THE NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY- FROM CONSENSUS TO ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE
Corresponding author:
[email protected]
Accepted
27 March 2026
Available Online
15 November 2015
Abstract
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE CRUCIAL, SCAFFOLDING TOOLS BUILT ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NPT 2 ESSENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY. "A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS", PROPOSED BY THE OBAMA ADMINISTRA TION'S GOAL FOR A LONG HORIZON AND SERIOUS UNCERTAINTY, EACH STEP REQUIRED BY THE TREATY TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS. THE MAIN OBSTACLE IS THE AMBIGUOUS ATTITUDE TO THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, TO THE NEED FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. A SIGNAL BOOST FOR THE INSPECTION SYSTEM, EXPORT CONTROLS, STRONG ATTITUDE AGAINST VIOLATING INTERNATIONAL REGIME. INCREASING THE NUMBER OF REACTORS WILL BRING AN INCREASE OF NUCLEAR
Keywords
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
INTERNATIONAL
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