAN.

With regard to the storage of used nuclear material, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia concerning the reprocessing and infrastructure have clarified issues,⁴³ the European experience being particularly valuable in this regard.⁴⁴

The ASEAN's principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States (principle of non-intervention in another States' domestic affairs) as it relates to nuclear power, considered an important component of national security, and is a serious obstacle to regional cooperation in regional matters even though it operates two regional groups.⁴⁵

ARF agenda could allow the involvement of foreign powers⁴⁶ in the affairs of South East Asia, even though CBMs are based on consultation and consensus, and not to have laid down specific procedures and mechanisms for exchanges of military information.⁴⁷ It is unlikely the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the ASEAN states due to their position to avoid antagonizing China, even during the US-China confrontation for Taiwan.

CBMs are implemented typically two categories of governor and military personnel; as well as CSOs could play an important role in the resumption of mutual relations between the opposing parties by non-military activities.⁴⁸ Non-military CBMs are of political, economic, environmental, societal biases and cultural.⁴⁹

The ARF could manage an arms control agenda centered on non-BMD as CBMs, and “BMD free” as an additional SEANWFZ zone supporting a regional armaments control over new weapons systems without some meaning to their security concerns. A common position on both is needed the consequences of the policies of the US and China as well as on the regional strategic balance.⁵⁰

With regards to preventive diplomacy, the ARF proposes modest targets, due to the fact that the strategic interests of its members are as diverse as and due to the lack of operational experience and capabilities in managing conflicts. The initiative “free BMD” could be supported by greater transparency regarding Chinese missile forces, notably those carried out on the South

⁴³ See Amano Yukiya, *Atoms for Peace in the 21st Century*, Transcript of speech delivered at the Energy Market Authority Distinguished Speaker Programme, Singapore, January 26, 2015. www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/atoms-peace-21st-century-1. (Accessed on 12 January 2017).

⁴⁴ European Commission 2014, “*The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)*,” http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/euratom/euratom_en.htm. (Accessed on 12 January 2017).

⁴⁵ ASEANTOM and a Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN).

⁴⁶ US, Japan, Australia and China.

⁴⁷ CBMs can be understood as a spectrum of activities aimed at changing the contemporary character of two or more interacting inimical societies in a certain positive way. In an ideal case, under the influence of CBMs, adversaries should increasingly start to undertake more mutual exchanges and gradually become more trustful towards each other. The CBMs should also contribute to establishing an atmosphere that would enable conflict resolution or aid the whole peace process. See Javaid Umbreen, “Confidence Building Measures in Nuclear South Asia: Limitations and Prospects,” *Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 25 (2), 2010, 341-359.

⁴⁸ Non-military CBMs can be understood as “[...] actions or processes undertaken in all phases of the conflict cycle and across the three dimensions of security in political, economic, environmental, social and cultural fields with the aim of increasing transparency and the level of trust and confidence between two or more conflicting parties (...) and to pave the way for lasting conflict settlement.” *OSCE Guide on Non-Military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)*, 2012, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 9.

⁴⁹ *OSCE Guide on Non-Military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)*, 2012, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 9-10.

⁵⁰ “Tanaka admits doubts over U.S. missile plan,” *Business Times (Singapore)*, 5 June 2001, 20.

coast of vis-à-vis Taiwan, demonstrating the value of the ARF as a mechanism for implementation.⁵¹

The mimetic adoption of the OSCE model in search of the legitimacy for the region of Southeast Asia, namely the ASEAN as a security institution with an agenda of its own is the main purpose for long time.⁵²

The community security plan focused on cooperation, like the OSCE (institution's successful model and “pioneer” in the field regional security through cooperation, by promoting concepts that have become universal approved by the UN).⁵³

ARF is built on the idea that the OSCE the “regional security is indivisible and can be ensured through cooperation” following an itinerary marked many episodes while avoiding institutionalization of mechanisms similar to CSCE to achieve international legitimacy even though it has the common perspective and implementation arrangements.

ADMM-Plus

In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum is launched (ARF)⁵⁴ that integrates the regional security dialogue process. Japan is a supporter of ARF multilateral cooperation for promoting “non-zero-sum game” on growth in the region.

In 1996, it is agreed the “ARF Concept Paper” but no progress is being made in the adoption of practical measures.⁵⁵

In 2002, Japan's proposal to initiate a format (Shangri-La Dialogue), unofficially, for a future meeting of the Ministers of defense (ADMM) is received coldly by the ARF partners.⁵⁶

In 2003, Bali Indonesia adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (replaced by the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II of 1976) to promote community security (including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding extinction post conflict peace-building, post-conflict).⁵⁷

⁵¹ See Tow William T. and William Choong, “Asian Perceptions of BMD: Defence Or Disequilibrium?” *Contemporary Southeast Asia* Vol. 23, no. 3, 12, 2001, 379-400.

⁵² See Mărcău Flavius Cristian, “Security as a determining factor of quality of life in a state from an insecure regional area,” *Analele Universității „Constantin Brâncuși” din Târgu - Jiu*, nr. 4/2015, Seria Litere și Științe Sociale, Editura „Academica Brâncuși”, 77-85.

⁵³ See Katsumata Hiro, “Establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum: Constructing a “Talking Shop” or a “Norm Brewery”?” *Pacific Review*, Vol. 19, Issue:2, 2006, 181-198.

⁵⁴ ASEAN Regional Forum - ARF. The ARF participants today are the ten ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar - together with China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Papua New Guinea, the EU, the US, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

⁵⁵ [...] as Japan endorses the centrality and leading role of ASEAN in the ADMM-Plus process, it is critical to support ASEAN's strength in engaging the major regional players in defense diplomacy. [...] the ADMM-Plus faces a significant lack of capacity for actual joint deployment in times of crisis. See Jimbo Ken, “Anchoring Diversified Security Cooperation in the ADMM-Plus: A Japanese Perspective,” *Asia Policy*, Vol. 22, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Jul 2016, 102-106.

⁵⁶ See Seng Tan, “Japan and Multilateralism in Asia,” in *Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia and in Global Governance*, ed. Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 2015, 67-68.

⁵⁷ ASEAN, *Declaration of ASEAN Concord II*, Bali, 7 October 2003; ASEAN, *ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action*, Vientiane, 29 November 2004.

In 2010, the ARF is approved as the format of meetings for the defense ministers⁵⁸ to be extended through the participation of the members of the extra-regional (ADMM-Plus).⁵⁹ In Japanese, ASEAN must continue to be the leading force of the region (the driving force of the region) and the ADMM-Plus to promote humanitarian assistance and aid in disaster relief (HADR).⁶⁰

In 2013, take places the first ADMM-Plus training exercises (in Brunei Darussalam) but the aid operations after the disaster caused in the Philippines by Typhoon Haiyan.

In 2014, the HADR is constituted by several expert groups (EWG)⁶¹ in maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism. Within the ARF framework aimed at non-proliferation and disarmament⁶² which might be involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and-legislative expertise, internal standards and control, declaring Southeast Asia as an area free of enrichment and reprocessing (Southeast Asia year enrichment-and reprocessing-free zone).⁶³

Japan proposes the following objectives for the ADMM-Plus (18 of 27 participating ARF states ARF) developing regional capacity to deal with security issues multilateral meetings: regular intraregional, practical cooperation, intergovernmental coordination, groups of experts in specific fields.⁶⁴

ADMM-Plus can be a platform for coordination of measures to increase confidence-building measures, the mechanisms for crisis management and cooperation on security measures for non-traditional in Asia-Pacific area. It is the only format for Japan and China for official exchanges between the Ministers of Defense, which is negotiating a mechanism for crisis management.⁶⁵

ASEAN can promote through defense diplomacy, military-to-military cooperation, strategic and growth financing capacity-building (capacity building).

The activity of the ADMM-Plus is heavily blocked by several factors: deviations from consensus among participating States, concepts and measures ADMM cannot be accepted in the ADMM-Plus, lack of capacity for deployment in the event of crisis.⁶⁶

In one study,⁶⁷ confidence as a form of influencing other subjects (nations, cultural groups, leading soldiers, relationship, etc.) can be understood as an equation of some variables in the

⁵⁸ ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting - ADMM.

⁵⁹ ADMM-Plus

⁶⁰ Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief - HADR.

⁶¹ Experts' Working Group - EWG.

⁶² ARF Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Beijing (July 2009), Singapore (July 2010), Las Vegas (February 2011), Sydney (March 2012).

⁶³ "NTI Nuclear Materials Security Index" at <<http://www.ntiindex.org/indicators/domestic-commitments-and-capacity/uns-cr-1540-implementation/>>.

⁶⁴ See Jimbo Ken, "The ADMM-Plus: Anchoring Diversified Security Cooperation in a Three-Tiered Security Architecture," in Sarah Teo and Bhubhindar Singh, S. Rajaratnum (eds.), *Roundtable on the Future of the ADMM/ADMM-Plus and Defence Diplomacy in the Asia Pacific*, School of International Studies, Policy Report, February 2016.

⁶⁵ See Yukio Tajima, "Defense Chiefs Agree on Quick Launch of Communication Mechanism," *Nikkei Asian Review*, November, 5, 2015, <http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Defense-chief-sagree-on-quick-launch-of-communication-mechanism>. (Accessed on 12 January 2017).

⁶⁶ Malaysia's ambitious proposal at the 2015 meeting to form a military team under the ASEAN banner for quick deployment to crisis areas has the potential to cultivate ASEAN's collective capacity for military deployment.

⁶⁷ See Bazin Aaron A., "Winning Trust Under Fire," *Military Review*, Vol. 95 Issue: 1, Jan/Feb 2015, Fort Leavenworth, 82-90.

context of each situation-part, moment, measures to increase confidence. Measures to increase confidence⁶⁸ are psychological in nature, communication⁶⁹ and in human relations.

In 2012, according to a study has proven CBSM's usefulness as a way of security cooperation (partnership, mutual reassurance, transparency) in terms of reducing tensions and escalation of incidents in several cases.⁷⁰

ABBREVIATIONS

A2/AD	Anti-Access/Anti-Denial
ABL	Airborne Laser
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile
AESA	Active Electronically Scanned Array
ALHK	Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill
AMD	Air and Missile Defense
AMDR	Air and Missile Defense Radar
AMRAAM	Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile
AN/TPY-2	Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASCM	Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
AWD	Air-Warfare Destroyer
AWS	AEGIS Weapon System
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDS	Ballistic Missile Defense System
C2	Command and Control
C2BMC	Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications
C4	Command, Control, Communication, and Computer
CMD	Cruise Missile Defense
EKV	Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle
EW	Electronic Warfare
GaN	Gallium Nitride
GBAD	Ground-Based Air Defenses
GBI	Ground-based Interceptor
GEM	Guidance Enhanced Missile
GMD	Ground-based Midcourse Defense
IAMD	Integrated Air and Missile Defense
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IRBM	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
LRSO	Long-Range Standoff weapon (nuclear tipped cruise missile)
MD	Missile Defense
MIRV	Multiple Independent targetable Re-entry Vehicle

⁶⁸ Michael Krepon, called these approaches confidence-building measures, or confidence and security building measures. See Michael Krepon, Dominique M. McCoy, and Matthew C.J. Rudolph, *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security*, (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 1993). Also Barnett Michael and Adler Emanuel, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History", in Adler Emanuel and Barnett Michael (eds), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 419.

⁶⁹ The telephone hotline between the White House and the Kremlin became a major factor in averting nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Alan J. Vick, *Building Confidence During Peace and War*, a RAND Note report, N-2698-CC, The RAND Corporation, 1998, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N2698.pdf> (accessed 24 October 2016).

⁷⁰ See Anthony Ian, Grip Lina, Patton Tamara, Wezeman Siemon T., Solmirano Carina, *Conventional arms control and military confidence building*, SIPRI Yearbook, Oxford University Press, UK 2013.

MML	Multi-Mission Launcher
MOKV	Multiple Object Kill Vehicle
NMD	National Missile Defense
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
OTH	Over-the Horizon
PAC	Patriot Advanced Capability
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SBIRS	Space Based Infrared System
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SM	Standard Missile
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
STSS	Space Tracking and Surveillance System
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
WSMR	White Sands Missile Range

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