MULTILATERAL SECURITY STRUCTURES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE

Andreea Emilia DUTĂ

ABSTRACT:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IS AN AREA WHERE ASEAN (SPECIFIC INSTITUTION SOUTHEAST ASIA) MAY CONTRIBUTE BUT DON'T GET INVOLVED (NORTH KOREA, CHINA-TAIWAN, SITUATED IN NORTH-EAST ASIA), BUT NOT IN THE CASE OF MILITARY INCIDENTS (THE CLASH BETWEEN CHINA’S PATROL VESSELS AND PHILIPPINE, VIETNAMESE EXPLORATION VESSEL BLOCKAGE BY CHINA, BORDER CLASHES BETWEEN THAILAND AND CAMBODIA) LEAVING THEM IN CHARGE OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY. TAIWAN, A TRIANGLE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS OVERLAPS ON A DIPLOMATIC FUND WHICH PREVENTED THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT BROKE OUT OPENLY, MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN ANY REGIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FORMAT.

IN EAST ASIA, OUTBREAKS OF CRISIS THAT CAN ESCALATE INTO AN ARMED CONFLICT - THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND THE TAIWAN STRAIT TO WHICH IT ADDS THE DISPUTES RELATED TO ARCHIPELAGOS FROM THE EAST CHINA SEA SOME UNDER THE CONTROL OF CHINA.

THE MIMETIC ADOPTION OF THE OSCE MODEL IN SEARCH OF THE LEGITIMACY FOR THE REGION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA, NAMELY THE ASEAN AS A SECURITY INSTITUTION WITH AN AGENDA OF ITS OWN IS THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR LONG TIME.

KEY WORDS: THE ARMS RACE, THE MILITARY ARSENALS, THE MILITARY EXPENSES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THE ASIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND NUCLEAR POWERS

The security environment of East Asia may be characterized as an “anarchic society” tributary concept of sovereignty, which leaves little space for diplomacy and measures to increase confidence (CBMs) where it plays a signified role: increase military spending (precondition of the arms race), reposition the powers (the Japan and China case), the potential escalation of low-intensity conflicts into war (North Korea and Taiwan), disputes concerning control of the seas (the East China Sea and South China Sea).

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Nuclear ambitions put enormous pressure on the Asian security environment; the action of relevant actors can have exponential consequences especially because four of the nine nuclear powers are Asian countries and have deployed nuclear weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the Security Council, IAEA does not lend itself to solve the Asian security problems and the Asian correspondences of the Council of Europe and the OSCE does not exist. The regional security institutions based on non-aggression treaties with different degrees of regulation - from formal arrangements, cooperation agreements ad hoc - uses a range of tools of preventive diplomacy-early alert/prevention, mediation, reconciliation, CBMs - proving value in many delicate situations.

Multilateralism, mutual trust, compromise, finding a mutually agreed solution is very difficult to achieve the asymmetric structures. The Asian nuclear powers share a history strewn with hostility and antagonisms religious and ideological, even though the Asian nuclear arsenals can not ensure the second blow, however the coup, preventive or pre-emptive favored by geographical proximity of these powers can be decisive, potential with the fundamental meanings for the Asian security environment.

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2 Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Iran plus peripheral Russia and Israel.
3 Politico-military cooperation was situated in the so-called first Helsinki basket, which included the joint military inspections, exchange mechanisms, constant information flow, early warning instruments, confidence-building measures mechanism, and the standing panel of state representatives (the so-called Permanent Council). See Mărcău Flavius Cristian, Ina Raluca Tomescu, “Coordinates of NATO – EU cooperation”, in proceedings Strategic changes in Security and International Relations, 2014, 258-265.
4 The Organization of American States - OAS (American continent), African Union - AU (Africa), Council of Europe and OSCE.
5 The Soviet Union-China over the demarcation of its long land border, China-India territorial gain, India-Pakistan over Kashmir, the Korean peninsula the direct military confrontations of Japan, USSR, Chinese as well as the US, France, Britain, Russia nor the US does not even share the land borders. Bajrektarevic Anis H., ”No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution,” Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3, no. 2, 2011, 196-207.
6 Especially in South Asia and on the Korean peninsula, not to mention the Middle East.
In the Asian space the bilateral asymmetric relations are usually the existence of a structure of pan-Asian security similar to the European, American and African security institutions, is being challenge with many facets. Bilateral Diplomacy is the main formula as there is not a common prospect for China and Japan on regional institutions as a diplomatic centre.

The San Francisco (1951) system inspired from the US, included a system of bilateral alliances centered on (Japan and South Korea), strategic relations (e.g., Thailand and the Philippines), military relations (Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore) is in dialogue with regional multilateral arrangements like the ASEAN having in regard to possibility of reconfiguration of the regional arrangements by China.

APEC is an economic forum bringing together the riparian States in the Pacific Ocean on both sides, OIC and NAM (transcontinental entities without permanent secretariats) with unclear competence in the field of safety-organizations that do not include all Asian countries.

KEDO (nuclear) and the contact group for Iran P-5 + 1 have asymmetric security mandates, namely to deter and press a state (North Korea and Iran).

GCC asymmetric structure created by the Americans focused on Saudi Arabia to counter threat pan-Arabism (the leftist Nasserist pan-Arabism) and Iranian influence in the Gulf region (after 1979) has a series of reactions after "Arabic Spring" 2011.

SCO is a security parity structure based on the Sino-Russian relationship for deterring international actors to issue claims on values that they share.

SAARC structure dedicated to the Indian subcontinent with a safety and a permanent secretariat office which depends on India-Pakistan relationship, although India plays a central role. ASEAN symmetrical structures build on the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs with real insights to underpin a legit pan-Asian forum.

SAARC and ASEAN could achieve a pan-Asian arrangement, or a multilateral organization with security expertise.

BIS(s) C/S (the Wall Street bankers) linked to the BRICS might draw attention to the importance of the pan-continental Asian issues.

ASEAN multilateral framework for East Asia promotes CBMs that cannot resolve the tensions in Northeast Asia (avoiding deciding on the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait) it is possible to create a framework for this region.

A trilateral framework in Northeast Asia not only did not reduce the importance of ASEAN but it contributes to solving the regional problems, including in South Asia.

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8 The examples are numerous: the US-Japan, the US-S. Korea, the US-Singapore, Russia-India, Australia-East Timor, Russia-North Korea, Japan-Malaysia, China-Pakistan, the US-Pakistan, China-Cambodia, the US-Saudi Arabia, Russia-Iran, China-Burma, India-Maldives, Iran-Syria, N. Korea-Pakistan, etc. [...] Asia today resonates a mixed echo of the European past. See Bajrektarevic Anis H., "No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution," Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3, no. 2, 2011, 198.

9 SEATO pact defense treaty organization for SEA which was essentially dissolved as soon as the imminent threat from communism was slowed down and successfully contained within the French Indochina. See Bajrektarevic Anis H., "No Asian century without the Pan-Asian institution," Geopolitics, History and International Relations 3, no. 2, 2011, 199.


11 The Iran-related Contact (Quartet/P-5+1) group.

12 The US, Japan, Korea, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

13 Triangle of Thailand-Malaysia-Indonesia represents the core of the ASEAN.
ASEAN has a positive role in CBMs, the previous diplomatic reconciliation between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-1967), prevented the escalation of the situation created by the invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam and the counter Khmer Rouge based in Thailand (1978). The role of ASEAN is taken to a larger scale by ARF and an extended vision, alongside CBMs to conduct a preventive diplomacy and building of conflict resolution mechanisms.

A division of responsibilities in this space: ASEAN with regional security and CBMs and trilateral from Northeast Asia for the tension in the Korean peninsula and lifting China’s control. Extinguish the conflict is not a corollary of ASEAN and other regional institutions from East Asia; the crisis in East Timor (1999-2000), the territorial conflict from the South China Sea (involving member states ASEAN and China).

Conflict management is an area where ASEAN (specific institution Southeast Asia) may contribute but don’t get involved (North Korea, China-Taiwan, situated in North-East Asia), but not in the case of military incidents (the clash between China's patrol vessels and Philippine, Vietnamese exploration vessel blockage by China, border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia) leaving them in charge of international diplomacy.

Taiwan, a triangle of bilateral relations overlaps on a diplomatic fund which prevented the outbreak of conflict broke out openly, much more effectively than any regional institutional format.

Configuring security architecture through the action of multiples determinants required reporting to the author’s vision states “Eastphaliene,” ASEAN as a central policy “Easphaliene.”

**PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY AGENDA THROUGH ASEAN COOPERATION**

In the early 1960s, Southeast Asia is declared by the States of the region “nuclear weapons free zone” (SEANWFZ). In this context, no ASEAN Member State does intend to use the nuclear technology critical (uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing) to support production of nuclear weapons; speculation regarding a program to produce nuclear weapons by Myanmar proved unfounded.

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16 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by ASEAN and China in 2002.


ASEAN Member States are Member States of the NPT and the Treaty of Bangkok (SEANWFZ), only three have ratified the CTBT and it remains lots to be done on the line of nuclear safety and security in accordance with IAEA standards, preventing nuclear terrorism. Moreover, the new requests relating to proliferation are considered outside the universal agreements are negotiated and are regarded with suspicion as being obstacles affecting their development. SEANWFZ signed in 1955 and entered into force in March 1997, China and the United States have not signed the Treaty has a number of potential effects in the future; Thus, the accession of China to the Treaty could limit its activities to the military in the South China Sea, even though they declare sovereignty over this space.

The Spratly Islands dossiers of the Exclusive economic zones (EEZs) depend on the position of Japan and Taiwan to BMF relative to SEANWFZ, the countermeasures of China in the Pacific and in the Indian Ocean that can seriously affect the US dominance to control the maritime lines, forcing ASEAN states to take a cautious position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interstate Trust</th>
<th>Peaceful Change</th>
<th>Regime Stability</th>
<th>Conflict Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
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<td>ASEAN-China Special Relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other forms of international relations</td>
<td>±</td>
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<td>+</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** By author.
**Note:** + = significant contribution; ± = weak contribution; - = no contribution; x = not applicable.

Figure no. 2 - Powers and contributions of family security institutions ASEAN

Association of South Asian States (ASEAN) pursues an agenda for cooperative security model OSCE - CSBMs, preventive diplomacy, conflict-resolution, mechanisms for crisis management - declaring their intention as ASEAN and ARF to be cooperative security

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22 Exclusive Economic Zones - EEZs.
24 Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN.
The ASEAN States are reserved in relation to develop BMD systems combined with geopolitical stakes of the South China Sea in the China-US relationship as well as the opposition of Russia and China, especially when US-China conflict related to Taiwan is ready to burst.

In East Asia, outbreaks of crisis that can escalate into an armed conflict - the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait to which it adds the disputes related to archipelagos from the East China Sea some under the control of China - Paracel Islands/Xisha (West Sand) the Scarborough Shoal, Zhongsha (Middle Sand), Nansha (Spratly Islands/South Sand - other under the control of Taiwan-Pratas Islands/Dongsha (East Sand), and Itu Aba/Taiping Island.

Claims of sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea can be resolved through diplomatic negotiations or protecting the rights claiming the use of force (Malaysia, Viet Nam, the Philippines, Brunei, China and Taiwan). The Philippines claims related to the Spatley Islands could involve US by invoking the bilateral treaty but also as an actor in East Asia. Within ASEAN it cannot harmonize political security cooperation because of divergences of interests of Member States, making it CBMs unlikely in South China Sea together with China.

ASEAN supports the peaceful exploitation of resources in the East China Sea, but also there is the forum that Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei and Vietnam raises claims related to sovereignty in this great against China but also against one another. Against the South China Sea regime in some countries are favorable to the position of China (Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar), some are reserved in relation to the involvement of the United States (Malaysia and Indonesia), other favors US involvement (Vietnam and the Philippines) and other neutral (Thailand and Singapore).

The South China Sea dossier has been the subject of several meetings, ASEAN, ARF, ADMM-Plus and EAS; moreover, the Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia addressed the ASEAN as a regional diplomatic structure in the sense of a negotiation based on consensus with China on the basis of UNCLOS.

ASEAN takes over and adapt the OSCE model for conflict management - internal and international conflicts to be managed collectively in the framework of regional security institutions through cooperation - while respecting the autonomy of the institution in relation to foreign powers, sovereignty, decisions made by consensus.

The security agenda through cooperation of the ASEAN it focuses on cooperation with foreign powers at the expense of its institutional autonomy and collective managing conflict with

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28 The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Philippines and the U.S.


30 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). When Beijing ratified UNCLOS in 1996, its reservations rendered that ratification largely meaningless because, as one of the disclaimers stated, China reaffirmed “sovereignty over all archipelagoes and islands” listed in its 1992 law.

restricting the sovereignty of its members. The implementation of this agenda has resulted in two streams, one active ASEAN-6 and a second reluctant CLMV.\(^{32}\)

The level of cooperation is low especially in crisis management for which there are not regional institutional capabilities, unable to speak of a security of the Asian-Pacific community as long as China is an authoritarian State.\(^{34}\)

In 2015, the initiative of creating a regulatory framework is within ASEAN on security, safety and nuclear non-proliferation, for regional cooperation rules (3S)\(^{35}\) as a result of plans for the development of nuclear energy. After the accident at Fukushima (2011) in this region a special emphasis is given to independent regulations ensuring transparency and a good public information, separated by the promoters and users of nuclear technology.\(^{36}\)

In the region, there are several States with an interest in nuclear power plants (NPP),\(^{37}\) signatories to the Treaty of Bangkok with the normative provisions of the framework document;\(^{38}\) there is a mutual interest that led to the creation of ASEANTOM.\(^{39}\) In furtherance of regional normative framework concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, is the development of infrastructure, human resource, legal framework and institutionalization of national resource management.\(^{40}\)

It is estimated that the first NPP within ASEAN will enter service in 2025. Vietnam proposes building of first NPP, two reactors of Russian production of 1,000 MWe (Phuoc Dinh, Ninh Thuan 1) and another NPP with Japanese assistance (Vinh Hai in Ninh Thuan 2).\(^{41}\) Indonesia has at its disposal three experimental reactors, but due to tectonic zone there is strong opposition to the use of nuclear energy. Malaysia is under pressure of demand for energy took into study the construction of a nuclear reactor as well as opposition to nuclear power of public opinion.\(^{42}\)

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32 Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Brunei.
33 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.
35 Regional cooperative norms on nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (3S).
37 Nuclear power plant (NPP). Interested are Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Philippines.
38 See Association of Southeast Asian Nations 1995. [...] “develop a coordinated ASEAN approach that would contribute to global undertakings to improve nuclear safety, in cooperation with the IAEA and other relevant partners, as well as promote and uphold IAEA standards of safety and security in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful use.” *Phnom Penh Declaration on ASEAN: One Community, One Destiny*, Joint Ministerial Statement 2012.
39 The ASEAN Network of Regulatory Bodies on Atomic Energy – ASEANTOM. The Vietnam Agency for Radiation and Nuclear Safety (VARANS), In Indonesia there is no Nuclear Energy Implementing Organization (NEPIO), In Malaysia, Malaysia Nuclear Power Cooperation (MNPC) was established as a NEPIO.
42 www.thepetitionsite.com/745/599 /785/public-petition-to-stop-nuclear-power-plants-in-malaysia, supported by the Malaysian Coalition Against Nuclear, MY-CAN.
With regard to the storage of used nuclear material, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia concerning the reprocessing and infrastructure have clarified issues, the European experience being particularly valuable in this regard.

The ASEAN’s principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States (principle of non-intervention in another States' domestic affairs) as it relates to nuclear power, considered an important component of national security, and is a serious obstacle to regional cooperation in regional matters even though it operates two regional groups.

ARF agenda could allow the involvement of foreign powers in the affairs of South East Asia, even though CBMs are based on consultation and consensus, and not to have laid down specific procedures and mechanisms for exchanges of military information. It is unlikely the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the ASEAN states due to their position to avoid antagonizing China, even during the US-China confrontation for Taiwan.

CBMs are implemented typically two categories of governor and military personnel; as well as CSOs could play an important role in the resumption of mutual relations between the opposing parties by non-military activities. Non-military CBMs are of political, economic, environmental, societal biases and cultural.

The ARF could manage an arms control agenda centered on non-BMD as CBMs, and “BMD free” as an additional SEANWFZ zone supporting a regional armaments control over new weapons systems without some meaning to their security concerns. A common position on both is needed the consequences of the policies of the US and China as well as on the regional strategic balance.

With regards to preventive diplomacy, the ARF proposes modest targets, due to the fact that the strategic interests of its members are as diverse as and due to the lack of operational experience and capabilities in managing conflicts. The initiative “free BMD” could be supported by greater transparency regarding Chinese missile forces, notably those carried out on the South

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45 ASEANTOM and a Nuclear Energy Cooperation Sub-Sector Network (NEC-SSN).

46 US, Japan, Australia and China.

47 CBMs can be understood as a spectrum of activities aimed at changing the contemporary character of two or more interacting inimical societies in a certain positive way. In an ideal case, under the influence of CBMs, adversaries should increasingly start to undertake more mutual exchanges and gradually become more trustful towards each other. The CBMs should also contribute to establishing an atmosphere that would enable conflict resolution or aid the whole peace process. See Javaid Umbreen, ”Confidence Building Measures in Nuclear South Asia: Limitations and Prospects,” *Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 25 (2), 2010, 341-359.

48 Non-military CBMs can be understood as ”[...] actions or processes undertaken in all phases of the conflict cycle and across the three dimensions of security in political, economic, environmental, social and cultural fields with the aim of increasing transparency and the level of trust and confidence between two or more conflicting parties (...) and to pave the way for lasting conflict settlement.” *OSCE Guide on Non-Military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)*, 2012, OSCE Secretariat, Vienna, 9.


coast of vis-à-vis Taiwan, demonstrating the value of the ARF as a mechanism for implementation.\(^{51}\)

The mimetic adoption of the OSCE model in search of the legitimacy for the region of Southeast Asia, namely the ASEAN as a security institution with an agenda of its own is the main purpose for long time.\(^{52}\)

The community security plan focused on cooperation, like the OSCE (institution's successful model and “pioneer” in the field regional security through cooperation, by promoting concepts that have become universal approved by the UN).\(^{53}\)

ARF is built on the idea that the OSCE the “regional security is indivisible and can be ensured through cooperation” following an itinerary marked many episodes while avoiding institutionalization of mechanisms similar to CSCE to achieve international legitimacy even though it has the common perspective and implementation arrangements.

**ADMM-Plus**

In 1994, the ASEAN Regional Forum is launched (ARF)\(^{54}\) that integrates the regional security dialogue process. Japan is a supporter of ARF multilateral cooperation for promoting “non-zero-sum game” on growth in the region.

In 1996, it is agreed the “ARF Concept Paper” but no progress is being made in the adoption of practical measures.\(^{55}\)

In 2002, Japan's proposal to initiate a format (Shangri-La Dialogue), unofficially, for a future meeting of the Ministers of defense (ADMM) is received coldly by the ARF partners.\(^{56}\)

In 2003, Bali Indonesia adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (replaced by the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II of 1976) to promote community security (including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding extinction post conflict peace-building, post-conflict).\(^{57}\)

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\(^{54}\) ASEAN Regional Forum - ARF. The ARF participants today are the ten ASEAN members - Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar - together with China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Papua New Guinea, the EU, the US, India, Mongolia, North Korea, Pakistan, Timor Leste, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.


\(^{56}\) See Seng Tan, ”Japan and Multilateralism in Asia,” in *Navigating Change: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in East Asia and in Global Governance*, ed. Rizal Sukma and Yoshihide Soeya, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, 2015, 67-68.

In 2010, the ARF is approved as the format of meetings for the defense ministers\(^{58}\) to be extended through the participation of the members of the extra-regional (ADMM-Plus).\(^{59}\) In Japanese, ASEAN must continue to be the leading force of the region (the driving force of the region) and the ADMM-Plus to promote humanitarian assistance and aid in disaster relief (HADR).\(^{60}\)

In 2013, take places the first ADMM-Plus training exercises (in Brunei Darussalam) but the aid operations after the disaster caused in the Philippines by Typhoon Haiyan.

In 2014, the HADR is constituted by several expert groups (EWG)\(^{61}\) in maritime security, military medicine, counter-terrorism. Within the ARF framework aimed at non-proliferation and disarmament\(^{62}\) which might be involved in the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and legislative expertise, internal standards and control, declaring Southeast Asia as an area free of enrichment and reprocessing (Southeast Asia year enrichment-and reprocessing-free zone).\(^{63}\)

Japan proposes the following objectives for the ADMM-Plus (18 of 27 participating ARF states ARF) developing regional capacity to deal with security issues multilateral meetings: regular intraregional, practical cooperation, intergovernmental coordination, groups of experts in specific fields.\(^{64}\)

ADMM-Plus can be a platform for coordination of measures to increase confidence-building measures, the mechanisms for crisis management and cooperation on security measures for non-traditional in Asia-Pacific area. It is the only format for Japan and China for official exchanges between the Ministers of Defense, which is negotiating a mechanism for crisis management.\(^{65}\)

ASEAN can promote through defense diplomacy, military-to-military cooperation, strategic and growth financing capacity-building (capacity building).

The activity of the ADMM-Plus is heavily blocked by several factors: deviations from consensus among participating States, concepts and measures ADMM cannot be accepted in the ADMM-Plus, lack of capacity for deployment in the event of crisis.\(^{66}\)

In one study,\(^{67}\) confidence as a form of influencing other subjects (nations, cultural groups, leading soldiers, relationship, etc.) can be understood as an equation of some variables in the

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\(^{58}\) ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting - ADMM.

\(^{59}\) ADMM-Plus

\(^{60}\) Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief - HADR.

\(^{61}\) Experts' Working Group - EWG.

\(^{62}\) ARF Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, Beijing (July 2009), Singapore (July 2010), Las Vegas (February 2011), Sydney (March 2012).


\(^{66}\) Malaysia's ambitious proposal at the 2015 meeting to form a military team under the ASEAN banner for quick deployment to crisis areas has the potential to cultivate ASEAN's collective capacity for military deployment.

context of each situation-part, moment, measures to increase confidence. Measures to increase confidence are psychological in nature, communication and in human relations.

In 2012, according to a study has proven CBSM's usefulness as a way of security cooperation (partnership, mutual reassurance, transparency) in terms of reducing tensions and escalation of incidents in several cases. 

ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>Anti-Access/Anti-Denial</td>
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<td>ABL</td>
<td>Airborne Laser</td>
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<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>AESA</td>
<td>Active Electronically Scanned Array</td>
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<td>ALHK</td>
<td>Air-Launched Hit-to-Kill</td>
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<td>AMD</td>
<td>Air and Missile Defense</td>
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<td>AMDR</td>
<td>Air and Missile Defense Radar</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMRAAM</td>
<td>Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>AN/TPY-2</td>
<td>Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance system</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area of Responsibility</td>
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<td>ASCM</td>
<td>Anti-Ship Cruise Missile</td>
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<td>AWD</td>
<td>Air-Warfare Destroyer</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWS</td>
<td>AEGIS Weapon System</td>
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<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense</td>
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<td>BMDS</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defense System</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>C2BMC</td>
<td>Command, Control, Battle Management and Communications</td>
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<td>C4</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communication, and Computer</td>
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<td>CMD</td>
<td>Cruise Missile Defense</td>
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<td>EKV</td>
<td>Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle</td>
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<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<td>GaN</td>
<td>Gallium Nitride</td>
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<td>GBAD</td>
<td>Ground-Based Air Defenses</td>
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<td>GBI</td>
<td>Ground-based Interceptor</td>
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<td>GEM</td>
<td>Guidance Enhanced Missile</td>
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<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground-based Midcourse Defense</td>
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<td>IAMD</td>
<td>Integrated Air and Missile Defense</td>
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<td>ICBM</td>
<td>Intercontinental Ballistic Missile</td>
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<td>IRBM</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRSO</td>
<td>Long-Range Standoff weapon (nuclear tipped cruise missile)</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Missile Defense</td>
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<td>MIRV</td>
<td>Multiple Independent targetable Re-entry Vehicle</td>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MML</td>
<td>Multi-Mission Launcher</td>
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<td>MOKV</td>
<td>Multiple Object Kill Vehicle</td>
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<td>NMD</td>
<td>National Missile Defense</td>
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<td>NPR</td>
<td>Nuclear Posture Review</td>
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<td>OTH</td>
<td>Over-the Horizon</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>Patriot Advanced Capability</td>
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<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>SBIRS</td>
<td>Space Based Infrared System</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SM</td>
<td>Standard Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>STSS</td>
<td>Space Tracking and Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THAAD</td>
<td>Terminal High Altitude Area Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSMR</td>
<td>White Sands Missile Range</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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