

# HISTORICAL COLLAGE: NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS' PARTY - ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

Laura SASU<sup>1</sup>

---

## ABSTRACT:

*THIS PARALLEL INGRESSION INTO THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALIST AND THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES ATTEMPTS TO TRACE, USING A COMPARATIVE APPROACH, THE SERIES OF STAGES IN THEIR ACCESSION TO POWER AS WELL AS THE CONTEXT AND SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT ULTIMATELY ALLOWED THESE PARTIES TO BECOME TOTALITARIAN REGIMES IN 20<sup>th</sup> CENTURY EUROPE. THE CONTRASTIVE METHOD ALLOWS THE EMPHASIS OF BOTH CONVERGING POINTS AND DIVERGENT ASPECTS OF THE INCIPIENT PATHS TOWARDS TOTALITARIAN POWER. THE COMMON TRAITS INCLUDE A POOR INITIAL REPRESENTATIVITY, INCLINATION TO VIOLENCE, DISREGARD FOR LEGALITY, OPPORTUNISTIC SPECULATION OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT, USE OF COMPROMISE FOR ATTAINING KEY POSITIONS OF GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE TO ORGANISE NEW ELECTIONS, PRE-ELECTORAL COMBAT OF POLITICAL OPPONENTS IN QUESTIONABLE WAYS AND EVENTUALLY ACCESSION TO AND MONOPOLIZING POWER BY METAMORPHOSIS INTO A STATE-PARTY. YET, THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE CONSISTS IN THE DE FACTO LEGITIMITY OF THE GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE PURELY FORMAL, FABRICATED LEGITIMITY OF ROMANIAN COMMUNISM, THAT WAS IMPELLED BY SOVIET SUPPORT AND BY OBVIOUSLY ILLCIT MEANS.*

---

**KEYWORDS:** COMMUNISM, NATIONAL-SOCIALISM, ACCESSION, POWER, TOTALITARIANISM

## INTRODUCTION: UNDERGROUND PARTIES

The German Worker's Party (Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei DAP) is founded in 1919 by a "small group of discontented"<sup>2</sup> in the historical context subsequent to World War I, when several other right wing parties emerged, as a consequence of the disappointment regarding the war defeat. They aimed at the annulment of the peace treaties, agrarian reform, nationalization of trusts, unifying all Germans and "solving the Jewish problem"<sup>3</sup>. At the same time, in 1921, the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist din România PCdR) is set up with an extremely poor popularity (that will persist until 1945)<sup>4</sup> only to be banned

---

<sup>1</sup> PhD candidate, MA., Transilvania University of Braşov, Romania, laurasasu@yahoo.com.

<sup>2</sup> J.Toland, *Viaţa lui Adolf Hitler*, Vol. I, Ed. Moldova, Iaşi: 1995, 57.

<sup>3</sup> As the phenomenon was referred to during this period.

<sup>4</sup> 1000 members on 23.07.1944 and by 23.04.1945 it has 42653 members according to the data of a party meeting of that month. V. Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate – O istorie politică a comunismului românesc*, Iaşi: Ed. Polirom, 2005, 109.

shortly afterwards by royal decree and by the decision of the liberal government, due to its implication in the Bolshevik armed rebellion<sup>5</sup> in 1924 against the Romanian authorities at Tatar-Bunar, where a pro-soviet revolutionary committee claimed the end of the so-called “Romanian occupation in Basarabia”<sup>6</sup> by annexing the latter to the Ukraine. Quite similarly, A. Hitler becomes president of a rather feeble party in 1921 which, from the very beginning, refuses to be just another regular party, but rather a movement with the ambition of becoming representative for the entire nation. As a leader, he contributes to setting up the propaganda and security structures of the party. Subsequent to a failed attempt to organise a coup d'etat, the party is also banned and its leader arrested and convicted (to a minimum sentence of six months in prison, where he writes *Mein Kampf*<sup>7</sup>), whereas this imprisonment will be later used extensively for propaganda purposes. This is the very moment when, in full awareness of his party's marginality, A.Hitler decides that the legal takeover of power is preferable, thus having the party compete henceforth in elections under the motto: „Even if it takes longer to outvote them than to shoot them, this way their own constitution will grant our success.”<sup>8</sup>

### **MAIN TEXT: FERTILE LAND FOR GROWTH - CRISIS, ERROR AND SLIDE**

The DAP will stay in the shadow until 1929 when - after having been re-founded under the name National Socialist German Workers Party ( National Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei NSDAP) subsequent to the expiry of the banning period in 1925 - the number of party's members and supporters increases, especially due to deepening economic crisis, so that the party will score 18,3% of the votes at the 1930 elections and then become the strongest party in 1932, by the 37,4% obtained<sup>9</sup>. Before attaining the desired amount of power, A.Hitler faces a number of obstacles, starting with his defeat by Paul von Hindenburg in 1932 in the second round for presidential elections, as well as the internal opposition by his party rival Gregor Strasser, whom he will soon eliminate. With chancellor Kurt von Schleicher resignation, Hitler manages to accede to the chancellor position and starts governing leading a NSDAP/DNVP minority coalition, where the 43% of the votes, cumulatively obtained by the two members of the coalition, did not (yet) form a majority. But the NSDAP settles, at least for the moment, for as little as only two ministry portfolios. This approach, known as the *taming concept* - will prove to be a serious underestimation of the Nazis, who now obtain the assurance of dissolving the German parliament - the Reichstag - and of organising new elections on 05.03.1933, when they expect to ensure an absolute majority, intended to grant their independence from any other coalition partners. While the NSDAP obtains the 34.4% in 1932, only 7 years after being re-founded, the development of the Romanian Communist Party is also characterised by a long period of insignificance. Similarly, existing clandestinely for quite a while, the PCdR seizes the opportunity created by the Soviet intervention on the eastern front in World War II and the resulting weakening of the German and their allied forces - among which Romania – and Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu,

<sup>5</sup> Subsequently proved in the trial of the 500.

<sup>6</sup> V. Frunză, *Istoria stalinismului în România*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 1990, 70.

<sup>7</sup> “Installed again in cell no. 7, Hitler opened his leather briefcase and pulled a thick notebook. On right top part of the cover he wrote: «My motto: when the world ends, the earth explodes but not my belief in a just cause». Then he added below: « the judgement of mediocrity and personal evil is over and today starts: My Struggle (Mein Kampf) Landsberg, April, 1<sup>st</sup>, 1924».” J.Toland, *Viața lui Adolf Hitler*, Vol. I, Iași: Ed. Moldova, 1995, p.107.

<sup>8</sup> A. Hitler, apud J. Hermand, *Die Utopie des Fortschritts. 12 Versuche*. Böhlau Verlag, Wien, 2007, 24.

<sup>9</sup> J. Falter, Th. Lindenberger, S.Schumann, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919— 1933*, München; Ed.C.H. Beck, 1986.

as leader of a „party virtually non-existing on the political scene”<sup>10</sup>, opportunistically joins and supports the internal forces,<sup>11</sup> that overthrow marshal Ion Antonescu<sup>12</sup> for the political reorientation<sup>13</sup> of Romania - a 180 degree turn, that will mould the country’s fate within the communist block for next fifty years. L. Pătrășcanu becomes hereby not only minister of justice but he also obtains key positions for the members of his party both in the government led by general Constantin Sănătescu,<sup>14</sup> and in the last democratic government led by general Nicolae Rădescu.<sup>15</sup> The final step towards totalitarianism occurs without any democratic basis - opposed to the German national socialism - but rather under direct involvement of Moscow that will shortly impose a unilateral government, with Petru Groza as a leader. Stepping back from governance, the two left wing parties, the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Communist Român PCR) and the Social Democrat Party (Partidul Social Democrat PSD) form a new alliance the National Democrat Front (Frontul Național Democrat FND). Officially denouncing any collaboration within the National Democrat Block (Blocul Național Democrat BND) with the National Liberal Party (Partidul Național Liberal PNL) and the National Peasants’ Party (Partidul Național Țărănesc PNȚ) they manage to create the conditions favourable to the expansion of the left wing and the elimination of the right wing as so-called „reactionary forces”: the political crisis. Subjected to the coercing pressure<sup>16</sup> of the Soviet representative, the King Mihai I accepts a list of a new government devised by Petru Groza but imposed<sup>17</sup> by Moscow, despite of I. Maniu’s and I.C. Brătianu’s protests, who saw herein the suicide of democracy. However, the fact that this imposed government is not acknowledged by the USA and the UK as a representative, democratic government determines the King Mihai I to start a Royal strike, refusing to sign any government document, in order to determine P. Groza to resign.

### CONSPIRING LEGALLY FOR LEGITIMIZING THE TOTALITARIAN RULE

This crisis comes to an end by a compromise in December 1945,<sup>18</sup> that provides the admission of a representative of PNL and PNȚ in the government and organising new, so-called *free elections* - a rather questionable term - since the organising ministries, the Ministry of Justice and that of Internal Affairs - were anything but *free*.<sup>19</sup> This compromise on the left wing’s part will bring, at a minimal and purely formal cost of two ministerial portfolios, the international acknowledgement of the Groza government as a democratic one

<sup>10</sup> A. Mureșan, *Cronica unei sinucideri asistate*, Iași, Ed. Polirom, 2011, 15.

<sup>11</sup> By forming the coalition named the National Democrat Block.

<sup>12</sup> Whose motto “All honours to the King but all power to me” would take its toll on the relationship between the King Mihai I and the Leader of the Romanian State that will result in the decision taken on 23.08.1944. A. Hillgruber, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române (1938-1944)*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 2007, 332.

<sup>13</sup> “I realised the difficulties and hardships to come“ confessed Sănătescu as a witness to the palace act in C. Sănătescu, *Jurnal*, Ed. Humanitas, București, 1993; but he would probably not anticipate that breaking the alliance with Germany and fighting against the former ally will lead to signing the armistice of 12.09.1944 that places Romania under Soviet influence by 90%, established later on 9.10.1944 by Stalin’s and Churchill’s signatures.

<sup>14</sup> Between 23.08.1944 and 3.11.1944, each party had a representative in the BND S. Neagoe, *Istoria guvernelor României de la începuturi - 1859 până în zilele noastre - 1995*, București: Ed. Machiavelli, 1995.

<sup>15</sup> Between 06.12.1944 – 28.02.1945 D. C. Giurescu, *Guvernarea Nicolae Rădescu*, București: Ed. All, 1996.

<sup>16</sup> Banging his fist on the table he emphasized: „Yalta is me!” N. Franck, *O înfrângere în victorie (1944 - 1947)*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 1992, 122.

<sup>17</sup> List that despite of only 5 portfolios held by the PCR, actually granted in a non-conspicuous way a leftist monopoly government.

<sup>18</sup> D.C. Giurescu, H.C. Matei, N.C. Nicolescu, *Istoria României în date*. București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003.

<sup>19</sup> Explicitly articulated warning made by Iuliu Maniu, who asked for the election neutrality.

and represent, actually, another checked point of the action plan set up in Moscow for Romania.

The common traits of the path to power undergone, so far, by the PCR and the NSDAP consists in the fact that, despite initial reluctance of the Romanian King to accept the government proposed by P. Groza and the prior refusal<sup>20</sup> by Paul von Hindenburg to name A. Hitler chancellor, both A. Hitler (NSDAP) and P. Groza (PCR) eventually achieve their goals and seize governmental power. In the contexts created by political crises, in each of the two situations, their accession to governmental top power positions is rather circumstantially and forced upon the King and Hindenburg; having attained these important positions, both parties intend to organise new election as soon as possible and by these elections, both groups aim to solve their legitimacy problem, inherent to the way they acceded to governmental position.

### **MIRROR: THE LEFT IS FOR THE RIGHT WHAT THE RIGHT IS FOR THE LEFT**

The circumstances used to their favour by the NSDAP and the PCR include the formal compromise, another important crutch used by both governments before elections. While the PCR made the compromise of granting two ministerial portfolios to the opposition for obtaining its international acknowledgement and putting an end to the Royal strike until the definitive quest of legitimacy by elections - that it was to organise and win by fraud-, the NSDAP also made the compromise of accepting a coalition with the DNVP, in a government where they held only two ministerial portfolios (despite of the 33.1% of the votes obtained at the 1932 elections), only for having A.Hitler as a chancellor and be able henceforth to articulate its legitimizing procedure, also by organising elections, and by cunning preparatives for influencing the results. Just like the Romanian elections in 1946, where the organising ministries (of justice and of internal affairs) were subordinated to the pro-soviet Groza government, the elections that grant the accession to power to the NSDAP are organised in Germany having A.Hitler as chancellor, W. Frick as minister of internal affairs and H. Göring in the same position for Prusia. Preparatives occur absolutely similarly: despite significant sideslips from a legal point of view (most remaining unclear up to the present, hence having effects difficult to assess and quantify) in both cases meticulously orchestrated measures will ensure the formal compliance with the legal provisions of electoral procedures, deviously masking those actions intended to decimate important percentages of the opponents' votes in advance. In Romania, despite the protests of the opposition, the Groza government postpones the date set for elections, to buy time for amending the electoral procedure by decree on 07.06.1945 and also for decreeing, on the same day, the dissolution of the senate, considered „reactionary”.

The new provisions of the electoral procedure aims, on one hand, to enhance the numbers of left wing voters, by granting voting right to all citizens aged 21, even to military troops or public officers,<sup>21</sup> both groups being obviously under full control of the government. On the other hand, the voting right is restricted for people who had held important positions during the Antonescu dictatorship, thus reducing the numbers of right wing voters. This provision - the constitutionality thereof being debatable per se - was applied absolutely discretionary: the administration had the legal basis and the executive means, by so-called deputation commissions, to exclude the top opponents from the political life but also many other people, whose voting right was abusively annulled. The People's Courts of pre-communist Romania will ensure the neutralisation of right wing leaders and voters, just like

---

<sup>20</sup> on 13.08.1932.

<sup>21</sup> Target group that would bring according to the left wing estimates a bonus of one million votes.

A. Hitler will pre-electorally annihilate his opponents, leaders and voters of the left wing by so-called lawful mass arrests. The compromise made by each of the two groups for attaining key positions in the election organising governments was fully taken advantage of: it granted them the opportunity to set up a favourable legal framework before elections as well as the control position over the political opponents before the actual voting process. Thus, before the date set for elections, on the 29.02.1933 (quite conveniently for the NSDAP) a massive and quite symbolic fire breaks out, burning the Reichstag, the parliament building. In Romania the pre-electoral elimination of the right wing, under the provision of law, mirrors and replicates step by step the exact same approach held by the German right wing against the communist left wing in 1933. While the Romanian „reactionary” senate is dissolved and many of the right wing voters banned from voting by the depuration commissions and People’s Courts, in pre-electoral Germany the parliament burns literally, whereas the hunt and annihilation of communists becomes not only a legal practice, but also a main campaign slogan. The parliament burns, the national socialists proclaim the state of emergency and blaming the German Communist Party (Kommunistische Deutsche Partei KDP) for the fire, implement a series of measures restricting the right to free expression (annihilation the communist press) the right to association (banning meetings of the left wing) and granting exceptional powers to the chancellor. Using this pretext and by this artifice A. Hitler initiates a real hunt against communists, under the accusation of acts of terror against the German state. This was legalised by the emergency ordinance *For the Protection of People and State* from 28.02.1933 that subordinated the police who will make political arrests joining his paramilitary *Assault Divisions*. Behind laws, passed legally under the messianic pretext of saving the nation from a terrible enemy, A. Hitler’s right wing and P. Groza’s left wing take analogous measures - otherwise contestable as unconstitutional - by which they exclude potential voters of political opponents. Despite of radical methods of neutralising main political rivals and then exploiting these as main electoral themes (the NSDAP wins the elections in the name of communist combat), quite contrary to their expectations of obtaining an absolute majority at the elections on 5.03.1933, the NSDAP only scores 43,9% of the votes<sup>22</sup> and is once again compelled to rely on the DNVP and their 8% for forming a majority government coalition, with 51,9%. On 23.03.1933 A. Hitler submits the temporary implementation of the *Enabling Act*, a law conferring dictatorial power to the chancellor and the government by eluding parliamentary legislation that will be passed, with 96 votes against and an overwhelming majority of 444 votes in favour. His strategy, both obvious and controversial, is however ratified by the majority vote of the parliament and further legitimizes, from this point onward, any measures regardless of their constitutionality, protected from the veto of the parliament. As he had planned after the failed putsch in 1923, even though it took longer to outvote than to shoot his opponents, A. Hitler and his NSDAP, managed to ensure legitimacy and at the same time discretionary powers to apply their ideas for the people and the state. Whereas the NSDAP - despite the high score at the elections - did not manage to obtain the desired majority, being compelled to pass the Enabling Act to ensure decisional freedom and totalitarian power herewith, the Romanian left wing had to act even more incisively to win the elections and ensure, at least, formal legitimacy: electoral fraud became, in this case, the ultimate resort to commandeer the electorate’s will expressed by vote. The 1946 elections fraud has meanwhile been historically proven<sup>23</sup> by numerous

<sup>22</sup> J. Falter, Th. Lindenberger, S. Schumann, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919—1933*, München: Ed.C.H. Beck, 1986.

<sup>23</sup> "Învățămintele alegerilor și sarcinile PC după victoria din 19 noiembrie 1946" a secret document in the Archives of the Ministry for National Defence (MAPN), Document Material Fund, file 1.742, f.12–13

documents,<sup>24</sup> indicating that Andrei Vîșinski's fears - that without a significant "aid", Romanian communists would not exceed 10% - were solved accordingly, by so-called appropriate electoral "techniques". This is also documented by several other statements by Ana Pauker or Emil Bodnăraș, who admits preparing to fraud the elections: „We hope to get 55-65% of the votes by real votes, but we need 90% and that will be accomplished by those opportunities conferred by electoral law and by certain techniques.”<sup>25</sup> The soviet ambassadors S. Kavtaradze also stated that "by certain techniques, the BPD can get 90% of the votes.”<sup>26</sup> The 1946 elections sealed, from a formal point of view,<sup>27</sup> Romania within the big communist family and despite of massive fraud accusations issued by external observers and by the opposition,<sup>28</sup> the BDP<sup>29</sup> wins the election with an score of official 69%. This last step in fabricating legitimacy took place according to the Stalinist principle:<sup>30</sup> It doesn't matter who votes for whom, it's important who counts the votes. Despite USA and UK diplomats' reports describing these elections as a massive fraud, an unprecedented prank and a simulacrum of legality, the results were never invalidated. The last remaining impediments in the way of communist totalitarianism are the political parties and the last icon of democracy King Mihai I. The political parties shall be eliminated swiftly and the King is called to Bucharest by P. Groza (as chief of government) and by Ghe. Gheorghiu-Dej (Secretary General of PCR), is presented pre-typed abdication act, and compelled to sign it. The King refuses to sign it without a preliminary popular referendum, but being prisoner in his own palace, with telephone connexions cut, with the royal guard substituted by units of the PCR,<sup>31</sup> he is blackmailed with the lives of 1000 arrested students that depend on his signature. The King's signature on the abdication act will be the last point on the instauration plan of Bolshevism in Romania. All obstacles overcome, the communist party can do as it will, hence becoming formally and factually the sole holder of state power.

### CONCLUSION: THE ANGLE THAT MAKES THE DIFFERENCE

This parallel ingression in the development of the parties, that were each to give birth to a form of totalitarianism in 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe, leads to one obvious conclusion: the path taken by the extreme right wing (NSDAP) and left wing (PCR) parties is in many respects similar, both in form and in essence. In starting as small parties, with a fascination for power, disinterested in legality and inclined to violence, therefore banned, developing afterwards rather due to external historical circumstances than their own merits, acceding by opportunism to the top governmental positions, used for the legal ratification and implementation of rather unorthodox measures intended to weaken political opponents pre-electorally, their paths do indeed converge. Despite their position on opposing extremes of the political spectrum, there are numerous essential aspects that coincide. Each of them

---

published by P. Țurlea, *Alegerile parlamentare din noiembrie '46: guvernul procomunist joacă și câștigă. Ilegalități flagrante, rezultat viciat*, în „*Dosarele istoriei*”, nr. 11, 2000, 35.

<sup>24</sup> More than 10 different sources announced prior to elections results very close to those that would become official D.C. Giurescu, *Documente privind alegerile din 19 noiembrie 1946*, Centenar Constantin C. Giurescu, Craiova: Ed. Universitaria, pp. 302-310

<sup>25</sup> E. Bodnăraș apud T.A. Pokivailova, *Contacte româno-sovietice în legătură cu alegerile*, AS, 1996, 3, 414.

<sup>26</sup> S. Kavtaradze, *Documentul 234, 20 noiembrie 1946* apud A. Cioroianu, *Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere în istoria comunismului românesc* București: Editura Curtea Veche, 2005, 65.

<sup>27</sup> By signing the treaty on 10.02.1947.

<sup>28</sup> Who were unable to form a right wing coalition.

<sup>29</sup> Predominantly leftist coalition.

<sup>30</sup> Stalin described by L.M. Kaganovici, one of his subordinates as: „tough and brutal demanding total and unconditional subordination” in R. Medvedev, *Oamenii lui Stalin*, București: Ed. Meridiane, 1993, 127.

<sup>31</sup> Tudor Vladimirescu division, a unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under the command of the left wing and of Moscow.

displays features identifiable in its counterpart, but both twin reflections of one and the same approach. The approach that was soon to grant them the accession to totalitarian power.

However, even though there is a spate of similarities revealed by the comparative analysis of the two totalitarianisms, there is one fundamental dissimilarity related to the compliance, respectively the failure to comply with legal and constitutional provisions that has direct and ultimate consequences upon the *de facto* legitimacy of that particular regime. In this respect, things no longer converge. The fundamental difference between the onset of the German national socialist totalitarian dictatorship (before WWII) and of the communist dictatorship in Romania (after WWII) consists in the fact that, A. Hitler - as he had planned - meticulously and rigorously stuck up to the very end to obtaining the legal legitimacy of totalitarian power by law, by submitting to the vote of the parliament and obtaining a significant majority in passing all the laws, including the *Enabling Act*, thus fulfilling his plan, prophecy and promise, according to which "their own constitution will guarantee our success."<sup>32</sup> In Romania, on the other hand, communist totalitarianism was imposed with the significant Soviet contribution, according to model of Bolshevik practices, in serious breach of legality, both by fraud of the election results and by eliminating the monarchy, and coercing the King to sign the abdication act, by the threat of a gun and by blackmail, threatening to kill a large number of imprisoned civilians. Thus, while national socialism walked on the solid ground, both *de jure* and *de facto*, of legitimacy and representativity by the initial vote of the population and subsequently by that of the parliament on the *Enabling Act*, in the case of Romanian communism things are different: its legitimacy is questionable, both from a judicial point of view, due to the coercive nature of acts and decisions that led to the instauration of the regime and from a factual point of view by the rather low real representativity of the party, known and acknowledged both by Moscow, and by the USA and the UK, as well as by Romania.

The diverging point in the initial path of the two parties that led to totalitarian dictatorships consists in the following: while the German national socialism consistently looked to it to accede to power as legitimate and representative production of the nation it represented and was to lead, the Romanian communism remains basically an imported regime, brought and imposed as a consequence of internal and external decisions and responsibilities, however, in its essence still a regime with questionable legitimacy and representativity. This aspect is relevant to this analysis since it reflects the way a party can undergo the metamorphosis to a totalitarian regime, even when it does not rely on a factual, real internal support. It represents an even more relevant warning for posterity, since, in this case, it doesn't even emerge from the midst or will of that particular nation, but can be literally implanted onto the vulnerable tissue of contextual weakness, error or precarity of that country.

The totalitarian nucleus evolves similarly both when it is externally supported, with a weak internal legitimacy and representativity and also when it is propelled by the majority vote of the electorate. It is obvious that the totalitarian ambition displays identical manifestations regardless of its form, its position on the political spectrum, with or without a prominent leader and, maybe, even regardless of its ideology or doctrine.

Totalitarianism – regardless of its legitimacy status, whether merely formally legitimised or factually representative – will find ways to preserve its position and to fully control its subjects from this position in the hierarchical upper extreme of absolute power and will bring them in the other extreme, at the lowest level of absolute submission, while the steps taken by both European totalitarianisms in this direction also occurred on an absolutely analogous pattern.

---

<sup>32</sup> A. Hitler, apud J.Hermand, *Die Utopie des Fortschritts. 12 Versuche*. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2007, p.24.

## REFERENCES

1. **Adrian, Cioroianu**, *Pe umerii lui Marx. O introducere în istoria comunismului românesc* București: Editura Curtea Veche, 2005
2. **Andreas, Hillgruber**, *Hitler, Regele Carol și Mareșalul Antonescu. Relațiile germano-române (1938-1944)*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 2007
3. **Dinu, C.** Giurescu, *Documente privind alegerile din 19 noiembrie 1946, Centenar Constantin C. Giurescu*, Craiova: Ed. Universitaria, 2001
4. **Dinu, C.** Giurescu, H.C. Matei, N.C. Nicolescu, *Istoria României în date*. București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003
5. **Dennis.** Deletant, *Teroarea comunistă în România. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej și statul polițienesc, 1948-1955*, Iași: Editura Polirom, 2001
6. **John,** Toland, *Viața lui Adolf Hitler*, Vol. I, Iași: Ed. Moldova, 1995.
7. **Nicoleta,** Franck, *O înfrângere în victorie (1944 - 1947)*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 1992.
8. **Petre,** Țurlea, *Alegerile parlamentare din noiembrie '46: guvernul procomunist joacă și câștigă. Ilegalități flagrante, rezultat viciat*, în „*Dosarele istoriei*”, nr. 11, 2000
9. **Roy,** Medvedev, *Oamenii lui Stalin*, București: Ed. Meridiane, 1993
10. **Stelian,** Neagoe, *Istoria guvernelor României de la începuturi - 1859 până în zilele noastre – 1995*, București: Ed. Machiavelli, 1995
11. **Tatiana, A.** Pokivailova, *Contacte româno-sovietice în legătură cu alegerile*, AS, 1996
12. **Vladimir,** Tismăneanu, *Stalinism pentru eternitate – O istorie politică a comunismului românesc*, Iași: Ed. Polirom, 2005
13. **Victor,** Frunză, *Istoria stalinismului în România*, București: Ed. Humanitas, 1990
14. **Jost,** Hermand, *Die Utopie des Fortschritts. 12 Versuche*, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2007
15. **Jürgen,** Falter, Th.Lindenberger, S.Schumann, *Wahlen und Abstimmungen in der Weimarer Republik. Materialien zum Wahlverhalten 1919— 1933*, Ed.C.H. Beck, München,1986