

THE „5+2” NEGOTIATIONS MODEL FOR THE SOLVING OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT

Ion PANAIT

ABSTRACT:

THE INVOLVEMENT OF BERLIN AND OF THE GERMAN DIPLOMACY STRENGTHENED THE SOLVING OF THE TRANSNISTRIAN CONFLICT. FOR THIS, THE GERMAN DIPLOMACY ORGANISED SOME INFORMAL SECRET MEETINGS IN GERMANY, BETWEEN IMPORTANT REPRESENTATIVES FROM CHISINAU AND TIRASPOL. BERLIN, OF COURSE, TOOK ADVANTAGE AND TRIED TO IMPOSE THEIR POINT OF VIEW AT THESE MEETINGS. THE STRENGTHENING OF THE RELATIONS WITH THE EU KEPT ON BEING THE MAIN ELEMENT OF THE MOLDAVIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS; A SERIES OF IMPORTANT STEPS WERE TAKEN IN GETTING CLOSER TO THE EU. THE CLOSING OF THE ASSOCIATIVE AGREEMENT AND ITS INITIALLING AT THE SUMMIT FOR THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP IN VILNIUS BROUGHT MOLDAVIA A LEGAL FRAME, ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNITARIAN AQUIS. WHATEVER THE RESULT OF THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT - THE VICTORY OF PUTIN'S RUSSIA/ DEMOCRATIC FORCES, OR THE BREAKING OF THE COUNTRY AS RESULT OF AN INTERNAL CONFLICT - IT WILL AFFECT MOLDAVIA.

KEYWORDS: MOLDOVA, „5+2” NEGOTIATIONS MODEL, USA, UE, RUSSIA, UKRAINE

During the last few years, Chisinau has been forced to be very careful in taking a firm position towards Moscow in regard to topics of great interest for the Republic of Moldavia. At the same time, both The USA and The EU were not disposed to put any extra pressure on Moscow regarding the Transnistria issue, for it is no priority to them. Given this perspective we can say that for both Washington and Brussels the number one priority in this issue would be the resumption of the official negotiations following the „5+2” negotiations model. The talks at Chisinau between the Moldavians officials and the American vice-president Joseph Biden demonstrated that both Washington and Brussels basically agreed on Russian troops and arsenal retreat from Transnistria, transforming the Russian peace mission into an international one, with civilian observers, or in regard to The USA and The EU assuming the status of a full member within the „5+2” negotiations model.

In order to consolidate this position, The USA and The EU asked Chisinau to adopt all necessary measures to determine the officials from Tiraspol to return to negotiations. Unfortunately, ensuring this kind of a context would have called for unacceptable compromises, leading to, for example, the annulment of The Law Regarding the Basic Provisions for The Special Juridical Status of the Settlements on the Left of The River Nistru issued by The Republic of Moldavia as opposed to Tiraspol's annulment of the results of the September 2006 Referendum regarding the independence of Transnistria and its later coupling to The Russian Federation.

The relative flexibility showed by the chief of Russian diplomacy, Serghei Lavrov, when met his Moldavian counterpart was considered by the German annalists the result of the meeting at the Meseberg Palace between the Russian president of that time, Dmitri Medvedev and the German Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel. At the same time, the German analysts estimated that the EU's efforts towards The Republic of Moldavia were to be successful and to lead in the end to Moldavia being accepted into The EU, together with Transnistria. This would have called for the taking off from power of the separatist Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, who had started to disconsider the Russian opinion, even though he kept on claiming that the only possible future for Transnistria would be with The Russian Federation.¹⁴

Ukraine, the second mediator and guarantee at the „5+2” negotiations model agreed with the opinion of some German annalists according to which, this would surely support the position of Russia, for Kiev seemed to be orienting to Moscow, despite its declarations in favour of The EU. It is interesting to see that shortly after the above mentioned consultations, on April the 28th, 2011; Igor Smirnov announced that Tiraspol was ready to negotiate the solving of the Transnistrian conflict. He also commented upon the information published in mass-media according to which the Kremlin was to give up supporting the officials in Tiraspol, turning in return towards the process of Moldavia reintegration led from Chisinau. Related to that, Smirnov said „... we had talks at Moscow with Narâşkin and Patrushev, and I asked them if the Russian Federation will continue to support us. Regarding Merkel's initiative, it is pretty active. Germany's unification is understandable, due to its implication in war. In our case, there will be no unification with the Republic of Moldavia. We did not get out of the Soviet Union cannot talk about the resumption of the entire negotiation process, though it has been given up since 2004.”¹⁵ Smirnov commended the meeting with the Moldavian premier, Vlad Filat, saying: „On 28th of April, as you know, a meeting with Mr. Filat was to take place. We got no official answer and I suppose this meeting will not take place. We are supposed to discuss issues that should improve the lives of all citizens living on the territory of The Transnistrian territory.”¹⁶ According to Smirnov, the main impediment for the negotiations is „... the elections on the right side of the River Nistru as well as the presidential elections”¹⁷.

On 26th of May 2011, the officials in Tiraspol said that Moscow should have increased the number of the „pacificators” in the area, up to 3.200 people; this declaration was made by the chief of the Transnistrian Delegation for the Unified Control Committee Oleg Beleakov.

On 10th of June 2011, the Moldavian diplomats left reception organized by the Russian Diplomatic Mission after its chief, the ambassador Valeri Kuzmin, officially introduced Vladimir Iastrebeac as the leader of the Transnistrian diplomacy. At Russia's National Day there were several representatives from the Moldavian Diplomacy as well as European representatives accredited to Chisinau. It is to be mentioned that after the Moldavian diplomats left the party they were followed by the European and American diplomats, who also left the party.

Within this context, the Moldavian prime-minister Vlad Filat, mentioned that the Russian Ambassador made a diplomatic blunder, announcing that he will demand for an official explanation. He also invited everybody to remain calm, especially that the day of June 21st was close and this was the day to start the negotiations to set The Transnistrian conflict.

¹⁴ The declaration of the Transnistrian separatist leader, Igor Smirnov, on April the 11th, 2011, at the so-called *Conference of the fighters for Transnistria's independence*, at Tiraspol, „Moscow has a major part in maintaining stability in the area, a reason for which they will be grateful to Russia and will do their best to fit their legislation with the Russian one in order to join The Russian Federation as soon as possible”. It is possible that this declaration was made at Kremlin's suggestion, for it was interested in putting pressure on The EU.

¹⁵ Cf. *Rompress* portal - <http://www.ropress.eu/politic/1153.html>.

¹⁶ Cf. *Rompress* portal - <http://www.ropress.eu/politic/1153.html>.

¹⁷ Cf. *Rompress* portal - <http://www.ropress.eu/politic/1153.html>.

The political analysts were worried because of the gesture made by the Russian Ambassador, considering that such an unseen gesture could be interpreted as a challenge from Moscow, leading to tension between the two countries. According to the political analysts, this gesture was a sign of sympathy from Russia to Tiraspol. It is necessary to mention that this incident took place just a few days after Moscow sent to the Moldavian diplomacy an official statement expressing dissatisfaction with the general election in Chisinau. In his turn, the External Affairs Ministry asked Kremlin to refrain from appreciations and comments that might be understood as interference into the internal affairs of another state.

On 12th of June 2011, the American senator John McCain, on visit in Chisinau, stated that the position of the Russian troops stationed on the Transnistrian territory indicates a breaking of the international norms; he expressed hope that the near negotiations in Moscow were to bring some progress in the process of Russian retreat. In his turn, the Moldavian prime-minister Vlad Filat mentioned that Washington plays an important part in identifying a solution for this problem. During the visit to Chisinau, the American senator John McCain was supposed to meet the communist leader Vladimir Voronin, but the last refused the meeting, saying that „... Mister John McCain's visit to our country during the election campaign is, for sure, interference into Moldavia's internal affairs, in the democratic process of expressing political options”¹⁸.

The „5+2” negotiations model for the setting of the Transnistrian conflict held in Moscow, on 21st of June 2011 failed, because of the rigidity of the Tiraspol delegation. Therefore, the participants decided to suspend the round of negotiations at Moscow in order to get additional consultation and return for further talks in the Russian capital in a short while. Within this context, the Moldavian Delegation stated the fact that main objective of the negotiations was „... to establish the special juridical status of The Transnistrian region, with respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of The Republic of Moldavia, within the internationally established borders.”¹⁹.

On June the 27th 2011, Moscow changed its position towards Transnistria, sending the message that Igor Smirnov's time as a separatist leader in Tiraspol was over. So began the movement for his removal, the „Graffiti War” being one of the most recent methods used. At the same time, the Russian mass-media said that Moscow wanted to change the leader in Tiraspol to whom they had promised protection in return for his retreat from the presidential campaign, at the end of 2011. The idea that in order to begin again the „5+2” negotiations it was necessary to change the leader in Tiraspol took form. The presidential elections in Tiraspol at the end of 2011 were to fulfil Moscow's desire, for the separatist leader Igor Smirnov was replaced with Evgheni Șevciuk, a friend of Kremlin.

On 5th of July 2011 appeared the first signal that the „5+2” negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol could be resumed. The Chief of the ECSO in The Republic of Moldavia, Philip Remler, said at that time, that Chisinau and Tiraspol have great chances with the resume of the „5+2” negotiations for the solving of the Transnistrian conflict; he said he was convinced that the two states were to solve all their problems by negotiations. In return, the Transnistrian leader of the time, Igor Smirnov, accused Chisinau to prevent negotiations. Chisinau preferred though to put again pressure on Transnistria, rather than talk with Tiraspol, the chief of Moldavian diplomacy, Iurie Leancă, stating in Bucharest that „... Tiraspol must understand that outside Transnistria there is a different way of thinking, there are another realities.” And that „...there are means and possibilities to make it change its point of view”²⁰. According to Leancă, „... such principles as the sovereignty of Moldavia, its territorial integrity and European perspectives are red lines that cannot

¹⁸ Cf. *Unimedia* portal - <http://unimedia.md/?mod=news&id=35024>.

¹⁹ Cf. *Hotnews* portal - <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-8990257-negocierile-moscova-prinvind-transnistriaesuat.htm>.

²⁰ Cf. *Hotnews* portal - <http://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-8990257-negocierile-moscova-prinvind-transnistriaesuat.htm>

be overstepped and that negotiations for the solving of the conflict with Transnistria should begin without any preliminary conditions”²¹.

After this signal for the negotiations resumption Berlin got again involved into the Transnistrian conflict, via the Russian-German dialog at Hannover, on 18th – 19th of July 2011, thus being created the so-called Transnistrian variable.²²

During the above mentioned period of time, Hannover was hosting the 13th round of German-Russian bilateral consultations at governmental level, during which a lot of political, economic and security issues were discussed, including the solutions for the Transnistrian conflict. We consider important to mention that starting June 2010-the signing of The Meseberg Memorandum by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the Russian President of the time, Dmitrii Medvedev, the conflict got on top of most political agendas of both state and non-state actors, involved into the negotiations process.

On the other hand, though the parties involved into negotiations were interested in finding a compromise to solve the conflict, the talks were getting more and more difficult and the political pressure was increasing. We consider that all these might have been due to the close line of political events in Moscow (elections for the State Duma on third of December 2011 and presidential elections on 4th of March 2012), and Chisinau (anticipated legislative elections in Moldavia) and Tiraspol (presidential elections in the self-called Transnistrian Republic at the end of 2011). All these demanded for stronger positions in regard to the modality of reaching a solution.

On 19th of July 2011, there were indications that Washington was for the federalisation of The Republic of Moldavia. By the voice of their ambassador in Chisinau, Asif Chaudhry, Washington Administration underlined that „... solving the Transnistrian conflict by creating and implementing a federalisation project for the country cannot compromise the process by which Moldavia gets closer to The EU”²³. The American diplomat also mentioned the necessity to observe two principles in the process of an eventual federalisation: respecting the territorial integrity and the state’s sovereignty, the rest depending on the will of the people.

On 20th of July 2011, at the meeting with the chief of the EU Delegation in Moldavia, Dirk Shuebel, the separatist Transnistrian leader, Igor Smirnov, said that there were no conditions for „5+2” negotiations, while The EU, by Dirk Shuebel’s voice, said that „... The European Union is interested in 5+2” negotiations”, hoping that „... the talks will get an official character after consultations in Moscow”, set for September 2011²⁴.

On 4th of August 2011, Moscow announced to support the official „5+2” negotiations²⁵. After a meeting at Chisinau between the Moldavian Vice-President Eugen Carpov and a representative of The Russian Federation, Serghei Gubarev, the status of the talks and the perspectives in this respect were discussed. The parties discussed their views upon the latest events, especially the actions that were to be taken, to prepare the second round of talks at Moscow, in September 2011. The Russian representative said that Kremlin was interested to resume the „5+2” official negotiations.

After a break of six years, despite all the efforts made by all actors involved into this matter “the 5+2” negotiations were resumed at the end of 2011, at the Estonian capital city Vilnius, where took place a first round of negotiations in between 30th of November – 1st of

²¹ *România Liberă* portal - <http://www.romanialibera.ro/actualitate/europa/seful-osce-in-r-moldova-negocieriledintre-chisinau-si-transnistria-in-format-5-2-ar-putea-fi-reluate-230271.html>

²² According to Angela Grămadă, *Variabila transnistreană a dialogului ruso-german de la Hannover*, The East-European and Asian Study Center (EEASC), <http://www.cseea.ro/publicatii/view/brief-analysis/variabila-transnistreana-a-dialogului-ruso-german-de-la-hanovra>

²³ Cf. *Politcom Portal* - <http://politcom.moldova.org/news/sua-tinde-spre-federalizarea-republicii-moldova-223051-rom.html>.

²⁴ Cf. *Noi Portal* - http://www.noi.md/md/news_id/4532/news_cat/60.

²⁵ Cf. *Moldova Suverană Portal* - <http://ns1.moldova-suverana.md.moldova-suverana.md/politic/3258-rusiasustine-reluarea-negocierilor-oficiale-in-format-q52q-.html>.

December. This meeting meant, at least formally, the debut of a new, superior stage of the talks being considered that the resumption of the „5+2” negotiations was to cause the involvement of all actors into gaining a real outcome. The next talks after Vilnius took place in February 2012 at the Irish capital Dublin (28 – 29 February), but with no results.

The first success came in March 2012 with the resuming of the railway bonds between Moldavia and Transnistria, by means of which the Government from Chisinau hoped to improve the ways of transportation back and forth the port of Odessa.

It is important to mention that the greatest transformations were at the political level. The election of Nicolae Timofti, on March 2012, as President of Moldavia, stopped long internal crises. In December 2011, a change happened at Tiraspol: Igor Smirnov (leading Transnistria for 20 years) lost presidential elections to Evgheni Şevciuk. These two changes were seen by the leaders at Berlin as „very promising”, the German part hoping that „... there will be progress between Moldavia and Transnistria in areas such as humanitarian aid, connecting transportation networks, and economic and social cooperation.”²⁶

There were some progresses from Meseberg in 2010 due to Merkel – Medvedev initiative. The involvement of Berlin and of the German diplomacy strengthened the solving of the Transnistrian conflict. For this, the German diplomacy organised some informal secret meetings in Germany, between important representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol. Berlin, of course, took advantage and tried to impose their point of view at these meetings. Such a meeting took place between 20 – 22 of June 2012, at Rottach-Egern, in Bavaria (South of Germany), the second such meeting in a year’s time, after the one in September 2011, where the officials from the respective countries met at Bad Reichenhall (South of Germany, in Bavaria). It is to say that, after a break of six years, the „5+2” negotiations were revived and The USA and The EU tried, as observers, to support and impulse the negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.

After the Rottach-Egern meeting there was third round of „5+2” negotiations between 12-13 July 2012, at the Austrian Capital of Vienna, to solve the Transnistrian conflict²⁷; the talks took place at the Ministry for External Affairs in Austria and were led by the ambassador Erwan Fouere, Special Representative for the solving of the Transnistrian conflict from The Irish President of The ESCO. The talk’s actors saluted the progress made by Chisinau and Tiraspol in increasing mutual trust and for the revival of the sectorial working groups, as well as for the positive effect of the revival of the transportation cooperation and for the degree of communication between Chisinau and Tiraspol at different levels.

On the reunion’s agenda there were topics such as the social and economic problems from both sides of The River Nistru: free circulation of people and goods, transportation in the region, the development of infrastructure, along with the validation of studies and the solving of the problems of the Latin schools in the Transnistrian region. During this round of talks in Vienna they also agreed upon the procedural means for the results of the „5+2” negotiations, especially the registering of the agreements from the round on 18th of April 2012, about the principles and procedures of the talks, for which a protocol with judicial value was created after the meeting in Vienna, 17-18 of April 2012(the classified catalogue for principles and the general agenda of the talks). We consider important to mention the fact that at this round of talks in Vienna, Tiraspol was accepted as equal part at the talks; important is also the fact that this happened in the same day the Special Russian Representative of the Russian President for Transnistria, Dmitri Rogozin, threatened Chisinau, „... if Tiraspol will not be an equal part at negotiations, The Moldavian Government will have to pay back Transnistria’s debt of 3 billiards dollars to the Russian concern Gazprom”²⁸.

²⁶ Interview with Manfred Grund, Christian-democrat deputy in Bundestag (German Parliament) and president of The German-Moldavian Forum, valid on Deutsche Welle – <http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,16038887,00.html>.

²⁷ The official web page of The Govern of The republic of Moldavians - <http://www.gov.md/libview.php?l=ro&id=5292&idc=606>.

²⁸ *Deutsche Welle* - <http://www.ziare.com/articole/negocieri+transnistria>.

At the conference after the Vienna talks, the Moldavian Vice-Premier for reintegration, Eugen Carpov, declared the talks a success, mentioning that the equality principle refers to all parties involved in talks. Regarding this topic, Carpov said that „... it is not about the status during the negotiations, but about the rights which are the same for all. These rights include the freedom to bring talk's topics and bringing initiatives to regulate the Transnistrian conflict”²⁹.

Another important aspect underlined by Carpov after Vienna, is that „... the federalisation is not a part of the 5+2 negotiations, this concept being never approached during talks”³⁰. During the talks between Eugen Carpov and the Ministry for the External Affairs, Nina Ștanski, there were discussions about the railway transportation through Transnistria and the validation of studies, but to no result. The two parties agreed to work upon the free circulation on the River Nistru³¹, for which they intend to obtain foreign funding. The next round of „5+2” negotiations was set for 2012, during 12-13 of September, also in Vienna, at The Austrian Ministry of External Affairs, presided also by Erwan Fouere. The participants discussed the latest progresses in the solving of the Transnistrian conflict and welcomed the idea of taking further steps into this matter; on account of the mutual trust prove the sector work groups and the dialogue between the political representatives from Chisinau and Tiraspol. The main topic was education, especially Latin schools and the validation of studies, but also movement freedom and the reopening of the bridge at Gura Bâcului. In the end there was scheduled a final round of „5+2” negotiations for 2012 at the end of November, at Dublin, in Ireland.

This last round of talks took part as scheduled, on 28th–29th of November 2012, and dealt with the perspectives of the cooperation between Chisinau and Tiraspol in banking, telecommunications and Transnistrian exports. The Dublin agenda didn't deal with the changing of the formula for the peace keeping process on the left of Nistru because Moscow and Tiraspol objected to that, despite the fact that at the beginning of 2012, a young Moldavian boy got killed at a Russian peace keeping post near Vadul lui Vodă. The meeting in Ireland had in the background a cooling of the relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, due to their divergent opinions in the problem of peace keeping in the area. Tiraspol demanded for more Russian troops in the area, while Chisinau wanted the turning of the mission into a civilian one. Other tensions appeared in October 2012 when the Moldavian Defence Ministry, Vitalie Marinuță, announced that Moscow delivered armament and trucks into the region. In response, Kremlin stated that the military technique was deployed in the region by mistake.

Yet, Chisinau was taken by surprise by announce made by the Transnistrian leader of the separatist regime in Tiraspol, Evgheni Șevciuk, that Moldavian businesses in Transnistria were to be overtaxed. There was no consensus in the problem of the car plates for the cars on the left of the River Nistru; Tiraspol rejected the model suggested by Chisinau and EUBAM. Furthermore, on the 1st of November 2012, the TV station Publika TV was stopped to broadcast on the left side of the River Nistru, on account that two Transnistrian TV posts were prevented from broadcasting in Moldavia. These led to the annulment of a meeting scheduled for 23rd of November 2012 between the Moldavian vice-premier, Eugen Carpov, and the Transnistrian representative, Nina Ștanski. At the end of the reunion in Dublin a new round of „5+2” negotiations was scheduled for 2013, a year during which Ukraine was to led ESCO, being a member of this format as a guarantee.

At the 2013 round of talks there were some tough responses between the negotiators. The Vice-premier Eugen Carpov said that the situation between the two shores was getting better, Nina Ștanski contradict him. As a matter of fact the negotiators had divergent opinions on many topics, as UNIMEDIA mentioned on 25th of April.

In reality, starting the 28th of April 2013, Moldavian citizens were allowed to travel into Schengen without visas, which was a success of Moldavian authorities. This gave an impulse to

²⁹ *Deutsche Welle* - <http://www.ziare.com/international/transnistria/deutsche-welle-tiraspolul-parte-egalanegocieri-1162595>.

³⁰ *Europalibera.org* - <http://www.timpul.md/articol/transnistria-devine-parte-egala-la-negocieri-dar-fara-statutjuridic-33225.html>.

³¹ The Gura Bâcului Bridge.

reforms in many domains, such as the protection of personal data, reforms concerning the internal affairs, justice and social reforms. The Transnistrian citizens got more interested in Moldavia. Although there were no important steps forward in the „5+2” negotiations, maintaining the status quo helped avoiding the escalation of the problems and the continuation of the dialogue. After a year in power, the Govern understood the necessity to rethink the security frame for Moldavia, a hot issue after the events in Ukraine.

The strengthening of the relations with the EU kept on being the main element of the Moldavian external affairs; a series of important steps were taken in getting closer to the EU. The closing of The Associative Agreement and its initialling at The Summit for The Eastern Partnership in Vilnius brought Moldavia a legal frame, according to the communitarian aquis.

Russia tried to give Transnistria military support but Ukraine stated in August 2013 that would not allowed for more than financial help. Also, Ukraine was to agree to any goods transported to Transnistria. "We will open the border for Russian goods only if Moscow and Chisinau will concur on this "said Andrei Descita.

In the bloom of the Ukrainian crises there was the 2014 round of „5+2" negotiations, on 5th-6th of June 2014, in Vienna, under the aegis of the Swiss and Serbian presidency of the ECSO. The negotiations were moderated by the special representative of the ECSO, the ambassador Radojko Bogojevic. The Moldavian delegation was led by the Ministry for the Reintegration Eugen Carpov. The participants discussed upon the freedom of movement for both people and railway transportation on both sides of the River Nistru, the opening of the bridge at Gura-Bîcului and Bîcioc, economical aspects involving interactions between the two parties for free trade with the EU and others.

The political representative of Tiraspol mentioned the so-called „economical blockage" of the Transnistrian region, but in response, the Moldavians brought conclusive statistical data proving the positive dynamics of the import-export activities made by the companies in the region, that beneficiated from the facilities granted to Moldavia by the international partners. Most participants agreed on this aspect and underlined the importance of increasing the economical interaction between the two parties. The Moldavian delegation suggested a unique economical space to bring the two closer to one another. It was mentioned that most of the problems in the region appeared as the result of not solving the Transnistrian conflict. All participants had access to pertinent information regarding the problems in granting access to people in Dubăsari area to the farming terrains on the Râbnița – Tiraspol line. The representatives from Tiraspol were asked to grant farmers' access to the lands by not taking any more unilateral decisions that affected people so much. Moldavia's intention of financial compensation for the farmers was confirmed.

There were discussed the problems met by the Latin schools on the Transnistrian territory. Moldavia introduced the latest progress in this respect, underlining there was pressure still on these schools. Eugen Carpov underlined the necessity of good conditions for the activity of the schools, including no more unilateral actions to endanger their existence. Schools remain an important issue on these negotiation's' agenda. There were talks for the validation of the educational documents issued by Tiraspol; the sectorial work groups for education were to continue the talks, helped by international specialists.

Another issue discussed was the progress in the problem of dismantling of the funicular between Rîbnița and Rezina, which involved all parties.

All these issues were to be reanalysed again at The Conference dedicated to promoting measures to strengthen mutual trust- in Freising, Germany, on 10th-11th of June, with the participation of the representatives from the sectorial work groups from Chisinau and Tiraspol.

At the end of June 2014, Russia demanded for the delay of the talks set by the special representative of ECSO, Radojko Bogojevici, for 17th -18th of July, to September. The delay was due to the fact that Moldavia, Ukraine and Georgia, former Soviet countries, signed on 26th of August agreement to associate with The EU, a fact that irritated Russia which failed in maintaining the three states within its influence.

Even so, we appreciate that from the resuming of negotiations, in 2011 the actors of the „5+2” negotiations model as well as Germany-though not a full member- had a major contribution to the progress of the talks.

The present crises in Ukraine indicates three problems that would not be solved by shouting slogans about democracy, „a European choice”, or the Eurasian „dream” of Vladimir Putin.

Whatever the result of the Ukrainian conflict - the victory of Putin’s Russia/ democratic forces, or the breaking of the country as result of an internal conflict - it will affect Moldavia. We don’t know the impact, because the Ukrainian conflict is far from end³². So far, any of the forces involved - the pro-Russia conservators or the opposition -could win.

The Russian elite agree that Ukraine should be broken³³. Russia should take the Eastern part (the coal resources) and South (Crimea being the big pot), and the Occident should take the West, with the nationalists and the Greek-catholics.³⁴

The bilateral relation with Russia is now troublesome, the main sensitive topics regarding Kiev’s intention to integrate into Europe, its refuse to be a part in the integrationists structures of the ex-soviet space, Ukraine’s desire to renegotiate energetical contracts and the will to obtain some guarantees for the gas quantity to transit Ukraine to Europe³⁵ for which Kiev refused the fusion between „Naftogaz” and „Gazprom” as well as the delineation of the maritime border in the Azov Sea and The Kerch Strait.

Kremlin’s views within the context of the Ukrainian crises suggest that no matter the course of events in Ukraine, Moscow will take the specific measures it wants, to protect its citizens, as they showed in Crimea and in order to counter/annihilate the attempts to diminish Russia’s interests in the region.

Russia’s specific actions are part of a larger strategy: restoring and maintaining its influence in Ukraine and avoiding Ukraine’s becoming an EU state or a NATO member. Ukraine’s federalisation would be to Russia’s benefit, for this would prevent it to join NATO. The Russian decisional factors discuss federalisation and a great degree of autonomy, including in terms of budget and international affairs. Such a scheme would allow for the East of Ukraine to adhere to The Customs Union/Eurasian Economical Union while the West maintains closer economic relations with The EU. At the same time, Ukraine’s strategic geographical position and the human and economic potential are of great value to Russia, challenging the viability of the Eurasian Union.³⁶

As for Ukraine’s East and South the Russian Federation will support all elements rejecting a political force in favour of the Occident. Russia’s efforts to mobilize the opposition in these parts of Ukraine will depend mainly on the level of tolerance and the policy promoted by the new authorities in Kiev. On the medium and long term, Russia bets on Ukraine’s economic dependence upon Moscow and on the Russian influence in most of the regions to diminish the interest for the European vector.³⁷

Poland, the neighbour from West, has some interest in Ukraine’s separations, in order to have a catholic neighbour, a fact that would help bilateral relations. It definitely isn’t interested in a separation that might, by accident, would bring it too close to The Russian Federation. The Polish Prime-Minister, Donald Tusk, made a lobby asking other European Capitals to prepare a package of assistance for Ukraine.

³² Nicu Popescu, expert of The EU Security Studies Institute in Paris. See Flavius Cristian Marceau , “Democratization in the former Communist State: imposition or necessity?”, in Research and Science Today 1(7)/2014, March 2014, 81-85,

³³ Pavel Felgenhauer, journalist at Novaya Gazeta

³⁴ Even the former soviet leader Mihail Gorbaciov has recently warned in an interview about the danger of breaking Ukraine and of the fact that, should Russia see this as the only solution, than it would be taken under consideration According to Felgenhauer, the Moscow’s elite profoundly despises the ex-president Viktor Ianukovici and his hunger for power and wealth and his depending upon the richest people.

³⁵ The Russian Federation promotes The South Stream project.

³⁶ An entity to ensure Russia’s supremacy within the entire space of the former Soviet Union, the historical base of its geo-political importance.

³⁷ See Emilia Andreea Duță, 'The Romanian struggle for detente inside of Warsaw Treaty (1966-1991)', *Studia Securitatis*, nr.1/April 2014, 160-171.

REFERENCES

1. **George RICHARDS**, The way in which Ukrainian opposition deceives people's expectations, an article in Eurasia Review, 21.01.2014
2. **DUȚĂ Emilia Andreea**, 'The Romanian struggle for detente inside of Warsaw Treaty (1966-1991)', *Studia Securitatis*, nr.1/April 2014, pp.160-171.
3. **Flavius Cristian MARCAU** , "Democratization in the former communist state: imposition or necessity?" , in Research and Science Today 1(7)/2014, March 2014, 81-85,
4. **THE NATIONAL INTEREST**, January – May Collection, 2014
5. **STRATFOR**, November 2013 – May Collection 2014
6. **THE WASHINGTON POST**, April – May Collection 2014
7. **CARNEGIE EUROPE**, Articles on the 11th and 17th of April 2014
8. **THE WALL STREET JOURNAL**, April Collection 2014
9. **RIA NOVOSTI**, Article on 15th of April 2014
10. **THE LOS ANGELES TIMES**, Article on 12th of May 2014