CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE NON-PROLIFERATION CHECKING MECHANISM
Accepted
26 March 2026
Available Online
15 March 2014
Abstract
THE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS SEEN FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT IS COMPLEX; THE FUNDAMENTAL THESIS OF A POTENTIAL CONFLICT SUSTAINING THAT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION SHOULD DISCOURAGE OTHER STATES” AGGRESIVITY WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, PREVENTING NUCLEAR STATES F ROM BECOMING MORE AGGRESSIVE. THE PROLIFERATION SPIRAL RAISES THE OBVIOUS PROBLEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY CAUSED BY THE RECONFIGURATION OF THE BALANCE OF POWER DUE TO NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES THAT ALSO LEADS TO A SYSTEMIC RECONFIGURATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ARCHITECTURE. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION IS TRIBUTARY TO A VERY LARGE PALETTE OF OPINIONS ORIGINATING IN BOTH POSSESSING AND NON -POSSESSING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SOME STATES APPROACH THE ISSUE CONSIDERING THEIR NATIONAL INTERES TS – ESPECIALLY THE NON-NUCLEAR ONES, CONSIDERING THAT NPT HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT TOWARDS THEIR INTERESTS DUE TO ITS CONSEQUENCES.
Keywords
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
NON-PROLIFERATION
NATIONAL INTERESTS
NON -
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